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Abstract  
 
The Financialization of a Cure: A Political Economy of Biomedical Innovation, 
Pricing, and Public Health 
 
Victor Roy  
 
Sofosbuvir-based medicines, approved in late 2013, offer a long-sought after cure for 
patients with hepatitis C, a virus that disproportionately affects marginalized populations 
around the world. But the prices set by its manufacturer at approximately $90,000 for a three-
month regimen intensified a global debate about the pricing of breakthrough medicines. The 
dominant economic explanations for pricing have centered on ‘risk’, with prices representing the 
costly and failure-ridden process of drug development, and ‘value’, with higher prices said to 
reflect improvements in patient health as well as savings from averted downstream medical 
expenses. These economic explanations are limited, however, by their focus on prices at the 
point of exchange between drug manufacturers and public health systems. 
Instead, I took a historical view, using the case of sofosbuvir to trace the political-
economic dynamics and organizational relations of power across the innovation process – from 
early stage science to deployment. Data from documentary sources, semi-structured interviews, 
databases, and observations at meetings allowed me to build an account of the sofosbuvir case. 
Combining this data with sociological and political economy literatures on the roles of an 
entrepreneurial state, the rise of financial capital, and the pricing and valuation strategies used 
by businesses, I argue that sofosbuvir’s prices did not represent the tangible costs of innovation 
or the health value for patients. Rather, the prices were a product of financialization: a pattern of 
accumulation in which growth was pursued through the capitalization and control of intangible 
hepatitis C assets in financial markets. As part of this pattern, I map the mobilization of 
speculative capitals behind Pharmasset, a small biotechnology company that emerged from 
public investments to develop the compound sofosbuvir, as well as the extractive logics driving 
the shareholders of Gilead Sciences, a large publicly traded pharmaceutical company that 
ultimately acquired Pharmasset and then set the prices for the therapy.   
I demonstrate that though an entrepreneurial state shaped the direction of the 
innovation process towards a curative therapy, the processes of financialization disconnected 
the distribution of risks and rewards, undermined the sustainability of future innovation, and 
diminished patient and public health outcomes. I conclude by responding to dominant 
economic answers on drug pricing in light of the evidence on financialization. 
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Timelines of Milestones 
The first timeline follows broader scientific advances and policy changes relevant to the sofosbuvir case, with more specific 
timelines on Pharmasset and Gilead, the two businesses involved in sofosbuvir’s development, covering clinical and business 
milestones for each. 
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Introduction 
 
Since their launch in December of 2013, sofosbuvir-based medicines1 have marked a 
critical breakthrough for patients with hepatitis C infection, offering a cure by eliminating the 
virus in more than 9o% for the patients that take them (Lawitz et al. 2013; Pollack 2013). The 
virus is a leading infectious killer around the world, disproportionately affecting vulnerable 
groups such as people who inject drugs, incarcerated populations, and those co-infected with 
HIV/AIDS (He et al. 2016; Hoofnagle and Sherker 2014; Rosen 2011a). Yet Gilead’s launch price 
– at approximately $90,000 per three-month treatment course in the US and ‘discounted’ in 
other countries – has challenged health system budgets, led to restrictions in treatment 
access, and ignited a global debate about the pricing of breakthrough medicines (Brennan and 
Shrank 2014; Walker 2015; Ward and Mermin 2015).  
The dominant economic explanations for pricing have centered on ‘risk’, with prices 
representing the costly and failure-ridden process of drug development, and ‘value’, with 
higher prices said to reflect improvements in patient health as well as savings from averted 
downstream medical expenses (Chahal et al. 2016; DiMasi et al 2003; Tice et al. 2015).2 
Critiques of these two rationales have focused on the methodological limits of each while also 
pointing to the power of an oligopoly-oriented pharmaceutical industry in co-opting the 
countervailing regulatory function of the state (Light and Warburton 2011; Reinhardt 2015). 
For reasons I elaborate in chapter 1, the case of hepatitis C suggests that such analyzes – both 
the economics rationales as well as their critiques - have limitations in explaining the prices of 
sofosbuvir.  
These economic rationales, as well as the critiques aimed at them, focus on drug prices 
at the point of exchange between drug manufacturers and governments (via public health 
systems). Rather than attend to drug prices at a single point of exchange or as an outcome of a 
single state-business relationship, my dissertation takes a different vantage. I interrogate 
prices as products of political-economic mechanisms, and bring financial actors into the mix 
of state and business organizations typically examined. As I describe in chapter 2, I traced the 
case of sofosbuvir – central to contemporary debates on drug pricing – from early stage science 
to the deployment of the therapy. Informing my investigation were sociological and political 
																																																						
1 Sofosbuvir is the main backbone compound which I trace in this dissertation, and its branded name is 
Sovaldi. Sofosbuvir is used in combination with other secondary compounds to boost its cure rates, 
which is why I also use the term ‘sofosbuvir-based’ treatments at points in the dissertation.  
2 Often with the support of business interests, these rationales are underpinned by studies using 
approaches from industrial and health economics (Nik-Khah 2014; Reinhardt 2015; Van Nuys et al. 2015). 
I detail these approaches in Chapter 1.  
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economy literatures on the role of the state in innovation, the rise and influence of financial 
capital, and the control and valuation of assets by businesses (Birch 2016b; Gagnon 2016; 
Krippner 2005; Lazonick 2015; Mazzucato 2013b; Veblen 1908b). Using documentary sources 
(including some rarely available internal corporate documents), semi-structured interviews, 
databases, and observation at meetings, I built an account of the innovation process and 
pricing strategies behind sofosbuvir.  
With the evidence from this research, I make two central claims in my dissertation. 
First, I argue that the prices of sofosbuvir do not represent the tangible costs of innovation nor 
the embodied health experiences of patients. Rather they are a product of financialization, a 
pattern of accumulation in which growth was pursued through the capitalization3 and control 
of intangible assets in financial markets. I demonstrate that three interrelated sets of dynamics 
underpinned this pattern of accumulation: mobilization of speculative capitals, shareholder-
driven extraction, and governance of intangible assets and financial capital by a multi-valent 
state. My second claim is that though an entrepreneurial state shaped the direction of the 
innovation process towards a cure, the processes constituting financialization disconnected 
the distribution of risks and rewards, undermined the sustainability of future innovation, and 
diminished the patient and public health outcomes of the therapy. In my final chapter, I 
juxtapose the dominant economic rationales of risk and value with the collected evidence to 
illustrate a final point: these economic arguments, serving as justifications for drug prices, are 
also used to naturalize a given distribution of capital in the innovation process.  
In contrast, my research shows that drug pricing in the case of sofosbuvir was 
determined by multiple mechanisms and relations of power that was neither natural nor 
given, but rather politically and historically contingent. The U.S. state, for example, through 
the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, created the rules by which public science could be converted into 
private, intangible assets that later became the object of financial speculation. Businesses 
began to distribute capital to shareholders, rather than reinvest in research and development, 
due to shifting patterns in corporate governance in the late 20th century. By contrast, 
explanations that pursue a single culprit or that obscure history can fail to advance current 
drug pricing debates. For example, in the summer of 2014, the US Senate launched an 
																																																						
3 Most generally, capitalization represents the present value of a future stream of earnings (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2009). I use the concept of capitalization in this dissertation to show how capitalists value assets 
not for their present productivity (in terms of profits, for example), but for the future accumulation that 
control over an asset may bring (for venture capitalists, shareholders, businesses). I suggest that 
studying the valuation of intangible assets through capitalization is part of illuminating the production 
of prices for new medicines. I elaborate on capitalization further in chapter 1 before tracing it in the 
empirical case.  
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investigation into Gilead’s pricing that drew on interviews with senior leadership and over 
20,000 pages of internal corporate documents (from emails to board presentations and 
meeting minutes) detailing the company’s strategies (Loftus 2015). At the end of 18 months of 
bipartisan scrutiny (a rare occurrence in Washington, D.C. these days), the headline of the US 
Senate Finance Committee’s final report flashed across their website: “Wyden-Grassley Sovaldi 
Investigation Finds Revenue-Driven Pricing Strategy Behind Hepatitis Drug” (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015).4 The headline fell flat not because the charge made by 
the committee was not true, but because of how little it (and their 120-page analysis) 
explained, even with access to a wide array of evidence. 
Implicit in this headline, and in critiques made by others, is a sense that business 
interests are embedded in a social world where other priorities, not just maximizing revenues, 
should have been considered (Reinhardt 2015). The failure to deliver on the promise of a new 
biomedical innovation – such as a curative therapy – can be morally troubling because life 
itself is at stake. In 2014, hepatitis C came in as the leading infectious killer in the US, causing 
more deaths than all other infectious diseases combined, including HIV (Centers for Disease 
Control 2016a). As a sociologist also training to be a doctor, I am motivated by the ideal of care 
in biomedicine that underlines the potential – and moral obligation – to use medicine to 
remedy biological pathologies in a way that may also help restore dignity. Patients with 
hepatitis C offer testimony to this ideal of care, as they seek treatment as a pathway to both 
health and freedom from the stigma that so often accompanies their infection (Harris 2009).  
Though this ideal reminds us of the underlying motivation for seeking better 
explanations, the ideal alone is insufficient for finding these answers. Sociological analysis can 
help ask the right questions, understand the way things are, and how they have unfolded. This 
insight can then be used to map out the range of fixes that might be necessary for a durable 
shift towards ‘care’ that we desire. My hope is that by opening such a space of inquiry through 
this dissertation, I can contribute towards a much larger effort already underway: to locate the 
mechanisms, the relations of power, and ultimately the potential sites of intervention in 
biomedical innovation that can explain and help us address a stark set of challenges.   
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
4 Sovaldi is the brand name of sofosbuvir.  
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Plan for the dissertation  
 
This dissertation unfolds in six chapters.5 The first chapter details the dominant 
explanations for drug pricing, poses my two research questions aimed at overcoming the 
limitations posed by these explanations, and builds an analytical toolkit from sociology and 
political economy that accompany me in my investigation. The second chapter maps the 
research design of a single case study and methodology for data collection and analysis used to 
interrogate the innovation process and pricing behind sofosbuvir. 
Chapters three through five are the three empirical chapters of the dissertation, 
chronicling the early stage science all the way into the deployment of the medicines in health 
systems. In chapter three, I detail the emergence of an entrepreneurial US state in providing 
the patient capital to unveil the virus as a cause of public health concern and develop the 
technologies necessary to finding its antidote. This chapter introduces the founding of 
Pharmasset, the small biotechnology company that emerged from a publicly funded lab to 
ultimately develop the sofosbuvir compound. In chapter four, I document the mobilization of 
speculative capitals behind Pharmasset as well as the rise of shareholders in shaping the 
strategies of large, established companies like Gilead Sciences. In tracking the development of 
sofosbuvir across these two companies, I illustrate the function of drug prices along a chain of 
speculative capital, and map the relations of power at stake between state, business and 
financial actors. In chapter five, I trace the deployment phase of the innovation process, from 
Gilead’s pricing approach, to the response from the ‘health delivery state’, and onwards into 
financial markets that reproduce the dynamics of financialization.  
The final chapter uses the findings across these three empirical chapters to synthesize 
an account of financialization that explain sofosbuvir’s prices. I then recount the implications 
of financialization for the outcomes of the innovation process, including impacts on patient 
and public health. With this analysis, I return to the economic logics of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ used 
in drug pricing debates to underscore their explanatory limitations considering the evidence I 
collected. I also suggest, however, that these two logics play a pivotal function in the 
innovation process by providing justifications aimed at both legitimating drug prices as well as 
conserving a given distribution of capital. The chapter concludes with a documentation of the 
contributions and limitations of the study, as well as potential research projects that my 
findings may provoke.   
																																																						
5 I have provided a timeline and cast of key organizations before the table of contents. You will also find 
a glossary of terms after the main text, as well as appendices with further information that elaborate on 
my sources of data.  
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In a brief conclusion, I reflect on the findings of the dissertation within a wider 
historical context of biomedical innovation, ending by considering what the future may hold. 
With this background for the plan of the dissertation, I now present the economic debates 
over the prices of new medicines and my alternative search for explanations.  
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Chapter 1. Searching for Answers on the Prices of New Medicines 
 
To understand the state of the socially constructed universe at any given time, or its change over 
time, one must understand the social organization that permits the definers to do their defining.  
Put a little crudely, it is essential to keep pushing questions about the historically available 
conceptualizations of reality from the abstract “What?” to the socially concrete “Says who”?  
- Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (1966)  
 
Over the past three years, inquiry into the sofosbuvir case has been part of a renewed 
search for answers on prices of breakthrough medicines from across civil society, academia, 
businesses, and governments. In this chapter, I first map out the prevailing economic answers on 
drug pricing – focused on ‘risk’ and ‘value’ - and illustrate how they have confounded 
comprehension into the social mechanisms that produce these pricing outcomes (section 1.1). I 
also illustrate the limits of focusing on the power of pharmaceutical monopolies in fully 
explaining the prices of new medicines. Taking up Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) exhortation, I 
then posit my first descriptive research question (section 1.2) in the pursuit of overcoming the 
limits of prevailing economic answers on drug pricing.  
Next, I trace the three analytical possibilities from sociology and political economy that 
accompanied me as I investigated the mechanisms behind the prices of sofosbuvir (section 1.3). 
This scholarship pointed me towards dissecting relations of power at stake between multivalent6 
state, business, and financial actors in the innovation process. Upon reviewing these bodies of 
literature, I revisit my research inquiry and pose a second question, which aims to complement 
the initial descriptive question with an inquiry that seeks to critically evaluate the outcomes of the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir (section 1.4). Finally, I end the chapter by providing a brief 
primer into the clinical, public health, and drug development features of hepatitis C, thereby 
enabling an informed entry into complex political-economic and scientific terrains (section 1.5). 
																																																						
6 By multivalent, I hold each of these set of actors to be composed of multiple organizations and actors with 
differentiated interests and involved in varied relations of power with other actors. For example, within the 
‘state’, I examine public sector organizations that fund innovation but also regulatory organs and health 
delivery systems that are involved with biomedical innovation; within ‘business’ I investigate small 
biotechnology companies versus larger, established companies; within ‘finance’, I look at different forms of 
financial capitalists, from venture capital to institutional shareholders. I elaborate on this perspective in my 
research design and methodology chapter (chapter two).  
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1.1 Risk and Value: The Dominant Economic Answers on Drug Pricing and 
Biomedical Innovation 
 The dominant economic answers for the price of new medicines center on two logics, both 
of which are inextricably linked to the patent-protected model of biomedical innovation. The first 
is the ‘risk’ logic, in which patent protected pricing power is presented as necessary to fund costly 
and failure-ridden research and development (DiMasi et al. 2016). The second is the ‘value’ logic, 
in which higher prices reflect improved patient health outcomes and averted downstream medical 
expenses (Gregson et al. 2005). These rationales are buttressed through studies from industrial 
and health economics and also constitute the primary discourse in which policy debates over drug 
development and pricing occur (DiMasi et al. 2016; Institute for Clinical and Review 2015). In the 
contested arena of drug pricing and development, critics challenge these justifications, 
responding to both logics with claims of methodological errors, evidentiary omission, as well as 
an interrogation of the deleterious influence of the monopoly power of pharmaceutical companies 
over the state.  
 In this section, I detail the justifications and evidence behind each economic logic and 
explicate the critiques of both. I also explore the political economy of the state-monopoly 
relationship, typically posed as a counter to economic answers on drug prices. I conclude, 
however, by arguing that the current debate – both defenses of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ as well as their 
critiques – fall short of understanding the wider social and political-economic dynamics behind 
the prices of new medicines.   
1.1.1 Risk and ‘risky R&D’  
 Before sharing the specifics of Gilead’s pricing strategy, the company’s COO John Milligan 
offered a general claim in October of 2014 to an audience of policy makers in Washington DC that 
would frame the rest of his remarks. “We do all of this at enormous risk,” Milligan asserted, 
thereby underlining the need for Gilead to receive a reward in exchange for bringing a new 
curative therapy to market (Brookings Institution, 2014). Milligan’s claim offers partial insight into 
the ‘risk’ logic used in prevailing accounts of drug development and pricing.  
 Manufacturers like Gilead Sciences price new medicines with the anticipation that there 
will be little or no competition due to publicly-granted patents over the intellectual property for a 
newly approved compound (Scherer 2001; 2004). This patent-centered configuration has long 
been argued by the pharmaceutical industry to be necessary to finance research and development 
into medicines (DiMasi et al. 2003; Harper 2010; Love 2014b).  From this vantage, patents are 
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understood to facilitate scientific development, in which inventions receive monopoly rights for a 
specific period of time (20 years from the time of the invention) only after which the public can 
gain full access (i.e. generic licensing) to the knowledge protected by the patent (Grabowski 
2002). As Biagioli (2006) has pointed out, patents technically govern a legal exchange between 
‘consumers’ and ‘investors’ of patent protected products, with these transactions conceptualized 
in the law as a ‘bargain’ or ‘fair exchange’: investors’ right to recuperate costs of research and 
development in exchange for customers’ access to the inventor’s product.  
 Under this model, the assumption is that patent-protected prices (and the resulting 
revenue) are paying for the costs of research development. The industry, funding and leaning on a 
series of economic studies since the early 1990s, has sought to demonstrate that costs of research 
and development are high and growing, thereby justifying their pricing strategies as a necessary 
vehicle for further innovation (PhRMA 2015). Most prominently, a group of economists at the 
Tufts Center for Drug Development has published models showing that the cost of developing a 
drug has increased from $231 million in 1991, to $802 million in 2003, and up to $2.6 billion in 2014 
(DiMasi et al. 1991; 2003; 2016). These numbers have been developed on the basis of what they 
argue are several inescapable features of drug development. One feature is the lengthy period 
over which investment must be made, with an average calculated to be 11 years to approve a new 
medicine in the DiMasi studies (DiMasi et al. 2016). A second is the high level of risk, with 
revenues from patent protected prices paying not only for successes but the thousands of 
compounds that fail to make it to approval (DiMasi et al. 2016). The third central feature is the 
industry’s ‘cost of capital’, or ‘opportunity cost’ of investment (estimated to be 10.5% in the 
DiMasi studies), as this capital could otherwise go to sectors with fewer risks and shorter product 
development cycles, such as information technology (Damodaran 2017; DiMasi et al. 2016) .  
 This knowledge has been used to posit a particular ‘cost-plus’ version of pricing, which we 
can formally represent here (Gregson et al. 2005):  
P = C + I, 
where C = cost of research and development7, and I = profit 
																																																						
7 Additional costs also include manufacturing and operations, though these are generally minimal for most 
therapeutics. For the purposes of demonstrating the point about risk, I present C as the cost of research and 
development in this equation.  
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Critiques of this ‘risk’ argument have typically focused on the methodological and evidentiary 
limits of these studies. These critiques demonstrate alternative methods that show the extent to 
which the industry ‘inflates’ their figures and point to the fact that the data in the Tufts studies 
are provided by the industry and shrouded from public scrutiny (Adams and Brantner 2006; Light 
and Warburton 2011; Love 2003; Pflumm 2011). For example, in analysing the 2004 Tufts study 
which reported a $802 million figure per drug developed, Light and Warburton (2011) used a 
different set of assumptions and data set to estimate a much lower figure of $180-$231 million per-
approved compound. Multiple studies have shown that companies spend much more money on 
marketing than research and development (Swanson 2015; Angell 2004; Gagnon and Lexchin 
2008). For example, a study by Gagnon and Lexchin (2008) calculated that the industry spent $58 
billion on promotional activities in 2004 alone, more than double their total research and 
development spending for the year.  
 Yet this debate suffers from more than just an inconsistent or non-transparent evidentiary 
base – the lack of a definition of risk or an account of how the organization of drug development 
has shifted, particularly in the last two decades, leaves these ‘risk’ findings open to multiple 
interpretations. First, in the Tufts studies, for example, all units of research and development 
dollars that are ‘risked’ are quantitatively treated the same in dollars; yet not all dollars spent on 
research and development are the same. Spending on minor improvements, or late-stage trials 
carry distinctly different technical ‘risks’ than investments in uncertain early-stage research 
(Pisano 2006). Indeed, it is not just the ‘amount’ spent on research and development, but how and 
when that also needs to be considered in any interpretations.   
 Second, this debate does not account for the shifting industrial structure in biotechnology 
and pharmaceuticals, assuming most compounds to be ‘self-originating’ within single firms 
(Avorn 2015). Yet over the past thirty years in which DiMasi’s studies have been at the center of 
the debate, the industry has shifted towards a structure in which many compounds travel through 
public-sector and small biotechnology companies while changing hands multiple times (Pisano 
2006). This debate has remained silent on the question of how to ‘count’ the costs of these 
transactions (i.e. acquisitions) and the contingent speculative dynamics of financial markets (i.e. 
‘asset bubbles’ and ‘gold rushes’ in particular therapeutic areas) in which drug development now 
occurs.  
 Finally, even with the ‘real data’ on drug development costs, these numbers would still 
leave significant space for interpretation about the meaning of the data and rationale for drug 
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prices. For example, the economist Dean Baker ‘flipped the script’ on the release of DiMasi’s $2.6 
billion estimate in 2014, using it to claim that the rising costs indicated an increasingly inefficient 
monopoly-based industry, thereby challenging the very justification for patents that the DiMasi 
studies aimed to legitimate (Baker 2014). Another study by a group of biotechnology investors 
into falling productivity – measured in terms of rising costs of research and development per drug 
approval – posited four distinct reasons for why this could be (Scannell et al. 2012).8 Any of their 
four interpretations of falling productivity would have different implications for drug prices. In 
sum, the analysis over whether prices reflect the costs of research and development leaves us with 
more questions than answers. What about the other main logic advanced in the dominant 
economic account of drug pricing?  
1.1.2 Value and ‘value-based pricing’  
 The second orientation towards drug pricing has centered on the notion that health 
system leaders want ‘value for money’, with value defined as better health outcomes as well as 
reduced downstream medical expenses from averting disease progression (the value of 
prevention). Higher prices, in this calculation, reflect the potential value of patient and public 
health improvements (Gregson et al. 2005). Because individuals cannot pay for this value – as the 
price of new medicines tend to be multiples above the median wages of individuals in most 
countries – this responsibility to value new medicines falls to health system leaders, who make 
determinations over how they can generate the most health improvement in their populations 
with the dollars they have (Iyengar et al. 2016; Reinhardt 2015). From the perspective of the 
manufacturer, pricing strategies should reflect the value to health systems via setting a ‘value-
based price’. As industry consultants Gregson et al (2005:121) puts it, “in contrast to historic 
approaches for which the company perspective was dominant and product prices tended to be on 
a ‘cost plus margin’ basis, pricing theory and practice now recognize that the needs and 
perspectives of the customers must be the starting point for pricing-strategy development.” In 
this reflection, Gregson points to the shift from the risk-dominant logic for pricing, and posits 
health systems as ‘customers’.  
																																																						
8 These four hypotheses by Scannell et al (2012) were 1) the notion that earlier drug development already 
took on the ‘low hanging fruit’, with newer efforts now taking on more challenging scientific and technical 
problems, thereby being more costly (they call it the ‘Better than the Beatles’ problem); 2) the ‘cautious 
regulator’ problem, in which a swing towards more regulation may be leading to higher hurdles for 
companies, 3) the possibility that managers waste money by ‘throwing money’ at R&D, and 4) an over-
reliance on technological high throughput screening methods for potential therapeutics (‘brute-force’ bias). 
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 The assessment of ‘value’ has been developed using a number of quantification 
approaches, with health systems and public health officials (the ‘customers’) using ‘cost-
effectiveness analysis’ (CEA) and manufacturers increasingly recruiting ‘pharmacoeconomics’ 
teams to build an evidence base for their pricing (Gregson et al. 2005; Maldonado Castañeda 
2016). These approaches typically attempt to quantify two ‘values’: the value of the new therapy in 
comparison to a reference product or treatment (such as existing standard of care) as well as the 
value of prevention (from averted downstream medical expenses).9  
 In the first valuation, the difference in the costs of the new therapy and the reference 
therapy are divided by the difference in the health improvements of the new versus reference 
therapies (Clement et al. 2009). While the ‘costs’ are typically the prices of a complete treatment 
regimen, the health improvements are quantified by using ‘quality-adjusted life year’ 
measurements (QALYs). Developed and used widely in health economics and public health, 
QALYs measure patients’ ratings of their health statuses under different conditions (i.e. for 
example, having progressive liver disease might be .7 on a scale of 1, with 1 equalling full health) 
(Weinstein et al. 2009). Health benefit can thus be measured using the differences in QALYs 
created by different medicines (Weinstein et al. 2009). This ‘cost per QALY’ ratio is then 
compared against the ‘value threshold’ that a health system sets, which is the additional amount 
that a health system is ‘willing to pay’ for an additional QALY for patients. If a medicine is below 
the threshold, then it has a ‘value price’ for which health systems would ideally be willing to 
reimburse a manufacturer (Reinhardt 2015). The National Health Services (NHS) in the UK, for 
example, typically pays for medicines that are within £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY (Claxton et al. 
2008). This methodology is used widely across Europe via ‘health technology assessment’ (HTA) 
bodies, such as National Institutes for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the NHS system; payers in the 
US, even with less direct government pricing regulation, are beginning to incorporate such 
studies into their deliberations over how much to pay for a medicine (Bach and Pearson 2015; 
Institute for Clinical and Review 2015; Pearson and Rawlins 2005).  
 With medicines that have population health level implications, such as the sofosbuvir-
based treatments, the valuation also takes the second step: calculating the total value of 
downstream medical expenses averted at a health systems-level through early diagnosis and 
treatment in comparison to the status quo (with the existing standard of care) (Dumit 2012b; 
																																																						
9 See Appendix D for more on this valuation approach, as well as the studies that analyzed sofosbuvir.    
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Gregson et al. 2005; Maldonado Castañeda 2016). For example, in the case of hepatitis C, 
pharmacoeconomic studies have shown that health systems could save billions in averted liver 
transplants and hospitalizations by treating patients early, even at Gilead’s launch price point 
(Chahal et al. 2016; Van Nuys et al. 2015). Taken together, these two valuation practices aim to 
advance a second kind of pricing strategy, represented as such (Gregson et al. 2005):  
Price = Value = R ± D,  
with R = reference product price and D = differential value10 
This pricing strategy is still inextricably linked to the patent-based system, as companies make 
these estimations with the anticipation of only limited, if any, competition because of intellectual 
property protections. But the value based pricing strategy requires a different kind of calculation 
for manufacturers. Gregson et al (2005:122) describe this change: “In essence, the fundamental 
pricing question has shifted from ‘what price do we need to charge to cover our costs and make a 
good return?’ to ‘Given market perceptions of value, which products can we profitably produce?’” 
In this way, manufacturers conceive of different health systems – typically national governments – 
as a ‘market’ to which they are calibrating their pricing, even though companies with new 
medicines may face little competition.11 
Criticisms of this value-based pricing logic have tended to come in two varieties. The first 
one is the methodological challenge of objectively measuring health improvements in monetary 
terms (i.e. costs per QALY)  (Knapp and Mangalore 2011; Nord et al. 2009). QALY measures, for 
example, can suffer from variations based on differences in patient populations and the extent to 
which patients’ valuation of dimensions such as reduced social stigma can be reflected in studies 
(Nord et al. 2009). Furthermore, the financial value imputed to each quality adjusted life year can 
appear arbitrary, with a country’s GDP serving as the closest proxy – in the UK, QALYs are valued 
at 20,000 - 30,000 GBP, whereas US health systems typically use values ranging from $50,000 to 
																																																						
10 This differential value is the company’s estimation of what ‘the market’ perceives to be the value of the 
company’s product in comparison to an existing standard of care or other reference product.   
11 In making this shift, companies are increasingly appropriating valuation logics from governments that the 
industry had generally resisted as pricing regulation in an earlier era. Government health systems around 
the world have indicated that ‘paying for value’ is a key priority in the face of aging populations, rising 
health care costs, and limited budgets. For example, a centerpiece of the Affordable Care Act (‘Obamacare’), 
in addition to expanding health insurance, has been paying for ‘value-based health care’ in which doctors 
and hospitals are reimbursed less for services (‘fee for service’) and more for actual improvements in health 
outcomes (Obama 2016). Companies are now increasingly using this value logic to legitimate prices to 
government health systems (Reinhardt 2016). 
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$150,000 (Neumann and Cohen 2014). The second criticism is that when deciding over a new 
medicine, value-based evaluations in health economics compare single interventions against each 
other, leaving wider budgetary concerns un-addressed (Reinhardt 2015). For example, in the case 
of hepatitis C, new sofosbuvir-based medicines were compared against the existing standard of 
care at the time, interferon-based regimens, which were already priced at more than $80,000 per 
patient. Sofosbuvir-based medicines offered a far greater health value than older interferon 
treatments; this quality also meant that more patients demanded the treatment. Yet by using the 
older reference price as the baseline with which to value sofosbuvir, health systems faced a major 
quandary: more patients could benefit from a treatment at prices that threatened to displace 
spending in other areas of health and social concern (Rosenthal 2014; Rosenthal and Graham 
2016).12  
These critiques of value-based pricing, however, leave a larger array of questions 
unaddressed. A narrow focus on the exchange between a manufacturer and buyers – and the 
determination of value at this exchange – renders the potential flow of value, from value creation 
to value extraction, invisible (Mazzucato 2016; Reinhardt 2016). What are the resources that 
generate ‘value’? Where do such prices come from (i.e. why was the reference price for sofosbuvir 
already $80,000)? Where does the value that is exchanged in such transactions go? How might its 
destination be part of evaluating the innovation process? Such questions are immaterial in this 
constricted conception of value. Both the ‘risk’ and ‘value’ logics as the prevailing economic 
answers on drug pricing for new medicines leave us with the opportunity to search anew for 
answers.  
1.1.3 The monopoly-state relationship: a partial analysis  
In critiquing these economic answers, one common set of analyzes is based on 
scrutinizing the ‘monopoly-state’ relationship (Adams and Brock 2004; Angell 2004; Baker 2014; 
Goozner 2005).13 In this lens, popularized through works such as Marcia Angell’s (2004) The Truth 
about the Drug Companies, pharmaceutical companies – granted monopolies over intellectual 
property by the state in order to take on risky research and development efforts – have in turn co-
																																																						
12 I elaborate on these pitfalls in chapters 5 and 6 at greater length.  
13 By ‘monopoly’ I refer to the fact that companies are granted patent protections for each of their specific 
therapies, effectively giving companies monopolies in therapeutic areas where they own the only or best-in-
class treatment. Some therapeutic areas can resemble oligopolies, with a small number of competitors 
producing similar patent protected medicines.  
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opted the state to charge high prices while failing to produce consistent innovation. Through 
political lobbying and regulatory influence, the industry has been able to bias legislation and rule-
making in its favor to protect and broaden their property protections, diminish competition, and 
limit measures to increase the countervailing power of government health delivery systems with 
regards to drug pricing (Adams and Brock 2004; Baker 2014). Furthermore, in this state-monopoly 
relationship, pharmaceutical companies not only co-opt the health delivery state, but as 
illuminated in Merril Goozner’s (2005) The $800 Million Pill, appropriate government-funded 
science by gaining property rights over technologies developed with taxpayer money. The state 
here is thus seen as a payer of two kinds of public goods - scientific research as well as health care 
(in the US, for vulnerable populations such as the elderly and poor).  
This political economy analysis provides a partial advance into our understanding of drug 
prices by illuminating the influences of monopolies. However, this critique falls short on three 
major counts. First, the analysis does not examine the ways in which research and development is 
influenced by new patterns of finance. For example, in examining the financing of biomedical 
innovation across the product development process, only the capital allocation and pricing 
decisions of large pharmaceutical companies are under scrutiny. As I raised earlier, shifting 
models of biotechnology development, such as venture-backed companies, present new financial 
dynamics to consider in debates over drug pricing and innovation (Lazonick and Tulum 2011). 
Second, this analysis holds a narrow view of the state, producing public goods such as basic 
science and paying for medicines, while struggling to exercise countervailing power in the face of 
powerful pharmaceutical companies. Yet as I will illustrate later in the chapter, other scholars 
have pointed to the multiple and shifting roles the state plays in the innovation process beyond 
the provision of public goods, such as making entrepreneurial investments that proactively shape 
and create markets (Mazzucato 2013b). 
Finally, a deeper interrogation and potential critique of the prevailing ‘risk’ and ‘value’ 
arguments are not possible without a broader analysis that brings in financial capital as well as 
the state in its multiple forms. Without such analysis, evidence of diminishing investments in 
research and development (especially in a context of high drug prices), is explained as 
pharmaceutical companies abusing the patent protections that the ‘risk’ argument legitimates 
(Angell 2004). The value answer can be explained as another ploy to maximize profits for 
manufacturers (Bach 2015; Reinhardt 2015). The causal story in each critique is reduced to a single 
actor’s power and the limited countervailing response of the state; absent is a historical 
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consideration of the wider political-economic contexts within which business monopolies and 
state actors have evolved.  
1.1.4 The limits of economic answers on ‘risk’ and ‘value’ and the monopoly-state critique   
 The dominant economic answers of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ as well as the monopoly-state critique 
share a blindspot: they largely abstract drug development and pricing away from the historical 
and political-economic contexts in which they occur. Before I pivot to charting a different 
research direction through the case of sofosbuvir-based medicines, I briefly summarize the three 
consequences of this blind spot as a way of defining an alternative agenda for inquiry.  
 First, existing answers rely on static, atomistic units of ‘risk’, ‘value’, and ‘monopoly’ which 
reduce prices to a single interaction between business and buyer, rather than dynamic, 
differentiated concepts that can be used to interrogate an innovation process. As I described 
above, realities and perceptions of risk change along the innovation process, and actors respond 
to and manage this risk in different ways. Value is not simply exchanged in one transaction - it 
has sources of creation, flows, and directions underpinning these flows (i.e. value creation to 
value extraction). The patents that grant companies ‘monopoly’ can also shift in purpose across an 
innovation process as ownership claims change hands between small and large companies (i.e. 
patents may be used to raise venture capital for small companies, patents may later become a 
potential asset for acquisition by a larger company). Thus, rather than taking static units of ‘risk’, 
‘value’ and ‘monopoly’ as a given, I aimed to dissect them across an unfolding innovation process. 
 Second, both economic answers as well as the critique of the state-monopoly relationship 
attempt to place a single actor ‘on trial’ for the benefits of a given system of drug pricing and 
development, rather than search for mechanisms that includes multiple organizations and 
relationships. The focus has been primarily on the contributions or abuses of established large 
pharmaceutical companies in pursuing research and development, or on the ability (or inability) 
of government to regulate prices or pay for new medicines. In attempting to find a single culprit, 
this vantage tends to present state and business as monoliths, and ignores the influence of 
financial actors in the innovation process. By bringing in an analysis of finance, as well as 
considering multiple organizational actors, I aimed to be open to a larger array of mechanisms 
and relations between actors that shape drug pricing and development.  
Third, existing economic answers and their methodological critiques tend to reproduce 
the discourses of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ at play in debates over drug pricing. Rather, I aimed to situate 
these discourses within historical and material relations of power to understand their changing 
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role and sway within debates over drug development and pricing.14 Such a descriptive endeavor 
may then help illuminate more precisely the functions of existing ‘risk’ and ‘value’ arguments in 
the innovation process (i.e. what they obscure, conserve, enable), locate the relations of power 
that underpin these functions, and more deeply appraise the limits of these economic answers.  
Thus, I sought to pursue a direction of research – both the right questions as well as 
accompanying analytical tools from sociology and political economy – that allowed me to move 
from static units to analytical concepts of an innovation process, from the logic of the trial to a 
descriptive search for mechanisms between multiple organizational actors, and from discourses of 
debate to relations of power. By attempting to make each of these pivots in my research, I aimed to 
develop a more rigorous understanding of the forces, relationships, and actors influencing drug 
pricing.  
1.2 Charting a different question 
 Rather than ask ‘are the prices of new medicines justified?’ – which is where prevailing 
economic accounts and their critiques place their attention – I sought to ask a question that did 
not have a yes/no answer nor was a test of a single variable or relationship. My investigation 
instead was oriented around a ‘how’ question15:  
How do the organizational and political-economic dynamics in an unfolding 
innovation process explain the prices of sofosbuvir-based medicines for hepatitis 
C?  
 In asking a how question, I aimed to take a wide frame to my investigation, and thereby 
arrive at a valid representation of the innovation process and its pricing outcomes. My question 
specifically contained three elements that ensured that I departed from the common pitfalls of 
answers cited earlier. First, I wanted to be open to the roles that multiple organizational actors 
potentially played, beyond large pharmaceutical companies and the health delivery state (i.e. 
																																																						
14 For example, I attempt to situate the more recent and public shift by the industry to use the ‘value’ 
argument within new political-economic models for drug development driven by financialization. By 
situating the discourses within their historical and material contexts, I could shed light more precisely into 
what gets obscured in current uses of the ‘value’ discourse. I return to this analysis in Chapter 6.   
15 Based on my sociological vantage and review of the literature, my research question assumed the domain 
of analysis to be within organizational and political-economic mechanisms – rather than other potential 
domains, such as psychosocial explanations of the financial desires of corporate executives, or cultural 
anthropological takes on the way different actors in society value innovation and biomedicine. Given the 
large-scale structural and social dynamics at play in biomedical innovation involving state, business, and 
financial actors, I found this to be the most robust and yet focused domain within which to look for 
answers.  
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small biotechnology companies and financial actors). Second, I embedded my organizational 
analysis in political-economic dynamics, thereby aiming to study the relations of power between 
these actors within a historical context. Third, I took the lens of an unfolding innovation process in 
order to interrogate how the relations between these actors, as well as the concepts or ‘risk’, 
‘value’, and ‘monopoly’, may shift during the trajectory that drug development takes. I further 
elaborate the implications of this orientation in the discussion of my research design and methods 
in the following chapter.16  
1.3 Three Analytic Possibilities from Sociology and Political Economy  
 Making such an interrogation requires entering and navigating the complex and shifting 
terrain on which biomedical innovation occurs. But I am far from the first to attempt this tall 
order. To answer my question, I was accompanied by previous works from within political 
economy and sociology traditions that have examined the organizational and political-economic 
dynamics shaping biomedical innovation. From my reading of this literature, three threads of 
inquiry provided mechanisms that I hypothesized could account for the innovation process and 
prices of sofosbuvir-based medicines.  
Each thread emphasized the role and influence of a different set of actors and in the 
innovation and pricing process. The first thread interrogates innovation in processual terms as a 
collective and cumulative endeavour, featuring an entrepreneurial state playing a critical role in 
confronting the risk and uncertainty involved with developing therapeutic breakthroughs. The 
second thread, linked to the first, maps the relationships between finance and the innovation 
process, and through the concept of financialization, identifies the rise of new patterns of 
accumulation in shaping the anatomy as well as directional and distributive outcomes of 
biomedical innovation. Finally, a third thread traces the relations of power between business 
organizations and other social actors (such as competing businesses, the state, financial sector) by 
elucidating the capitalization17 and control by businesses of a community’s assets to generate and 
amass capital in the economy. Each thread provided partial and potential explanations which I 
could explore in the sofosbuvir case (see Table 1.1). I now describe each in turn.  
																																																						
16 I define and justify the parameters of the question and case study later in the research design and 
methodology chapter (Chapter 2).  
17 By capitalization, I refer to valuation of anticipated future earnings streams from the ownership and 
control over (intangible and tangible) assets. I further define capitalization in the context of my dissertation 
when I review Veblen’s development of the concept later in the chapter.  
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Table 1.1 Potential mechanisms of relevance for sofosbuvir case  
Analytic thread  Potential organizational and political-economic mechanisms   
Entrepreneurial state   - The state confronts the radical uncertainty involved with innovation 
through patient, risk-taking capital.  
- State investments can overcome technological frontiers, shape the 
directions of the innovation process, and ‘dynamise in’ private capital – 
rather than ‘fix markets’ or ‘crowd out’ investment.  
- State policies shape the relationship between public and private actors, 
such as by governing the rules by which entrepreneurial public 
investments can be used.   
Finance and 
financialization  
 
 
- Patterns of accumulation have shifted away from profits accruing from 
trade and commodity production and towards financial channels.   
- Speculative financial markets, rise of shareholder power, and state actions 
are potential pathways that have enabled this shift towards 
financialization in the economy. 
Capital and 
capitalization as power  
 
 
- Capital is the quantified ownership and control over grouping of 
intangible and tangible assets from a wider community  
- Capitalists pursue an accumulatory advantage versus other capitalists, 
thereby valuing assets based on their capability to generate differential 
growth through anticipated streams of earnings in the future. The 
calculation of these future streams of earnings in terms of present value is 
called capitalization.  
- Capitalization processes are sites at which multiple social relations of 
power can be dissected.  
 
1.3.1 Innovation and an entrepreneurial state  
 When sofosbuvir was approved for use in late 2013, the medicine replaced an array of 
older medicines for hepatitis C that had proven noxious for many patients but had until then 
represented their only hope (Pollack 2013). If we understand one part of any definition of 
innovation to be the generation of a better-quality product, sofosbuvir, unlike many ‘me-too’ 
medicines with minor or no therapeutic advance, appeared to epitomize it (Knight 2013). In 
understanding the development of such innovations, one major starting point has been the 
economist Joseph Schumpeter’s formulation of ‘creative destruction’, in which a group of people 
or a person develops an idea or invention into a new product, process or market, thereby 
replacing prior innovations (Schumpeter 1942). Breaking from static economic frameworks from 
his time, Schumpeter saw these waves of innovation in processual terms as explaining the 
dynamic change witnessed in capitalism (Ingham 2003).  
 As has been argued by innovation scholars, this change does not occur via only playing 
the lottery, where the probabilities of a bet are known ex-ante (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013; 
Mazzucato 2013a). Rather, innovation embodies what scholars have called ‘Knightean 
uncertainty’: the odds of generating rewards from investment in innovation are unknowable 
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beforehand (Knight 1921; Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato 2013b).18 In this view, playing 
probabilities will simply not do. Innovation processes instead necessitate direct confrontation 
with an ‘immeasurable risk’, which in turn requires long-term strategic commitments. This 
confrontation happens from the earliest stages of a process, often a long time away from the 
launch of a product or creation of a new market. The first steps in generating a new compound, 
for example, have been called by Gambardella (1995) the ‘most creative steps’ in drug 
development and contains a high level of technical uncertainty. As a process moves along, 
scientists and drug developers attempt to answer questions relating to a product’s different 
technical risks through further clinical testing and human clinical trials. By the final stages, such 
as in Phase III clinical trials, this prior testing can make it possible to place a probability of 
success for a given compound (Bleicher et al. 2003; Pisano 1997; Robbins-Roth 2001). We can thus 
think of uncertainty and risk existing along a continuum across an innovation process.  
 Taking on this uncertainty and risk is not a lone enterprise. Rather, as the ‘systems of 
innovation’ school of thinking has described, multiple organizational and economic actors across 
a society circulate and diffuse knowledge to generate innovation (Freeman 1995; Lundvall 1992). 
Among these actors is not just the private sector, which receives much of the attention (and to 
which we will return in due course), but the state, through a network of public sector 
organizations. Through its ability to mobilize funding from taxpayers, the state is viewed as taking 
on risks that private businesses otherwise would not (‘fixing market failures’, by conventional 
economic parlance). In the arena of drug development, for example, the state has been described 
as taking on the upstream science required to produce new compounds and therapies.19 Others 
argue, instead, that the role of the state in innovation goes beyond investments in basic science 
and research and ‘fixing market failures’. Rather, as Mazzucato has described, an entrepreneurial 
state is a potential lynchpin in driving innovation across sectors and national economies 
(Mazzucato 2013b). Mazzucato has identified several key features that constitute an 
entrepreneurial state, differentiating it from a state that only provides public goods such as basic 
science.   
																																																						
18 Refers to Frank Knight, an economist in the early 20th century. He elaborated the concept of uncertainty 
in his 1921 book Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit.  
19 Multiple studies have identified the origins of particular compounds or broader therapeutic advances to 
the US state via their National Institutes of Health (Angell 2004; Sampat and Lichtenberg 2011). As I alluded 
to earlier, however, such a view of the state’s role in the innovation process for new medicines may be too 
narrow. 
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 First, the state provides patient investment across the upstream-downstream stages of the 
innovation process. Through a network of decentralized public organizations, investment goes 
towards not only to basic science, but also to companies and projects with commercial potential 
(Mazzucato 2013b). In Mazzucato’s view, this latter investment does not ‘crowd out’ private sector 
actors; rather, the state provides substantial resources to technology development in ways that 
‘risk-averse’ companies do not. In the US state, for example, we find that the Small Business 
Innovation Research Program is a pivotal source of support for early-stage businesses in uncertain 
technological spaces (Keller and Block 2013; Mazzucato 2013b).  
 Second, the state uses this investment to take on ‘technological frontiers’, where 
overcoming radical uncertainty and technical hurdles can translate to entirely new business 
opportunities that were previously unforeseen (Mazzucato 2013b). For example, this risk-taking 
capital has produced new general purpose technologies on which entire new sectors of the 
economy, such as biotechnology, have been borne. Third, Mazzucato describes a state which sets 
the ‘direction’ for innovation, through a mission-orientation that far from ‘market-fixing’ actually 
creates and shapes markets to produce value and overcome challenges with broad social 
implications (Mazzucato 2013b; 2016). Public investment in green technologies illustrates the 
potential market and direction shaping powers of an entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2015).  
 Finally, an entrepreneurial state also governs the ‘rules of the game’ that mediate the 
relationship between public and private actors, and in turn can determine the extent to which an 
innovation ‘ecosystem’ is mutualistic (win-win) or parasitic (in which few actors extract more 
value than they put in to the process) (Mazzucato 2013b; 2016). The U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, which 
stipulates the rules by which publicly funded science can be patented, for example, is one such 
rule that I return to in chapter 3.  
 The frame of an entrepreneurial state encourages research that peels back the layers 
behind an innovation process and identify the extent to which public investment and risk-taking 
may have played a critical factor. In the domain of drug development, this concept has largely 
been applied at the level of the pharmaceutical industry (i.e. the emergence of biotechnology or 
the overall role of the NIH) rather than traced in the context of specific therapeutic areas. Few 
case studies of drug development have attempted to go beyond early-stage science to 
systematically explore the contributions of an entrepreneurial state as described by Mazzucato 
across the innovation process. Finding evidence of the state’s contribution to hepatitis C drug 
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development and sofosbuvir specifically would shape our understanding of the division of 
innovative labor undertaken in the process.  
 Beyond public sector organizations, however, multiple types of private companies are also 
typically part of innovation processes. In the development of sofosbuvir, this includes 
biotechnology companies and incumbent pharmaceutical firms. Unlike the taxpayer-funded state, 
companies must direct retained capital from within their firm or attract capital from external 
sources in order to finance projects aimed at innovation. These requirements are subject to a 
vexing set of dynamics to which we turn our attention next.  
1.3.2 Finance and financialization 
 Schumpeter’s insight into the critical role of innovation in the economy, as I described 
earlier, was paired by his interrogation of the central function of credit money in the economy. He 
recognized that new products, processes or markets would not materialize on their own, but 
rather require the kind of credit investment that enables the experimentation, failure, and long-
term learning characteristic of innovation (Ingham 2003). For Schumpeter, writing in the first half 
of the 20th century, banks – which he held to be the ‘headquarters of capitalism’ - would be the 
source of this credit money (Ingham 2003; Mazzucato 2013a).   
 Fast forward over the 20th and into the 21st century, and Schumpeter could not have 
foreseen the heterogeneous array of financial actors (venture capital, institutional investors, the 
stock market, public sector organizations) that now populate the landscape. This heterogeneity in 
financing is mirrored by firms at different stages of the product and business cycle, from early-
stage start-ups without any sales, to businesses about to launch a product, to established 
incumbents with existing flows of profitability (Gompers et al. 2005; O'Sullivan 2006). Just as 
these businesses have diverse financing needs depending on their position in the life cycle, the 
expectations of different financial actors in turn pattern the strategies of businesses and the larger 
industrial structure. For example, Gary Pisano (2006) in his book Science Business has described 
the emergence of biotechnology companies from the late 1970s onwards, and the parallel growth 
of different forms of financing as these early stage companies pursued therapeutic development. 
Pisano dissects the inadequate nature of much of this finance: neither venture capital nor stock 
markets, in his view, provide the kind of long-term investment model needed to translate a 
complex scientific base to overcome the risk-laden hurdles of therapeutic development. His 
mapping of the biotechnology sector offers a view into how ‘financial actors’ can influence ‘non-
financial’ actors involved in productive processes of drug development. Though he never 
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explicitly unpacks the underlying logics and institutions behind this impatient financial capital, 
Pisano tacitly points to a trend that has been described extensively elsewhere: financialization. 
 Drawing on multiple reviews of the concept, I take financialization to describe both a 
shifting ‘pattern of accumulation’ as well as a set of political-economic mechanisms to which this 
shifting pattern can be traced (Davis 2009; Krippner 2011; van der Zwan 2014). Scholars of 
financialization have documented the two distinct but related dimensions to this pattern of 
accumulation: one is the expanding role and profits of financial sector actors and short-term 
oriented trading markets, and another is the rising influence of shareholder control (and 
‘maximizing shareholder value’) on corporate governance and strategy (Mazzucato 2013; van der 
Zwan 2014). Together, the existence of financial markets as vehicles for short-term betting and the 
influence of shareholders as the primary recipients of capital within corporations has privileged, 
as Krippner (2011) puts it, “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production”. To understand the 
emergence and reproduction of this pattern, three central mechanisms have been highlighted – in 
addition to the (1) speculative dimension of financial markets and (2) the dominance of 
shareholders, scholars have linked (3) state actions to financialization. I describe these three 
mechanisms briefly here (see Table 1.2 for a summary). I also highlight the nascent but growing 
literature connecting financialization to the pharmaceutical sector, which has largely focused on 
the second (i.e. shareholder dominance) of these mechanisms.  
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Table 1.2 Potential mechanisms for financialization 
 Description  Potential gaps in explanation 
Speculation  Capitalists pursue capital accumulation 
through speculation in financial markets, 
based on betting on the future valuations of 
assets, creating vulnerability to disruptive 
events and cycles of bubbles and bursts.  
Does not explain the institutional 
mechanisms by which speculation 
operates, such as the construction of 
assets that are the object of 
speculation and financial markets. 
Shareholder 
control 
Shareholders have displaced managers as 
the key agents of control over the capital 
allocation decisions of businesses since the 
1970s, with a focus on share price in equity 
markets and distributions of capital 
(‘maximizing shareholder value’) in the 
form of buybacks and dividends over long-
term internal investments; explains shifting 
corporate strategies oriented around 
financial markets. 
Does not focus on implications for 
product-level trajectories and prices; 
instead, focuses largely on macro-
industry or firm-level capital 
allocation strategies, and implies 
higher prices are due to maximizing 
shareholder value ideology but does 
specifically map out how products are 
valued and priced    
State 
governance  
Policymakers beginning in 1970s responded 
to a constellation of fiscal and social crises 
by depoliticizing economic management 
through a series of governance decisions 
over interest rates, inflation, and regulation 
that led to the rise of finance (Krippner’s 
thesis). One example: high interest rates in 
1980s meant that companies could make 
more money in credit instruments than 
productive investments.  
Explains the larger political-economy 
shifts towards the accumulation of 
capital by the financial sector, but 
does not relate this specifically with 
pharmaceutical sector or biomedical 
innovation; for example, the 
emergence of new kinds of financing 
(such as venture capital).   
 
Speculation: One mechanism by which this shifting pattern of accumulation is argued to 
occur is the emergence and growth of speculative financial markets. By this view, investors aim to 
use the financial market to make short-term bets for near-term gains based on the selling of assets 
or trading of shares in a given company. This future-orientation creates susceptibility to ‘external 
events’, such as the introduction of a new technology or policy change whereby prices can swing 
based on the psychosocial dynamics (‘herd effects’) of traders (Kindleberger 1978, Minsky 2015, 
Shiller 2003;2014).When such manias occur, prices are severed from purported ‘intrinsic values’ 
(Shiller 2003; 2014). This literature offers two key insights: the future oriented nature of valuation 
strategies undertaken by financial actors and their consequent susceptibility to bubble and burst 
cycles. Others argue, however, that an understanding of financial accumulation requires a further 
analysis of the institutional dimensions underlying speculation (Krippner 2011; Leyshon and Thrift 
2007). Leyshon and Thrift (2007:98) observe, for example, that the “bedrock of financial 
capitalism is not the spectacular system of speculation but some thing more mundane; that is, 
financial capitalism is dependent on the constant searching out, or the construction of, new asset 
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streams, usually through a process of aggregation, which then – and only then – allows 
speculation to occur”. This critique points to the need to analyze assets that underlie speculation, 
particularly knowledge assets in the realm of biomedical innovation, and the institutional 
dimensions of the construction and trajectory of such assets through financial markets.20  
Shareholder control: The second mechanism explored in explanations of financialization 
is the ascendancy of shareholders in governing corporate strategy, contrasting to an earlier period 
in which business managers more closely controlled capital allocation decisions. Scholars 
analyzing this mechanism argue that this shift has increased the orientation of non-financial firms 
to financial markets and thereby shaped business strategies (Davis 2009; Lazonick 2015). This shift 
is traced, in turn, to several factors (see Table 1.3 for a summary). One has been the growing 
scholastic view in the 1970s that shareholders, not corporate managers, could most efficiently 
allocate capital across the economy using share price as a core metric (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
This vantage was linked to the ‘principal-agency’ theory in law and finance, which posited that the 
‘residual’ earnings of a corporation belong to the shareholder, because they have no market-
determined or contractual guarantee of a reward (unlike workers with salaries, for example) 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Without uniting ownership with control over 
management, agency theorists have argued, managers have no incentive to return value to 
shareholders and could instead pursue inefficient or management-enriching strategies at the 
expense of the economic efficiency that ‘maximizing shareholder value’ could instead bring. This 
scholastic view linked with political-economic shifts, with institutional shareholders gaining 
greater power onwards along with the emergence of an active market for hostile takeovers in the 
1980s enabling owners to place increasing pressure on managers to take measures to boost share 
price.  
While these arguments from law and finance and political-economic shifts in the 1980s 
provide important context, I draw primarily from the literatures on changes in corporate 
governance and strategy that reinforced this shift towards shareholder control (Davis 2009; 
Lazonick 2010; 2015; Mazzucato 2013a). This literature has focused on the ways in which corporate 
governance and strategy has shifted to ‘maximize shareholder value’, with two dimensions central 
to the analysis. One has been the increasing move towards repurchasing a company’s own shares 
(‘share buybacks’) as a vehicle to distribute earnings to shareholders, while the other has been the 
																																																						
20 I return to this analysis by focusing on Veblen’s conception of capital and assets in the next section (1.3.3).    
Roy	33 
	
increasing use of stock options and awards for executive compensation, thereby linking the 
interests of executives to shareholders using share price as a core measure of performance  (Davis 
2009; Lazonick 2014; Lazonick et al. 2016). I investigated and elaborated on the extent to which 
these strategies of capital allocation and compensation may have shaped the innovation process 
behind sofosbuvir.  
Table 1.3 The shift towards shareholder control  
Key factor  Description and time period  
Scholastic 
arguments 
from law and 
finance   
 
- ‘Maximizing shareholder value’ argued by law and finance scholars in the 1970s and 
1980s as a way to create efficient capital allocation across the economy, with 
shareholders using share price in financial markets to evaluate the potential for 
sectors and firms (‘efficient market hypothesis’) to deliver growth.  
- Business managers expected to direct/disgorge ‘free cash flow’ from earnings (or 
‘residual earnings’ ) to shareholders, with shareholders argued to be the only ‘residual 
claimants’ on a corporation’s earnings. 
- Aimed at resolving the ‘principal-agent’ problem, with business managers (agents) 
otherwise believed to use capital for ‘inefficient’ purposes. 
Political-
economic 
shifts    
 
- Increasing influence granted to institutional shareholders through political-legal 
arrangements that concentrated shareholder ownership in pension and hedge funds 
- Active takeover market in the 1980s used as a vehicle for shareholder pressure, with 
companies with low share prices seen as vulnerable targets  
Changes in 
corporate 
governance 
and strategy  
- Increasing distribution of ‘residual’ earnings to shareholders, with SEC Rule 1o-b-18 
promulgated in 1982 permitting companies  to distribute earnings to shareholders 
through buying back a company’s own shares (‘share buybacks’). 
- From 1980s onwards, executive compensation increasingly tied to stock-based pay, 
such as stock options and awards; executives, as major shareholders themselves, 
driven to ‘maximize shareholder value’ 
Note: I focused on the third set of factors (highlighted) in the course of my investigation.    
A series of analyzes have examined the influence of this escalating shareholder orientation 
within the pharmaceutical sector (Andersson et al. 2010; Gleadle et al. 2014; Lazonick et al. 2016; 
Montalban and Sakinc 2013). These studies have centered largely on chronicling how large 
established companies are increasingly down-sizing their early-stage efforts (to mitigate the 
technical risks of drug development) and distributing their accumulated capital to shareholders, 
relying instead on small biotechnology companies to supply them with new potential products 
that can generate growth (Andersson et al. 2010; Gleadle et al. 2014; Montalban and Sakinc 2013). 
Lazonick (2015) has called this approach by large firms more broadly to be the ‘downsize and 
distribute’ model of corporate strategy in the name of ‘maximizing shareholder value’. These 
literatures thus also illustrate shareholder value to be a distributive project (Davis 2009; van der 
Zwan 2014): by directing the rewards of a collective process of production and innovation to a 
single class of actors – shareholders – other actors, such as workers and taxpayers, are seen to be 
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marginalized (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). In this view, a small group of financial actors 
engage in value extraction, by which shareholders accrue rewards disproportionate to the capital 
they risked into productive processes (Lazonick 2015).21 Like the literature on the entrepreneurial 
state in the setting of biomedical innovation, however, much of the analysis of financialization 
has focused at a macro-economy or sectoral level, with few cases of a product or firm-level view. 
This gap limits our understanding of the meso-level mechanisms and precise impacts of 
shareholder control on crucial goods, such as the pricing of medicines.  
State action: A third mechanism described to underpin financialization is the role of the 
state, of which the most prominent work has been done by the economic sociologist Gretta 
Krippner (Krippner 2005; 2011). In her book Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise 
of Finance, she recounts financialization as less a deliberate outcome sought by US policy-makers, 
but an unplanned result of their attempt to respond to a unique constellation of crises that 
confronted the state beginning in the late 1960s and 1970s (Krippner 2011).22 In their response to 
crises such as inflation and slowed growth, policymakers turned over decisions to a state-
constructed ‘de-politicized market’ through an array of governance choices related to monetary 
and banking policy. These decisions together produced the rise of finance. The maintenance of 
high interest rates by Federal Reserve chairman Volcker, for example, lured companies to direct 
more of their capital to financial instruments rather than invest in their businesses, one of the 
mechanisms by which non-financial firms became financialized (Krippner 2011). Taking a cue 
from her interrogation of the broader relationship between the state and financialization, I aimed 
to look at this relationship in a more narrowly confined matter, as it relates to biomedical 
innovation in the case of sofosbuvir. This meant observing the circulation and accumulation of 
capital across the sofosbuvir innovation process and following any potential connections between 
different state actors and the rules governing this flow of capital.23 
																																																						
21 Lazonick (2015) has argued that ‘maximizing shareholder value’ is “a theory of value extraction that lacks a 
theory of value creation,” as the central focus is on the distribution of capital to shareholders through 
financial markets rather than on investments in organizations that can generate value.  
22 Though I do not chronicle her full analysis here for the purposes of brevity, Krippner’s work to ‘bring the 
state back in’ to analyzes of financialization is a pressing and important task in the realm of biomedical 
innovation, which I highlight in chapter six.  
23 As I describe in my methodology as well as in my discussion chapter (chapter six), I did not perform an 
exhaustive analysis of the regulatory apparatuses of the state as it relates to the financing of biomedical 
innovation – instead, I investigated the kinds of financing and capital allocation decisions that shaped my 
specific case, the innovation process behind sofosbuvir. I then noted what, if any, state policies and rule-
changes may have in turn influenced those financing and capital allocation decisions. This ultimately 
presented a limited view of the state in relation to financialization, as I did not do in-depth research into 
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1.3.3 Capital and capitalization as power  
Thus far, we have discussed the innovation process largely in terms of the state as well as 
financial actors, while only indirectly touching on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
businesses that are also part of the terrain. In this section, I draw on the economist Thorstein 
Veblen’s analysis of business to address gaps in current conceptualizations of pharmaceutical 
companies in the innovation process (Veblen 1908a; 1908b). As I described earlier in section 1.1.3, 
the focus in drug pricing debates has largely been on the monopoly power of larger, established 
pharmaceutical companies. In this view, large companies pursue pricing strategies designed to 
maximize profits, and use their lobbying power over the state to maintain favorable intellectual 
property and pricing related rules. While the attention to the influence of pharmaceutical 
industry has produced important insights in the analysis of regulatory science and drug 
approval24, similar work in the arena of drug pricing must extend our understanding of the 
position and interests of different business actors in the innovation process. An investigation of 
drug pricing requires analytical tools for questions that often go unanswered.  
For example: (1) How does the control over knowledge – secured through patents (state 
granted ‘monopolies’) – function in business strategies at different stages of a product 
development cycle? For example, as multiple analysts have described, small biotechnology 
companies rarely produce profits from the sales of products, and yet can generate significant 
returns for their venture capitalist backers – indicating that the function of patents varies 
depending on the stage of the product development cycle (Birch 2016; Lazonick and Tulum 2011). 
(2) What are the pricing and valuation approaches that business actors use, and what does this 
tell us about the relationship between businesses and other actors in the innovation process? 
Business organizations pursue their pricing strategies within complex political-economic contexts 
that include competing businesses, the financial sector and shareholders, as well as potential 
buyers (i.e. government health systems (Gregson et al. 2005; Maldonado Castañeda 2016; Scherer 
2004). (3) Finally, what are the specific logics of profitability and growth that structure the 
																																																						
the strategic interests and historical processes at stake in each domain of state policy and regulation. 
Further research focusing on the role of the state and the financialization of biomedical innovation at the 
level of the state and multiple firms and the broader sector – beyond a single therapeutic case – can redress 
this limitation.  
24 For example, Abraham and Davis have provided important historical and sociological insights into the 
ways that companies use their power to appropriate public agencies and bias the ‘rules of the game’ by 
which new medicines are approved (Abraham 2002; 2008; C. Davis and Abraham 2013). 
Roy	36 
	
strategies of business, beyond ‘maximizing profits’ – and how are these strategies shaped by 
potential competition and financial markets? As I indicated with the literature on financialization, 
business organizations operate in financial environments in which time-bound expectations 
shape their strategies (Lazonick et al. 2016; Rajan 2012). ‘Maximizing profits’ may be one part of 
the equation, but may not fully capture the calculations that guide companies to pursue certain 
business strategies.   
To develop analytical tools capable of interrogating business organizations in the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir, I turn to Veblen-inspired works which examine the ways 
that businesses accumulate capital and generate specific power relations in the economy.25 In a 
period of rapid industrial change and concentration of wealth at the turn of the prior century, the 
economist Thorstein Veblen outlined a prescient dissection of capital and power in two articles in 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics in August and November of 1908 (Veblen 1908a; 1908b). 
Veblen viewed the power of the new businesses he was witnessing as resting not in new forms of 
productivity, as often assumed in the neoclassical economic theories of his colleagues, but more 
so in the means by which business interests deployed and extended their control over industrial 
knowledge to accumulate capital.  
In pursuing what scholars have termed a ‘realist’ analysis of capital, Veblen (1908) had 
three key insights that, taken together, can provide a robust toolkit to dissect the innovation 
process and the pricing strategies that are entangled with it. I elaborate these three insights by 
drawing on Veblen’s original scholarship as well as a small group of political economists and 
science and technology studies (STS) scholars that have translated Veblen to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical development (Birch 2016; Cochrane 2011; Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Veblen 1908b).   
 First, Veblen saw production to be a social process using and generating an array of what 
he called ‘assets’ in a ‘community’. These assets, could be tangible, such as material technologies, 
																																																						
25 One growing area of contribution from anthropologists and sociologists of science and technology studies 
are the links between shifts in biomedicine towards a more molecular and genomic base to shifts in 
capitalism towards a more financialized mode of accumulation. This literature has centered on discussions 
related to ‘biocapital’, and other ‘bio-hyphenated’ concepts. Popularized in part by Sunder-Rajan’s book 
Biocapital as well as lively commentary by colleagues such as Joseph Dumit with his notion of surplus 
health, they have traced how the turn to the molecular (i.e. biomarkers, genomics, surrogate endpoints) is 
entangled with discourses of capitalism that abstract biomedicine away from the embodied health 
experiences of patients and towards the future-oriented, promissory force of financial value (Dumit 2012b; 
Helmreich 2008; Rajan 2006; 2012; Rose 2007). While I draw on their insights in the rhetorics of this 
dynamic, my interest in sofosbuvir is more oriented around the political-economic mechanisms along 
which capital and knowledge flows.  
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or intangible, such as knowledge (patents, for example).26 Capital, in this view, materialized with 
the ownership and control over groupings of tangible and intangible assets by more powerful 
economic actors within the community (Cochrane 2011; Veblen 1908a).27  
Second, Veblen defined capital as a quantified form of control with a future orientation, 
because owners value their assets based on the expected future stream of earnings that can be 
derived from their ownership (Birch 2016; Muniesa 2011; Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Veblen 1908a). 
Business organizations and financial actors use capitalization exercises to value these streams of 
earnings, in which future earnings are translated into a present value to guide decisions over 
capital allocation (Muniesa 2011; Nitzan and Bichler 2009). Birch (2016) has linked the paradox of 
the biotechnology sector – most companies produce no products or sales but attract large flows of 
capital – to the ‘assetization’ of drug development, in which anticipated downstream prices and 
market valuations, not profitability, are the basis for investment (Birch 2016; Birch and Tyfield 
2013). He illuminates the logics of assets by contrasting them with commodities – a comparison I 
highlight in Table 2.1 below.28 Furthermore, capitalists not only anticipate capital in terms of 
future streams of earnings, but based on whether assets will generate a differential advantage 
against other capitalists (Cochrane 2011; Nitzan and Bichler 2009). In other words, capitalists 
pursue accumulation not by some absolute register, but by comparison against other 
opportunities (cost of capital, competing businesses, competing sectors). This conceptualization 
of assets informs my investigation into the ways pharmaceutical businesses manage, value, and 
struggle over assets in the innovation process.       
																																																						
26 Assets are defined by the International Accounting Standards (IAS) as: “a resource that is controlled by 
the entity as a result of past events (for example, purchase or self creation) and from which future economic 
benefits (inflows of cash or other assets) are expected (International Accounting Standards 2016).  
27 Veblen (Veblen 1908b:525) described the process of increasing ownership and control in historical terms: 
“As the technological development falls into shape as to require a relatively large unit of material 
equipment for the effective pursuit of industry, or such as otherwise to make the possession of the requisite 
material equipment a matter of consequence, so as seriously to handicap the individuals who are not 
without these material means, and to place the current possessors of such equipment at a marked 
advantage, then the strong arm intervenes, property rights apparently begin to fall into definite shape, the 
principles of ownership gather force and consistency, and men begin to accumulate capital goods and take 
measures to make them secure”. 
28 Birch’s adaptation of Veblen’s work on assets highlights 1) the future orientation in the valuation of assets 
as well as the 2) distinct demand logics of assets, particularly in financial markets. This conceptualization 
enables an analysis of the ways in which financial actors value compounds along the innovation process, 
and explains the speculative bubbles and rushes that occur in drug development. For example, why did 
Gilead Sciences buy Pharmasset for $11 billion in 2011? This vantage provides a way to answer this question.  
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These two points – capital as the ownership and control over assets as well as a quantified 
form of control – converge on a third: capitalization represents a relational form of social power. 
The capitalization exercises required to calculate future streams of earnings from owning 
intangible and tangible assets are far from simple pricing operations in a ‘natural’ market. Rather, 
as Nitzan and Bischler (2009) have elaborated in their ‘capital as power’ scholarship, methods of 
capitalization translate a complex magma of social interactions between capitalists and other 
social actors. For example, when a large incumbent pharmaceutical company is pursuing an 
acquisition of a smaller company, their analysis of the value of the smaller company’s assets is 
based in large part on their perception and anticipation that future buyers may be willing to pay 
for this asset. This assumes the rules and relations of power governing the exchange between the 
company and the buyer (often government health systems). In linking Veblen to the 
pharmaceutical industry, Gagnon (2016:596) interprets the implications of such an analysis, worth 
quoting at length here:  
“Not only are productive assets capitalized in the process, but also any 
institutional reality is capitalized as well, be it social, legal, political, culture, 
psychological, or any thing else that can grant an earning capacity. Capitalization 
is therefore based not only on productivity but any institutional and structural 
power that confers control over the community to increase differential gains in 
the sphere of distribution (or in the words of Veblen, any capacity for vested 
interests to gain some thing for nothing)”  
 
This conceptualization of capital and capitalization as translations of multiple forms of power that 
pattern the accumulation strategies of capitalists can be applied to biomedical innovation 
(Cochrane 2011; Gagnon 2016). The process of capitalizing assets is an almost continuous process 
in contemporary drug development: for example, intangible pharmaceutical assets far from 
approval are evaluated for their value through a web of financial markets and business 
organizations on a daily basis (any cursory look at the business section of the newspaper or the 
NASDAQ index illustrates this). The pricing of pharmaceutical assets, in this context, can be 
studied through unpacking the future-oriented ‘valuation strategies’ employed by these economic 
actors (Beckert 2011; 2014; Maldonado Castañeda 2016).  
 While this scholarship provides helpful tools with which to analyze pharmaceutical 
businesses, they have not been applied to specific empirical cases of drug development and 
pricing. The case of sofosbuvir offers an opportunity to test the utility of these concepts in an 
empirical crucible. Nor has Veblen’s original conceptions of assets, capital, and capitalization 
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been linked, in the context of biomedical innovation, to late-20th century shifts towards 
financialization that I reviewed in the previous section. Joining up Veblen with an analysis of 
financialization may provide the tools with which to fully understand the prices of sofosbuvir and 
the innovation process that produced them.  
Table 1.4 Comparing Assets vs. Commodities  
Assets  Commodities 
Ownership relationship (over future 
stream of earnings, secured via 
political-legal contract)  
Source of 
value  
Exchange relationship  
Can be intangible (knowledge, IP) or 
tangible (inventory, equipment)  
Types   Typically refers to a tangible good or service   
Prices goes up with higher demand 
(i.e. asset bubble in speculative rushes)  
Demand 
logics in 
markets  
Prices fall with increase in demand (depends on 
the type of ‘market’ – such as generic vs. 
patent/branded market in pharmaceuticals)  
- Copyright over album 
-Intellectual property over compound 
structure 
Examples  - iTunes version of the album on sale for $17.99  
- Generic pharmaceuticals  
Source: Birch (2016) 
1.3.4 The possibilities from synthesis: actors, mechanisms, and evaluation of outcomes  
 Each of the three threads – innovation and an entrepreneurial state, finance and 
financialization, and capital and capitalization as power – provided conceptual tools with which I 
investigated the innovation process and pricing behind sofosbuvir-based medicines. I returned to 
them iteratively throughout my research in the pursuit of building a synthetic representation of 
the innovation process. This analytical orientation towards my investigation offered three 
possibilities: (1) exploring the relationships between a triad of key actors rather than a single actor 
or state-business dyad, (2) a consideration of multiple political-economic mechanisms, and (3) a 
framework with which to not only describe the process but also evaluate its outcomes.  
 First, the literatures together gave me the tools with which to explore the potential roles 
of three key sets of multivalent actors in the innovation process – the state, finance, and business 
– as well as the relationships between them. Rather than locate pricing as a hermetically sealed 
matter for a single actor to determine or an outcome of a single relationship (state-business, for 
example), this triad motivated a search for the relations of power at play. By ‘multi-valent’ actors, 
I mean that multiple organizational types with different strategic interests and positions in the 
innovation process comprised each ‘set’ of state-business-financial actors contained. For example, 
I did not take the ‘state’ to be singular: though an entrepreneurial state is the explicit focus in the 
first thread, state actors appear in different forms vis a vis financialization as well as with 
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businesses – such as in governing financial actors (the SEC) and regulating pricing possibilities 
(health delivery systems).29 I thus attempt to account for this heterogeneity across the triad.  
 Second, with a single case as a ‘strategic site’ of inquiry, I could test the multiple 
mechanisms offered by the three threads in explaining the sofosbuvir case and bring together the 
comparative advantages of each. The financialization literature offers a macro-economic and 
firm-level view of regimes of accumulation, yet questions of how specific assets are valued and 
priced largely falls from view. The literature on capitalization provides a way of studying this 
quantification process (i.e. pricing) as a set of ‘valuation strategies’ that also tell us about the 
relations of power constituting such strategies. The literature on the capitalization of assets refers, 
via Veblen, to a ‘community of assets’, but does not explicitly trace the role of the state. The 
conception of an entrepreneurial state offers one way to give ‘the community’ a more specific 
form with which to investigate the genesis and evolution of assets. Finally, though the 
entrepreneurial state helps explain the confrontation with Knightean uncertainty and brings the 
state into the upstream-downstream process, this literature alone cannot explain the trajectory of 
the innovation process through financial markets or the pricing and valuation of medicines by 
businesses. The literature on financialization and capitalization provide insights into this 
trajectory.  
 A final opportunity of this synthesis is an interrogation of the distributive outcomes at 
stake in an innovation process. Viewing innovation as a cumulative and collective endeavor 
between these actors, we can take stock of the actors that took risks in the process (and what kind 
of risks), as well as the actors that accrued the rewards in the process. This push towards 
evaluating the outcomes of an innovation process is emphasized in Lazonick and Mazzucato’s 
(2013) framework of the ‘risk-reward nexus’, which I explore in the case of sofosbuvir. Lazonick 
and Mazzucato (2013:1094) argue that that though “one might expect that those economic actors 
who take the risks of investing in the innovation process would be ones to reap the rewards of 
when the innovation process succeeds and suffer the losses when it fails”, this link is in fact 
broken in contemporary capitalist economies in which a small number of financial actors are able 
to reap outsize rewards. The extent to which this framework holds true in this case is made 
																																																						
29 Rather than assume and reify a unitary view of the state, I view the state a la Bourdieu: a set of public 
organizations engaged in institutional processes producing and struggling over scientific, technological, 
and economic capital while also deploying a type of “meta-capital” that set the rules of the game for social 
spaces, which can alter the distribution of capital between actors in those social spaces (Bourdieu, 
Wacquant, and Farage 1994). 
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possible by mapping out the distribution of risks and rewards across the innovation process 
behind sofosbuvir.  
 Understanding this distribution aims at evaluating the innovation process. As Lazonick 
and Mazzucato (2013:1096)  suggest, we can then assess “whether it (the given ‘risk-reward nexus’) 
supports or undermines the innovation process.” I measure this in two ways in the case of 
sofosbuvir. First, I evaluate the direction and sustainability of the innovation process. I use Stirling 
(2009) and Mazzucato’s (2016) conception that innovation has a direction – a set of end-outcomes 
around which a process may be aimed – that can be empirically assessed (i.e. the extent to which 
a process yields clinically significant therapeutic advances or incremental and me-too medicines). 
By sustainability, I consider the extent to which the process supports further innovation (i.e. the 
reproduction of positive directional outcomes, such as breakthroughs in other areas of biomedical 
innovation). Second, because I hold the innovation process to also include the deployment phase 
of the technology (see Chapter 2, section 2.1 for my definition), I measure its patient and public 
health impact. Such an evaluation entails assessing the ways in which health systems adopted the 
medicines and, in the context of an infectious disease, were able to (or not able to) mount a 
public health response.  
1.4 Revisiting the research questions 
 Having reviewed the literature, we can now revisit the research questions guiding the 
investigation. The analytical possibilities I chronicled above provided the conceptual tools with 
which to answer the first question I had identified in section 1.2:   
1. How do the organizational and political-economic dynamics in an unfolding innovation 
process explain the pricing of sofosbuvir-based medicines for hepatitis C? 
 Based on my review of the literature as well as Lazonick and Mazzucato’s ‘risk-reward 
nexus’, I also asked a second question that accounted for the importance of evaluating the 
outcomes of the process:  
2. How were the risks and rewards of sofosbuvir’s development distributed across its 
innovation process, and what were the outcomes for the direction and sustainability of 
innovation as well as for patients and public health?  
 I mapped the data used to answer the second question along the innovation process and 
returned to take stock of the outcomes in chapter 6. Before I describe the research design and 
methodology used to collect the data to answer these research questions, I first provide a brief 
primer into the target of sofosbuvir-based medicines: the hepatitis C virus. This primer will 
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provide helpful context within which other dynamics of the innovation process can be 
interpreted.  
1.5 A shadow epidemic and the search for a cure: a primer  
The human struggle against hepatitis C has endured for decades, with the virus assuming 
a secure – but not unassailable – position. Understanding this position from three angles – its 
silent and dangerous course in the body, its spread and transmission on a global scale particularly 
among vulnerable groups, and the molecular innovations and vulnerabilities that has shaped the 
search for therapies – provides important context for any sociological diagnosis of the sofosbuvir 
case. These three dimensions (see Table 1.3 for a summary) serve as a technical primer to support 
both the comprehension of the data and evidence and as an interpretation of the relative 
significance of core flanks of the argument.  
 Table 1.5 Key dimensions and features of hepatitis C 
Key dimension of 
hepatitis C  
Specific features   
Chronic infectious 
course through the 
liver  
- Virus is transmitted via the blood, primarily injecting drug use.  
- Scars liver tissue (fibrosis) over the long-term.  
- Can take 5-20 years for patient to reach end-stage liver disease, which is fatal.  
Global epidemic of 
social disadvantage 
- 150 to 170 million infected globally 350,000 die each year.  
- 3.5-4.7 million estimated to be infected in the US; 14 million in Europe.  
- Affecting patients in high and low income countries, disproportionately 
affecting vulnerable populations such as those incarcerated, people who 
inject drugs, and co-infected with HIV.  
Therapeutic search  - Virus has several key proteins which, when targeted, eliminate the virus from 
the bloodstream by halting its replication.  
- Virus does not replicate outside the body, making drug testing and 
development initially very challenging.  
- Virus has a high error rate while replicating, leading to multiple subtypes 
(called genotypes), for which combination of compounds are often needed to 
treat the virus in order to target multiple proteins. 
- Therapies prior to sofosbuvir (interferon) had high levels of toxicity and low 
levels of cure, with patients only taking the treatment in the later stages.  
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1.5.1 A chronic infectious course through the liver    
The first point of context: the hepatitis C virus is infectious, transmitted via the blood, but 
also chronic, in that the primary damage wrought by the pathogen is the scarring of the liver 
tissue over the course of many years (Afdhal 2004).30 The transmission route for infection has 
typically followed two courses: (1) through blood transfusions before the early 1990s, when 
countries began instituting routing screening of blood banks for hepatitis C after the discovery of 
the virus in 1989, and (2) via injecting drug use with non-sterile syringes  (Alter 2013; Chen and 
Morgan 2006; Rosen 2011b).31 In the early months after infection, patients do not experience any 
immediate symptoms and often are unaware of the pathogen. This asymptomatic course can go 
undiagnosed for years, unless patients are tested using basic antibody screening (Rosen 2011a). 
The cause of this curious course of disease is due to the way the virus, while proliferating 
itself, instigates the body to attack its own liver.  Rather than directly killing liver cells, the virus 
enters liver cells, replicates in large numbers, and spreads to neighboring liver cells (Rosen 2011a; 
Sulkowski and Thomas 2005). This invasion triggers an immune response of the body’s own 
defenders, which attracts a variety of cells to the sites of injury. As the body attempts to heal these 
sites and contain the region of inflammation, liver tissue become riven with lesions and scars 
(Bedossa and Poynard 1996; Ge and Runyon 2016). This pathophysiological process of liver 
scarring is called fibrosis, which over time disfigures the orderly architecture of the liver into a 
state known as cirrhosis (See Figure 1.1). If a patient is diagnosed with the infection, a patient’s 
liver is scanned in order to ‘stage’ the tissue on this continuum of fibrosis to cirrhosis to indicate 
the severity of disease progression.  A cirrhotic liver – without its normal structure – cannot carry 
on with its crucial functions.  
If we think of the liver as a giant processing plant at the center of a diverse economy of 
biochemistry – manufacturing proteins that clot our blood and maintain our blood pressure, 
storing and transforming energy sources, and protecting our blood stream from toxins– the 
devastating consequences of a cirrhotic liver come into full view (Chen and Morgan 2006; Rosen 
2011a). As the disease progresses, a patient may experience intense fatigue, accumulation of fluid 
in the abdomen (called ascites), and a number of other physical signs and symptoms; without 
																																																						
30 Hepatitis means literally ‘inflammation of the liver’. Hepatitis C is related to hepatitis A, B, and E in that 
they are all viruses that affect the liver, but via different etiologies and pathophysiologic pathways which I 
do not detail here.  
31 Sexual transmission has also been documented, but accounts for a small percentage of transmissions. 
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screening, patients may only be diagnosed at a more advanced stage when these physical changes 
have progressed (Rosen 2011a). Patients in the late stages of hepatitis C require hospitalization and 
liver transplants, may progress into liver cancer, and eventually die without treatment. But this 
process takes time and does not happen to everyone: anywhere from 5-20 years on average for 
patients, with estimates of 20% reaching the later cirrhotic stages (Rosen 2011a; Sulkowski and 
Thomas 2005). This duality of hepatitis C – with both potentially deadly consequences but also 
slow progression – means that the virus carries large scale patient and public health implications 
emulating an infectious epidemic (a transmissible pathogen, eventual mortality, stigmatization 
upon diagnosis of infection), but without the political emergency dynamic spurred by epidemics 
such as HIV/AIDS or Ebola (high velocity of mortality with widespread fear).  
1.5.2 A global epidemic of social disadvantage  
A second point of context relates to the populations affected the virus. The disease 
disproportionately affects populations down the gradient of poverty and relative political power. 
Particular patient populations - low-income patients, incarcerated peoples, people who inject 
drugs and those co-infected with HIV/AIDS – have higher infection rates than the general 
population (Beckman et al. 2016; Ward and Mermin 2015). This disproportionate risk travels 
globally, following the spread of the virus. The WHO estimates that 150-170 million are infected 
with the virus, with 350,000 dying each year (Hagan and Schinazi 2013). In Europe, 14 million are 
infected with the virus; in the UK itself, about 210,000 (Gornall et al. 2016; WHO 2015). The US 
has an estimated 3.5-4.7  million infected by the virus as of 2014, with the virus killing nearly 
20,000 patients per year – more than all other infectious diseases combined, including HIV/AIDS 
(Edlin et al. 2015; 2016a).  
Like HIV/AIDS but unlike diseases like tuberculosis, hepatitis C has affected populations 
in high, middle, and low-income countries (Hagan and Schinazi 2013; Momenghalibaf 2014; WHO 
2015).32 The large numbers of infected persons, along with their disproportionate share in 
vulnerable populations, means that public health systems have been at the center of the response 
to the virus and the advent of new curative treatments (Chahal et al. 2016; Iyengar et al. 2016; 
Ward and Mermin 2015). In contrast to rare diseases affecting small numbers, or even diseases 
																																																						
32 The presence of populations in high-income countries meant that companies saw a market, unlike with 
diseases such as tuberculosis where infection is concentrated in low-income settings. I do not address the 
implications of hepatitis C pricing in low-income countries at great length, though I will refer to this briefly 
in chapter 6.  
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that in the US receive large coverage from private insurance (such as diabetes), hepatitis C – as an 
infectious killer that unevenly affects populations without private insurance – requires resources 
and commitment from the public sector.  
1.5.3 Searching for therapies   
Third and finally, the molecular biology of the virus – its structure and strategies for 
replication at its most basic level –has made it both a stubborn but also a vulnerable target for 
drug development. The hepatitis C virus is made of a single strand of genetic material; this genetic 
material replicates and translates into the ten proteins that compose the progeny of the virus 
(Scheel and Rice 2013). Of these ten proteins, three are used to make the structure of the progeny 
hepatitis C virus and are thus dubbed the “structural proteins”, whereas the other seven are used 
to make a copy of the genetic material for the next generation and are called the “non-structural 
proteins” (Lindenbach and Rice 2013). These non-structural (‘NS’) proteins, specifically NS3/4, as 
well as NS5b and NS5a, have been proven to be targets for drug compounds because of their 
ability to halt the replication process (Rice and Saeed 2014). Sofosbuvir targets the NS5b protein, 
which is considered to be the central protein in the viral replication cycle (Sofia et al. 2010).  
Unlike the HIV virus, which integrates its genetic material into the host immune cells, the 
hepatitis C virus takes the new copy of genetic material and exits the liver cells, looking for new 
liver cells to fall prey (Lindenbach and Rice 2013). On the one hand, this replication approach has 
made the virus vulnerable to elimination, as targeting the viral proteins could remove the virus 
from the blood stream by halting its further replication. Patients could be cured of the virus, 
unlike with HIV, which remains in the bloodstream even with current treatments.   
Yet on the other hand, the error-ridden nature of its replication has made hepatitis C 
stubborn to intervention. Notably, the virus replicates without a robust proofreading function, 
meaning the virus has generated a proliferating number of subtypes that are categorized into six 
known genotypes (Dorner et al. 2013; Scheel and Rice 2013). This means that drug compounds 
have to eliminate virus at a high level from the bloodstream in order to reduce the risk that 
surviving viral progeny can gain resistance against a given compound. For this reason, patients 
with different genotypes of hepatitis C have typically required different combinations of multiple 
treatments in order to attack the virus at several points (Rice and Saeed 2014). In addition to high 
rates of resistance, another blockade stood in the way of researchers: for unknown reasons, the 
Roy	46 
	
virus did not grow in cell cultures outside the human body, making it difficult to test potential 
compounds for their anti-viral effect in pre-clinical research (Bartenschlager et al. 2016).33  
This combination of high resistance and the difficulty of testing compounds meant that 
patients through the 1990s and 2000s were left with few options (Groopman 1998).  Until 
sofosbuvir-based treatments, patients typically were prescribed interferon-based treatments 
(Heim 2013). Interferon is a protein that the body’s cells release to ‘interfere’ with foreign invaders 
such as viruses, and increasing its potency aimed to eliminate the hepatitis C pathogen (Isaacs 
and Lindenmann 1957). However, much like chemotherapies for cancer, interferon is toxic for 
patients, with severe side effects (Heim 2013). Furthermore, patients had to bear weekly injections 
for 48 weeks (Heim 2013). The initial interferon-based therapies in the 1990s and 2000s reached a 
cure rate in only 20-50% patients, defined as the clinical endpoint of sustained virologic response 
(SVR) (Heim 2013).34 Facing this long and difficult haul, many patients declined treatment until 
the late stages of disease (Groopman 1998).  
The drug development opportunity was clear and urgent: directly attacking the virus, 
rather than using the indirect method of boosting interferon, could potentially lead to greater 
potency and lower side effects – and an eventual elimination of the virus (De Clercq 2005). 
Scientists followed the conventional research and drug development pathways (see Table 1.1) to 
test potential antidotes against hepatitis C, with pre-clinical research involved in identifying 
potential compounds that could target potential vulnerabilities in the virus and promising 
compounds moving into human clinical trials. The culmination of the multiple organizations and 
scientists navigating these challenges in pursuit of an antidote, however, were shaped by a series 
of political and economic dynamics. These dynamics foreground my research.  
In summary, three crucial dynamics of the hepatitis C virus from its scientific and clinical 
dimensions are relevant to understanding the case. First, hepatitis C has a chronic-infectious 
course in scarring the liver that takes a long period of time and in a proportion of patients but has 
potentially deadly consequences. Second, the virus affects large numbers of people particularly 
among vulnerable populations, creating a matter for public health and public policy concern. 
Finally, the biological properties of the virus have made it stubborn to treat but also amenable to 
																																																						
33 I document this technological challenge in chapter 4, and the role of a risk-taking state in overcoming the 
hurdle.  
34 SVR is defined as the failure to detect virus for 3 months after the completion of treatment and is 
equivalent to ‘cure’ – long-term studies have shown an exceedingly small percentage of patients (less than 
1%) remitting after reaching SVR (Trepo 2013). 
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complete elimination. With this primer, we can now encounter the methodology used to engage 
with the research questions this dissertation poses.  
Box 1.1. Clinical trial process in drug development  
After pre-clinical research is completed, a compound may be deemed to be ready for clinical trials in 
humans. Before beginning clinical trials, companies usually file for patent approval35 from the United 
States Patent and Trademarking Office, and their compounds are judged for being useful, novel, and non-
obvious36 (Angell 2004; Pisano 1997). To begin clinical trials, a pharmaceutical company files an 
investigational drug application (IDA) with the Food and Drug Administration. Trials proceed in three 
main phases before approval, with a fourth occurring afterwards:  
 
• Phase I trials establish safe dosage and investigation of metabolism and side effects by testing in 
normal volunteers.  
• Phase II trials investigate the drug in comparison to placebo, usually with a small number of 
patients with the relevant disease or condition. Drugs are given at various doses.  
• Phase III evaluates the safety and effectiveness of the drug in much larger numbers of patients 
(hundreds to tens of thousands) by comparing it against the current standard of care. FDA 
approval usually rests on these Phase III ‘registration’ trials.  
• Phase IV trials occur after FDA approval as post-marketing studies that survey for adverse 
reactions and further analysis of efficacy. 
 
																																																						
35 Secrecy of the drug is not possible once clinical trials begin, so patents at this early stage ensure 
monopoly protection on their invention. However, the regulatory process also cuts into this monopoly 
period, incentivizing industry to push regulatory bodies to speed up their review process (Angell 2004).  
36 Non-obvious refers to the idea that the invention must go beyond what would have been the next logical 
step in the inventive process by some one trained ‘in the useful arts’.  
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Chapter 2. Research Design and Methods  
A Case Study of Pricing through an Innovation Process 
 
“There are an infinite number of facts about the motorcycle, and the right ones don’t just dance 
up and introduce themselves. The right facts, the ones we really need, are not only passive, they’re 
damned elusive, and we’re not going to just sit back and “observe’ them. We’re going to have to be in 
there looking for them…The difference between a good mathematician and bad one, is precisely this 
ability to select the good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality. He has to care!” 
- Robert M. Pirsig (1991:279), Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 
   
 
 In my second chapter, I describe the rationale and structure of the research design for 
answering the two questions that guided my investigation. I begin by chronicling a single case 
study-based research design and articulating the reasons for specifically selecting to focus on 
sofosbuvir’s innovation process (section 2.1). I then describe which data sources I used to 
construct the case study, the strategies I used to collect the data (section 2.2), and my approach to 
interpretation and analysis of the evidence I accumulated (section 2.3). Pirsig’s admonition 
shaped my iterative practice to data analysis, whereby I alternated between the evidence and data 
I collected and the analytic resources I chronicled in chapter 1 in order to progressively arrive at 
the answers contained in this dissertation. The chapter ends with an anticipation of limitations in 
my research design.  
 
2.1 Case study design 
In this section, I describe why I employ a single case study design as the vehicle through 
which to collect and interpret data to answer my research questions. Then I outline the 
parameters and key definitions that bound my object of analysis in the case study. I conclude by 
detailing the specific reasons for selecting the innovation process behind sofosbuvir-based 
medicines as the case for investigation.  
 
2.1.1 Why a single case study 
As I described at the end of chapter 2, two research questions animate my investigation. 
First, how did the organizational and financial dynamics of the innovation process for sofosbuvir-
based hepatitis C medicines unfold to explain its pricing? Second, how were the risks and rewards 
distributed across this process and what were its attendant outcomes for innovation and public 
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health? A single case study is well-suited to answer such how questions, in which as Yin (1984:23) 
puts it, “the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. I aim to 
re-embed an analysis of the phenomenon of pharmaceutical pricing and innovation within the 
political-economic contexts in which it occurred. Though I appraised the literature to gain a sense 
for these contexts (such as financialization) prior to the research, their influences were not self-
evident. I held them more as tentative frames open to elaboration and revision, with the answers 
emerging only by building the case study itself.  
Furthermore, my research aim was not to control variables to validate hypotheses; rather, 
my questions targeted “a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no 
control” (Yin 2009). Rather than pursue a comparative method across several cases, or test a 
hypothesis among a large N set of cases, my goal was to apply sociological and political economy 
analysis to explain a set of outcomes (pharmaceutical pricing and the risks and rewards of the 
innovation process) and thereby make sense of a given case of interest. This focus in turn afforded 
me the opportunity to trace connections that could in turn be potentially used to interrogate 
other cases or used to generate theory in a larger N set of cases (Johansson 2003; Stake 1995).  
 
2.1.2 A case study of what? Defining the object of study and its parameters   
 
In a single case study design, the selection of the case is a crucial research choice that 
frames the opportunity for contribution. But before I articulate my reasons for selecting the 
particular case, however, I need to first answer another question: “a case of what?” Even though 
the boundaries within the case (such as between actors, or between phenomenon and context) 
are at stake as the research unfolds, I must aim my investigation at what Stake (2005:444) calls 
the “specific one” – a discrete object which marks the provisional bounds of the study. As Stake 
describes, “if we are moved to study it, the case is almost certainly going to be a functioning body” 
(Stake 2005:444). For example, a case study of pharmaceutical pricing and innovation could 
consist of, for example, a single drug company, a single drug, or a single relationship between a 
company and a government. Given my sociological orientation and the research questions derived 
for my study, I define the “specific one” under examination in this dissertation to be an innovation 
process behind the sofosbuvir-based medicines in which I trace the relational dynamics between 
multiple organizational actors that shape pricing. Each of the frames that shape my object of 
study –processual and relational - requires further resolution.  
Roy	50 
	
I draw on the literatures described in chapter 1 to articulate six parameters for analyzing 
an innovation process in pharmaceuticals. First, I first define innovation in pharmaceuticals as a 
process that generates improved clinical outcomes rather than a ‘me-too drug’ that received 
regulatory approval based on minimal therapeutic benefit from the existing standard of care 
(Avorn 2004; Gagne and Choudhry 2011).37 This links to the notion that innovation has a direction 
in which new therapies can address health challenges facing patients and populations (Mazzucato 
2016; Stirling 2009). As I have already indicated, sofosbuvir represents a major clinical advance by 
offering a cure in nearly all the patients that take the medicine. I aim to trace the key inputs that 
made this advance possible, as well as the extent to which directional outcomes – of improved 
patient as well as public health outcomes – were realized.   
Second, I view this process as occurring across upstream-downstream stages, beginning 
with early science and onwards into deployment of a medicine (Freeman 1995; Lundvall 1992).38 I 
intentionally include deployment, which breaks with conventional “R&D” accounts of 
pharmaceuticals, because this is the stage in which patients and public health systems stand to 
benefit from the higher quality medicines. Examining the extent to which potential patient and 
public health benefits are realized provides a crucial measure of the outcomes of the process.  
Third, I study pricing and valuation along this process, specifically searching for ‘strategic 
sites’ at which prices are shaped in the upstream-downstream process. Though I take the launch 
prices in the US as a central query, I contextualize this launch price with the different valuations 
made by venture capitalists, potential acquirers, and the stock market earlier in the innovation 
process (Beckert 2011; Birch 2016; Maldonado Castañeda 2016; Veblen 1908b).  
																																																						
37 Typically, the unit cost dimensions of an innovation outcome are also included within definitions of 
innovation itself. In this case of hepatitis C, however, I take economic efficiency gains (such as generation of 
better quality products at lower unit costs) as part of the contested terrain to be examined in this 
dissertation and thus do not include it directly in my definition. In other words, as I described in the ‘value’ 
argument in chapter 1, the very underpinnings of the economic valuation of pharmaceutical innovation are 
up for debate.  
38 I draw on two leading “systems of innovation” scholars, whose definitions of innovation include the 
diffusion phase as intrinsic to understanding the process. Freeman (1995) defined innovation as occurring 
within a “network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, 
import, modify and diffuse new technologies” and Lundvall (1992:2) expressed the process as “the elements 
and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion, and use of new and economically useful, 
knowledge”. I use the term “deployment” in this dissertation as a more intentional form of diffusion 
because sofosbuvir-based medicines, unlike an iPhone or other consumer technology, are a curative 
medicine for an infectious epidemic disease for which delivery systems are available and an explicitly 
defined market (infected patients) are waiting to use the medicine upon approval and manufacturing.  
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Fourth, I parallel Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) in viewing innovation as a product of 
cumulative and collective efforts involving past and present knowledge contributed by multiple 
organizational actors. This means tracing past scientific and technical knowledge contributed to 
the innovation process as well as examining the roles of multiple public and private 
organizational actors involved in the innovation process.  
Fifth, and finally, because I take innovation to be an uncertain process as defined in 
chapter 1, in which these multiple actors are taking risks for uncertain rewards, any analysis must 
account for these specific risks and rewards (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). I define risks to be 
the contribution of funding and capital (whether public or private) as well as innovative labor 
(taking on scientific and technical challenges of different qualities along a process), whereas I 
define rewards to be financial gains (revenues, taxes, capital gains) and health improvements 
(patient and public health outcomes and improvements). Understanding this risk-reward nexus 
can inform our assessment into the sustainability of the innovation process – the extent to the 
process generates further resources and capital for research and development into other areas of 
unmet medical need.   
A sixth parameter is that innovation processes are mediated by the geographic context in 
which they unfold. This spatial awareness draws on science and technologies studies as well as the 
varieties of capitalism scholarship in political economy (Rajan 2006; Stuart and Sorenson 2003; 
Birch 2016; Hogarth 2017; Hall and Soskice 2001). Because the innovation process behind 
sofosbuvir almost all took place across U.S. public agencies and companies, my investigation is 
marked by several features of the U.S. ‘innovation system’ with regards to biomedical research. 
First, the U.S. government has invested significant sums in biomedical research, primarily 
through their National Institutes of Health, that has underpinned robust de-centralized networks 
of university laboratories as well as spurred scientific breakthroughs (Block and Keller 2009).39 
Second, over the past three decades, the U.S. has developed a sizeable venture capital sector (with 
hubs in Silicon Valley and Boston) that have backed nascent biotechnology enterprises at their 
early stages of development (Pisano 2006; Lee and Dibner 2006; Hogarth 2017). Third, scholars 
have noted the differences between national economies with regards to access to capital for 
corporations, whereby U.S. based companies (such as Gilead Sciences) are shaped by more short-
term oriented capital within stock-markets as opposed to their German and Japanese 
																																																						
39 Between its founding in 1938 to 2011, the NIH budget towards scientific and biomedical research has 
totaled $804 billion in 2011 dollars (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2011).   
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counterparts, where a bank-dominant system allows for access to more patient forms of capital 
(Hall and Soskice 2001; van der Zwan 2014). Fourth, the regulatory apparatus within the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and fragmented U.S. health system generally privileges the adoption 
of new technologies through accelerated approval pathways as well as limitations in drug pricing 
regulation in contrast with European countries, where national health systems tend to have 
greater bargaining power and regulatory authority (Kesselheim 2011; Kesselheim 2016; Davis and 
Abraham 2013).40 As with any single case study based research, these geographically specific 
features will bound my investigation and the interpretation of findings, with the caveat that the 
innovation process may have unfolded differently if it had occurred in a different geographic 
context. Considering these hypotheticals is beyond the scope of the dissertation, but following the 
case through the U.S. context can provide a specific chronicling of how its specific features shaped 
the innovation process and drug prices. 
Table 2.1 Parameters of the innovation process  
Parameter  Implication for case study data collection 
Generation of therapy 
representing significant 
clinical (and public 
health) advance  
Identify the qualities of the product innovation and trace the actors and 
steps that made these qualities and directional outcome possible.  
Upstream-downstream 
stages, including 
deployment 
Trace early stages of hepatitis C research and drug development history 
and follow it to present-day period of treatment deployment.  
Pricing and valuation Follow mechanisms of pricing and valuation at locations along the 
upstream-downstream innovation process, with a focus on understanding 
the market launch price 
Cumulative and 
collective effort with 
multiple organizational 
actors  
Identify multiple public and private actors involved in the innovation 
process, as well as scientific and technical contributions that made 
discovery and development of sofosbuvir possible 
Risks and reward nexus  Account for the financial and scientific/technical contributions across the 
process, as well as the financial and health rewards that were the outcomes 
of this innovation process  
Geographic context  
 
Follow the specific elements of how the geographic (regional or national) 
context shapes the innovation process (in this case of sofosbuvir, a U.S. 
based context).  
 
																																																						
40 It is worth noting that the boundaries between the U.S. context and the rest of world with regards to 
regulation are often blurred by the influence that multinational pharmaceutical corporations can exercise. 
For example, the pharmaceutical industry has sought to increasingly ‘harmonize’ regulatory pathways by 
influencing both US and European regulatory authorities (Davis and Abraham 2013). Additionally, the 
launch prices set in the U.S. are typically discounted in Europe by 10-20%, meaning that the initial U.S. 
launch price becomes a reference point internationally (Kesselheim 2016). 
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Besides focusing on innovation as a process based on these six parameters, the other major 
consideration of my research design is to view this process in relational terms. By relational, I 
draw on Emirbayer’s (1997) conception in which relations between actors or units are held to be 
the object of analysis, with these relations unfolding as processes rather than existing as static ties 
among inert substances (Abbott 1996). This emphasis aims to depart from the blind spots which 
have often confounded the debate over pharmaceutical development and pricing. These blind 
spots, which I identified in chapter 1, parallel critiques made of substantialist modes of research, 
in which ‘substances’ such as single, atomistic actors constitute the fundamental unit of inquiry 
rather than relations.41  In such modes of research, atomistic actors are deployed as pre-
determined entities in research, thereby failing to capture the multiple dynamics of social life.42  
By contrast, a preferred relational approach within the case study allowed me to map sets 
of relationships over time. Rather than consider monolithic entities such as the ‘state’, ‘business’, 
and ‘financial capital’, I allowed my methods of data collection and analysis to reveal 
differentiated, multivalent actors along each axis of analysis as illustrated in Figure 2.1. For 
example, rather than focusing only on Gilead, I also related Gilead to small biotechnology 
companies such as Pharmasset. Additionally, I avoided an analysis of Gilead and its hepatitis C 
pricing in ahistorical terms, and instead traced the evolution of its business and mapped the sets 
of relationships (such as with the state and financial sector) which in turn shaped its hepatitis C 
strategy.  
In keeping with this orientation towards analysis, I conceived of power not as atomized 
quanta attached to single actors to increase or decrease, but rather as a relational concept that 
emerges and evolves with the positions occupied by these social actors. Emirbayer (1997) explains 
such a treatment of power: “far from being an attribute or property of actors, then, power is 
unthinkable outside matrices of force relations; it emerges out of the very way in which 
figurations of relationships […] are patterned and operate.” Rather than assemble an elaborate 
																																																						
41 Emirbayer (1997) illustrates two pathways by which substantialist research typically proceeds, with each 
possessing critical limitations. One is a self-action pathway, in which actors are substances propelled by 
rational interests (as witnessed in rational actor theory), and an inter-action pathway in which actors or 
units are held as unchanging entities in which action takes place among these unchanging entities akin to 
Newtonian mechanisms (as in many variable-based quantitative studies). 
42 Desmond (2014) highlights three critiques of substantalist modes of research: (1) imposing static and 
atomistic categories in place of intertwining connections; (2) dealing in ‘groupism’ rather than tracing the 
relations between groups, and (3) ‘process-reduction’ as opposed to unpacking the processual dynamics of 
social life.   
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taxonomy of power with multiple metrics or pursue a rank ordering of different kinds of power, 
my aim was to describe these ‘matrices of force relations’ and how they shape the innovation 
process. For example, the strategies of small biotechnology companies as well as established 
pharmaceutical companies can only be understood vis-à-vis their shifting positions over time with 
financial actors such as venture capitalists and shareholders. This view of power also emulates 
Veblen’s analysis of capital which I reviewed earlier, in which multiple relations of power get 
translated into the capitalization exercise used by economic actors.43 Armed with this relational 
approach as central to my research design, I could trace the unfolding of an innovation process 
(defined by parameters set out earlier) to locate and follow the mechanisms and relations of 
power that produced sofosbuvir’s prices and a particular distribution of risks and rewards. 
 
Figure 2.1 Mapping a triad of multivalent actors and relationship across time  
 
 
 
2.1.3 Why the innovation process behind sofosbuvir-based treatments? Justifying the 
selection 
 
Having justified an individual case study design focused on a unit of analysis that is 
process-based and relational in nature, we can now articulate the reasons for the selection of the 
																																																						
43 See Chapter 1, section 1.3.3.  
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specific case. Stake (1998:236) points to this as the hallmark of any case study research design: “As 
a form of research, case study is defined by interest in individual cases, not by methods of inquiry 
used”. The interest in this individual case was based on three pieces of rationale, which I draw 
from different methodological and sociological scholars. First, the case fulfilled key operational 
criteria of the phenomenon in question (Yin 1994:91). Second, the case “looms large” over debates 
in pharmaceutical pricing and innovation (King and Sznajder 2006:767). Third, the case presented 
an “opportunity to learn” with uncommon access to data and social networks involved in the 
innovation process (Stake 2005:451). Taken together, these reasons align with my aim of 
explaining outcomes in a single case rather than testing theories in a set of ‘representative’ cases.  
Sofosbuvir-based treatments posed two key operational criteria of the larger phenomenon 
under question: (1) sofosbuvir represented a true clinical breakthrough with public health 
implications and (2) their prices became the subject of intense social and political contestation. 
Sofosbuvir-based treatments created a drastic shift in treatment possibilities for hepatitis C 
patients: while prior regimens required six to twelve months of treatment and offered only 50% 
response rates with high rates of side effects and toxicities, sofosbuvir-based regimens have 
offered nearly 100% cure rates with few side effects after only three months of treatment 
(Hoofnagle and Sherker 2014; Ward and Mermin 2015). This clinical advance required scientific 
and technological advances over a significant period of time, meaning an innovation process 
existed which could be investigated. This trait is unlike many medicines that have prices deemed 
to be high but are the result of gaming the intellectual property system and not new scientific and 
technological labor, such as the prominent case of insulin in which prices continue to rise even 
though insulin’s discovery was decades ago (Greene and Riggs 2015).  
The prices of sofosbuvir-based treatments also ignited a wide-ranging social struggle over 
treatment access and valuation. Unlike other prominent cases, Gilead’s pricing could not be 
explained away by maneuvers of a single business unit in acquiring previously approved or off-
patented medicines (Armour and Rockoff 2016).44 Nor could criminality be used as a central 
explanation. As a staff member of a US Senator shared with me, “you won’t find any thing orange 
jump-suit worthy here”, suspecting that I had been looking for incriminating evidence when 
																																																						
44 Two cases of price gouging which drew public attention and indignation in 2015 and 2016, Turing 
Pharmaceuticals and Valeant Pharmaceuticals, have been subject to US Congressional scrutiny, with senior 
leadership in both companies coming under scrutiny. See “Valeant, Turing Boosted Drug Prices to Fuel 
Preset Profits” in Wall Street Journal on February 2, 2016 (Armour and Rockoff 2016). 
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examining the data generated by the US Senate finance committee investigation into Gilead.45 
Rather, what I found most interesting was the absence of an overt criminal explanation and rather 
the ostensible presence of a multi-layered and contested social process requiring the tools of 
sociological and political economy analysis.  
The second reason for selecting this case, beyond fulling my two core ‘operational criteria’ 
- the pricing over sofosbuvir-based treatments ‘looms large’, meaning novel research findings have 
the potential of making important contributions to the debate over hepatitis C and potentially the 
broader discussions over pharmaceutical pricing and innovation. The medicines reflected not 
only a clinical marvel, but also the most profitable drug launch in pharmaceutical history. They 
became the subject of political, policy, and academic debates. In the arena of politics, they were 
raised by candidate Clinton on the campaign trail (DuVall 2016) and galvanized a US Senate 
investigation (Loftus 2015). In space of policy discussions, health agencies from around the world, 
policy institutes, and think tanks have wondered about how to interpret and respond to the 
challenge of hepatitis C medicines and drug affordability (Chahal et al. 2015; Reinhardt 2015; J. 
Walker 2015; Ward and Mermin 2015). At the sole forum on drug pricing organized by the Obama 
administration, sofosbuvir was cited as a paradigmatic of the drug affordability problems 
challenging many health systems (Pear 2015; US Health and Human Services 2015)  Scholarly 
analysis of the pharmaceutical sector, ranging from medicine to industrial and health economics, 
has weighed in on the issues raised by sofosbuvir as well (Brennan and Shrank 2014; Chahal et al. 
2016; Kesselheim et al. i 2016; Leidner et al. 2015). Yet these analyzes typically have obscured the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir, thereby only providing partial explanations. A more 
complete explanation would be a boon for this disputed domain: given the large numbers of 
hepatitis C patients, but also the potential for breakthroughs in other disease areas with sizeable 
patient populations such as Alzheimer’s and certain cancers, the hepatitis C and sofosbuvir 
innovation process holds potential for pivotal lessons that will be closely examined by multiple 
stakeholders.  
Third, the case of sofosbuvir-based treatments offers what Stake (2005:451) frames as an 
“opportunity to learn”, which in this case comes in two forms: its unique features as well as the 
practical access to data. The case of sofosbuvir may be considered to be an outlier by some 
analysts, based on the large numbers of patients with an infectious disease in hepatitis C as well as 
																																																						
45 Interview 25 
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the curative and time-bounded nature of sofosbuvir-based treatments (Flier 2017). Indeed, many 
medicines with high prices are for diseases with smaller populations, and many of these 
medicines require long-term or even life-long treatment (Kesselheim et al. 2016; Montazerhodjat, 
Weinstock, and Lo 2016). However, as Stake (2005:451) has noted, “some times it is better to learn 
a lot from an atypical case than little from a seemingly typical case”. To heed Stake’s advice, I take 
inspiration from Mauss (1985:10), who noted that such cases possess "an excessiveness which 
allows us better to perceive the facts than in those places where, although no less essential, they 
still remain small-scale and involuted." Indeed, the tensions that sofosbuvir’s pricing created for 
health systems - and the debates this instigated - were an important reason for why a large array 
of evidence became available for analysis over time. For example, the appendices in the US Senate 
investigation provided approximately 1,500 pages of internal corporate documents with detailed 
information on the valuation of sofosbuvir by Pharmasset, Gilead’s acquisition of Pharmasset, and 
their subsequent pricing of their treatment regimens. Interviews would not have yielded such 
detailed internal information about business strategies. Given the timeliness of the drug’s 
approval with the start of my PhD, I was also able to follow a slew of media accounts, new journal 
articles, and in-person events through which I could identify potential interviewees and gather 
more data. The case thus offered rare opportunities to gain access to sources of data pivotal 
towards answering research questions on drug pricing and innovation.  
In sum, the innovation process behind sofosbuvir-based treatments possessed three 
compelling reasons to motivate my investigation: key operational criteria as a high and contested 
price for a breakthrough drug, a case which looms large over debates on the issues I am interested 
in, and finally an opportunity to learn with uncommon availability of data. Armed with an 
intriguing case, I set out to collect data that could answer the questions posed in this dissertation.  
 
2.2 Data sources and collection 
 I drew on four sources of data – documents, semi-structured interviews, databases, and 
observation at meetings – to build the case study account.46 I describe my data collection and 
analysis occurring over four phases as highlighted in Table 2.1, with the data collection all 
																																																						
46 I also spent 10 clinic sessions with hepatitis C patients to better understand the clinical and treatment 
issues at stake. This time was split between a clinic in Los Angeles and Addenbrookes hospital in 
Cambridge, UK. Though I did not glean any direct evidence for the case study of the innovation process –
individual patient cases were not part of my data set – as a future physician-social scientist, this time with 
patients provided helpful context and understanding in pursuing my research.  
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happening in the first three phases. A more detailed listing of the data including interviews is 
provided in Appendix A. In Phase I, I began with documentary evidence to build a starting 
foundation of understanding with which to gather further documentary data, identify and pursue 
interviews, and attend relevant meetings. Phase II mixed pursuits for all three sources of data, 
with phase III returning to a focus on documentary content. I periodically analyzed this data 
across all four phases of data collection in a manner described in section 2 
 
Figure  2.2  Data collection and analysis across research timeline  
 
 
I bounded my data collection from these four sources based on the parameters and 
definitions outlined in the prior section in ways that I specify below for each data source. The four 
sources of data worked together, as I triangulated across them to assess the validity of the 
evidence. Documentary sources provided a significant portion of the evidence, given the wealth of 
available information in medical and policy journals, media accounts, and public databases. 
Pairing this with internal corporate documents and evidence, such as those offered in the US 
Senate investigation and interviews, allowed me to represent the innovation process.  
Semi-structured interviews served two important roles: they provided narrative 
“thickness” to the drug development process by providing contextual information not presented 
at meetings or available in documentary sources that I had collected to that point. On several 
occasions, interviewees pointed to a development of which I had been unaware; they not only 
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provided their perspective and narration on the development, but also referred me to articles 
which could provide more evidence to interpret. The interviews thus “filled in” gaps and provided 
glue to many of the steps described in the innovation process. Second, they allowed me to check 
the relative significance of certain events and mechanisms that had emerged from documentary 
sources and observations at meetings. For example, I was able to understand the comparative 
importance of a certain technological advance or a public initiative from multiple experts within 
the field, rather than rely solely on an organizational document or journal article.  
I used databases principally to gather financial data on the two key companies involved, 
Pharmasset and Gilead, as well as funding data on NIH projects. These numbers proved crucial to 
interpreting the risks and rewards taken by these organizations across the innovation process.  
Finally, observations at meetings provided an opportunity to learn more about the 
strategic orientations of different actors, especially with regards to the deployment of hepatitis C 
medicines. Perhaps most crucially, they provided the chance to request interviews - several of my 
key informants emerged from in-person encounters at meetings or conferences. In the section 
that follows, I review my data collection methods for each of the sources. 
 
Table 2.2 Data sources and collection methods  
Data Source  Collection Methods  
Documentary 
Sources 
o Scientific and medical journals: I used Web of Science and a search of pivotal 
medical journals to identify key articles that covered scientific/therapeutic and policy 
developments.  
o Media accounts: I used Lexis Nexis to search for media accounts from 2000-2016, 
and also tracked news stories as they appeared based on real-time developments as 
well as snowballing. I focused on New York Times, Bloomberg, Financial Times, Wall 
Street Journal, STAT Health, and FiercePharma, as these are critical sources of news 
and reporting on the pharmaceutical sector and health care. I chose the 2000-2016 
time frame based on my reading of scientific and medical journals, which indicated 
that this was the most active period for hepatitis C drug development.    
o Organizational/institutional reports: I searched websites for key organizations 
identified in other documentary sources (such as the NIH) and SEC filings for 
Pharmasset and Gilead. I reviewed earnings call transcripts between Gilead and 
investment analysts (gathered through S&P Capital database) as well as investor notes 
(gathered through Thomson Reuters).  
o Historical policy research: I searched for key papers and book chapters that 
documented the policy, legislation, and regulations that may have played a significant 
role in shaping the sofosbuvir innovation process.  
o The US Senate investigation released in December, 2015 was the most significant 
documentary source, providing over 1,500 pages of internal corporate documents for 
review.  
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Semi-
structured 
interviews  
o 41 interviews with initial sampling of 15 based on initial document review, and then 
snowball sampling to find the rest  
o State actors: National Institutes of Health scientists, publicly-funded university 
scientists, public health system officials (i.e. Medicaid) 
o Business actors: scientists at start-ups, biotech executives, senior leadership at large 
pharmaceutical companies, scientists at established companies  
o Financial actors: venture capitalists, investment analysts 
o *I also interviewed actors who did not neatly fit into one of these categories, but had 
expert knowledge on a relevant domain. For example, I interviewed several patient 
advocates who had kept close track of the drug development pipeline for over a 
decade as part of their formal organizational roles in treatment advocacy groups and 
provided detailed accounts of specific compounds and business strategies.     
Databases  o S&P Capital for Gilead and Pharmasset’s financial data, with statements in all 
recorded years and then analyzed for relevant data; I also was able to retrieve earnings 
call transcripts that I count towards my documentary sources.  
o NIH Reporter database for funding on publicly funded research related to the 
innovation process.  
o Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services drug spending database for financial data 
on what US public systems spent on sofosbuvir-based medicines.  
o I used the Wayback Machine, an internet archive, to examine the old webpages of two 
key companies in the innovation process that no longer operate in hepatitis C: Apath 
and Pharmasset.  
o OpenSecrets database provided political lobbying data on Gilead in Washington DC, 
which helped contextualize state-business relations with regards to drug pricing  
Observation 
at meetings 
o I gathered invitations to a total of 6 in-person fora of key actors related to sofosbuvir 
and also watched 3 such events online for a total of 9 meetings.  
 
2.2.1 Documentary sources 
 
Among documentary sources, I reviewed scientific and medical journals, media accounts, 
institutional filings and reports, and historical research.47 I began with the scientific and medical 
literature in order to develop a firm understanding of the scientific and technical underpinnings 
of the hepatitis C and sofosbuvir innovation process. To develop my initial sample of this 
literature, I used two strategies: broad searches in Web of Science and PubMed as well as journal-
specific queries. In Appendix A, I describe these searches in greater detail, as well as provide 
examples of the literature I reviewed.  
The second documentary source was media accounts, which involved gathering key news 
stories of hepatitis C science and drug development. I used Lexis Nexis to search for relevant 
articles from January 1, 2010 to October 1, 2014, as this time frame allowed me to capture much of 
the drug development process into the post-approval stages. I searched through the news stories 
																																																						
47 Here, I provide the general strategies I used for documentary sources. Refer to Appendix A for further 
detail and examples of the documentary evidence.  
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to identify ones that related to organizations involved in the sofosbuvir innovation process. One 
of the exciting challenges of my project: new stories on hepatitis C were written almost every 
week during 2014 and 2015. This meant that I needed to keep up with the rapidly evolving context 
and news events and be open to multiple news sources reporting on the case. Two online news 
sites dedicated to reporting on the industry - FiercePharma and FierceBiotech - as well as a health 
related news site, STAT Health, provided this more real-time reporting and analysis. I later did a 
second search in Lexis Nexis, from October 2, 2014 to December 1, 2016 in order to capture any 
further news articles that I might have missed in the intervening period since my initial search. 
For my third documentary source, I compiled content across the organizations that 
emerged from scientific and medical journals as well as media accounts. For example, I used 
multiple NIH websites to download their plans for hepatitis C science, with the earliest document 
from 1999, with a NIH Action Plan for Liver Disease Research launched in 2003 with three annual 
follow-up updates to 2006. I also used SEC’s online EDGAR filing system to search for all the 
quarterly and annual reports for the two main businesses at the heart of the development of 
sofosbuvir, Pharmasset and Gilead. These SEC filings contain extensive historical information on 
each of the businesses, their drug pipelines, and financial data. I reviewed the publicly available 
FDA documents on the approval of sofosbuvir to identify the key clinical trials (and their 
sponsors) used to evaluate the medicines. With this initial sampling of data from journals, media 
accounts, and organizational documents, I began to perform interviews, which I describe further 
below.  
As the research unfolded and I had a better sense for the key political-economic dynamics 
at stake in the innovation process, I conducted historical research into policy, legislation and 
regulation that may have shaped those political-economic dynamics. For example, how was 
publicly funded science used in the innovation process? How did particular kinds of financing 
emerge? What were the rules, if any, around the distribution of capital by senior executives or 
pricing new medicines? I did not perform an exhaustive review of all such policies related to the 
pharmaceutical sector or biomedical innovation, as this would be beyond the scope of my 
dissertation project, but attempted to trace each of the important policy domains that may have 
been factors in the sofosbuvir innovation process. I performed internet searches to identify 
academic papers and book chapters that could offer this historical understanding. As examples: I 
leaned on studies by Block and Keller on public funding for commercialization, Gompers on the 
emergence of venture capital, Lazonick on the rules for share buybacks, and Kesselheim as well as 
Roy	62 
	
Rai and Eisenberg on US federal policies on property rules on publicly funded science (Gompers 
1994; Keller and Block 2013; Kesselheim 2011; Lazonick 2015; Rai and Eisenberg 2003).   
As I performed more interviews and better appreciated the role of the financial sector on 
the drug development process, I also reviewed earnings call transcripts between Gilead’s senior 
executives and investment analysts on Wall Street, dating from Q3 of 2011 (just before Gilead 
announced its acquisition of Pharmasset) to Q3 of 2015 (16 reports). Additionally, I studied 11 
notes from investment analysts assigned to the hepatitis C ‘market’, drawing on my access to 
Judge Business School’s ‘Thomson Reuters’ database of investor reports.  
Lastly, I was aided by the 18-month bipartisan investigation by the U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee (led by Senators Ron Wyden and Chuck Grassley). In a 144-page report with over 1500 
pages in appendices released on December 1, 2015, the Senate Finance committee investigators 
chronicled Gilead’s approach to pricing in detail based on approximately 20,000 internal 
documents provided by Gilead to the Senate Finance committee (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015). The Appendices of the US Senate report were of particular interest 
to me, as they contained meetings minutes from both Pharmasset and Gilead’s board of directors, 
in addition to internal corporate strategy towards hepatitis C drug development and pricing, with 
some documents dating back to the late 1990s. 
 
2.2.2 Semi-structured interviews  
From my initial review of documents, I developed a starting sample of the key 
organizations involved in hepatitis C science, drug development and pricing — these centered on 
the state, business, and financial actors.  
From this ‘organizational layer’, I identified key names and contact details via 
organizational websites and via attendance at meetings and conferences and subsequently 
emailed them with interview requests. After an initial wave of 15 interviews, I used snowball 
sampling to gather more names for potential interviews, eventually completing 41 total 
interviews. I tapered and eventually ended the process when I reached a point of empirical 
exhaustion for the purpose of answering my two research questions - after I had gathered all my 
key documents and had performed enough interviews where the key patterns had already 
emerged and been sustained both across the interviews as well as other data sources (Auerbach 
2003). I approached my interviewees via two methods: direct emails and in-person encounters 
with an email follow-up. I usually asked for only 20-30 minutes of time, especially with senior 
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business officials, but was often granted more time when the interview actually began and 
unfolded.  
I prepared a general set of questions, and adjusted them based on the person I was 
interviewing as well as the flow of the interview itself. I drew on best practices from semi-
structured and elite interviewing, given the exploratory nature of my research into the innovation 
process as well as the kind of elite actors I aimed to interview (Berry 2003; Kincaid and Bright 
1957; Peabody et al. 2013). Where a structured interview is composed of a carefully designed and 
fixed set of interview questions aimed at identifying common or divergent patterns across 
interviewees, a semi-structured interview allowed me the opportunity for probing by enabling the 
interviewee to expand freely on a given topic or question (Peabody et al. 2013). My questions 
aimed at four general areas, with specific probes adjusted to the particular interviewee. I usually 
began by asking a personal, open-ended question about their involvement and background in 
hepatitis C and/or pharmaceuticals. The middle part of my interview centered on unpacking the 
key actions they took and processes of which they were a part, and identifying their relationships 
with other key actors. I encouraged interviews to begin at the beginning and work forward in 
order to gain a historical perspective from their vantage. (i.e. telling the evolution of hepatitis C 
science from their vantage, or involvement in an acquisition process for a compound). I typically 
ended by asking the interviewee on their perceptions of the controversies around hepatitis C 
medicine and their pricing, and directions for further resources, questions, and interview 
contacts.  
Given the controversial nature of hepatitis C medicines and the significant media 
attention on the topic, I aimed to put my interviewees at ease: rather than “interview you”, I 
aimed to “talk with you” and reminded respondents that their answers would be confidential 
(Berry 2003).48 This approach worked, with only one publicly funded scientist and one hedge fund 
trader declining my interview request. I usually performed interviews that extended to 45-60 
minutes long. Several key informants gave longer interviews and provided critical depth via their 
proximity to an important process or episode (usually over an hour). Throughout the interviews, I 
																																																						
48 I followed the advice shared by Berry (2003:679) which had been passed on by a mentor, Robert Peabody: 
“None was more important than this: the best interviewer is not one who writes the best questions. Rather, 
excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like a good talk among 
old friends. He didn’t carry a printed set of questions in front of him to consult as the interview progressed; 
yet he always knew where he was going and never lost control of the discussion. He gave his subjects a lot 
of license to roam but would occasionally corral them back if the discussion went too far astray.” 
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made on the spot modifications to explore un-anticipated yet promising threads that emerged 
from the discussion (Kincaid and Bright 1957; Peabody et al. 2013). In order to maximize candor 
with interviewees and reveal potentially sensitive details of their activity, I did not perform tape-
recordings and instead took notes by hand and wrote them up following the interviews (Berry 
2003; Peabody et al. 2013). I was able to maintain my eye contact by only jotting down notes 
rather than entire passages. In almost every case, I immediately followed the interview by typing 
up my recollection of the encounter and waited six hours at the most in a small number of 
interviews.  
 
2.2.3 Databases 
 
 In total, I used five databases to gather financial and spending data relevant to the case. 
First, for Pharmasset and Gilead, I used the S&P Capital database, which contained all the 
financial statements for the companies over their recorded history. Second, to account for US 
public investments in science, I used the NIH’s REPORTER database to identify grants to 
particular labs, including private labs at companies such as Pharmasset. Third, I used an archival 
database called the Wayback Machine - a digital archive of the Internet - to find Pharmasset and 
Apath’s original website pages in order to generate the early history of the biotechnology 
companies and their sources of funding. The fourth database I used was the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid drug spending database, which tracks public sector spending on pharmaceuticals 
by the two major public programs in the US: Medicare and Medicaid. This enabled me to 
understand the impact of sofosbuvir in terms of overall budgetary expense and treatment access. 
Fifth and finally, I used OpenSecrets, a database that tracks spending on political lobbying in 
Washington D.C. by different special interests. I searched for Gilead’s lobbying spending as a way 
into understanding how the state-business relationship evolved with the company’s hepatitis C 
pricing strategy.  
 
2.2.4 Observation at meetings  
 
From December 2014 to January 2016, I attended 6 major meetings related to hepatitis C 
medicines and I also watched proceedings of 3 meetings via virtual recording. All of the meetings 
brought together multiple actors of interest to my research question, with the major difference 
being the ‘lead convener’: sometimes it was a different branch of government (such as the FDA or 
the CDC) or industry (such as Gilead or a Gilead-funded academic institute) or clinicians (such as 
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the British Association for the Study of the Liver - BASL). The only major actor absent in most of 
these meetings were investment analysts and other Wall Street and London financial actors; I 
used the transcripts of earnings call as well as investor notes as key sources to understand their 
vantage. For each of the meetings I attended in-person, I actively jotted notes and composed a 
field note in the evening (Emerson et al. 2011). For each of the meetings I observed virtually, I had 
the freedom to rewind and listen, and I similarly jotted down key quotes and later composed 
notes.  
 
2.3 Data interpretation and analysis  
 
 I adapted elements of Ragin’s constructivist approach to social science research (see 
Figure 3.2) in my approach to data analysis, which calls for an iterative approach to building a 
case study (Ragin 1994). I alternated between analyzing data across my three sources to build 
provisional representations of the innovation process (via research memos and papers) and 
drawing on sociological and political economy literatures to conceptualize the analytical frame 
through which I was interpreting these provisional representations. By analytical frame, I refer to 
the literatures and concepts described in chapter 1 which provided tentative lenses through which 
to initiate my exploration but which shifted and evolved through the research process.49 I brought 
these analytic frames into juxtaposition with the representations of the innovation process yielded 
by the data and evidence I had collected in order to identify gaps, continuities, and tension 
points. These juxtapositions either encouraged me to either gather more data (i.e. when an 
analytical concept revealed gaps in my current data collection) or review the sociological and 
political economy literatures (i.e. when a piece of evidence could not be explained by the existing 
analytic frame I had been using at the time). As represented in Figure 2.2, this iterative approach 
between my data and my analytical resources allowed for a progressive approach to building a 
valid representation of the case study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
49 For more on these analytical frames, see Chapter 1 and the sections devoted to the entrepreneurial state, 
financialization, and capital as power.   
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Figure 2.3 Data analysis approach to case study development    
 
Source: Adapted from Ragin (1994), Constructing Social Research 
 
 This representation amounted to a sociological ‘account’ of the innovation process behind 
sofosbuvir-based treatments. Much like a clinician combining a patient history with quantitative 
data from diagnostic tests to make a clinical diagnosis, I take ‘account’ as a double-entendre a la 
Stark (2000): both a set of numbers (such as costs of drug development, revenues, patients 
treated), as well as a narrative of the innovation process.50 Each gave the other context – whereas 
numbers enabled a quantitative picture for risks and rewards, narrative detailed the nature and 
significance of social processes that could help make sense of those quantitative metrics. Through 
the combination of numbers and narrative in a clinical account of the innovation process, I could 
make a sociological and political economy diagnosis of the mechanisms that produced Gilead’s 
pricing and yielded a particular set of innovation and public health outcomes.   
 The data analysis itself fell largely into two modes of work. First, I built a detailed 
historical record of the innovation process. This record was a ‘live’ document which I updated 
throughout my data collection process and drew from all three sources of data. Second, I tracked 
key financial figures across the innovation process from documents as well as the S&P Capital and 
NIH databases, in keeping with my aim of not only capturing the narrative but also the numbers 
																																																						
50 Stark (2000:5) captures the intertwined nature of narrative and numbers: “Etymologically rich, the term 
‘account’ simultaneously connotes bookkeeping and narration. Both dimensions entail evaluative 
judgments, and each implies the other: Accountants prepare story lines according to established formulae, 
and in the accountings of a good storyteller we know what counts. In everyday life, we are all bookkeepers 
and storytellers. We keep accounts and we give accounts.” 
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that composed the account. These financial figures included the costs of research and 
development for sofosbuvir, the funding and financing behind the innovation process from 
multiple public and private actors, the revenues accrued by Gilead for sofosbuvir, as well as the 
distribution of these financial flows to shareholders and senior leadership. I used a third strategy 
of analysis – qualitative coding - to a lesser degree. I only used coding on earnings call transcripts 
to identify the strategic interests communicated by investment analysts and Gilead’s senior 
leadership. However, I did not code my individual semi-structured interviews as I was not 
interpreting their ‘talk’ for discursive patterns but rather for key events, relationships with other 
actors, and elaborations of technological and political-economic processes. I tagged these data 
points as I reviewed my interview notes and integrated them into the emergent and provisional 
narrative.  
 To ensure greater validity, I subjected this narrative to two further methods: within-case 
triangulation and counter-factuals. Both approaches helped test provisional representations of the 
innovation process and refine the empirical chapters and argument laid forth. Within the case, I 
triangulated across accounts provided by different actors and documentary sources to reconcile 
discrepancies or gaps in the narrative (Stake 2005). I also compared key events and processes in 
the innovation process with other compounds and firms in the hepatitis C arena beyond Gilead 
and sofosbuvir: a key example was comparing acquisitions of hepatitis C assets by a number of 
large companies. Such comparisons helped test alternative mechanisms and understand the 
extent to which I was capturing the right political-economic dynamics rather than isolated events 
or viewpoints.  
Additionally, I used counter-factual reasoning at specific points in the provisional 
narrative to challenge and sharpen my representation of the innovation process. Counterfactual 
reasoning involved posing alternative causal processes that could have occurred and run counter 
to the ones established via empirical research (Collier 2011; Fearon 2011; Levy 2009). As Levy 
(2009) puts it, “a theory that specifies the consequences of both X and not X tell us more about 
the empirical world than a theory that specific only the consequences of X.” For example, my 
analysis of Gilead’s acquisition of Pharmasset is based on asking what might have happened to 
Pharmasset if it had attempted to remain a stand-alone company and if Gilead had not existed as 
an acquisition specialist capable of leveraging its significant capital. Posing the counterfactual 
strengthened my analysis of the mechanisms by which speculative financial markets and 
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shareholders of incumbent pharmaceutical companies like Gilead influence the trajectory of drug 
pricing.   
I also used my provisional representations of the innovation process to garner feedback 
during my investigation. In one instance, the publication of a peer-reviewed article in the British 
Medical Journal in July, 2016 generated further feedback from two peer reviewers, BMJ’s editors as 
well as written responses from Gilead Sciences and other scholars of pharmaceutical innovation 
(Roy and King 2016). Throughout the research, my supervisor, Dr. Lawrence King, as well as 
discussions with several peers researching pharmaceuticals also guided and improved my 
methodology and analysis. Additionally, I presented my research at several major conferences, 
including at the European Association for the Study of Science and Technology (EASST) in 
Barcelona (in September of 2016) and at the Harvard Medical School’s MD/PhD conference in the 
social sciences and humanities, at which I was able to gain useful feedback.  
By (1) alternating between my data and the analytic frame, (2) interpreting my data with 
provisional narrative-building and retrieval of key numbers, (3) performing within-case 
comparisons and counter-factuals, and (4) engaging in ongoing feedback and consultation with 
multiple colleagues and advisors, I produced an analytically valid representation of the hepatitis C 
innovation process from the data I collected. 
 
2.4 Limitations in research design 
 
Though I provide a more complete accounting for potential limitations of my research 
findings in chapter 7, two ex-ante limitations are important to anticipate and address.  
The first potential limitation relates to my research into the role of the state. With regards 
to the state, I primarily focused on the role of innovative public sector organizations, such as the 
NIH, in contributing to the innovation process behind sofosbuvir. Unlike my research into an 
entrepreneurial state, my tracing of the relationships between other state actors and business 
and financial actors (state-finance, state-business) required me to lean on historical research 
done by others to understand the key policies, regulation, and legislation that shaped the rules 
by which specific political-economic dynamics may have unfolded as they did. By drawing on 
research by others, I may have missed important dynamics or erred in the interpretation of the 
ones I present. Where possible, I tried to study at least two different accounts (i.e. reading 
multiple histories of the Bayh-Dole Act, for example). Furthermore, my aim was not to perform 
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an exhaustive historical analysis of each of those rules, policies and legislations51, but rather trace 
the important shifts to the specifics of the sofosbuvir innovation process. In other words, this 
historical research provided critical context – but the foreground remained the innovation 
process behind sofosbuvir.  
A second potential methodological limitation: my focus on a single, successful case of 
drug approval, sofosbuvir (and its combination therapies), at the exclusion of many other 
hepatitis C compounds that were pursued in the broader drug development process. Analysts of 
pharmaceutical innovation are right to point out that tens of compounds reached phase I and 
phase II trials for hepatitis C, with a small minority even reaching to phase III and FDA approval. 
I did not, however, perform an analysis of the trajectories of all potential hepatitis C compounds 
(both successful and failed) as well as all the business units that attempted to pursue therapies 
for the disease. One argument against my approach is that it would underplay the contributions 
of private businesses to the hepatitis C innovation process. 
Such a critique, however, falls for the same traps laid by the ‘risk’ argument, in which 
summing the private industry contributions is argued to reflect Gilead’s prices (Calcoen et al. 
2015).52 My approach sought to develop an alternative to this debate through a thick description 
of a single compound’s trajectory, a method that could not be used to trace all or even multiple 
potential compounds within the context of a PhD time frame.  
But my approach also mitigated against this potential critique in three ways. First, my 
accounting of the upstream stages of hepatitis C research was historically deep, and these early 
stages of discovery apply to all onwards drug development – indeed, as we will see, any drug 
development rested on these contributions. This historical retrieval of the early science anchored 
my broader analysis of the innovation process. Second, my approach included not just a product-
level view of sofosbuvir but also a business-level, organizational view: I therefore present the costs 
of all research and development attempted by the businesses that developed sofosbuvir, which 
includes the costs of all failed compounds. Third, I bring in an industry-level view at critical 
junctures of the innovation process by tracing the relationships between developers of sofosbuvir 
																																																						
51 As I indicate in chapter 6, this would be a separate project, and might draw on the model set by Gretta 
Krippner’s (2011) work on tracing the relationship of the state with financialization in order to develop 
deeper insights into the role of the state in the financialization of biomedical innovation.  
52 A study funded by Gilead Sciences and performed by Boston Consulting Group aimed to make this 
argument, showing an overall 2% success rate by the industry in getting hepatitis C compounds all the way 
to approval (Calcoen et al. 2015).   
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and competing business organizations. Two examples capture this vantage: I juxtaposed the 
sofosbuvir valuation with the prices of the key prior therapy for hepatitis C, interferon, and I also 
captured the trajectory of two other hepatitis C compounds and competing businesses (Bristol 
Myers Squibb and Merck) to indicate the ‘gold rush’ dynamics of drug development. By taking 
these steps, I gave readers insight into the broader industry-level dynamics shaping the 
innovation process.  
Any innovation process for a therapeutic area like hepatitis C contains a multitude of 
scientific, technological, and business events, some of which may fall from view during research. 
But the guidance of sociologist Charles Tilly (1990:36) offers a way through the paralysis that may 
otherwise set in from studying a seemingly infinite territory, in that he recognized the role of the 
researcher as “not to give a ‘complete account’ (whatever that might be), but to get the main 
connections right”. While my case focuses on those most relevant to sofosbuvir, the parameters I 
set in section 3.1 (regarding innovation process and relational dynamics) allowed me to trace 
outwards to capture those connections most crucial in answering my research questions. These 
connections, I argue, can be used to make sense of the multiple dimensions of the sofosbuvir 
innovation process, and illustrate the dynamics that influence the prices of new medicines.  
 
2.5 Summary of research design  
 
My research design employs a single case study to answer the two central research 
questions. I defined the central object of study to be the innovation process behind sofosbuvir-
based treatments and the relationships between multiple organizational actors and political-
economic mechanisms that can explain sofosbuvir’s pricing as well as the outcomes of the process 
(risk-reward nexus, public health outcomes). By drawing on four sources of data – documentary 
content, semi-structured interviews, databases, and observation at meetings – and then engaging 
in an iterative process of analysis, I built a valid representation of the case study. The products of 
this data collection and analysis are shared in the three empirical chapters that follow. The three 
chapters unfold in largely a historical manner, begin with the early stages of science and research 
behind hepatitis C and moving forward into drug discovery, development, and deployment.  
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Chapter 3. Making the Invisible Visible:  
The Hands of an Entrepreneurial State and a Shadow Epidemic 
 
“Oh GREAT LIVER in the sky, 
Show us where and tell us why 
Send us thoughts that will inspire us 
Let us see this elusive virus 
If we don’t publish soon, 
They’re going to fire us!” 
- Dr. Harvey Alter, Chief, Infectious Diseases Section, National Institutes of Health,  
Excerpted poem regarding NIH’s pursuit of the hepatitis C virus from Alter (2013) 
 
Decades long public backing, beginning in the 1960s, allowed for both the unveiling of a 
virus with a long, chronic course of pathology and illness and for the technologies necessary for 
developing its antidote. Over this period, a network of public institutions and funding turned a 
shadow epidemic into a tractable target for intervention and a magnet for further financial 
investment. This first empirical chapter chronicles this story, centering on the ascent of an 
entrepreneurial U.S. state in the pursuit of understanding a virus and plotting its demise. I begin 
with a focus on tracing the early stages of scientific discovery and technological development and 
trace them forward into subsequent steps in the drug development process. As I follow the 
transformation of a shadow epidemic into a tractable target for biomedical intervention, I draw 
on Mazzucato’s (2013b) concept of an entrepreneurial state to illuminate its critical role across 
multiple stages of the innovation process. The description of this process draws on scientific and 
medical journal articles, interviews with scientists, as well as public database queries of research 
grants, and is summarized in Table 3.1 below.  
This entrepreneurial state manifested itself via three interdependent threads over four 
decades: the provision of patient investment across the upstream-downstream terrain of the 
innovation process, risk-taking capital at technological frontiers that created new possibilities for 
drug development, and the legal contract and apparatus for converting public knowledge into 
private assets and organizations.53 This patient investment, risk-taking, and deal-making by an 
entrepreneurial state set private capital in motion for hepatitis C drug development and also 
shaped the direction of the innovation process towards a curative therapy. Yet the state’s deal on 
																																																						
53 The temporal unfolding of knowledge regarding hepatitis C – from a matter of post-war curiosity to 
contemporary concern – gives us the opportunity to map the parallel emergence and evolving roles of 
public organizations in the innovation process during the 20th century.  
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the conversion of public into private intangible assets became one of the key factors in the 
financialization of hepatitis C drug development, as it bolstered the conditions for a particular 
mobilization of speculative capitals in financial markets of intangible assets.54  
First, in section 3.1, I follow the emergence of the National Institutes of Health, with a 
central group of scientists in Bethesda, MD, along with scientists at other government agencies 
and the private company Chiron, in leading efforts to elucidate viral hepatitis and identify the 
infectious pathogen behind its chronic form. A signature effort begun by NIH scientists in the late 
1960s comprised of tracking patients over the course of decades to understand the “natural 
history” of the disease. These long-term studies of patients with liver inflammation formed the 
basis of grasping hepatitis C not as a benign disease, but as a matter for both individual concern 
and as a population health problem of epidemic proportions. This clinical and epidemiological 
visibility provided the foundation for further investment in therapeutic development that led to 
sofosbuvir.  
Second, public investments and research (section 3.2) into overcoming technological 
barriers hindering hepatitis C drug development in the 1990s led to a critical breakthrough – the 
sub-genomic replicon – that “dynamized in” private capital from small and large pharmaceutical 
companies.55 With the discovery of the replicon, the state went beyond cultivating the seedbed of 
basic science and proactively took a radical risk in extending the technological horizon upon 
which drug development could occur.  
Third, the state continued this orientation towards risk-taking into therapeutic 
development, supporting the development of ‘nucleoside science’ – a kind of medicinal chemistry 
used for its anti-viral properties but shunned through the 1980s into the 2000s by large companies 
for the risks posed by nucleosides in clinical trials (section 3.3). This research into nucleoside 
science, led by chemist Ray Schinazi based at the Veterans Affairs hospital and Emory University, 
also led to a new company in 1998, Pharmasset, that would ultimately develop the curative 
backbone, sofosbuvir, over the subsequent decade. The state created the legal and organizational 
apparatus with a series of regulatory shifts in the 1980s, exemplified by the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, by 
																																																						
54 While I foreshadow this dynamic at the end of this chapter, I use chapter 5 to more fully unpack this 
mobilization. 
55 This contrasts with the typical role assigned to the state in economic debates, in which public 
investments are said to ‘crowd out’ private capital. Here we observe the opposite to be true: investments in 
the replicon created a market for hepatitis C drug development which private capital attempted to exploit 
as an economic opportunity (Mazzucato 2016).  
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which publicly funded knowledge on nucleoside science could be converted into privately owned 
intangible assets to launch Pharmasset. I highlight the “triple helix” of publicly funded science, 
university labs, and small enterprises enabled by the Bayh-Dole Act, and point towards its 
consequences for both the financialization of drug development as well as the distribution of risks 
and rewards in the innovation process.   
 
Table 3.1 The Entrepreneurial State behind hepatitis C and sofosbuvir  
Phase of 
contribution 
(and relative 
timeline) 
Description and 
significance  
Actors  Key papers and/or reported 
funding  
Identifying the virus  
Identifying 
NANBH 
(early 1960s – 1975) 
Process of elimination by NIH 
scientists led to discovery of a 
‘non-A, non-B’ hepatitis 
pathogen  
NIH Blood Bank 
program 
Feinstone et al (1975) 
Confirming 
causative viral 
pathogen 
(1975-1989)  
Scientists continued to test 
possible viruses to identify 
pathogen causing viral 
hepatitis  
NIH, FDA, CDC  Alter et al (1978b), Tabor et al  
(1978a) 
Bradley (1979) 
Molecular biology 
techniques used to 
discover causative 
pathogen  
(1985-1989)  
Scientists manipulated and 
cloned DNA through new 
genetic engineering tools, 
leading to new screening 
techniques that led to 
hepatitis C discovery 
NIH, CDC with 
Chiron 
Choo et al (1989) 
Tracking the virus 
Long-term 
tracking studies  
(early 1960s to 
present) 
Patients receiving transfused 
blood with hepatitis C 
tracked over four decades to 
reveal significant patient and 
public health consequences 
NIH intramural 
studies, VA, CDC, 
Armed Forces 
Institute of 
Pathology  
Berman et al (1979),  
Ishak et al (1995),  DiBisceglie et 
al (1991), Seeff (1992), Alter 
(1992) 
Research tools for drug development  
Replicon 
development 
(1995-2002)  
German and US scientists 
created a research tool called 
the replicon that enabled 
replication of the parts of the 
hepatitis C virus with out 
which drug development 
could not proceed 
Germany 
government 
(German 
Research Society, 
Ministry for 
Education and 
Research); NIH 
extramural 
awards 
Lohmann et al 
(1999a) and Blight (2000) 
 
$3.4 million for Rice lab to 
develop replicon; $10.76 million 
total for hepatitis C research; 
German research funding from 
mid-1990s not publicly listed  
Replicon 
commercialization 
(2000-2003)  
Replicon was manufactured 
and distributed by Apath, a 
company supported through 
multiple major NIH grants, in 
order to enable hepatitis C 
drug development across 
company labs  
Small Business 
and Innovation 
Research 
Programme 
$1.81 million for replicon 
commercialization; $9.39 total 
to Apath from NIH and NIH 
SBIR  
Medicinal chemistry for drug development  
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Nucleoside science 
(1991-2005)  
Provided funding and support 
for anti-viral development 
that would form basis for 
Pharmasset  
NIH, VA  $2.72 million for viral hepatitis 
research; $8.84 million total 
from NIH; VA spending not 
reported  
Pharmasset launch 
(1998-2004)  
Multiple early stage grants 
provided important financial 
support and market signal to 
venture capitalists  
Small Business 
and Innovation 
Research 
Programme, VA, 
Emory  
$1.01 million for hepatitis C; 2.46 
million total from NIH SBIR; VA 
spending not reported  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS BELOW WILL BE DETAILED IN CHAPTER FIVE 
Sofosbuvir 
discovery 
(2005-2007)  
McGuigan method used by 
Pharmasset to develop 
sofosbuvir  
British Medical 
Research Council, 
European 
Research Council, 
Belgian 
government 
Funding not reported by MRC; 
research performed in mid-
1990s 
 
McGuigan et al (1996a) 
Clinical trials 
Phase II clinical 
trial 
(2011-2013)  
NIH-led study tested 
sofosbuvir in vulnerable, 
high-risk populations  
NIH  Estimated to be ~$14.2 million to 
run anti-infective trial in Phase 
II Osinusi et al 
(2013b) 
Pharmasset grant 
for clinical 
development  
(2010)  
ACA grant provided to 
Pharmasset to perform 
clinical trials  
Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and 
Health and 
Human Services 
(HHS)  
$244K grant from Affordable 
Care Act (‘Obamacare’) 
provision ((United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:13) 
*See Appendix B for further details on NIH funding sources, all of which were identified using the NIH Reporter 
database   
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3.1 Discovering Hepatitis: From the Front Lines of War to the National 
Institutes of Health 
 
The greenish hue creeping over human skin, termed jaundice, drew the eyes of medical 
scholars since antiquity (Gardner and Paul 1958; Rosner 2002). Episodes of war accompanied 
outbreaks of this condition, but the precise causes – beyond the suspected inflammation of the 
liver, termed hepatitis - remained a mystery (Gardner and Paul 1958).56 Investigating hepatitis in 
the twentieth century also began in the crucible of war. In World War II, 200,000 American 
soldiers suffered from hepatitis, marking the pathology as a matter of prime importance to 
military researchers (Gardner and Paul 1958). From their analysis of patient cases and samples, 
doctors suspected two infectious routes for this hepatitis: one via the blood, and the other oral-
fecal (Zimmerman et al. 1947).57 Yet the precise pathogens that traveled along these routes and 
their pathological consequences for patients persisted in obscurity. Four decades of research 
centered at the National Institutes of Health as well as other key public agencies lifted the veil.     
3.1.1 A home for viral hepatitis research: the emergence of the National Institutes of 
Health   
 
The process of ‘following’ viral hepatitis in the post-war period fell largely to an unlikely 
group of collaborators at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) campus in Bethesda, Maryland 
along with accompanying scientists at other government agencies.58 With the study of liver 
diseases still in its infancy, investigation into hepatitis emerged from a network of scientists and 
clinicians that ranged in expertise from blood banking to infectious disease to hepatology.   
Before World War II, US government  support for scientific research was a fledgling but 
largely marginal area of focus. The passage of the Public Health Services Act of 1944, however, 
inaugurated a more intentional strategy to pursue scientific research in the national interest. 
Emerging from prior iterations of government laboratories, the National Institutes of Health grew 
rapidly in the post-war years: from a total budget of $8 million in 1947 to $1 billion in 1966 
																																																						
56 The Babylonian Talmud of the 5th century BC referred to “epidemic jaundice”. Through out the Middle 
Ages and into the American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War, and World War I, bouts of jaundice – some 
times termed “campaign jaundice” – befell soldiers (Gardner and Paul 1958; Rosner 2002). 
57 One of the researchers, Hyman Zimmerman, served as a doctor stationed in north-east France during the 
Battle of the Bulge and returned to the U.S. after the war to serve in the public Veterans Affairs system as a 
doctor and research scientist over the next four decades. He is considered the “father of hepatology”, the 
study of liver disease (Kennedy 1993).     
58 Interviews 17, 20, 23 provided insight to this period.  
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(Harden 2008; NIH 2017a). From an initial handful of centers between 1946 and 1949, the NIH 
grew to 15 Institutes by 1970 and 27 by 1998. These investments aimed to give the US an economic 
and national security edge in the Cold War (Slaughter and Rhoades 1996).59 Over the decades 
following the war, several new Institutes as part of the broader NIH would serve as homes to viral 
hepatitis research (see Table 3.2): the Laboratory for Infectious Disease (LID) which later became 
part of the National Institutes for Infectious and Allergy Diseases (NIAID), the National Heart, 
Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), and the National Institute for Arthritis, Metabolism and 
Digestive Diseases (later renamed National Institutes for Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney 
Diseases – NIDDK). Scientists at these Institutes found their physical home at the NIH’s Bethesda, 
Maryland campus and formed what is known as the organization’s ‘intramural’ (or internal) 
research program.60  
The scientific pursuits in these Institutes and Centers were closely linked to patients and 
clinical care: as part of the Public Health Service Act of 1944, the NIH was authorized to conduct 
clinical research, which manifested in the form of a new research hospital called the Warren 
Grant Magnuson Clinical Center (often called simply the “Clinical Center”) at the Bethesda 
campus (Harden 2008). The Clinical Center served as hub for the growing campus, with the 
hospital opening in 1953 with 540 beds (Harden 2008). This hub, which continues to serve as the 
heart of the NIH campus, placed patients and research laboratories within close proximity to 
enable collaboration between doctors and lab scientists. The NIH budget, which stood at $52 
million in 1950, crossed $1 billion by 1966 (NIH 2017a). Though the rate of increase in science 
funding slowed in the late 1960s and 1970s from health-related funding going to Medicare and 
Medicaid and concerns over high inflation, the rapid post-war growth provided an institutional 
																																																						
59 In 1950, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s director and founder of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, Vannevar Bush authored a seminal report, Science: the Endless Frontier, arguing that 
scientific knowledge would help determine the country’s health, economic opportunity, and national 
security. Bush (1945:8-9) wrote at the time, “The government should accept new responsibilities for 
promoting the flow of new scientific knowledge and the development of scientific talent in our youth. 
These responsibilities are the proper concern of the Government, for they vitally affect our health our jobs 
and our national security. […] For many years the Government has wisely supported research in our 
agricultural colleges and be the benefits have been great. The time has come when such support should be 
extended to other fields.”  
60 The intramural program refers to the NIH’s internal research program at their Bethesda campus, which as 
of 2015 represents 10% of the organization’s overall budget ~$32 billion budget. This contrasts with the 
‘extramural’ program, in which 80% of NIH’s budget is granted to a broad network of research scientists 
based primarily at universities (NIH 2017a). We return to the extramural program later.  
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base for scientists interested in viral hepatitis to pursue an uncertain course of research (NIH 
2017a).  
 
Table 3.2 Main NIH Institutes involved in hepatitis C research  
NIH Institute  Main hepatitis C contributions  
National Institutes for Infectious and Allergy 
Diseases (NIAID), formerly the Laboratory for 
Infectious Disease  
Unveiled life cycle of hepatitis C virus, 
collaborated with other institutes on clinical 
research and trials, later led a Phase II clinical 
trial for sofosbuvir  
(Alter et al. 1978a; Lindenbach and Rice 2013; 
Osinusi et al. 2013b)   
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
(NHLBI); formerly the National Heart 
Institute 
Tracked patients after blood transfusions for 
viral hepatitis and created first national 
strategy to screen blood for hepatitis C (Alter 
2013; Alter and Houghton 2000) 
National Institutes for Diabetes and Digestive 
and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK); formerly the 
National Institute for Arthritis, Metabolism 
and Digestive Diseases 
Tracked long-term patients with viral 
hepatitis, pioneered initial treatments for 
hepatitis C with interferon, unfolded hepatitis 
C pathophysiology and outcomes (Hoofnagle 
2004; Hoofnagle et al. 1986a) 
  
 
3.1.2 Heart of a viral hunt: tracking chronic infectious hepatitis   
 
Both the precise pathogens behind infectious hepatitis and their pathological 
consequences were revealed in part via long-term tracking studies led primarily by the National 
Institutes of Health along with accompanying studies by the Veterans Affairs administration and 
the Centers for Disease Control. Yet the circuitous route to understanding viral hepatitis did not 
pass through the liver, but instead via the perils of a new procedure: open heart surgery. Two 
years following the first open-heart surgery in Philadelphia in 1953, the NIH began performing 
them at their Clinical Center in Bethesda (Harden 2008). These surgeries often aimed to replace 
faltering heart valves, the tough windows of tissue that control the flow of blood through the 
organ. In early attempts, however, lengthy procedures with significant blood loss meant patients 
required large transfusions of blood. Beginning in the mid 1960s, with the knowledge that one 
form of viral hepatitis traveled through the blood, a group at the National Institutes of Health’s 
Laboratory for Infectious Disease (LID) wondered about the contents of this transfused blood and 
the fate of the patients that received them (Alter 2013; Walker 2006). A handful had shown 
abnormalities related to the liver after the transfusion, but whether this was a pattern with 
clinical consequences was an open question. By taking a blood sample from patients prior to 
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surgery, and then following them in the subsequent months, they hoped to shine light on this 
potential cause and course of liver pathology (Walker 2006).61 This concern and curiosity, 
however, was not theirs alone.  
Blood transfusion had only been used sporadically before World War II, but procedures 
like open-heart surgery required their use on a growing scale in the post-war years. This need led 
to a wide-scale development of blood banks and blood transfusion services, including at NIH’s 
Clinical Center, with its Blood Bank Department (Walker 2006). The department became a 
pivotal hub for research into viral hepatitis, coordinating and leading studies to track viral 
hepatitis in patients following open-heart surgery (Alter 2013).  Collaborating with the Laboratory 
for Infectious Disease, scientists found that a third of those receiving transfusions developed 
elevations in liver enzymes (Alter et al. 1975; Alter et al. 1978a).62 These elevations signaled the 
duress of liver cells, as they leaked enzymes into the blood. Though these patients did not 
experience symptoms or signs of a clinical hepatitis from liver failure (such as jaundice), this 
biochemical hepatitis yielded evidence of a liver coping against some attacking pathogen (Berman 
1979).63 Hiding from their observers, however, lurked not one, but two distinct pathogens. These 
studies enabled an elucidation of these pathogens, ultimately not only leading scientists towards 
hepatitis C but also revealing the clinical consequences of the pathogen behind the disease.  
First, these long-term tracking studies allowed NIH researchers to test, by process of 
elimination, multiple potential pathogens that were suspected to be the cause of this infectious 
hepatitis. During the 1960s, scientists including Dr. Harvey Alter at the NIH had already identified 
one pathogen behind blood-borne hepatitis, which they had dubbed hepatitis B (Alter 1999). Over 
the next five decades, Alter would become a meticulous steward and investigator for the efforts 
																																																						
61 Dr. Purcell, an infectious disease doctor then at LID who would become a central figure in viral hepatitis 
in subsequent decades, describes the process in an oral history for the NIH: “So we set up a program 
whereby we would get a blood sample from patients who would be undergoing surgery, to take [a sample] 
Monday morning, [as they] came in for the week’s surgery, get a blood sample from them, and then – if they 
survived the surgery, [which not all of them did] – follow them at weekly intervals for the first couple of 
months, and then at monthly intervals for six months, and then perhaps indefinitely after that. Bob (his 
collaborator) had an epidemiologic nurse, but either she or I or both of us would go over, or go out around 
about four states here, to the homes of these people – because they were generally too sick to come out” 
(Walker 2006:7).  
62 Enzymes are proteins that catalyze chemical reactions; in this case, they were measured as an indicator 
(otherwise known as a biomarker) for a potential disease process.  
63 Biochemical hepatitis refers to a chemical or molecular change that is measured in the blood, whereas 
clinical hepatitis refers to a change that can be observed during a physical exam or biopsy of liver tissue, or 
experienced by a patient.  
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begun by scientists at the Laboratory for Infectious Disease and at the Blood Bank Department of 
the NIH (Alter 1999). One of Alter’s first questions with his colleagues: did hepatitis B cause the 
transfusion-associated hepatitis in the patients they had tracked thus far? They found, 
surprisingly, that only a third of those patients had been infected with this particular virus (Alter 
and Houghton 2000; Alter, et al. 1978b). Two out of every three patients were thus infected with a 
mystery pathogen. They tested another suspect which had came to the fore: hepatitis A. In 1975, a 
group of scientists at the Laboratory for Infectious disease had used direct observation via 
electron microscopy to identify hepatitis A as a viral cause of hepatitis (Feinstone et al. 1975; 
Feinstone et al. 1973). But upon testing the non-B blood, they found that not a single case was 
related to Hepatitis A, which they knew to be instead transmitted via the fecal-oral route.  
Publicly funded scientists had been pivotal to solving two central post-war puzzles of viral 
hepatitis: identifying the pathogens suspected to cause blood-borne (Hepatitis B) and fecal-oral 
(Hepatitis A) injury to the liver. But in solving these two puzzles, another had emerged: grappling 
with a third pathogen dubbed “non-A, non-B hepatitis”.65 Alter, Purcell, and others who had 
worked on viral hepatitis redoubled their efforts, but their initial confidence of a quick resolution 
and identification of a “hepatitis C” withered (Alter 2013). Another fifteen years would pass with 
the virus remaining a ‘known unknown’, a story to which we return later.  
Second, this NIH tracking study would be central to a broader public effort to understand 
the extent to which this pathogen posed a threat to patients and population health. At the time, 
elevated levels of liver enzyme (‘transaminitis’) had been the only notable change. But did 
patients have worse health or mortality outcomes? Little was known: the virus would remain 
invisible with out further study of its consequences (Alter and Houghton 2000). The only solution 
was to remain patient and follow the pathogen where it took patients and their bodies. In 
addition to the patients followed by Dr. Alter at the NIH Blood Bank, three other groups began to 
track the course of this pathogen: scientists at the Veterans Affairs administration and another 
NIH node, the National Institutes of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK), and 
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) (Alter et al. 1975; Berman 1979; L. B. Seeff et al. 1987). 
																																																						
65 Alter recalled the debate over naming this mystery pathogen: “We considered calling it hepatitis C at that 
time, but Purcell (Alter’s collaborator) insisted on the more amorphous term because we had not yet 
proven it was a virus and, if so, how many agents might be involved” (Alter 2013:9). He continued “We were 
also pretty confident that we would discover the NANB agents in a relatively short time and then apply the 
proper nomenclature. This was a confidence that was shattered over the next 15 years of intensive – but vain 
– effort” (Alter 2013:9).  
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Researchers at these public agencies speculated about the pathogen’s consequences. One 
study published in 1975 and another in 1979 found that a majority of cases with non-A, non-B 
hepatitis led to persistent liver damage, with more serious scarring of liver tissue occurring in 
approximately one-fifth (Berman 1979). But crucially, patients did not experience symptoms, 
leading authors to continue to guess about the consequences of this pathogen. The authors 
suspected that the disease might resolve itself in many patients, suggesting, “in view of the 
generally asymptomatic nature of this disease and of the trend toward spontaneous biochemical 
resolution, it would be difficult to evaluate the efficacy of drug therapy”  (Berman 1979:1). These 
researchers would rely on another set of biomedical tools from pathology in order to make a 
determination over the severity of the disease.  
Because the pathogen caused its damage slowly, reports of organ failure or patient 
symptoms could not guide researchers (Ghany et al. 2008). Instead of these more observable 
measures of disease progression, researchers had to focus on molecular markers in the blood 
(called biomarkers, such as liver enzymes in blood samples) as well as changes in liver tissue 
acquired via biopsy samples (Bedossa and Poynard 1996). These measures could indicate both the 
presence and the progression of the disease course. Histologists at the Veterans Affairs 
administration and Armed Forces Institute for Pathology were among the leading analysts of such 
tissue (Ishak et al. 1995; Knodell et al. 1981). Drawing on studies from the late 1960s and 1970s, a 
group of doctors and pathologists across these two public institutions introduced the initial 
scoring system in 1981 which would later by iterated upon to arrive at the scoring system that has 
become popularized in clinical trials and treatment policy decisions (Bedossa and Poynard 1996; 
Ishak et al. 1995).66   
By applying these analytical tools to their cohorts of patients infected with the mystery 
pathogen, researchers across these public agencies discovered the potential severity of the disease 
course. In the early 1990s, a trio of published studies indicated that frequency of death from 
progressive liver disease was higher with the pathogen, with one positing, “surviving patients with 
chronic infection may yet die of liver disease” (Alter et al. 1992; DiBisceglie et al. 1991; Seeff et al. 
1992). Taken together, these tracking studies elucidated more precisely the possible risks of the 
chronic but often asymptomatic course of the disease. This was no benign pathogen: the health of 
the public was at risk, especially as a generation of patients grew older. Yet scientists and 
																																																						
66 The main METAVIR staging system is based on a F0 to F4 scale, in which F0 refers to the earliest stages of 
liver scarring, and F4 represents the latest stages when the liver is considered to be cirrhotic (Rosen 2011a).  
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clinicians remained vexed by the identity of the pathogen for much of this time; without its 
identity, and a diagnostic test for finding it in the blood, developing therapeutics remained out-
of-reach prospects.  
3.1.3 Identifying the pathogen: Chiron, the CDC, and the NIH  
 
Unveiling this pathogen would require both the long-term efforts begun by the NIH on 
‘non-A, non-B’ hepatitis as well as new breakthroughs in the field of molecular biology. A private 
pharmaceutical company Chiron used these breakthroughs, the long-term tracking work by the 
NIH, and collaboration with another government agency, the CDC, to crack the code behind the 
mystery pathogen.  
In the years after the 1975 identification of a ‘non-A, non-B’ form of viral hepatitis, 
government scientists sought first to prove that the causative pathogen was indeed transmissible 
(Tabor et al. 1978b). At the NIH and Food and Drug Administration, scientists proved that the 
virus taken from patients in tracking studies could be transmitted to chimpanzee, resulting in 
similar liver abnormalities as in humans (enzyme elevations as well as histological changes) (Alter 
etal. 1978a; Tabor et al. 1978b). These experiments proved the infectious nature of the pathogen. 
NIH scientists also elucidated the pathogen’s structure through a series of studies to determine 
that it was likely a virus, given its small size, and had a lipid-based outer envelope structure  
(Feinstone et al. 1987).67 Despite these crucial findings in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
pathogen remained elusive on a molecular level: absent its key identifying features, such as its 
genetic code, foreign structures that induced the body’s immune response (antigen), or the 
proteins making up the body’s defense against the invading agent, there was no way to detect the 
pathogen until it was already infecting liver cells. No one had pieced together the precise identity 
of the pathogen.  
In 1983, a small biotechnology company, Chiron68, became interested in this mysterious 
form of viral hepatitis as a potential business opportunity: by identifying the virus, the company 
believed they could develop diagnostic tests soon afterwards and generate millions in potential 
																																																						
67 They used filtration and extraction-based methods to elucidate its size and viral nature. Filtration studies 
pass molecules through small, microscopic pores to identify potential size of pathogen, whereas extraction-
based methods use a form of detergent to understand what kinds of chemical configurations compose the 
pathogen structure.  
68 Founded by three university scientists from Berkeley and University of California-San Francisco, the 
company represented an early wave of biotechnology companies using new molecular biology techniques 
and corporate partnerships (Fischer 1993). 
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sales to blood banks and transfusion services (Fischer 1993; Houghton 2009). Chiron’s research 
program into identifying non-A, non-B hepatitis occurred over six years, until 1989, with the 
company reportedly investing approximately $5-6 million each year which they had garnered 
from an initial public offering in 1983 and revenues from partnerships with larger companies 
(Fischer 1993). 69  
A stark challenge lay before any scientist pursuing the pathogen: the blood of infected 
patients was not teeming with virus, making the search tantamount to finding the proverbial 
needle in the haystack (Alter and Houghton 2000; Houghton 2009). For the effort, they recruited 
a scientist fresh off his post-doctoral thesis that had involved new techniques from the rapidly 
evolving breakthroughs from molecular biology, Michael Houghton. After initially experiencing 
several rounds of failure in identifying the “needle in a haystack”, Houghton’s team turned to a) 
pivotal collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and b) new tools in molecular biology 
developed through public funding (Houghton 2009).  
In their early experiments, Chiron’s scientists relied on old biological techniques, in which 
pathogens were identified via a direct discernment of ‘viral structure’.70 But with the virus not 
abundantly present in the blood stream, these approaches failed (Alter and Houghton 2000; 
Houghton 2009).  Searching for blood more abundant with non-A, non-B pathogens, Houghton’s 
team began working with Dan Bradley, a scientist at the Centers for Disease Control. In 1977, 
Bradley had started work on viral hepatitis when a company that produced blood clotting 
proteins for hemophiliacs became concerned that non-A, non-B hepatitis could be transmitted via 
its product (Bradley et al. 1979). After being approached by the company, Bradley began to test 
the hypothesis in chimpanzees. Upon confirming the company’s suspicion, Bradley continued to 
develop the chimpanzee model and determined which chimpanzee samples had the highest levels 
of infection coursing through their blood plasma and liver. 
Recent advances in molecular biology by 1985, however, allowed Bradley and another 
Chiron scientist, George Kuo, to propose an alternative, and ultimately fruitful route: cloning 
many, many copies of the virus, and then assessing its structure through indirect methods such as 
matching these copies with potential viral antibodies (Houghton 2009). By this strategy, called 
blind immuno-screening, cloned copies of genetic material from the infectious samples developed 
																																																						
69 A decade later, Chiron would use this investment as a justification for its wide-ranging and contentious 
intellectual property claims on the Hepatitis C virus which I briefly highlight in the following chapter.  
70 For example, they tried to bind genetic material from infected livers with those of known viral genomes 
to see if there was any family semblance or relationship with existing viruses.  
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by the CDC’s Bradley would be tested against antibodies from infectious patients. Rather than 
trying to find the needle directly, in other words, they came up with a ‘magnet’ – the antibody – 
and then attempted to find out whether the antibody would detect one of the cloned copies of the 
‘needle’ (the virus) taken from Bradley’s infectious chimpanzees (Houghton 2009). The approach 
worked: one of the cloned copies from the chimpanzees bound to the antibody. These molecular 
biology techniques were made possible through breakthroughs in manipulating genetic material 
made in the 1970s, These advances, pioneered by scientists Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer and 
funded by the National Institutes of Health, laid the technical basis for Chiron’s strategy and an 
entire new sector of biotechnology (Cohen et al. 1973; Pisano 2006; Vallas et al. 2011).73  
One more major step remained in confirming the identify of the pathogen: testing 
whether this antibody would detect the virus not just in chimpanzees but in the infectious human 
patients that the NIH’s Harvey Alter had tracked for over two decades. Multiple groups had 
approached Dr. Alter to see whether they had correctly identified the pathogen. Alter reflected, 
“By 1989, many different laboratories claimed to have developed a non-A, non-B assay and asked 
to test the panel. None were able to break the code and by 1989, the score was viruses, 20; 
investigators, zero” (Alter 2013:10). But at this point, Alter received a call from one of Chiron’s 
scientist, asking Alter to trial Chiron’s antibody test against the panel of blood he had carefully 
tracked over decades. To Alter’s surprise, the Chiron test worked. He tested the pre-transfusion 
and post-transfusion samples, and found that the antibody tested negative in the pre-transfusion 
group, and positive in the post-transfusion group, just as would be expected from the right test. 
Fifteen years after identifying a non-A, non-B pathogen, scientists working across Chiron, CDC, 
and the NIH had solved the puzzle in 1989 (Choo et al. 1989).74 They called the virus hepatitis C.   
 In sum, the post-war period to 1989 required an ascendant National Institutes of Health 
and a series of public sector organizations (including the Centers for Disease Control and 
Veterans Affairs) to pursue an unknown pathogen through patient investments. First, through 
																																																						
73 Cohen and Boyer were able to use a kind of protein called ‘restriction enzymes’ to cut small, circular 
pieces of bacterial DNA called plasmids at specific, known sites, and then insert DNA from another 
organism into those gaps. The bacterial DNA then replicated in large numbers, proliferating the newly 
manipulated DNA and its proteins. This technical foundation was elucidated and developed through 
significant federal funding from the NIH, with the seminal studies by Boyer and Cohen along with Paul 
Berg conducted in the early 1970s. Their research paved the way for further experimental possibilities, with 
123 NIH-funded projects funded by 1976 (Vallas et al. 2011). 
74 In a major award for the discovery of the virus, the Gairdner Prize - all three – Houghton from Chiron, 
Bradley from the CDC, and Alter from the NIH - were identified as key contributors (Wadman 2013).  
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long-term tracking studies of infectious patients, scientists at the NIH were able to identify the 
existence of a unique pathogen leading to a chronic but infectious form of hepatitis, which they 
dubbed non-A, non-B hepatitis. Second, by applying biochemical and histological analysis to 
these long-term tracking studies, publicly funded scientists across the NIH, CDC, and VA revealed 
that this form of hepatitis was not a benign entity, but rather the cause of a serious disease 
process that could end in mortality for a significant number of its human hosts. Finally, critical 
collaborations between Chiron and the CDC and NIH, along with new publicly funded advances 
in molecular biology, enabled the discovery and identification of the precise pathogen. Yet this 
early stage research would only mark the beginning of the scientific effort behind hepatitis C: 
further advances would rely on patient public capital to overcome a major technological hurdle 
posed by the virus.  
3.2 Overcoming a technological hurdle: the replicon tool   
 
Publicly funded scientists and agencies would go far beyond the ‘basic’ science for 
hepatitis C: they would develop the very technology required for drug development to begin. Far 
from conventional critiques of the state “crowding out the market”, risk-taking capital from the 
public sector helped “dynamize in” a market of private capital for investment in hepatitis C drug 
development. This technology – a research tool called the replicon – provided all potential drug 
developers – from large companies to small startup enterprises – with the necessary vehicle to test 
compounds against the virus. Rather than relying on indirect methods of attacking the virus, like 
the interferon-based therapies had done, the replicon also shaped the direction of the innovation 
process towards curative therapies, as drug developers could now pursue compounds which 
directly attacked the viral proteins on which the pathogen’s survival rested.  
3.2.1 Growing a stubborn virus  
 
This public risk-taking was pivotal because of a curious trait of the hepatitis C virus: the 
virus did not grow within cells, unlike most other viruses. Viruses are “intercellular parasites”, 
meaning they work inside of human cells and hijack its machinery to survive; typically, the 
efficacy of an anti-viral compound is evaluated by testing it within cells. Yet because the virus did 
not grow within cell cultures generated in laboratories, scientists could not test whether their 
compounds actually inhibited viral activity (Lindenbach and Rice 2005). The reasons for this 
stubbornness were unknown at the time, relegating scientists to studying the virus in bits and 
pieces. Drug development for hepatitis C could not progress, as scientists remained vexed by this 
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puzzle through much of the 1990s. Trials of different models yielded little success (Pollack 2003). 
One scientist lamented a “painfully slow process” and a “struggle to establish research tools and 
cell culture systems for HCV” as the rate-limiting factor for further advances in the field 
(Lindenbach and Rice 2005:689).  
In the mid-1990s, German scientists began to pursue this puzzle, led by Ralf 
Bartenschlager at Heidelberg University and funded by the Germany Ministry for Research and 
Technology76 and the German Research Society (Bartenschlager 2002). After initial attempts to 
reproduce the hepatitis C virus failed, they tried another route: instead of growing the entire 
Hepatitis C genome, what if they could reproduce just a part of it – the part that contained the 
main proteins involved in making more copies of itself? They were encouraged to pursue this idea 
based on the knowledge of other viruses with RNA code, which had shown that the outer proteins 
(called ‘structural proteins’) were not essential for replication (Bartenschlager 2002; Lohmann 
1999b). Instead, they sought to construct a line of genetic code with only the internal proteins 
thought to be critical for Hepatitis C replication.77 They then inserted this line of code (‘genome’) 
into cancerous liver cells (Huh-7 human hepatoma line) to see if copies of the virus could be 
produced (cancerous cells replicate at high levels, by definition). Upon analysis via various 
methods, Bartenschlager’s team ultimately found what they had long sought after: hepatitis C 
genetic material (RNA strands) of the anticipated size and correct subunits teeming inside the 
cancerous liver cells (Lohmann 1999b). In a reflection piece, Bartenschlager recounted the 
significance: “this first robust HCV cell culture model recapitulated all the intracellular step of the 
HCV replication cycle and because replication of these HCV RNAs relied on the viral enzymes, 
most notably the NS3 protease and the NS5B polymerase, the replicon system was suitable for 
drug development”  (Bartenschlager 2002:913). In other words, drug companies could finally test 
whether their compounds worked against the parts of the virus – such as the NS3 protease and 
the NS5b polymerase – that enabled its replication. Inhibiting those parts could mean stopping 
																																																						
76 Renamed the Federal Ministry for Education and Research as of 1998. 
77 Imagine a line of code made of different letters in alphabet (A-T-C-G), with groupings of these letters 
called ‘genes’ that produce particular proteins. Bartenschlager’s team replaced the genes that produced the 
outer proteins with a code used instead to produce an enzyme (NPT – neomycin phosphotransferase) that 
inactivates a cytotoxic drug (G418). Through this manipulation, they sought two consequences: first, the 
Hepatitis C RNA would no longer produce the outer proteins. Second, they could select only the cells that 
had produced enough of this newly manipulated RNA by applying the cytotoxic drug. This left 
Bartenschlager’s team with only the RNA that had the internal genes required for viral replication 
(Lohmann 1999b).  
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the virus, and the disease, in its tracks.  
When veteran science journalist and writer Jon Cohen attended a NIH meeting on 
Hepatitis C in June of 1999, reports of the sub-genomic replicon were the “show stopper” (Cohen 
1999b). The implications for drug discovery loomed large. Discussing Bartenschlager’s work, 
leading hepatologist Stanley Lemon shared, “if these results hold up, they’ll be enormously useful 
for drug screens” (Cohen 1999b:29). The group described the sub-genomic replicon in a 
November 1999 paper in Science, completing nearly five years of work (Lohmann 1999b).  
Yet the replicon that Bartenschlager’s team had developed possessed significant 
limitations. Charlie Rice, a leading hepatitis C scientist in the US, noted: “Bartenschlager's 
replicon was a landmark discovery in its own right, but the frequency with which you could 
initiate viral RNA replication was low” (Nair 2011). The Bartenschlarger replicon was active in only 
1 out of every 1,000,000 host cells, creating the need for an additional and cumbersome step of 
selecting the right cells in which to test potential compounds (Blight 2000). A scientist at 
Rockefeller University in New York, Rice had spent nearly a decade studying the virus with the 
support of the NIH and suspected that a further advance hung in the balance.  
 
3.2.2 The NIH extramural program and the development of the replicon  
 
With the identification of the virus in 1989, much of the focus on the part of the NIH had 
shifted towards a better understanding of the biology of the virus: this effort went far beyond the 
Bethesda-based campus, considered part of the NIH ‘intramural research program’, but instead to 
university laboratories across the US that receive grants through the NIH’s ‘extramural research 
program’. This de-centralized network of funding university scientists like Charlie Rice represents 
approximately 80% of the NIH’s budget and has become a core dimension of the US 
entrepreneurial state’s support of the innovation process in biomedicine.  
The NIH doubled its overall budget in the 1990s, from $8.9 billion in 1990 to $15.6 billion 
in 1998 (and up to $28 billion in 2004) (NIH 2017a). Though funding for hepatitis C trailed that of 
HIV research – with HIV garnering far more attention as a more acute infectious disease and 
immediate public health emergency –  the growth in the budget directed towards liver research 
still out-paced the increasing overall NIH budget (Cohen 1999b). Much of this liver research was 
directed to viral hepatitis, with hepatitis C the leading disease of interest. Multiple NIH-led 
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forums and congressional testimony aimed to bring attention to hepatitis C.78 Jay Hoofnagle 
(2004) the director of liver disease research at the NIH testified in 2004 to Congress:  
 
“Let me point out that during this overall doubling of the NIH budget, funding for 
Hepatitis C increased nearly 5-fold, demonstrating the relative and emerging 
importance of research into this disease. Hepatitis C has been an area of high 
priority to the NIH during this critical period of our budget doubling”. 
 
A primary method for funding these developments via NIH’s extramural research program was 
the R-01 granting mechanism given to senior scientists at universities across the US. These grants, 
which have been historically the longest and most widely used avenue for funding by the NIH, 
provide 3-5 years of funding disbursed annually over the period of the award (NIH 2016). Budgets 
for R-01 grants are not capped, giving applicants the flexibility to demonstrate the specific needs 
for the proposed amount (NIH 2016). These R-01 grants, combined with several other NIH 
funding mechanisms, would support Charlie Rice and his lab to build on the work of the 
Bartenschlager lab in order to make crucial improvements on the replicon tool (Blight 2000). 
 Rice’s team took the Bartenschlager replicon tool and aimed to make it reproduce at far 
higher rates (Blight 2000; Nair 2011b). Their strategy: hunt for genetic mutations that could enable 
the replicon to be more productive. Led by a scientist in Rice’s lab, Keril Blight, they rebuilt the 
replicon system using Bartenschlager’s data and the support from NIH grants that amounted to 
$3.40 million between 1999 and 2003 (the years during which much of the replicon work was 
carried out).80 This was part of an overall investment of $10.8 million between 1993 to 2005 in 
Rice’s hepatitis C specific research.81 
																																																						
78 The NIH held two “Consensus Development Conferences” (CDC)78, one in 1997 and another in 2002, to 
synthesize the current state of knowledge on Hepatitis C from scientific, medical, public health vantages 
(NIH 2002). In testimony on March 5, 1998 to Congress, the former Surgeon General of the U.S., C Everitt 
Koop  (1998), also signaled the looming consequences for failing to take action on Hepatitis C: “We have an 
infectious disease that is an undisputed threat to the public health. It is a viral disease that millions of 
people harbor without knowing they have it. […] If we do not act, we will see a tragic increase in liver 
disease, in the demand for liver transplants, and in the death rate from hepatitis C related liver failure […] I 
believe we have a 5-year window to identify and treat a significant proportion of the infected population if 
we are to head off the huge increase of liver disease I believe is ahead”.  
80 NIH grants numbered CA57973 and AI40034 were listed as the two principal sources for their replicon 
papers in 2000 and 2002 (Blight 2000; Blight, McKeating, and Rice 2002). I examined each grant, which ran 
for both before and after the period of replicon research, between the years 1999 and 2003 to arrive at the 
$3.40 million figure.  
81 See Appendix B for further details on publicly funded grants and amounts. 
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  They found the right mutations based on their use of a strain of the virus that was more 
infectious than the one used by the Bartenschlager team (Marshall 2000). Using these mutations, 
the Rice lab’s replicon produced abundant viral proteins in one of out of 10 host cells, rather than 
one in 1 million, as was the case with the replicon developed by Bartenschlager’s team in Germany 
(Blight 2000). “That really makes a big difference,” Rice shared at the time, “It is going to allow us 
to do genetic studies on a much shorter time scale” (Marshall 2000). A fellow scientist, Francis 
Chisari, agreed with this assessment: “a major improvement in the efficiency of the replicon 
system that Bartenschlager developed” (Marshall 2000:1871). This replicon technology was further 
refined in the coming years by both the Bartenschlager and Rice labs, with drug developers 
eagerly awaiting the technology for use in their hunt for hepatitis C compounds.84  
To manufacture and distribute the replicon for wider use, Rice would need to search for 
further support. In order to rapidly share this new technology with the many companies that had 
previously shied away from hepatitis C drug development, Charlie Rice turned to a small 
biotechnology company named Apath that he had founded when he was still at the Washington 
University of St. Louis (Apath 2016).85 Rice had envisioned Apath less as a profit-driven enterprise 
and more a vehicle for accelerating the fruits of his discoveries into the hands of other firms and 
scientists working on therapeutic advances (Marshall 2000). To make good on this vision for 
Apath and the replicon technology, Rice looked again to state investments.  
 
Figure 3.1 / The replicon for hepatitis C  
’’ 
source: Science (2000), p. 1871 
caption: This rendering shows the replicon on the bottom containing the critical subunits that enabled 
testing of compounds for hepatitis C.   
																																																						
84 The replicon technology was expanded to include multiple subtypes (called ‘genotypes’) of the hepatitis C 
virus, such that drug developers could test compounds on all the variations of the virus which infect 
patients. See Horscroft (2005), Bartenschlager (2002), Blight (2003) papers. 
85 The existence and evolution of Apath was linked to the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act passed by US Congress, which 
enabled the private patenting of publicly funded research. I focus on this legislation and its consequences 
later in this chapter specifically in the context of Pharmasset.  
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3.2.3 Sharing the replicon widely with the US small business program (SBIR)  
 
To meet its aim of sharing the replicon widely, Apath would look to a little-known government 
funding stream, the ‘Small Business Innovation Research’ (SBIR) program. Begun with a legislative 
act by the US Congress in 1982, the SBIR program requires government agencies with a research 
and development aim to ‘set aside’ a percentage of their budget for domestic small businesses that 
show a strong potential for technology commercialization (Ceulemans and Kolls 2013; Keller and 
Block 2013).  
SBIR grew out of an emerging policy debate about the role of government in incentivizing 
innovation and private entrepreneurship during the 1970s and 1980s (Keller and Block 2013; 
Slaughter and Rhoades 1996). Senator Ted Kennedy, the iconic Democratic legislator from 
Massachusetts, wanted to make it easier for entrepreneurs to commercialize promising 
technologies and start new businesses (STTR 2016). To test whether the government could 
support this aim, Senator Kennedy led the passage of legislation to pilot a small business program 
within the National Science Foundation launched in 1977  (STTR 2016). With a successful launch 
within the National Science Foundation, the SBIR program was replicated across the federal 
government on a bipartisan basis through the passage of the 1982 SBIR Act (Keller and Block 
2013). In order to further bridge a perceived gap between basic sciences and commercialization, 
Congress also passed the STTR (Science Technology and Transfer) program in 1992, in which 
small businesses must formally collaborate with a research institute (typically university and non-
profits) to receive a grant (STTR 2016). The Small Business Administration has been charged with 
the responsibility of executing on these two programs across federal agencies.  
SBIR and STTR work in a multiple-phase, decentralized manner (SBIR 2016). Federal 
agencies are given leeway to determine whether to use the funding as grants or contracts and to 
solicit proposals with narrow or broad specifications (Keller and Block 2013). The primary aim, 
however, is to fund pre-commercial technology development. All agencies with ‘extramural 
research budgets’ (such as the NIH or the Department of Energy) of over $100 million are required 
to set aside a percentage of their research budgets for these programs (2.9% of their budgets as of 
a 2011 reauthorization bill) . Each agency administers its own individual program within 
guidelines established by Congress, and designates areas for research and development in their 
proposal solicitations from small businesses (Keller and Block 2013). The intellectual property that 
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results from the research belongs to the firm, though the government retains the right to license 
the technology for an appropriate fee (SBIR 2016). In the decade between 2007-2016, National 
Institute of Health’s SBIR and STTR programs together provided $3.53 billion in grants to small 
business advancing products for biomedicine (National Institutes of Health SBIR/STTR program 
2016). Across federal agencies, SBIR alone has self-reported the creation of 700 public companies 
due to its program from 1982 to 2016, with those companies attracting approximately $41 billion in 
venture capital investments (SBIR 2016)  
 Two decades after its launch, SBIR would benefit Apath’s efforts on hepatitis C. Apath 
received its first SBIR grant in 2001, a 2-year, $750,000 package from the National Institutes of 
Health (Apath 2016). Though the first grant was aimed at hepatitis C diagnostics, the next grant, 
within less than a year, was a similar 2-year, $750,000 grant from SBIR for further developing the 
replicon (Apath 2016).89 During this time, Apath received a total of $3.38 million from the NIH, 
with $1.6 million from its SBIR program. In total from 1999 to 2008, Apath received over $9 
million in federal funding from the National Institutes of Health, with funding for research across 
anti-viral science. The funding specifically for the replicon gave Apath the capacity to build a 
business organization capable of manufacturing and distributing the replicon across academic 
and industrial laboratories. Labs awaited the replicon eagerly. One scientist, Stanley Lemon 
noted, that until now “it’s been hard to get a system that was widely enough available so that 
people could play with it”, continuing that “it will be great news if this innovation means that the 
technology will now be widely available” (Marshall 2000:1871).  
In a Science article reporting on the discovery in 2000, Rice shared Apath’s plans for 
commercializing the replicon (Blight 2000). In its early stages, Rice’s team was determining 
whether they would make a few requests for company’s use of the replicon, such as asking for a 
30-day pre-publication review of scientific papers written by those who use the technology or 
negotiation with Apath on intellectual property rights should an inventor make a discovery using 
the technology (Marshall 2000:1871). But Rice made his strategic interests clear. Not wanting to do 
any thing that would “impede academic research”, Rice went on to reassure the interviewer, “I 
think that sharing material for academic research should be done with as few strings as possible” 
(Marshall 2000:1871). Within two years, private and public labs began to acquire the replicon, as 
Apath offered non-exclusive licenses to use its so-called “Blazing Blight 7” technology, (referring 
																																																						
89 See Appendix B for a listing of all SBIR grants made to Apath, derived from NIH Reporter database.  
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to its co-inventor Keril Blight, one of the scientists in Rice’s lab). One of the many companies to 
buy Apath’s replicon around this time would be a small start-up in Atlanta named Pharmasset 
that would go on to develop sofosbuvir (Pharmasset 2009).  
In sum, publicly funded research proved pivotal at each stage of overcoming this 
technological hurdle that had previously prevented drug development. German agencies 
supported the Bartenschlager lab, and the NIH’s extramural program supported Charlie Rice’s 
modifications on the initial replicon technology. Additionally, the SBIR program enabled Rice’s 
team via Apath to commercialize the technology and distribute it to companies at a small charge 
based on a non-exclusive license. The consequences for this support were significant: the replicon 
became used throughout the industry to test potential compounds that directly attacked the 
virus. Within the field of hepatitis C, it served as a kind of “general purpose technology” for 
hepatitis C, on which all future drug development was based.91 Dr. Marc Collett, then the head of 
discovery research for a small biotechnology company ViroPharma, noted its importance, “That’s 
a definitely a breakthrough that every group has used” (Pollack 2003).  
When the Lasker Prize committee in 2016 chose hepatitis C as the major medical advance 
on which to shine a spotlight, they awarded Rice and Bartenschlager along with Michael Sofia, the 
chemist who eventually developed sofosbuvir (Bartenschlager et al. 2016). Far from “crowding out” 
private funding, an entrepreneurial state dynamised in private capital, as companies began to see a 
potential clinical and economic opportunity in hepatitis C. Rather than tinker with indirect 
methods of attacking the virus, as the interferon-based regimens had done in boosting the body’s 
immune system, the replicon enabled drug developers to find targets that directly halted the 
replication of the virus: this discovery thus also shaped the direction of the innovation process 
towards therapies that could result in increasing rates of cure.   
 
3.3 The Triple Helix: Public and Private Science in the Launch of Pharmasset  
 
In the spring of 1998, an Emory University scientist also based at Atlanta’s Veterans Affairs 
hospital, Ray Schinazi, launched a company called Pharmasset. From the very beginning, his 
intentions were clear. “I coined that name,” he would tell a reporter later, “it’s actually 
																																																						
91 Examples of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) are the Internet, semi-conductors, nanotechnology; 
though the replicon is not a GPT on such a scale (and is actually based on other biotechnologies that are 
GPTs), the point is that the replicon had a widespread effect within the arena of hepatitis C drug 
development.  
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‘pharmaceutical assets’ and the idea was to create assets that would be sold to companies. That 
was the initial business plan” (Berkrot 2011). One of those assets would turn out to be sofosbuvir, 
the curative backbone for treating hepatitis C. Schinazi’s pursuit owed its genesis to multiple 
dimensions of an entprenreneurial U.S. state. The launch of Pharmasset resulted not only from 
long-term patient investments in science and risk-taking in commercializing that science, but also 
political-legal arrangements by the US government, exemplified by the Bayh-Dole Act, that 
enabled the conversion of publicly funded science into private assets.  
3.3.1 The development of nucleoside chemistry and Pharmasset as public science  
 
Schinazi benefited from decades of public support before starting his venture, with years 
of experience as a biochemist developing a new field of drug development: nucleoside chemistry. 
Under the tutelage of the ‘father of antiviral drugs’, William Prusoff93, Schinazi had trained as a 
post-doc at Yale in the late 1970s after completing his doctoral research at the University of Bath 
in England (Cohen 2015). At Yale, he helped Prusoff’s team show that a ‘nucleoside analogue’, 
d4T, had activity against HIV (Cohen 2015). Nucelosides are chemical pre-cursors to nucleotides, 
which are the building blocks for DNA and RNA. Schinazi’s research focused on synthesizing 
‘analogues’ to these nucleosides, which then get modified by the body and are taken up by viruses. 
When viruses incorporate these nucleoside analogues into their growing DNA or RNA chains 
(depending on the kind of the genetic material a given virus has), the analogues gum up the 
chain, block their further production, and abort the virus (De Clercq 2005). Schinazi’s research, 
beginning with Prusoff at Yale and then in Atlanta, focused on making nucleoside analogues into 
viable drugs. In the 1980s into the 2000s, large pharmaceutical companies shunned these 
compounds at the time, as they were deemed to be a high risk for causing harmful toxicities if 
they got into the production of genetic material in human cells (Cohen 2015). Two institutions 
would provide him with the long-term funding necessary to carry out the research for making safe 
and effective nucleosides: the Veterans Affairs administration94  and the National Institutes of 
Health.  
 Schinazi came to Atlanta in the early 1980s, basing his laboratory at the Atlanta Veterans 
Affairs hospital while joining the faculty of Emory University (Cohen 2015). Since the early post-
																																																						
93 Prusoff had synthesized the first anti-viral ever used in clinical practice, a drug called idoxuridine that 
treats herpes infection of the eye (Cohen 2015).  
94 The Veterans Affairs hospital/health care system in the US is a publicly funded national system, akin to 
an ‘NHS for military veterans’.  
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war years, the VA had expanded a nascent set of research projects into a fully-fledged research 
program that had produced many notable contributions (Hays 2010).96 Schinazi has credited the 
VA as an important dimension for his successes, as he enjoyed space for a staff of nearly 40 with 
what was considered to be the latest technologies as well as a state of the art animal research 
facility critical for pre-clinical testing of potential drugs at his ‘Laboratory for Biochemical 
Pharmacology’ (Emory University 2016). Additionally, Schinazi in nationally broadcast interview 
claimed that 7/8ths of his salary came from the Veterans Affairs systems during the 1990s and 
2000s, with the remainder presumably from his faculty appointment at Emory (Reid 2015).98 
Schinazi would translate these resources for his research into new nucleoside therapies, most 
notably for HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C, both of which affect veterans in large numbers. For his 
work, he would later receive the William S. Middleton Award from the Veterans Affairs, the 
highest honor for biomedical research given by the agency (Veterans Affairs 2015). 
Alongside the VA, the NIH served as Schinazi’s other primary source of financial support. 
Like Charlie Rice, Schinazi was also the beneficiary of NIH’s extramural funding program, with 
support from multiple programs, including R-01 grants as well as the special National Merit 
Award (NIH 2017b). The National Merit Award goes beyond the R-01 program by recognizing 
scientists deemed to be exceptional with the opportunity to pursue projects with ‘greater risks’ 
that are ‘more adventurous’ that take time to develop: these awards are given typically for no less 
than 5 years, and can be renewed for a total 10-year window of research (NIH 2017b).99 Starting in 
the early 1990s into 2011, Schinazi translated $8.4 million in different NIH funding streams 
towards his nucleoside research.100 By the late 1990s, Schinazi had developed multiple compounds 
																																																						
96 In 1955, Congress first appropriated a research and development budget for the VA system. The VA 
system has produced breakthroughs such as the first cardiac pacemaker (1958), concepts that led to the 
development of the CAT scan (1960), and liver transplantation (1968) (Hays 2010). In 2016, the VA research 
budget was $1.8 billion.  
98 A US Congressional hearing in 2016 related to sofosbuvir’s cost to the VA health care system focused on 
the VA’s limited disclosure policies related to products and patents generated using VA funding (Flier 2016). 
The VA relies on ‘self-report’ from scientists themselves, diminishing the agencies ability to gain royalties 
from potential licenses. In FY 2014, the VA earned only $375,674 in royalties (Flier 2016). By contrast, the 
NIH’s intramural program, which has more than double the budget of the entire VA’s R&D program, earned 
$137 million in royalties (Flier 2016). 
99 According to a separate analysis performed by the access to medicines group Knowledge Ecology 
International, Schinazi was a principal investigator of 64 NIH grants between 1991 to 2012, involving $10.5 
million in public funding. He filed a total of 49 patents that disclosed federal funding, with the NIH and VA 
listed as two of the principal federal agencies. This figure is larger than my $8.4 million finding, because it 
includes non-nucleoside science related research (Love 2014a). 
100 See Appendix B with data for grants listed, based on NIH Reporter database.  
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that could serve as leading candidates for development. One compound, emtricitabine, showed 
particular promise for HIV (Cohen 2015). Schinazi launched a company called Triangle 
Pharmaceuticals in 1996 to further develop the compound in clinical trials (Cohen 2015). In 2004, 
the compound would get acquired for $464 million by a familiar company: Gilead Sciences 
(Cohen 2015). 
With Triangle focused on developing emtricitabine, Schinazi launched Pharmasset as a 
vehicle through which a larger array nucleoside compounds could be developed into valuable 
‘assets’ for larger pharmaceutical companies that were still shying away from early-stage 
nucleoside science from the fear of toxicities. He positioned the company as a nodal point in a 
network of publicly funded research universities in the Atlanta area, drawing on the libraries of 
compounds that were being produced in these university laboratories. An Atlanta Business 
Chronicle article described the configuration: “Schinazi has a team of 30 researchers at Emory 
continuing to discover new drugs. Liotta has about 15 researchers and another founder, Chung 
Chu at the University of Georgia, has about 20. The fourth founder is scientist Jean Pierre 
Sommadossi of the University of Alabama at Birmingham” (Robbins 1999). Schinazi went on to 
extol the comparative advantage of the early-stage employees at his new company: “Most of them 
are top scientists from around the world who bring more than 100 patents and the beginnings of 8 
potential drug formulas to the company” (Robbins 1999).  This configuration – of taxpayer funded 
research happening at universities and used to support a small biotechnology company like 
Pharmasset – was enabled through a political-legal shift that had occurred nearly two decades 
earlier.   
3.3.2 The Bayh-Dole Act and the Conversion of Public Assets  
 
The early 1980s witnessed a marked shift in the political-legal rules governing science and 
technology in the US. The dominant narrative behind this shift: policy makers on a bipartisan 
basis saw the need to response to the economic malaise of the 1970s, and one route they foresaw 
was to promote business through the commercialization of new advances in science and 
technology  (Mowery and Sampat 2004; Rai and Eisenberg 2003). This vision was to be realized, in 
part, through direct funding of small business and regulatory changes encouraging private actors 
to commercialize knowledge developed in federal laboratories and with public funding (Boettiger 
and Bennett 2006). The purported goal from such a shift was two-fold: promote jobs through 
high-tech industries and gain an edge in an increasingly competitive global market (Slaughter and 
Rhoades 1996; Vallas et al. 2011). A raft of changes unfolded in the 1980s (see table below), making 
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it easier for a nascent biotechnology sector and pharmaceutical sector, for example, to take 
advantage of new knowledge generated via public funds.  
One specific change came with the 1980 passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, which permitted 
inventions developed with public funds to be patented by a university or a professor rather than 
be assigned to the government (Rai and Eisenberg 2003). Before the Bayh-Dole Act, such a move 
would not have been possible due to public ownership rights over research. Reflecting on the 
moment, an administrator at Ray Schinazi’s Emory university reflected, “The theory was that a lot 
of innovation was coming out of federally funded research, but it was all owned by the 
government and ‘sitting on the shelf’” (Robertson 2015). That administrator, Todd Sherer, was the 
head of Emory University’s Technology Transfer Office (TTO), a new kind of office launched 
across American universities in the 1980s and 1990s (Robertson 2015). TTOs worked with 
university professors to apply for patent protection over their discoveries and support the 
commercialization process  (Mowery and Sampat 2004). This new legal set-up shifted the stakes 
of research: for university administrators, all research generated by faculty could now be valuable 
intellectual property, and for university professors like Ray Schinazi, all discoveries could now be 
converted to private, licensable products attracting capital rather than serving as knowledge in 
the public domain  (Mowery et al. 2001). 
Schinazi and Emory took advantage of this change in the mid-1990s, when his laboratory 
iterated on a prior discovery by a Canadian scientist to develop emtricitabine for HIV/AIDS 
patients in 1996 (Cohen 2015). Emory patented the compound, which Schinazi had developed 
with public funding, and then licensed it later to Triangle Pharmaceuticals, Schinazi’s spin-off 
business (Cohen 2015) .  When Gilead later bought Triangle for its emtricitabine compound for 
$464 million and then began selling it as part of a combination therapy in 2004, Emory University 
gained $540 million in royalty payments – the largest royalty payment to a university at the time 
(Emory University 2005).101  
The Bayh-Dole Act and the broader regulatory shifts of the 1980s are a contested terrain 
that I do not explore at greater depth here.102 What is clear, however, is that this period signified a 
																																																						
101 In an interview with university media after the deal, Emory’s university president affirmed the 1980 law, 
saying, “The elements of our strategic plan that are research related and consistent with the Bayh-Dole Act 
provisions will benefit from these moneys.” (Emory University 2005). 
102 The Bayh-Dole has sparked multiple interpretations, with advocates pointing to it as a positive force 
behind innovation in the US and others describing its deleterious effect in privatizing science (Boettiger 
and Bennett 2006; Kenney and Patton 2009; Mowery et al. 2001). I do not engage in these broader debates 
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break from previous pathways for innovation. The STS scholar Sheilla Jasanoff articulated, for 
example, that Bayh-Dole “changed the long-standing presumption that publicly funded work 
could not be privately owned and exploited” (Jasanoff 2011:235). Gary Pisano, in his work on the 
emergence of the biotechnology sector, detailed the shift in incentives for publicly-funded 
scientists: knowledge assets were now to be monetized, incentivizing academics to pursue a direct 
economic interest via shares in a new company as well as attempt to attract external investors to 
sustain and expand research efforts (Pisano 2006). This configuration of university labs, public 
funding, and small enterprises has been dubbed a “triple helix”, with many innovations tracing 
their genesis to this triad    
In this sense, the Bayh-Dole Act promulgated a new political-legal contract to convert 
public science into private assets, and spawned an organizational apparatus to support the 
commercialization process. Such a contract contained a risk: the government could forfeit its 
right to knowledge that would later be of public concern. Rooted within the Bayh-Dole Act was a 
“march in” provision, which enabled the US government to license any intellectual property that 
emerged from federally funded research in the case of public health need (Kesselheim 2011; Rai 
and Eisenberg 2003). As of 2016, the provision had never been exercised. In the meantime, 
university professors like Ray Schinazi would operate within this political-legal contract and 
organizational apparatus as he pursued his hepatitis C research.  
Table 3.3 Regulatory shifts favorable to biotechnology commercialization in 1980s 
Year  Legislation/rule 
change 
Significance  
1980 Bayh-Dole Act Permitted inventions developed with federal funds to be privately 
patented and owned rather than assigned to the government 
1980 Stevenson-Wydler 
Technology Innovation 
Act 
Promoted federal laboratories to transfer technology to non-federal 
entities; required federal laboratories to set apart a percentage of 
budget towards tech transfer activities  
1982 Small Business 
Innovation Act  
Created system of grants for small business, promoted direct 
federal financial support of commercialization  
1980  Diamond vs. 
Chakrabarty Supreme 
Court ruling  
Made it legal to patent genetically modified organisms; enabled 
upstream patenting 
1986 Federal Technology 
Transfer Act  
Expanded Stevenson-Wydler (1980) to create ‘CRADA’ framework – 
cooperative research and development agreements – between 
federal government and commercial sector for technology transfer 
Sources: Slaughter (1996) and Vallas (2011) 
 
																																																						
here but point to its influence in enabling Pharmasset to commercialize publicly funded nucleoside 
research.  
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3.3.3 Public risk-taking on Pharmasset  
 
By the late 1990s, starting a company from publicly funded research at a university had 
become a more common practice. As I described earlier, Schinazi had already done it once, with 
Triangle Pharmaceuticals (Cohen 2015). With the idea to start a new company to take on a wider 
range of nucleoside compounds for viral diseases, and the legal space within which to do it, 
Schinazi looked to attract financing. One source would be venture capital, a kind of finance I 
describe in the next chapter. Yet another key source remained the US state. Not only did funding 
from public agencies such as the NIH and VA provide a base of knowledge on which to found 
Pharmasset, but the NIH’s SBIR program also took risks on those assets to develop them further.  
Between the initial founding in 1999 to the discovery and development of the more 
efficient replicon by Apath in 2002, Pharmasset’s focus remained on other nucleosides for HIV 
and HBV (Robbins-Roth 1999). After the development of the replicon, however, the NIH granted 
Pharmasset funding for hepatitis C, as drug discovery only then began in earnest across the 
industry. Over the course of the company’s first seven years, the NIH would support Pharmasset 
with $2.46 million in public financing through 16 SBIR grants, like the ones given to Apath LLC for 
the sub-genomic replicons. Of these, six grants between 2002-2004  supported Hepatitis C drug 
development specifically, at a cost of $1.01 million.103 This money also came in parallel with over 
$50 million in private venture capital, which I analyze further in the next chapter when I focus on 
private financial capital.  
Though the venture capital funding outsized Pharmasset’s initial NIH funding, these SBIR 
grants still proved critical to Pharmasset’s early formation. As Block and Keller describe, the 
importance of SBIR grants are not limited to the amount of money itself. SBIR grants provide a 
kind of “signaling and certification” mechanism to venture capital (Keller and Block 2013:644).104 
Keller and Block traced the relationship between venture capital and SBIR grant in five different 
years between 1995-2009 (Keller and Block 2013). In the life sciences in particular, they found that 
beween 1995 and 2009 roughly 20% of venture capital investments were made to firms that had 
																																																						
103 As one of its promising compounds later moved through initial clinical trials, Pharmasset would also be a 
beneficiary of the Affordable Care Act  when a little-discussed provision created a $1 billion fund for 
applications for projects ‘that showed significant potential to produce new and cost-saving therapies, 
support jobs and increase U.S. competitiveness’. The modest federal grant of $244,479.25 specifically 
supported the ‘development of PSI-7977’ under the Qualifying Therapeutic Discovery Program. 
104 Keller and Block (2013) write, “The relationship between SBIR and VC is permeated by multiple logics in 
which venture capitalists use SBIR as a signaling and certification mechanism—investing in ideas developed 
through the program—and that they also use the program to develop ideas they already find promising.”  
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previously received one or more SBIR awards (Keller and Block 2013).105 Pharmasset was one of 
these firms, as venture capital came alongside these SBIR grants; the company featured each of its 
14 SBIR grants prominently on their website, showcasing them to potential investors on their 
website as badges of public support.  
 
Table 3.4  Timing of NIH SBIR grants and venture capital rounds   
Year  NIH funding   # of grants  Venture capital 
round?  
1999 0  X (Series B)  
2000 $442,011 4  
2001 $630,461 4 X (Series C)  
2002 $553,207 3  
2003 $450,260 3  
2004 $189,277 1 X (Series D)  
2005 $194,954 1  
TOTAL 2,460,170* 16  
 
Figure 3.2 Screenshot of Pharmasset website, May 2002 
 
Source: Wayback Machine  
Caption: Pharmasset displayed their NIH grants on their website, a badge of approval and 
signaling mechanism used to attract other investors. Eight SBIR or STTR grants are showcased 
between 2000 and early 2002. Pharmasset’s first Hepatitis C related SBIR-STTR grant came later 
in 2002, which was not available for retrieval from the Wayback Machine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
105 Keller and Block argue that this is a striking figure, given that SBIR only represents 2.5% of all federal 
extramural research and development funding and is rarely cited as an important source of funding for 
biotechnology development (Keller and Block 2013). 
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3.4 Following an entrepreneurial state: a summary   
 
This chapter shows how patient investment, confrontation with uncertainty and risk, and 
deal-making by an entrepreneurial state set private capital in motion for hepatitis C drug 
development and shaped the direction of the innovation process towards a curative therapy. In 
short, a shadow epidemic became visible, which in turn mobilized the search and development of 
its antidote. 
First, through the emergence of the NIH in the post-war era, scientists engaged in long-
term tracking of the disease process before the virus was even identified. Without this long-term 
tracking, scientists, public health officials, and drug companies could not have known the 
seriousness of the health consequences posed by the hepatitis C virus. This tracking also provided 
the samples pivotal to confirming the discovery of the virus.  
 Second, through the NIH’s upstream-downstream funding mechanisms – via its 
extramural research program as well as the Small Business Innovation Research program – an 
entrepreneurial state overcame significant technological obstacles to shape the creation and 
direction of a new market for drug development in hepatitis C. The discovery and the 
development of the replicon – facilitated by the German state as well as the US NIH – enabled 
drug companies to begin trialing potential compounds that directly attacked hepatitis C, thereby 
shaping a path towards a curative therapy. The NIH specifically enabled the Rice lab to not only 
develop a more efficient replicon but also to manufacturer and distribute the research tool widely 
in the early 2000s.  
 Third, the US entrepreneurial state both funded the long-term nucleoside science behind 
Pharmasset and made investments in its earliest stages and also created the legal contract in the 
Bayh-Dole Act via which the company could convert its public assets into private ones. An 
entrepreneurial state behind hepatitis C thus took on crucial roles in the innovation process: 
patient investing in the upstream-downstream science necessary for elucidating the virus and 
developing therapies, risk-taking in breakthrough technologies to overcome technical obstacles to 
curative drug development, and governing the conversion of public assets for the creation of new 
organizational entities such as Pharmasset.   
Each of these three threads converged to set the direction of the innovation process 
towards a curative therapy and attract private capital to take advantage of the emerging economic 
opportunity. Yet the Bayh-Dole Act also created the conditions for a particular mobilization of this 
private capital, in which Pharmasset would look to speculative capitals (ranging from venture 
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capital to an eventual initial public offering) for the development of its intangible pharmaceutical 
assets. As I describe in the subsequent two chapters, this configuration would be one of the 
critical inputs towards the financialization of hepatitis C drug development and sofosbuvir’s 
pricing.    
 Large pharmaceutical businesses did not appear in these early stages of the innovation 
process. Until the development of the replicon, these firms largely stayed on the sidelines of the 
innovation process. Small biotechnology companies and venture capital also were mobilized once 
the replicon had been developed. Furthermore, the small biotechnology company critical to the 
sofosbuvir innovation process, Pharmasset, can be traced back to long-term public support from 
the Veterans Affairs administration as well as the NIH’s extramural research program funding via 
Emory University. By this initial accounting, taxpayers via public sector organizations took on 
pivotal risks in the innovation process behind hepatitis C. While this chapter captures the role of 
public sector organizations, the entrepreneurial state makes crucial reappearances later in the 
drug development process that will enable a more detailed accounting of its role in the innovation 
process. Whether the rewards to the public sector are proportionate to this risk-taking requires 
onwards analysis into the downstream stages of the innovation process. We turn to these stages 
in chapter four.   
 
Roy	101 
	
Chapter 4. Chasing the Golden Snitch: Speculative Capital and 
Shareholders behind Sofosbuvir 
 
“Harry was speeding toward the ground when the crowd saw him clap his hand to his mouth as 
though he was going to be sick – he hit the field on all fours - coughed - and something gold fell into 
his hand. 
 
 'I've got the snitch!' he shouted, waving it above his head, and the game ended in complete 
confusion. 
 
…Harry hadn't broken any rules and Lee Jordan was still happily shouting the results - Gryffindor 
had won by 170 points to 60.”  
 - JK Rowling, in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, describing Harry’s chase for the golden 
snitch 
 
 
With the advent of the replicon in the early 2000s, the race for new medicines to tame the 
hepatitis C virus expanded, as drug developers were finally able to test compounds that directly 
attacked the virus. Two businesses formed the foreground of this race: Pharmasset, controlling 
the development of sofosbuvir, and Gilead Sciences, a large business in pursuit of new growth 
beyond its sales of HIV medicines.  As Gilead’s senior leadership evaluated its prospects in 
hepatitis C in the summer of 2011, they turned to the world of fiction to give their high stakes 
game plan a name: Project Harry (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015). In the 
famed fantasy series by JK Rowling, Harry Potter and his competitors play quidditch, a game in 
which there is one goal: to catch the Golden Snitch. Though multiple types of balls zoom around 
in the field of play, only one – the Golden Snitch – guarantees an automatic victory. The analogy 
to drug development for hepatitis C fit. Finding the best therapy to hepatitis C would mean 
winning in one of the largest potential pharmaceutical ‘markets’ available. This chapter chronicles 
this game, focusing on the development of sofosbuvir across the multiple state, business, and 
financial actors that constituted the pre-clinical research to late stage trials for compounds aimed 
to treat hepatitis C.  
Through chronicling this game, I introduce the influence of financialization on the 
eventual launch prices for sofosbuvir. With the financialization of drug development, a chain of 
financial actors engaged in a pattern of accumulation aimed at growth through the capitalization 
and control of intangible assets in financial markets. In this chain, for example, Pharmasset 
mobilized over $50 million in venture capital, launched an IPO of $45 million, and would later be 
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acquired for $11 billion – even though the company never developed an approved medicine or 
produced profits. This chain of speculative capital rested on the opportunity to make gains on 
short-term bets in financial markets of intangible hepatitis C assets. The valuations of these 
intangible assets, in turn, was held up by the promise that health systems would pay for rising 
prices in exchange for improved therapeutic outcomes for larger patient populations (what I refer 
to as the pricing escalator).   
For Gilead, a large publicly traded business, extractive logics driving its shareholders 
meant that profitability alone would not do - shareholders valued the company based on its (1) 
potential to generate near-term growth at a magnitude greater than competing vehicles for 
capital accumulation (what I call the shareholder growth treadmill) as well as its (2) distribution to 
shareholders of earnings that executives deemed could not be used to generate such growth. With 
long-term investments in drug development at odds with these shareholder demands, Gilead used 
its accumulated capital to gain control over Pharmasset for sofosbuvir’s anticipated earnings 
stream – and then distributed the bulk of its eventual hepatitis C revenues to shareholders (rather 
than long-term reinvestments in research). Through this combination of speculative capitals and 
extraction driven by Gilead’s shareholders, the prices and valuation of sofosbuvir along the 
innovation process became fastened to the logics, institutions and relations of power at play in 
financial markets – not the tangible costs of innovation or embodied health improvements 
experienced by patients.   
The state, rather than receding into the backdrop, continued to play a pivotal role in the 
innovation process, as the application of public science from a decade earlier ultimately 
transformed one of Pharmasset’s hepatitis.C assets into sofosbuvir. The US state also governed the 
rules of control for capital – with the emergence of venture capital and the rise of shareholder 
control over businesses both due in part to shifts in regulation.  
In this chapter, I detail these dynamics underpinning the financialization of sofosbuvir in 
four parts:  
First, I follow the mobilization of speculative capitals behind Pharmasset (section 4.1). In 
this case, Pharmasset developed a promising new compound called sofosbuvir with venture 
capital, licensing partnerships with larger businesses, and the stock market, with each set of 
financial actors making bets on the anticipation of rising prices and valuations for hepatitis C 
assets. I describe how the state’s governance over the rules of capital enabled the formation of 
speculative financial markets, and also how the key scientific advance that shaped sofosbuvir’s 
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curative potential came from state-supported knowledge. To compose this account, I weave 
together Pharmasset’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, scientific and 
medical journals detailing chemical and clinical advances, and interviews with scientists.  
The second part (section 4.2) traces the structural crisis created by shareholder control 
over Gilead Sciences. I show how shareholders valued Gilead and other established108  
pharmaceutical businesses not on their sales and rate of profitability but by their potential to 
grow. Combining media accounts and Gilead’s financial statements with existing histories of the 
rise of shareholders and the company’s early trajectory, I follow Gilead from its genesis to trace 
the influence of this shareholder control on Gilead’s position in the innovation process less as a 
research and development company and more as an acquisition specialist.  
In part three (4.3), I document Gilead’s use of their accumulated capital to attempt to 
transcend their shareholder-driven crisis of growth by acquiring Pharmasset for $11 billion and 
gaining control over the stream of earnings anticipated from sofosbuvir. I unpack Gilead’s 
valuation of Pharmasset - through its capitalization exercise – as a strategic site of analysis in the 
innovation process that reveals the broader relations of power between Gilead and three actors: 
with small biotechnology companies like Pharmasset, the public health delivery state, and 
shareholders. A close analysis of the acquisition comes from interviews with industry executives 
as well as internal documents from both Pharmasset and Gilead in the US Senate investigation. 
Through media accounts, I also show how Gilead’s acquisition of Pharmasset triggered a series of 
acquisitions for hepatitis C assets, illustrating the ways a struggle for growth between competing 
businesses escalated the speculative costs of innovation in the late-stages of drug development.  
In the final part (4.4), I follow Gilead’s financial statements to show the destination of 
their hepatitis C earnings. Rather than reinvesting their hepatitis C revenue into research and 
development or pay taxes, I demonstrate that regulatory shifts by the US state enabled Gilead’s 
senior executives to channel much of these earnings into share repurchases designed to boost the 
value of its remaining shares to shareholders - with a significant shareholder being Gilead’s 
executives themselves with the rise in stock-based compensation. After describing each of these 
parts, I conclude by (in section 4.5) taking stock of the key political-economic dynamics in this 
phase of the innovation process.  
																																																						
108 By ‘established’, I am referring to the large, incumbent businesses that have experienced long-term 
profitability and are publicly traded, in contrast to small biotechnology companies that often have no 
approved products or sales.   
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4.1 Sofosbuvir’s development and financial markets of pharmaceutical 
assets  
 
The early 2000s brought an expanding search for hepatitis C therapies, with the replicon 
drawing in an expanding field of emerging companies and speculative capital.109 This section 
follows the process by which speculative capitals110, varying in its multiple forms from venture 
capital to public equity in stock markets, mobilized behind Pharmasset and sofosbuvir (see Table 
4.1 for a summary of each of the primary sources for Pharmasset’s capital). The lure for these 
different capitals was not Pharmasset’s anticipated profitability and sales from approved products 
– the company had a $313.9 million deficit over the course of its existence – but rather on the 
promise of growing valuations for hepatitis C assets (Pharmasset 2009). This growing valuation 
was in turn underpinned by the phenomenon of a pricing escalator, in which future prices were 
expected to be higher than those of the existing standard of care. The owners of this capital did 
not aim to finance Pharmasset’s drug development to the point of approval and sales – but rather 
aimed to make bets in increasingly liquid financial markets (from venture capital to NASDAQ) for 
rewards within time horizons far shorter than the time (ten years) it took to develop sofosbuvir.  
Along the trajectory of these stages in the innovation process behind sofosbuvir, the 
imprint of public organizations and state policy remained, as the application of public science 
transformed the curative potential of one of Pharmasset’s early hepatitis C assets (PSI-6130) and 
ultimately manifested in the sofosbuvir compound. Furthermore, technological and regulatory 
shifts undertaken by the US State in the 1970s into the 1980s led to the formation of these 
financial markets of speculative capital for pharmaceutical development. This speculative process 
in the early stages of drug development, which involved multiple financial actors, business 
organizations, and the state, was a central element in the financialization of drug pricing and 
																																																						
109 Along with the replicon development, another development also supported investment in hepatitis C 
research: Chiron loosened its previously prohibitive intellectual patent protections over hepatitis C after 
pressure from the US Centers for Disease Control in 2004 (P. Elias 2004). During the 1990s and early 2000s, 
Chiron had set up barriers to research in the area by charging significant licensing fee and royalties based 
on their patents after the identification of the pathogen in 1989 (Cohen 1999a).   
110 My usage of the term ‘speculative capitals’ is marked by two features. First, I use the term ‘speculative’ to 
refer to the short-term and exit-oriented nature towards these forms of capital. This contrasts with more 
‘patient capital’, as defined by Deeg and Hardie (2016) by their intention towards long-term investment, 
performance measured through creditworthiness (and I would also add ‘learning’) rather than share price, 
and likelihood of maintaining investment (rather than exit) in face of adverse firm conditions. I also use 
‘capitals’ in plural to refer to the different types of such speculative capital - ranging from venture capital to 
equity traders on the stock market – which vary in extent of patience and expectation of return.  
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innovation. I drew on Pharmasset’s financial filings, articles in medicinal chemistry journals, the 
US Senate Finance Committee report as well as interviews to follow this process.111  
 
Table 4.1 Pharmasset’s sources of financing, 1999-2011 (all figures in millions)  
Period  Financing source Amount 
2000-2005 SBIR $2.46  
1999-2004 Venture Capital  $53.81  
2004-2010 Roche partnership $44.50  
2007 Initial public offering $45.00  
2008-2011 Follow-on equity financing  $345.87 
   
 TOTAL FINANCING, 2011-
2011  
$491.66 
 TOTAL OPERATING LOSS, 
2001-2011  
-$313.9  
Sources: Pharmasset SEC filings, S&P Capital database  
4.1.1 Pharmasset’s early assets and the entry of venture capital  
As Pharmasset embarked on developing its early pharmaceutical assets in the early 2000s, 
they searched for potential sources of financing to carry forward their research efforts. Venture 
capital would enter this stage of the innovation process, aiming to generate a return through 
investments in Pharmasset’s intangible pharmaceutical assets. Section 4.1 first situates these 
venture capital investments in Pharmasset in the context of other financing sources, then 
describes the mechanisms of pricing and valuation used by venture capitalists to pursue their 
strategic interests in the innovation process, and ends by linking regulatory shifts by the US state 
to the genesis of venture-backed biotechnology businesses like Pharmasset.  
Neither direct public funding beyond NIH’s SBIR program nor bank financing would 
comprise Pharmasset’s search for capital. Though the state had been a critical source of patient 
capital for Schinazi’s efforts to arrive at this stage, the SBIR grants highlighted in the previous 
chapter would not be sufficient for entering compounds into the phase I and II trials that typically 
run into the millions: an average anti-infective clinical trial in a single Phase I can be $4.2 million, 
with a Phase II trial amounting to $14.2 million, according to a US government study using 2004-
2012 data (Sertkaya et al. 2016).112 While hepatitis C was a growing public health concern in the 
																																																						
111 Interviews 12, 13, 15, 26, 27, 28, and 35 contributed to understanding Pharmasset’s early stage financing 
and ultimately the development of sofosbuvir.  
112 See Sertkaya (2016) for more on clinical trial data  
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late 1990s and 2000s, the NIH had not developed a strategic ‘mission-oriented plan’ to scale-up 
financing of hepatitis C drug development, particularly public funding of clinical trials (Cohen 
1999b).113 This lack of mobilization contrasts with the case of HIV/AIDS, in which political 
movements had instigated a broad-based public-sector driven approach to drug development (see 
Broder 2010).114 Similar political support had yet to be engendered for hepatitis C in national 
capitols, with the chronic and often invisible nature of hepatitis C combined with the 
marginalized status of many patients with the virus as potential reasons for this relative silence 
(Groopman 1998). Banks, in the meantime, would also not be a viable option for Pharmasset. The 
high levels of uncertainty and the lack of collateral from approved products for small 
biotechnology companies like Pharmasset make them unsuited for bank financing (Hopkins et al. 
2013; Robbins-Roth 2001).  
Instead, by 2004, Pharmasset had raised $55.3 million in venture capital to finance their 
nucleoside development work (S&P Capital IQ 2016b). This financing came in staged equity 
rounds, from a seed stage to series B, C, and D.115 Each round escalated the capital investment 
amount in parallel with the valuations of the company made by the given venture capitalists in 
that round: from $3.91 million in its Series B round in June 1999 to its Series D round of $40 
million in August 2004 (S&P Capital IQ 2016b).116 A different venture capital fund led each round, 
with two focused mostly on drug development (MPM Capital and Burrill and Company) and a 
third (TVM) investing across information technology as well as life sciences domains (S&P Capital 
IQ 2016b). These venture funds, like others similar funds but in contrast to the US state, provided 
financing to Pharmasset in return for an ownership stake in the company (Robbins-Roth 2001).117  
																																																						
113 While major public investments shaped the direction of the innovation process for hepatitis C towards a 
cure, the absence of a larger ‘mission-oriented’ strategy inclusive of public funding of clinical trials in this 
case was a critical limitation of the entrepreneurial state in the case of hepatitis C.  
114 Broder (2010) tells story of NIH’s collaboration with Burroughs-Wellcome, now Glaxo-Smithlkline (GSK) 
to develop first anti-retrovirals. 
115 For Pharmasset, this seed round was not publicly reported; from personal communication with the 
founders of the company, as well as individual public statements on deals with allied companies, I 
calculated that Pharmasset raised approximately $2.5 million in this initial round. Two million came from 
selling licensing of compounds with two companies, one in Boston and another in Brazil, with the 
remaining funds coming from a range of smaller contributions from $10 to $500K.   
116 These rounds mirrored the typical ranges for small biotechnology ventures in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. 
117 Neither the VA nor the NIH, both of which had supported Pharmasset, had any ownership stake in 
Pharmasset as it developed.  
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Yet when Pharmasset raised $40 million in a series D round of venture financing in 2004, 
the company had no approved products, had run an operating loss in each year since its founding 
(for a total of $15.8 million in deficits), and was not expected to generate profitability for years 
into the future (Pharmasset 2006). Why did Pharmasset then attract this venture capital? Three 
dynamics reveal the interests of venture capitalists as well as the pricing and valuation practices 
that underpin their position within the innovation process.  
The first dynamic is that venture capitalists aim to gain financial rewards not on the 
profitability of a newly approved or existing drugs, but via mobilizing publicly-funded science into 
downstream financial markets in which they can exit their ownership of an investee firm 
(Lazonick and Tulum 2011.; Pisano 2006; Robbins-Roth 2001). Venture capitalists typically 
maintain their ownership stakes for three to five years, and are focused on exiting through either 
an acquisition of their investee firm by a larger business, or via an initial public offering, in which 
venture capitalists can transfer their ownership to other shareholders while generating a gain 
based on the valuation of the acquisition or IPO (Lerner and Willinge 2011). For example, MPM 
Capital, Pharmasset’s venture capital backers for their series B round, shared their preference 
towards exiting via acquisitions, with MPM’s founder Luke Evnin (2014) stating, “when we 
approach an investment, we really think about who’s the buyer and what will we have to show 
that buyer? Is this a team and a product portfolio that will get us there?”. In this way, venture 
capitalists are positioned between the state and financial markets of larger businesses and public 
shareholders. As Evnin (2014) continued in a blog post, “Due to NIH funding now also going 
towards programs that demonstrate commercial potential, our ‘start ups’ are much further along 
by the time we invest – even though they may still be straight out of academia.” In the case of 
Pharmasset, venture capitalists viewed the company’s hepatitis C assets – a product of the public 
funding described in the previous chapter – as a potential vehicle for generating financial gains.  
This brings us to the second dynamic: these downstream financial markets placed a 
growing economic valuation – based on the anticipation of an increasing price and market size – 
on future hepatitis C assets. Using the library of compounds that Schinazi had developed in the 
1990s with public support along with the newly developed replicon, Pharmasset’s scientists 
embarked on testing potential nucleoside compounds for hepatitis C (Robbins-Roth 2001). By 
April of 2004, the company had identified a promising structure for a hepatitis C therapy, which 
they dubbed PSI-6130 (Furman, Otto, and Sofia 2011). The compound appeared to significantly 
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curtail the virus in rat populations, and would ultimately serve as the base structure for sofosbuvir 
(Furman et al. 2011).  
The PSI-6130 compound for hepatitis C was a major driver behind Pharmasset’s $40 
million venture capital series B round in October 2004 (Kallon 2010).118 The existing interferon-
based therapies for hepatitis C were priced at ~$36,000 per treatment regimen in 2004, yet only a 
small number of patients could take the treatment due to its toxicity (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015; Vernaz et al. 2016). In the US, only an estimated 50,000 patients 
annually began treatment, of the over 4 million infected (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015). Of these patients, only 15-40% responded to the treatment depending on the 
patient population, and most experienced significant side effects (Heim 2013).  Patients waited 
until they were in the late stages of disease before taking the interferon regimen (Heim 2013).119 
Investors anticipated that improvements in therapies could both command a higher price over 
time as well as translate to larger patient populations seeking earlier treatment of the disease. 
Pharmasset’s SEC filing later at the time of their IPO captured this anticipation, in which they 
cited the past example of improvements in interferon treatment cure rates and increases in 
market value: “When the replacement of interferon with pegylated interferon in 2000 further 
increased the SVR rate to range of about 47% to 54%, sales of HCV drugs again increased 
significantly from more than $1.3 billion in 2000 to more than $2.0 billion in 2002” (Pharmasset 10-
K 2007). 120  This expanding valuation of the ‘market’ – and the mobilization of venture capital into 
the innovation process –  rested on an anticipation of prices for an improved therapy that would 
be some magnitude higher than the existing reference price.121 A recent retrospective evaluation 
found that launch prices for hepatitis C medicines indeed followed this logic, increasing over 
																																																						
118 Interviews 34, 35 reinforced this view, and was also represented in legal filings over the patent claims to 
PSI-6130 (Kallon 2010). 
119 Inteferon had first been tested in 1986, before the 1989 identification of hepatitis C (Hoofnagle et al. 
1986),. The NIH’s Jay Hoofnagle, who had wondered if the therapy might work against non-A, non-B viral 
hepatitis, found that 11% of the patients experienced a cure after a year-long regimen (Hoofnagle et al. 
1986b). Interferon would later be combined with ribavirin in improved formulations by Roche and Schering 
Plough in the late 1990s to yield better results, yet patients still experienced significant side effects and cure 
rates remained below 50% (Heim 2013). 
120 The ‘replacement of interferon’ with ‘pegylated inteferon’ in 2002 represented an improvement at the 
time. As a reminder, SVR rate stands for ‘sustained virologic response’, and is equivalent to a cure.  
121 This links back to the logic described earlier by the equation, Price = Value = Reference price + 
differential value (Maldonado Castañeda 2016). Here we see the function of such a pricing approach in 
speculative financial markets. I elaborate the emergence, uses, and consequences of the pricing escalator 
later in this chapter (sections 4.1.2 and 4.3 as well as in the next chapter, sections 5.1 and 5.2). 
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$1,000 per 1% increase in cure rates for patients (Vernaz et al. 2016). I use the term pricing 
escalator to refer to this dynamic, which reappears throughout the chain of speculative capital 
that I trace later in this chapter (see Figure 4.1 for visual representation). In this way, investors 
were engaging in an intra-capitalist competition not just for profits but for differential growth 
(Cochrane 2011; Veblen 1908b).122  
 
Figure 4.1 Pricing escalator and expansion of market valuation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Investors anticipated rising prices for future hepatitis C medicines based on buyers continuing to pay 
for higher prices for improved therapeutic outcomes in the future, with the price of the existing standard of 
care serving as a reference price (R) and an additional price (D) based on an estimate of the differential 
value of better health outcomes. Higher prices (R+D) combined with the larger volumes of patients who 
stand to benefit from a better medicine produced forecasts with expanding market valuations, the lure for 
speculative capital to make bets in the innovation process.   
																																																						
122 To put it another way, to garner further investment for hepatitis C compounds, investors bet that future 
market valuation (price x patient population) would be greater than the current market garnered by the 
capitalists that owned the approved therapies for hepatitis C at the time. This growth logic fueling larger 
market valuations lured capital behind Pharmasset.   
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The third dynamic follows from the first two: through the existence of these downstream 
financial markets as well as the potential for growing valuations, venture capitalists could pursue 
significant rewards from their investments while exiting far before the approval and sales of any 
medicine. Venture capitalists in biotechnology typically seek 40-75% rate of expected ‘returns’ on 
their investments (Lerner and Willinge 2011).123 Such investors argue that this reward is warranted 
based on their relative illiquidity compared to downstream traders in stock markets (who can buy 
and sell shares on a daily basis) as well as the risks posed by unproven, early-stage businesses 
(Lerner and Willinge 2011). Furthermore, venture capitalists view themselves as ‘active investors’ 
who use their technical and business expertise and networks to take nascent businesses into 
potentially ‘high value’ businesses. Partners at venture capital funds with a biotechnology focus 
typically have a background in biomedical research and/or medicine which they use to evaluate 
potential technologies for investment that may otherwise fail to proceed (in terms of research and 
development) due to lack of financing. They also serve on the boards of investee firms, using their 
technical and financial expertise as well as authority as an investor to shape management 
decisions over talent, technology, and business strategy along the critical early stages of a firm’s 
development (Robbins-Roth 2001, Booth and Salehidizah 2011, Hogarth 2017). Returns for venture 
capitalists are viewed in the light of this position as an ‘active investor’ in the innovation process 
as well as the expectation of making significant returns on successful investee firms to cover for 
the large proportion of failed investments.   
An investment in any company with a particular hepatitis C asset contained some level of 
risk: while investors anticipated large and growing valuations for the overall hepatitis C market, a 
given compound could end up failing in clinical trials, thereby collapsing an investment. 
However, this risk was mitigated by the existence of financial markets through which venture 
capitalists (and downstream traders) could exit their ownership stakes far before the development 
of any compound. Pharmasset’s venture capital investors, for example, each had a stake in the 
company from between three to eight years before Pharmasset’s eventual public offering (S&P 
																																																						
123 I have seen these estimates on expected returns vary, with one analyst putting the threshold at 400% 
returns for some venture funds (Glabau 2016b). The main point here is that venture capitalists seek returns 
far above the rates of return in the stock market due to the arguments cited above. An analysis of recent 
annualized returns between 2000 and 2010 of 1400 venture capital funds show that life sciences venture 
capitalists delivered 20% returns (higher than information technology), with skewed returns on successful 
deals covering losses on others (Booth and Salehizadeh 2012). 
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Capital IQ 2016b). From the IPO onwards, these venture capitalists exited their ownership stakes 
at variable points based on trading on Pharmasset’s share price on the NASDAQ stock exchange.  
In sum, the mobilization of venture capital into Pharmasset rested on 1) the opportunity 
to exploit publicly funded discoveries based on the existence of downstream financial markets 
that could 2) impute growing financial valuations to the hepatitis C market, thereby 3) enable the 
potential for significant gains at an exit far before the approval of any therapy for hepatitis C.124 
This mobilization of venture capital for the life sciences, however, was not a natural 
phenomenon, but a historically and politically constituted set of dynamics that coincided with 
technological and regulatory shifts in the 1970s and 1980s undertaken by the US state and 
influenced in part by new business interests. I highlighted the technological shifts in the previous 
chapter, in which advances of molecular biology – largely funded by the NIH – enabled scientists 
to pursue a much larger array of technical directions (Vallas et al. 2011). The expansion of venture 
capital to commercialize the developments made possible through these publicly funded 
discoveries rested in two further sets of regulatory changes. The first set of changes related to the 
conversion of public into private intangible assets, which I also documented in the prior chapter, 
regarding the Bayh-Dole Act as well as other related changes to commercializing knowledge 
during the 1980s (Rai and Eisenberg 2002). This enabled a political-legal apparatus via which 
smaller spin-off enterprises like Pharmasset became vehicles for venture capital investment.  
The second set of US regulatory shifts relates to the structure of financial incentives and 
flow for venture capital in the late 1970s into the 1980s. Two principal changes occurred. First, in 
1979, the Department of Labor amended the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974’s (ERISA) “prudent man rule”, which had previously prevented pension funds from investing 
substantial sums in venture capital funds or other ‘high-risk’ asset classes (Gompers 1994; 
Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). Through their amendment, the Department of Labor instead 
allowed pension funds to invest up to 10% in venture capital (Gompers 1994). A second rule 
change had come the year before, when the emerging high tech and venture capital trade 
																																																						
124 Venture capital for hepatitis C followed the broader pattern indicated by Pharmasset: entering in after 
the advent of the replicon, venture funds sought to make gains not from the profits of any newly approved 
medicines – no new classes of medicines were approved for hepatitis C until 2011 – but from the potential to 
make gains in speculative financial markets. Between 2004 and 2008, the industry group BIO estimated that 
venture capital funds invested $500 million in all hepatitis C projects led by small biotechnology companies 
{Thomas:2015wq}. In the period between 2008 and 2012, however, this figure dropped to $101 million, with 
fewer new companies pursuing hepatitis C once compound had moved into later stage clinical trials and 
larger companies had acquired venture-backed businesses with hepatitis C assets {Thomas:2015wq}.   
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associations successfully lobbied the US Congress to decrease the capital gains tax from 49.5% to 
28%, as they viewed this to be an additional incentive to draw in venture capital (Gompers 1994). 
The ascent of venture capital proved significant in the decade following these two regulatory 
changes: in 1978, before these regulatory and tax changes, venture capital amounted to a small 
slice of economic activity, with a total of $216 million in commitments to such funds (Gompers 
1994). Pension funds made only 15% of this commitment. By 1988, pension funds accounted for 
nearly half of a total of $3 billion committed to venture capital funds (Gompers 1994). Taken 
together, therefore, these shifts helped produce an expansion of venture-backed biotechnology 
companies.  
In this section, I have illustrated the function of venture capital for Pharmasset and the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir as well the pricing and valuation strategies underpinning 
the circulation of this capital. Furthermore, I have shown that critical shifts mobilized by the US 
state in the 1970s and 1980s enabled the emergence of this form of capital. Rather than pursuing 
the financing of drugs through to their approval, venture capital mobilized on the basis of 
downstream financial markets valuing hepatitis C assets and enabling a significant reward at a 
time of a pre-approval exit from their ownership stakes. In this way, the venture capital behind 
Pharmasset became one link in a longer chain of multiple speculative capitals. We continue our 
tracing of this chain of capitals onwards into the next section.  
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Table 4.2: Venture capital rounds financing Pharmasset, 1998-2004  
Round of 
funding 
Date(s)  Amount / Deal Venture capital investors  
Series A  
(seed 
funding) 
1998-1999 Precise number 
unreported; likely  
~2.5 million125 
$ 1 million from Idenix (originally called Novirio) in 
exchange for 1 million shares; 1 million from 
Microbiologica, a Brazilian manufacturer led by Dr. 
Jaime Rabi; ~$500K from family and friends 
Series B June 1999 $3.91 million / 2.3 mil 
shares at $1.70 per 
share 
MPM Capital (BB BioVentures LP)  
 
*Ansbert Gadicke of MPM joined company’s board 
Series C February 
2001 
$7.4 million / 
1,357,798 shares at 
$5.45 per share 
 
TVM Capital (KG)  
 
*Alexandra Goll, partner at TVM Capital joined 
company’s board 
Series D August 4, 
2004 
$40 million / 
7,843,380 shares of 
series D redeemable 
convertible preferred 
stock at $5.10 
Burrill & Company  
 
*G. Steven Burrill, Founder and Chief Executive Officer 
of Burrill & Company joined the company’s board of 
directors. 
  Total venture 
funding   
$53.81 million 
 
Source: Pharmaset’s S&P Capital IQ report (2016b)  
 
Table 4.3 Summary of venture capital funds behind Pharmasset 
Source: FierceBiotech profiles   
 
 
																																																						
125 From personal correspondence with Pharmasset co-founder and reiterated in Atlanta Business Chronicle 
story (Robbins 1999). 
Venture 
fund 
Key facts about venture fund  Pharmasset investment and period to IPO  
MPM 
Capital  
- Founded in 1997, based in Boston 
- 23 deals  
- $2 billion in management, split 80/20 on drug 
development and medical device ventures  
- Led series B round in 1999 for $3.91 
million 
- 8-year investment period, from 1999 
to 2007  
TVM 
Capital  
- Founded in 1983 as one of the first venture capital 
funds in Germany 
- 37 deals, 8 exits  
- Focuses on information technology as well as 
biotechnology  
- Led series C round in 2001 for $7.4 
million 
- 6-year investment period, from 2001 
to 2007 
Burrill and 
company  
- Founded in 1985, based in San Francisco 
- 15 deals 
- Focused almost exclusively on life sciences with 
some investments in agriculture and biomaterials   
- Led series D round in 2004 for $40 
million 
- 3-year investment period by IPO  
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4.1.2 A financial market of pharmaceutical assets: a corporate partnership and an IPO 
Beyond initial public funding and venture capital, Pharmasset’s leadership searched for 
further financing to sustain the long-term research efforts required to develop new therapies. As 
the prior section highlighted, venture capital would only provide partial financing, and with a 
structural preference and positioning oriented around an ‘exit’ in which they pass ownership to 
other investors. To sustain their research efforts, Pharmasset turned to two kinds of actors: a 
larger pharmaceutical business in Roche, and public equity markets through an IPO. Both 
directions financed Pharmasset’s search for compounds in the near-term, and like venture capital, 
rested on pricing and valuation strategies that bet on growing markets and prices for hepatitis C 
assets as well as short-term exits.  
By the spring of 2004, Pharmasset had what it viewed to be a promising pharmaceutical 
asset in PSI-6130 (Kallon 2010). The company had decided to advance the compound into early 
human trials, as PSI-6130 had shown profound inhibition of the virus via binding to its NS5b 
polymerase protein both in the replicon and subsequently with rats (Furman et al. 2011). Though 
Pharmasset aimed to pursue this nucleoside strategy further, many questions typical of pre-
clinical drug development remained: how long would the compound stay in the body? How much 
of the compound would be needed for the desired effect? Would the compound be safe in 
humans? Questions of potency, effectiveness, and toxicity hung over the future of the compound. 
With no experience in hepatitis C clinical trials, Pharmasset looked to a strategy that had grown 
in the past two decades in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector: the ‘strategic 
partnership’ between small enterprises and established companies (Bartenschlager et al. 2016; 
Sofia et al. 2010).   
Strategic partnerships have been pursued within the industry as a way of joining up the 
supposed comparative advantages of small and large companies, with small biotechnology 
companies supplying established businesses with compounds from early stage research often 
deemed to be too risky for larger firms, and larger businesses providing clinical trial expertise to 
small companies with little expertise in the development process (Pisano 2006).126 In the past 
																																																						
126 While venture capital provides financing to the overall business, capital from established pharmaceutical 
companies typically focus on advancing a specific pharmaceutical asset onwards into clinical trials (Baum et 
al. 2010). This approach can be thought of as project-based financing. Some venture investments emulate 
this focus, especially for businesses working on single therapeutic classes, for example.   
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three decades, such alliances have grown as a mode of interaction between small and large 
companies, especially as large companies have outsourced early stage research. 127  
Just months after closing their series D round and patenting their PSI-6130 compound, 
Pharmasset struck such a ‘partnership’ deal with Roche, a large Swiss-based pharmaceutical 
company (Roche 2004). As the manufacturer of the leading hepatitis C treatments at the time, 
interferon-based treatments Pegasys and Copegus, Roche saw potential in Pharmasset’s PSI-6130 
compound to expand their anti-viral strategy (Roche 2004). Roche’s interferon treatments were 
toxic and many patients avoided taking them until their disease had already progressed into its 
later stages (Heim 2013). Their public list price for the regimen was about $40,000, and the market 
for hepatitis C – which also included Schering Plough’s interferon products - had grown to over $2 
billion in sales by 2004 (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015). Much like 
Pharmasset’s venture capital backers, Roche hoped that progressive improvements in treatment, 
such as by pairing interferon with a compound like PSI-6130, could enable them to grow the 
potential pool of patients who might start the regimen at earlier stages of the disease.  
With recent expertise in hepatitis C clinical trials with their interferon regimens, Roche 
aimed to conduct further investigations into the efficacy and safety of Pharmasset’s compound in 
humans. The deal called for Roche to make an up-front payment of $8 million to Pharmasset, with 
Roche agreeing to further pay upwards of $105 million in milestone payments if the compound 
made it through to advanced clinical trials, and royalty payments on any approved products. In 
exchange, Roche would gain global rights for the compound and accrue all associated revenue, 
minus the royalty payments to Pharmasset (Pharmasset 2006). Finally, Roche also gained share 
equity in Pharmasset in the form of ‘convertible stocks’ that could turn into common stocks 
should the company go for an initial public offering (IPO); this share equity element in their 
agreement mitigated Roche’s risk by assuring them of a potential near-term gain should the PSI-
6130 compound not make its way to approval and sales (Pharmasset 2006). Over the next six years 
during which the two companies partnered on clinical trials for PSI-6130 and its modified 
																																																						
127 The effectiveness of strategic partnerships for generating innovation has been contested due to the short 
time horizons and secrecy involved between firms attempting to share knowledge about assets, both of 
which eschew the long-term learning required for drug development (Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira 2005; 
Gleadle et al. 2014; Pisano 2006). I do not engage in the debate over this division of labor here, but provide 
this context to situate Pharmasset’s strategy.  
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versions, Roche directed $44.5 million to Pharmasset  (Pharmasset 2011).128 In turn, Roche received 
266,667 shares in Pharmasset at the time of its IPO at a value of $2.4 million (Pharmasset 2009). 
As Roche continued with clinical trials during the mid into late 2000s, Pharmasset took this 
capital to pursue compounds both in hepatitis C as well as HIV and hepatitis B. Yet they would 
also turn to another set of financial actors to sustain their research and development efforts: 
public shareholders.  
By 2006, Pharmasset began to prepare for an initial public offering (IPO), converting it 
from a privately held company to one that would be publicly traded on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange (Robbins-Roth 2001). Two factors shaped Pharmasset’s move: first, an IPO would enable 
Pharmasset’s venture capital investors to exit and “cash out”, and second, the offering could 
generate a new round of capital to finance the company’s clinical trial efforts. At the stage of the 
IPO, institutional shareholders enter into the innovation process in a more direct manner (up to 
this point, their role has been the indirect, via the financing of venture capital funds), as they take 
ownership from VC funds and then pass ownership on to other shareholders (Andersson et al. 
2010; Hopkins et al. 2013). Hopkins et al (2013:909) have argued that institutional investors at this 
stage can be seen less as processing physical materials and more as “pipelines that process 
financial contracts”. Rather than provide capital for the remainder of the innovation process, 
institutional investors and the IPO process create a market for speculative trading in which equity 
investors can move in and out of their investment in a particular company. The ‘market price’ 
created by the IPO valuation process enables these exchanges, by which traders aim to pursue 
capital gains.129  
Such trading in pharmaceutical assets – many of which may never receive regulatory 
approval and generate earnings – has been facilitated through the specific configuration of the 
NASDAQ stock exchange. As described by Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), the NASDAQ 
exchange, unlike its older New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) sibling, allows companies like 
Pharmasset with no record of profits and low capitalization to do an IPO. Like the formation of 
																																																						
128 Roche eventually abandoned further development of PSI-6130 (called RG-2748 at Roche) in 2011, after 
other companies (like Pharmasset itself with sofosbuvir) came to Phase II and Phase III trials with 
compounds that had an advantage in clinical outcomes and dosage (Pharmasset 2011).  
129 Multiple observers have pointed to the tendency of such speculative equity markets, with a small number 
of institutional investors concentrating share ownership, to become riven by short-termism, herd behavior, 
and risk aversion (Haldane 2011; Hopkins et al. 2013; Lazonick 2015).While I do not provide an exhaustive 
analysis of this short-termism, I describe how it operates in the context of larger pharmaceutical companies 
later in the chapter.   
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venture capital, NASDAQ was also a product in part of the US state: the exchange was created in 
1971 as the world’s first electronic stock market upon the encouragement and guidance of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission.130 The presence of NASDAQ allowed for a highly liquid 
financial market via which venture capitalists could exit their initial investments (Lazonick and 
Mazzucato 2013). Traders could enter and exit based on fluctuations in the share price, which 
were in turn shaped by development milestones and clinical trial results of intangible 
pharmaceutical assets, rather than forecasts of profitability and earnings.  
Pharmasset raised $45 million via its IPO on April 26, 2007 on the NASDAQ exchange, 
with their stock trading at $9 per share (Reuters 2007). Of the $45 million raised by Pharmasset, 
four institutional shareholders each held more than 5% of the company’s shares (S&P Capital IQ 
2016b).131 This valuation was based on Pharmasset’s focus on three clinical trial stage nucleoside 
compounds including the PSI-6130 compound being developed with Roche as well as one for 
hepatitis B (clevudine) and HIV (racivir) (Pharmasset 2006; 2010; Reuters 2007). For each 
compound, Pharmasset forecasted the potential for major revenue. As I highlighted earlier with 
the phenomenon of the ‘pricing escalator’, Pharmasset had observed that even modest 
improvements in treatment had led to increases in revenue in the past. The company predicted 
that worldwide sales for anti-virals against hepatitis C would go from $2.2 billion in 2005 upwards 
to $4 billion by 2010 and $8 billion in 2015 (Pharmasset 2006; 2010; 2011). With 15 million 
chronically infected with hepatitis C in the major markets of the US, Europe and Japan, 
Pharmasset’s senior leadership believed their development program for hepatitis C could generate 
the compounds to gain a share of that future growth.  
 Shareholders bet on this promise as well. As Pharmasset patented a compound believed to 
hold breakthrough potential in 2008 and began to run clinical trials showing promising results in 
2010 and 2011, the company raised further capital in the public equity markets by issuing new 
shares – with five separate rounds of ‘follow-on’ financing amounting to $345.9 million in capital 
																																																						
130 After a 1963 report submitted to the US Congress on a study of securities markets, the SEC recommended 
that the National Association of Security Dealers (a private body of security traders overseeing the trading 
activities of its members) make use of new computer technologies to establish a national electronic 
quotation system for what are known as ‘over the counter stocks’ – or stocks that traded off the main stock 
exchanges (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). 
131 The major institutional shareholders – both pension funds as well as hedge funds – at the time of 
Pharmasset’s IPO were the following (S&P Capital IQ 2016b): Fidelity Management and Research (467,800 
shares for $4.552 million), T Rowe Price (75,000 shares for $729,750), QVT Financial 2,055,498 shares for $20 
million), and BlackRock Advisors (275,000 shares for $2.675 million . 
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(S&P Capital IQ 2016b). Pharmasset used a fraction of this capital on research and development, 
which focused on clinical trials in 2010 and 2011 for the compound that would ultimately be 
sofosbuvir (spending $124.1 million) (Pharmasset 2011:66). These ‘follow-on’ financings also 
enabled new shareholders to trade on Pharmasset’s rising price: the price of Pharmasset’s shares 
ascended in 2010 and 2011 – reaching $85 dollars per share in October of 2011 on the strength of 
this potentially breakthrough therapy (Carroll 2011; Feuerstein 2011). We turn to the development 
of this breakthrough next.   
4.1.3 Sofosbuvir as a hybrid breakthrough: public science meets private asset  
While Pharmasset relied on the mobilization of this speculative venture and public 
shareholder capital for its financing at this stage, the company’s breakthrough would rest in the 
application of publicly funded science generated a decade before. The PSI-6130 compound, the 
centerpiece of their hepatitis C strategy and their partnership with Roche, suffered from a central 
limitation: when the compound entered the blood circulation, it metamorphosed into multiple 
different chemical versions, reducing its overall potency in the liver (Furman et al. 2011; Gounder 
2013; Sofia and Furman 2010). This chemical dis-banding limited its effectiveness in eliminating 
the virus from the liver, thereby requiring multiple pills, increased dosages, and the potential for 
greater side effects. While Roche continued their attempts to improve the drug as it proceeded 
into clinical trials, Pharmasset’s own scientists pursued research into other potential hepatitis C 
compounds. One of these scientists, Michael Sofia, had examined the PSI-6130 effort and began 
searching for an alternative direction based on several looming questions (Sofia and Furman 
2010): was it possible to reduce the pill count, lower the dosage, and increase the potency of the 
compound even further than PSI-6130 could? The PSI-6130 compound would provide a 
therapeutic benefit, but not to the extent that would jettison interferon from treatment regimens. 
A more potent compound could reduce or eliminate the need for the toxic interferon altogether, 
which would dramatically increase the numbers of patients who might benefit from treatment 
(Sofia and Furman 2010).  
To build a compound that transcended PSI-6130’s limitations, Sofia and his team at 
Pharmasset looked to an innovation from European scientists. The origins of PSI-6130’s 
limitations were known: the compound suffered from an diminished ability to complete a set of 
modification steps once in the blood stream (Sofia et al. 2010). Blocked at an earlier step, the 
compound transmuted into its inactive version, thereby reducing its potency. Sofia surmised that 
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bypassing this blocked step would hold the key to boosting any approach to inhibiting its target, 
the virus’s NS5b polymerase (Bartenschlager et al. 2016). In his search for potential bypass 
strategies, he encountered the work of a British scientist, Christopher McGuigan. In the 
‘McGuigan method’, an additional chemical structure called a ‘phosphoramidate’ is added to a 
base compound, with this structure serving as a ‘mask’ until it reached the liver (Cardiff 
University 2014; McGuigan et al.2010; Perrone et al. 2007). By adding the ‘mask’, Sofia aimed for 
the body to take advantage of its own physiology: because the liver is often the first place where a 
drug is absorbed and modified, Sofia hypothesized that the mask would fall off in the liver, 
thereby revealing the chemical structure ready to undergo the necessary modification steps to 
bind and inhibit the NS5b polymerase (Gounder 2013) . Sofia believed he had found his Trojan 
horse. By sneaking into the liver with a mask, the compound would have its greatest effect in 
precisely the organ where hepatitis C was wreaking its damage. 
McGuigan had pioneered this method in collaboration with Belgium scientist, Jan 
Balzarini, over the prior decade (Balzarini et al. 1996; McGuigan et al. 1996b; Mehellou et al. 
2009). Based at Cardiff University in the UK, McGuigan led the effort to develop this 
phosphoramidate structure and method, first in the context of HIV and then other viruses (like 
hepatitis C) and more recently in cancers (McGuigan et al. 2010). In the seminal 1996 paper 
describing the approach McGuigan and his collaborators cited four public sources of funding: the 
British Medical Research Council, two programs of the European Commission, and the Belgian 
government.132 A subsequent paper in 1999 reiterated these funding sources (Siddiqui et al. 
1999).133  
Accessing this knowledge through the public domain, Sofia was able to apply it to 
Pharmasset’s hepatitis C research (Cardiff University 2014). Attempting multiple versions of the 
phosphoramidate “mask” and fixing it onto the base PSI-6130 structure, Sofia finally found one 
iteration which showed a profound decline in the virus (Bartenschlager et al. 2016; Sofia et al. 
2010). Additionally, the modified inactive versions that had been observed with the PSI-6130 were 
absent. The new structure would be named PSI-7977, and eventually receive the name sofosbovir 
																																																						
132 The precise funding sources named were The AIDS Directed Programme of the MRC, the Biomedical 
Research Programme and the Human Capital and Mobility Programme of the European Commission, the 
Belgian Geconcerteerde Onderzoeksacties, and the Belgian Natinoaal Fonds voor Wetenschlappelijk 
Onderzoek. See McGuigan (1996, 1999) papers for more.  
133 I could not locate the precise figures for this funding, as specific grants were not identified; these grants 
pre-dated internet databases that have archived this type of information for the public.  
Roy	120 
	
after its lead scientist. PSI-7977 became Pharmasset’s lead candidate for hepatitis C in 2008, after 
a three year period of pre-clinical testing by Sofia and his team. Documenting this process in 
chemistry and medical journals after the development of sofosbuvir, Sofia cited the McGuigan 
method as the pivotal and defining step to arrive at the curative backbone compound 
(Bartenschlager et al. 2016; Sofia and Furman 2010; Sofia et al. 2010).134  
The sofosbuvir structure and curative function can be observed to be a hybrid public-
private outcome, recombining publicly funded knowledge in the context of a publicly-traded 
business (see Figure 4.2 for hybrid genesis of sofosbuvir). Pharmasset filed for intellectual 
property protection on this new compound in 2008,135 and began to prepare for early stage human 
trials in 2009 and 2010 (World Health Organization 2016). By 2008 Pharmasset had developed 
more clinical trial capabilities, having attempted to develop compounds in HIV and hepatitis B in 
the previous half-decade and worked in partnership with Roche on its hepatitis C protocol 
(Pharmasset 2009; 2010). With this experience and the requisite financing from their IPO, 
Pharmasset pursued early Phase I and Phase II clinical trials as an independent company  
(Pharmasset 2011). Over the course of these two years, Sofia’s application of the McGuigan 
method would be validated in several Pharmasset-led early-stage clinical trials, with each trial 
showing promising results (Gounder 2013; Knight 2013).  
Though in small samples, the compound showed results heretofore not witnessed in 
hepatitis C: in Phase II trials for example, sofosbuvir cured hepatitis C in rates higher than 90% in 
multiple cohorts among a 564-patient population (Pharmasset 2009; 2010). Pharmasset used the 
capital generated from its IPO as well as further secondary financings from shareholders to run 
these trials at a total cost of $62.4 million. To further validate their compound, Pharmasset 
worked with the National Institutes of Health on a Phase II trial in the sickest patient populations 
often under-represented in clinical trials for hepatitis C by private companies: African Americans 
																																																						
134 In one of his papers aimed at more public medical audiences written with other hepatitis C scientists, 
Sofia (2016) described their overall strategy, “To address the deficiencies of the PSI-6130 prodrug a radical 
redesign of this nucleoside inhibitor was developed by Sofia and colleagues  […]To address the problem of 
delivering a highly charged, unstable, and membrane-impermeable uridine monophosphate into cells and 
ultimately into the body, a ‘Trojan horse’ strategy was developed that masked the uridine monophosphate 
in such a way as to impart stability and facilitate transport into the body and into liver cells.” In another of 
his papers, Sofia (2010) described the source of their Trojan horse strategy: “We speculated that application 
of the phosphoramidate prodrug method would be an ideal approach for delivering the desired uridine 
monophosphate to hepatocytes in an in vivo setting.” Here the McGuigan method is called the 
‘phosphoramidate prodrug method’.  
135 Roche, Merck, and AbbVie would all later sue Gilead over sofosbuvir’s patents.  
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and those with advanced liver disease (Osinusi et al 2013).136 In case they chose to remain a free-
standing company, Pharmasset meanwhile also plotted out $90.4 million to bring the compound 
all the way through Phase III trials and registration with regulatory authorities (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015).137   
 
 Figure 4.2 Organizational and financial sources of sofosbuvir structure  
 
Note: Sofosbuvir structure is composed of the phosphoramidate component developed through 
public European sources along with the backbone developed at Pharmasset, itself supported by a 
mix of private and public funding at the time of its discovery. VC = venture capital. 
 
Table 4.4 Phase I and Phase II clinical trials for sofosbuvir by Pharmasset and NIH 
Trial Time period Patients tested  
Phase Ia / Ib  June 2009  Tested safety and tolerability in healthy 
patients (Ia), and then in chronically infected 
patients (Ib) 
Phase IIa / IIb (3 trials)  
- ELECTRON 
- POSITRON 
- ATOMIC  
2010-2011 564 patients across different populations and 
regimen lengths 
Phase II trial (National 
Institutes of Health)  
2011-2013 6o patients, under-represented and sicker 
patients not otherwise tested (African 
Americans, advanced liver disease)  
See Table 4.6 for total costs of sofosbuvir development, including pre-clinical research as well as clinical 
trial development by Pharmasset and Gilead Sciences. Sources: Pharmasset SEC 10-K and Gilead Sciences 
10-K filings.   
																																																						
136 The NIH sponsored the trial, releasing data with positive findings in mid-2013. 
137 See Table 4.6 later in the chapter with a breakdown of these reported costs. 
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4.1.4 Potential pathways for Pharmasset: durability or disposability?   
As Pharmasset entered 2011 with PSI-7977 looking to be a potent intangible asset, the 
company’s senior leadership had a decision to make, typical of small biotechnology companies 
with compounds preparing for later stage trials: to grow as a durable, free-standing business, or 
become a ‘disposable’ business via an acquisition by an established pharmaceutical company 
(Baum et al. 2010; Ozmel et al. 2013). Documents from Pharmasset’s strategic planning and board 
meetings captured by the US Senate investigation reveal that two major considerations shaped 
the company’s self-assessment about its future: first, the timing and results of further clinical data 
for PSI-7977 and competing compounds, and second, their capability to grow into a diversified, 
global enterprise.  
If Pharmasset were to find a partner or get acquired, they wanted it to be with the right 
company for the right price. Early indications from their Phase II trials were that PSI-7977 would 
work most effectively if paired with a second compound, much like combination therapies for 
HIV (Garber 2011). Using PSI-7977 alone as a ‘mono-therapy’ could otherwise lead to high rates of 
resistance and lower cure rates (Sofia et al. 2010). Several established companies, such as Bristol 
Myers Squibb, Gilead Sciences and Merck, had developed compounds that might work in tandem 
with PSI-7977, but the data on those compounds still presented a murky picture, as few had made 
it into later-stage clinical trials (Garber 2011).  Pharmasset knew they could gain leverage by 
waiting (Flinn 2011). With complete Phase II trials for PSI-7977 to be released in late 2011, the 
compound would likely be in high demand; none of the larger companies had developed a 
backbone compound with its potency (Flinn 2011). Furthermore, if Pharmasset chose to pursue 
another partnership like it had done with Roche previously, choosing the company with the right 
‘partner compound’ for PSI-7977 would be pivotal. If the right combination were not chosen, 
Pharmasset would not only lose out on future revenues from the compound, but also the 
opportunity to get out-right acquired. With these possibilities in mind, they proceeded with 
caution (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:645):  
 
“At this point in time, the likelihood of choosing wrong is significantly higher than the 
likelihood of choosing the right combination partner for PSI-7977. As an example, 
assume that a protease inhibitor is the correct combination partner. […] There is only 
a 15% overall probability of choosing the correct compound for combination with PSI-
7977 and achieving the Good Deal scenario.”  
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Pharmasset’s “15% overall probability” came from their analysis of the compounds they saw in the 
hepatitis C market, many of which had yet to proceed into Phase II trials. By waiting, Pharmasset 
would gain more information with which to determine any decisive steps towards the right deal. 
In the meantime, Pharmasset’s executives evaluated whether they could build a durable free-
standing business.  
But to grow as a standalone company, Pharmasset forecast the challenge of building a 
global marketing, regulatory, and distribution networks that would require new expertise and 
financial resources that they currently did not have (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:502). Additionally, Pharmasset worried that they would need to quickly diversify to other 
areas of therapeutic development after the launch of PSI-7977, as a curative therapy for hepatitis 
C would not lead to the type of continuous growth that their shareholders expected. The 
company’s viability as a single-product business remained a looming question, and the team 
began to explore other therapeutic areas it could enter.138 They later concluded that the prospects 
for diversification would need to come from outside the company. “In fact, given the substantial 
time frame from research program initiation to product launch,” Pharmasset’s leaders observed in 
a 2011 board meeting update, “it is highly unlikely that any de novo research program will provide 
the necessary revenue in the required timeframe” to deliver growth beyond hepatitis C (United 
States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:501). In this context, larger companies appeared to be 
better suited to be Pharmasset’s suitors in a potential acquisition than as competitors vying for 
growth (Garber 2011).  
Which path would sofosbuvir take in the hands of Pharmasset? As observed in section 4.1, 
the promise of escalating market valuation and growth had circulated a chain of speculative 
capital into the innovation process behind sofosbuvir, with the cash hungry and deficit-running 
Pharmasset entirely reliant on external capital markets for financing as the drug development 
process moved forward. Understanding its next steps in the innovation process thus demands an 
analysis of another set of financial dynamics alongside those of speculative asset-based markets: 
the relationship between shareholders of large pharmaceutical businesses and the corporate 
																																																						
138 In a July 2010 board meeting memorandum, the company highlighted its challenge due to failures in HIV 
and hepatitis B, and attempted to plan a response: “Pharmasset no longer possesses such a well-balanced 
pipeline. Presently, Pharmasset’s pipeline is entirely focused on nucleoside analogs for treating HCV […] 
However, over time, we have identified opportunities that with a little investment in research could result 
in success in several years” (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:646) 
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strategies of these businesses, and in turn the relationship between large and small biotechnology 
companies.  
4.2 Life science or shareholder science? Gilead’s position in the innovation 
process 
 
As Pharmasset scanned the future for its options entering into 2011, large established 
pharmaceutical companies viewed the hepatitis C market with anxiety and promise: the growing 
valuation of the market indicated the significant financial potential, yet none of the major 
companies appeared to possess the compounds and treatment regimen to accrue the large share 
of these potential earnings (Garber 2011; Knight 2013; Rice and Saeed 2014). One of these large, 
publicly traded companies was Gilead, which found itself in a predicament by the summer of 2011: 
beyond their HIV/AIDS medicines, research and development efforts within the company bore 
few fruits during the 2000s. The scope for further growth seemed limited: to many Wall Street 
analysts, Gilead appeared destined to be a single disease business (Jannarone 2011). Though 
improved treatments for hepatitis C presented a new revenue opportunity, Gilead found itself 
stuck (Jannarone 2011). When Pharmasset surveyed Gilead’s history in a strategy document, they 
noted: “Today (2011) Gilead is left wondering what to do in HCV,” due to a “lack of successes” 
(United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:665). 
In section 4.2, I trace Gilead from its genesis to its position in the hepatitis C innovation 
process in 2011 to reveal the mechanisms by which shareholders controlled the company’s capital 
allocation strategies. Unpacking the ‘shareholder growth treadmill’ – the near-term and 
differential growth demanded by shareholders - faced by companies in publicly traded financial 
markets, I show how Gilead was exposed to a structural crisis in 2011 that explains its position in 
the innovation process less as a research and development company, but as an accumulation 
center – using accumulated capital from prior sales to specialize in acquisitions of late-stage 
assets in the drug making process.139 This section thus introduces the extractive logics driving 
Gilead’s shareholders and the ways this influenced the innovation process behind sofosbuvir.140   
 
	
																																																						
139 This analysis in turn situates Gilead’s pursuit to acquire Pharmasset as described in the following section. 
140 I elaborate on these logics later in the chapter as well as in chapter 5, before synthesizing its implications 
for the sofosbuvir process in the discussion chapter (chapter 6).  
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4.2.1 Gilead’s rise: acquiring and recombining innovations for HIV/AIDS  
 
From its early origins onwards, Gilead’s business strategy has centered on acquiring 
pharmaceutical assets from outside the company and then recombining them into treatment 
regimens that could be used in a larger patient population than each individual compound could 
otherwise on their own.   
Launched in 1987 by a medicine and business graduate, Michael Riordan, Gilead initially 
focused on a new biotechnology (anti-sense technology) that could be used to shut down proteins 
responsible for viral replication (Brown 1997). Unlike Pharmasset, the company did not emerge 
from a publicly funded lab at a university, but rather materialized in Silicon Valley during the 
early years of biotechnology with a growing abundance of speculative capital to finance new 
ventures (Chandran et al. 2014). The company began with $6 million in venture capital (Brown 
1997). With no products or profits, Gilead went public in 1992 on the NASDAQ exchange, raising 
$86.25 million with 5.75 million shares of common stock in its initial public offering (IPO) (Brown 
1997). By then, the company had shifted from its initial anti-sense strategy, as it attracted capital 
based on an approach of finding compounds from outside the company (Rangan and Lee 2009).   
Under the leadership of John Martin, a medical chemist recruited from Bristol Myers-
Squibb with experience in anti-viral research, Gilead turned its focus to nucleoside science. 
Martin envisioned a two-pronged business model: ‘in-licensing’ compounds from other 
companies and institutions while also attempting to build up its internal research capabilities 
(Rangan and Lee 2009). For example, Gilead in-licensed compounds from researchers at two 
institutes in Europe with whom Martin had worked while at BMS.141 One of these compounds – 
tenofovir disoproxil fumurate (TDF) – would be approved in treatment for HIV in 2001, becoming 
the only once-daily pill at the time (Rangan and Lee 2009). After a minor acquisition in 1999 of 
the company NeXstar, Gilead’s second purchase in 2003, Triangle Pharmaceuticals, poised the 
company for dominance in HIV/AIDS (Gilead Sciences 2016a). For $464 million, Gilead gained 
ownership of a compound known as embtricitabine, which had already received FDA approval 
(Gilead Sciences 2016a). Ray Schinazi, also the founder of Pharmasset, had begun Triangle in 1996 
based on developing embtricitabine (Cohen 2015). With these two compounds – TDF and 
																																																						
141 In 1991 and 1992, Gilead entered into “royalty” agreements with the institutions where his European 
colleagues had worked: the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry at the Academy of Sciences of 
the Czech Republic (IOCB) and the Rega Institute for Medical Research, Katholic University in Leuven, 
Belgium (Rangan and Lee 2009). The agreements specified that the institutions would receive royalty 
payments if compounds led to a marketed product.  
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embtricitabine – Gilead bet on a strategy of recombining innovations from outside the company to 
realize commercial success. 
  Within three years of its acquisition of Triangle, Gilead offered two main treatments for 
HIV/AIDS: first Truvada, launched in 2004, and then Atripla, launched in 2006. Truvada was a 
combination of embtricitabine and TDF, while Atripla added a third compound licensed from 
Merck (Rangan and Lee 2009). Before this point, patients with HIV/AIDS typically required 
multiple medications taken multiple times a day, making it difficult to adhere to treatment and 
increasing the likelihood of side effects. Combining multiple medicines into a once-daily 
treatment, as Truvada and Atripla did, allowed Gilead to become the leading manufacturer of HIV 
medicines. Though five classes of medicines existed for HIV, with 20 different anti-retroviral 
compounds, 80% of patients in the U.S. by 2008 received one of Gilead’s HIV medicines (Rangan 
and Lee 2009).142 From its launch in 2004 to the end of 2011, Truvada generated $13.5 billion in 
total revenue (Gilead Sciences 2012). Atripla amassed $11.2 billion by 2011, surpassing Truvada in 
yearly sales in 2010 (Gilead Sciences 2012). Gilead’s HIV strategy had paid off, leading the 
company to grow during the 2000s from a small publicly traded company with no products and 
sales to a growing biopharmaceutical company generating $8 billion in revenue by 2011.  
Gilead’s strategy thus rested less in scientific discovery within their labs and more in 
recombining discovery from beyond its Foster City campus (Rangan and Lee 2009). Both TDF and 
embtricitabine, the backbone compounds in their HIV regimens, came from university 
laboratories, with Gilead making modifications and then bringing them together in single pills for 
simplified treatment regimens (Rangan and Lee 2009). Yet Gilead’s acquisition-based strategy was 
positioned to respond to a structural crisis driven by the expectations and influence of Gilead’s 
shareholders. Understanding the financial stakes for Gilead in the summer of 2011 provides insight 
into the structure of this crisis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
142 Though the majority of patients received either Atripla or Truvada, a smaller percentage also received 
embtricitabine (brand name: Embtriva) and TDF (brand name: Viread) in combination with therapies from 
other companies, with Gilead receiving a portion of those sales.  
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Box 4.1 Gilead by 2011: key primer facts 
• Founded in 1987 by Michael Riordan, IPO for $86.25 million with final share-financed 
capital investment coming in 1996 
• Major HIV compounds TDF (licensed in 1996) and embtricitabine (acquired in 2004) from 
university labs via licensing and acquisition, respectively, Both compounds are the 
backbone in their HIV combination therapies Truvada and Atripla.   
• HIV regimens amounted to $33 billion in sales in the decade between their launch in 2001 
and 2011, with annual sales of over $7 billion in 2011 (representing 90% of the company’s 
total revenue) 
 
4.2.2 Gilead’s structural crisis: the shareholder growth treadmill, patent cliffs, and a dry 
pipeline  
 
In the years between 2009 and 2011, Gilead’s rates of profitability were considerable, 
ranging from 33% to 37.6% (Gilead Sciences 2012).143 For Gilead, this rate of profitability was 
possible due to its patent protected prices and revenues in a single therapeutic area: medicines for 
HIV/AIDS. This singular product focus, built on the licensing and acquisitions of TDF and 
embtricitabine highlighted in the previous section, generated almost all the company’s revenue 
during the previous decade. Between 2008 and 2011, for example, Gilead’s revenues climbed by 
about $1 billion each year, from $5 to $8 billion, with their HIV/AIDS medicines making up 85% of 
that revenue (Gilead Sciences 2012). Even with this steady rate of growth, however, three 
historically contingent and institutional factors exposed Gilead to a structural crisis: shareholder-
mediated growth as a publicly traded company, patent cliffs on its existing products, and a dry 
pipeline of potential compounds. These three factors would each converge to shape Gilead’s 
business model and its position within the innovation process less as a research and development 
company but more as an acquisition and regulatory specialist.  
First, as a publicly traded company listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, Gilead’s value 
to traders and shareholders is determined not by its profits, but by the expectation of growth in 
profits. In other words, value in a speculative market, as discussed earlier and described by 
Sunder-Rajan (2012), is based on the potential for a company’s existing or new compounds to 
generate more in earnings over the present rate of earnings. For companies like Gilead with 
established flows of revenue, a company is gauged by shareholders on their capability to grow 
																																																						
143 Rate of profitability is equal to net income divided by total revenue.  
Roy	128 
	
with a particular magnitude and time horizon.144 Shareholders typically compare companies’ 
potential for growth against their competitors as well as the cost of capital (or market rate of 
return). This differential rate of accumulation is tied to the notion that owners of capital can 
allocate that capital to other vehicles for surplus generation. The typical expectation for growth 
(or ‘return on investment’) in the pharmaceutical sector is 8-10%, and this growth is assessed by 
comparing earnings reports against those from previous quarters and the prior year (Damodaran 
2017; Rajan 2012).145 This quarterly and annual time horizon combined with the expected 
magnitude of growth shapes the evaluations of shareholders as they make bets on given stocks.  
Take Gilead in 2011: the company’s share price had increased between 2006 and 2008, 
mirroring its growth in HIV sales. But after this growth began to plateau in 2009 and 2010, its 
share price slumped, reverting back to its pre-HIV growth era (see Figure 5.6). A piece in Forbes 
magazine at the end of 2010 summed up the sentiment on Wall Street: “As its earlier galloping 
growth begins to slow, investors are starting to wonder what Gilead plans to do for a second act” 
(Forbes 2010). The fear that Gilead would remain a single disease business, with limited prospects 
for growth, dictated the company’s value rather than its nearly $8 billion in revenue or high rate 
of profitability. This focus on share price and expected growth, in turn, was not a natural 
economic outcome; rather, political-legal shifts have configured the rising power of shareholders 
over business strategies. This shareholder-driven expectation of growth, however, has influenced 
and converged with two other institutional and political-economic dynamics to pattern Gilead’s 
position in the innovation process: looming patent cliffs and dry pipelines. 
First, Gilead’s existing products had a finite life consequent to the length of their 
intellectual property protections. Though the threat was not immediate, like those faced by other 
companies, these expirations – dubbed ‘patent cliffs’ – still loomed over Gilead’s prospects.146 One 
of their key HIV compounds, TDF, was set to expire in 2017 in several key markets including 
																																																						
144 For small companies like Pharmasset with no approved compounds or sources of ongoing profitability, 
value would be assessed through the progression of its pharmaceutical assets via clinical trials and 
milestone events, such as initiation of a regulatory approval process. For these smaller companies, trading 
volume and share price can swing between periods of inertia and quietude to ones of intense volatility and 
high volumes of trade. 
145 See Damodaran (2017) for cost of capital across US sectors using multiple data sets to arrive at 7.58% for 
established pharmaceutical companies and 9.25% for smaller biotechnology companies. I discuss the cost of 
capital further in section 4.3.1.   
146 Many of Gilead’s competitors faced the problem of finite patent life even more acutely: by 2012, drugs 
representing more than $67 billion in sales were expected to lose patent protection and hence face 
competition from generic manufacturers (Andersson et al. 2010; Rajan 2012). 
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Europe, threatening their most lucrative HIV treatment regimens in a little over five years to 
generic competition (Rangan and Lee 2009). Furthermore, though the HIV treatment regimens 
were delivering steady revenue growth for Gilead (about $1 billion each year between 2008 and 
2011), they could not deliver the magnitude shareholders demanded over the long-term as the HIV 
epidemic plateaued (Chandran et al. 2014). Only a new source of revenue could resolve the 
predicament of the patent cliff and meet those growth conditions. This meant that disease areas 
like hepatitis C, with existing high priced therapies being used in growing patient populations, 
presented an important opportunity to generate growth. But generating that growth to replace 
off-patent medicines within a short-term time horizon was also threatened by another dynamic: 
dry internal pipelines. 
The same shareholder imperative on near-term and continuous growth for a publicly-
traded business like Gilead also inhibited the long-term investments required to translate 
uncertain research into approved therapeutics and new sources of revenue. Rather than investing 
in long-term research, Gilead distributed capital to shareholders through out the 2000s. Though 
Gilead’s revenue totaled $33 billion between 2007 and 2011, the company directed $3.3 billion, or 
10%, towards research and development (S&P Capital IQ 2016a). Much of this was allocated to 
performing late-stage clinical trials on acquired assets in heart disease, as Gilead attempted to 
diversify beyond HIV (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:667).147 Meanwhile, the 
company directed $9.9 billion to shareholders in the form of buybacks, or 3x their research and 
development budget. 148   
In hepatitis C, the company had advanced two compounds into phase II trials, but both 
appeared to lack the effectiveness of competing compounds like PSI-7977.149 Monitoring Gilead’s 
pipeline, Pharmasset’s executives noted that “their protease inhibitor is not very potent and has a 
resistance problem,” and observed that their other compound showed the potential for adverse 
																																																						
147 These acquisitions and clinical trials yielded $350 million in revenue between 2009 and 2010, as these 
medicines were for smaller patient populations suffering from specific heart-related problems (Gilead 
Sciences 2012).  
148 Via the strategies of ‘maximizing shareholder value’, earnings that could not be used to generate the 
growth characterized earlier through investments within the firm were expected to be directed to 
shareholders. I describe these distributions to shareholders – in the form of buybacks and dividends later in 
this chapter as well as in chapter 5. Gilead directed a bulk of the remainder towards shareholders via share 
repurchases (or share ‘buybacks’), the function and consequences of which we review later in the chapter. 
See Appendix C for key financial figures for Gilead between 2007-2016.  
149 Interviews 26, 27, 28, 38 provided context into the array of hepatitis C compounds in 2010-2012, and their 
relative merits and prospects at the time.  
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heart related events at the necessary dosages (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:667). Unlike Pharmasset’s approach to pursue the riskier nucleoside science in developing 
sofosbuvir, Gilead’s more modest approach of building on known (and less risky) science via 
protease and non-nucleoside inhibitors had left its hepatitis C armamentarium empty. Evaluating 
Gilead’s pipeline and looming patent expirations, an analyst with Bloomberg business stated, “We 
continue to be pessimistic about Gilead’s long-term growth”, yet noted that he had upgraded the 
stock from a sell to a buy because of “a large share buy-back plan announced earlier this month” 
(Jannarone 2011). In this context, long-term investments were eschewed for distributions of 
capital to shareholders, leaving a shaky pipeline on which to meet the expectations of 
shareholders.  
These twin pressures – patent cliffs on existing treatments as well as the dry pipeline from 
which to generate new revenue – shaped Gilead’s search for near-term growth. To resolve their 
predicament of generating growth in the context of patent cliffs and limited pipelines, Gilead saw 
acquisitions as their preferred approach to using their accumulated capital.150 Reflecting on their 
position in an earnings call, then CEO John Martin described this strategic preference to Gilead’s 
investors: “We typically like things where we can have impact on Phase III and where we can 
accelerate those products either into the approval process or into greater indications after the 
approval process” (Seeking Alpha 2015). In other words, Gilead’s senior leadership saw their 
company as less oriented around researching and developing new compounds within their own labs, 
but more as an acquisition specialist delivering near-term growth at the magnitude necessary to 
meet the expectations of financial markets.   
As I introduced in chapter 1 with my description of shareholder control and its role in 
financialization, Gilead’s orientation towards shareholders and financial markets is not a natural 
phenomenon but part of a historically and politically contingent dynamic (Davis 2009; Lazonick 
2015). The shift towards shareholder control began in the 1970 and 1980s with the notion that 
shareholders in financial markets – and not managers of business organizations, as before – could 
most efficiently allocate capital across the economy to deliver growth using the metric of share 
price (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Any investments by a company needed 
to have the potential to generate growth at the magnitude and within the time horizon described 
																																																						
150 This approach aligned with and reinforced the seemingly cemented ‘performance narrative’ pervading 
the pharmaceutical industry, in which large companies increasingly were to ‘outsource’ the ‘research’ side of 
R&D, leaving it to more nimble early-stage companies and venture capital to perform (Andersson et al. 
2010; Gleadle et al. 2014; Montalban and Sakinc 2013). 
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earlier; any capital that managers believed could not generate this growth, under this view, should 
be distributed to shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986). As 
I describe later in this chapter, regulatory shifts enabling this distribution of capital (through 
buybacks, primarily) along with linking executive compensation to share price through stock 
options and awards bolstered shareholder control over the capital allocation strategies of 
businesses. The extractive logics underpinning shareholder control, which I elaborate further later 
in this chapter and in chapter 5, created a structural crisis for Gilead.  
As 2011 wore on, Gilead knew that losing out on the hepatitis C market could hold 
potentially dire consequences for the business. Gilead’s competitors in hepatitis C, such as Merck 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb, were long-standing companies with diversified businesses across 
multiple therapeutic areas (Jannarone 2011). Gilead’s reliance on HIV left the business in a 
vulnerable position, especially if one of its competitors “won” the hepatitis C sweepstakes by 
coming to the market first or with a best-in-class treatment regimen (Ha et al. 2011). A larger 
company, for example, could view Gilead’s HIV business as an attractive acquisition opportunity, 
and launch a merger or takeover attempt to gain control over this revenue stream (Jannarone 
2011). Transcending its near-term growth crisis would thus be facilitated by a major play in 
hepatitis C. In August of 2010, Gilead hired John McHutchison, a doctor who led many early-stage 
clinical trials in hepatitis C for different biotechnology companies - including early stage trials for 
Pharmasset’s PSI-7977 (Gilead Sciences 2010). He had been immersed with the details of the many 
potential late-stage assets for hepatitis C that were being developed beyond Gilead’s labs (Werth 
2014). Pharmasset’s senior leadership noted the hire, observing “the very clear signals from Gilead 
and John are that they will be making some strategic moves in HCV” (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:667). We now turn to the intersection of Gilead and Pharmasset’s 
trajectories to unpack the relations of power and dynamics of pricing at stake in financial markets 
for pharmaceutical assets.  
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Figure 4.3 Gilead’s share price between August 2006 and December 2010 
  
Caption: After rising from $16 to nearly $30 on the strength of HIV sales in 2006 thru 2008, Gilead’s share 
value fell and stagnated between $16 and $20 in 2010, as sales growth from HIV continued but slowed, and 
the company did not have another product in the pipeline anticipated to generate new growth. Source: 
Google Finances, GLD. 
4.3 Capitalizing on sofosbuvir and the hepatitis C gold rush  
 
In attempting to transcend this structural crisis driven by growth expectations of 
shareholders, Gilead turned to a pursuit of Pharmasset and its PSI-7977 asset in the summer and 
fall of 2011. The acquisition process that ensued between Gilead and Pharmasset provides a 
‘strategic site’ for investigating the mechanisms by which the mobilization of speculative capitals 
behind Pharmasset (and described in section 4.1) converged with the extractive logics driving 
Gilead’s shareholders. Underpinning this acquisition process were valuation dynamics, as both 
Gilead and Pharmasset determined the right price for a potential transaction by capitalizing the 
earnings streams each expected to earn from owning PSI-7977. In analyzing capitalization 
strategies, I go beyond the narrow frame of capitalization as a pricing operation performed by 
business owners (in this case Pharmasset and Gilead) but, ala Veblen, view it as a political-
economic vehicle that translated relations of power between multiple actors (state, business, and 
financial) vying for control over hepatitis C assets (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Veblen 1908b). 
I dissect this capitalization vehicle in three parts, drawing on Pharmasset and Gilead’s 
business plans contained in the US Senate investigation, SEC filings and financial statements, 
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media accounts, as well as interviews.151 First, I decipher the assumptions embedded in both 
Gilead’s and Pharmasset’s valuations of sofosbuvir in the summer and fall of 2011 to illustrate the 
relations of power among multiple actors across the innovation process that in turn shape drug 
pricing. Gilead’s position is revealed not only vis a vis its own shareholders and Pharmasset, but 
also with a downstream health delivery state. Second, I trace Gilead’s position as an ‘accumulation 
center’ in the innovation process, by which they converted their accumulated capital from prior 
sales of HIV medicines into winning sofosbuvir in a bidding contest. Finally, I document the ‘gold 
rush’ that ensued after Gilead’s acquisition to show how the intra-capitalist competition for 
growth by established pharmaceutical businesses from hepatitis C assets escalated financial 
speculation in the late stages of drug development.  
4.3.1 Project Harry and the relations of power in pricing and valuation    
 
By the summer of 2011, both Pharmasset and Gilead faced a strategic decision over 
hepatitis C: should they proceed independently or pursue a ‘combination’? If they were to 
undertake a combination with each other, what would be the right price? Each company 
approached these questions from a different vantage. As I described at the end of section 5.1, 
Pharmasset plotted the potential for bringing PSI-7977 to patients as a stand-alone company, but 
recognized the need to scale-up their capabilities in regulatory approval as well as in setting up a 
global manufacturing and distribution infrastructure. From Pharmasset’s vantage, any suitor 
pursuing an acquisition would need to appropriately value the potential earnings stream that PSI-
7977 could bring.  Gilead, on the other hand, had few promising avenues other than an 
acquisition to gain a significant share of the hepatitis C market. To explore this acquisition 
avenue, Gilead joined with Barclays Capital in ‘Project Harry’, the internal name given to their 
joint effort to model the financial value of PSI-7977.152 The compound, combined with Gilead’s 
long-standing experience in Phase III trials for anti-virals as well existing global manufacturing 
and distribution channels, could yield the new revenue the company needed to kick-start 
slumping growth. To make this happen, however, Gilead would need to determine whether and at 
what price to make such a bet.   
																																																						
151 Interviews 1, 3, 12, 15, 38 contributed insights into the capitalization process.  
152 In Project Harry, Gilead was ‘Gryyfyndor’, Pharmasset was ‘Harry’, with PSI-7977 the ‘golden snitch’ – the 
most potent hepatitis C compound that could serve as the backbone to a curative therapy (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015).  
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As Gilead and Pharmasset weighed these positions and potential strategies, both 
companies conducted capitalization exercises in order to assess the value of sofosbuvir (still 
named PSI-7977 at the time) to each of their businesses. Described simply by Muniesa (2011:31), 
capitalization can be conceived of as the reduction of a stream of future earnings to their present 
value through the use of a calculative device (a discount rate) which signals how much money a 
capitalist would be prepared to pay now for a future flow of money. Gilead would use this 
calculation to identify how much it would be willing to pay now for the future flow of earnings 
from sofosbuvir. Pharmasset, by contrast, would need to determine how much it would need to 
receive now in order give up the potential to accrue earnings from PSI-7977 in the future as a 
stand-alone company. Rather than understand these exercises in capitalization through the sole 
lens of a technical device, however, dissecting the assumptions of the calculation reveals the 
relations of power that are stake in drug pricing and innovation. I focus on two major 
assumptions here, drawing primarily on data from ‘Project Harry’, Gilead’s joint valuation exercise 
with Barclays Capital.  
The first assumption was the potential price that PSI-7977 could demand upon approval. 
Gilead, for example, assumed a price of $65,000 per patient through most of its modeling exercise 
while also testing a sensitivity range of prices $10,000 below and above that point (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:792). They chose this figure for sofosbuvir’s future price based 
on the price of the existing standards of care for hepatitis C which was about ~$50,000 in 2011, and 
the anticipation that not only would it likely rise by the year of the drug’s approval (estimated to 
be 2014 in the model), but that buyers would pay more for a superior clinical outcome (United 
States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:792). This continued the promise of pricing escalator 
that had mobilized the chain of speculative capital through the innovation process. In making this 
pricing assumption, Gilead pointed to its anticipation of its relationship with a central actor: the 
state, and specifically, its public health delivery systems.153 Particularly in the US, the largest 
market for pharmaceuticals, Gilead forecasted their ability to set the price and gain monopoly 
returns, with a high level certainty about the limited countervailing powers of the state.154 This 
relatively open pricing horizon, protected from competition via the patents for PSI-7977, would 
																																																						
153 I discuss the dynamics of drug pricing and the ‘health delivery state’ in the following chapter.  
154 Even in other high-income settings (such as Europe and Japan), which would purchase hepatitis C 
medicines with greater regulatory and negotiating power, Gilead anticipated being able to charge prices in 
the range of the existing therapies, at a discount to their US launch prices.  
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shape the valuation that Gilead placed on the compound and the amount they would be willing to 
bet.  
The second assumption was what Muniesa earlier referred to as the ‘calculative device’ – 
the discount rate (Muniesa 2011). The discount rate is used by business managers, in this case the 
senior leadership teams of both Gilead and Pharmasset, to identify the rate of return (or ‘return 
on investment’) which must be exceeded to justify an investment. This discount rate is based on a 
core assumption in financial accounting: a hundred dollars tomorrow is worth less than a 
hundred dollars today. This discount rate is based on a company’s weighted cost of capital, which 
is the rate of return expected by investors and debt holders on the capital it has provided to a 
business. A failure to generate a return greater than the cost of capital – in this case 10% for Gilead 
– would mean that an investment is not worth pursuing (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015:822).155  
Yet the use of this cost of capital in investment and valuation assessments reveals a crucial 
relationship of power: between shareholders and business managers. In this configuration, any 
capital that cannot be used to generate growth greater than the cost of capital would be deemed 
to be wasteful, and would thus be better directed towards shareholders who could, as argued 
under the frame of ‘maximizing shareholder value’, more efficiently allocate capital to other firms 
and sectors in the economy. In this case, the acquisition of PSI-7977 was forecast to generate 
growth greater than the cost of capital (at the price points cited above). However, I follow its role 
in this capitalization exercise because it reveals how the growth expectations of shareholders 
structure every capital allocation decision by Gilead’s senior leadership into a simple imperative: 
either grow greater than the cost of capital within a near-term time horizon, or distribute the 
capital to shareholders.156 Though Gilead’s shareholders expected growth to exceed the cost of 
capital, I later show that shareholders did not actually risk any capital into the innovation process 
behind sofosbuvir.157  
																																																						
155 See the explainer box for a more detailed primer on these financial accounting methods. 
156 Michael Jensen, one of the leading proponents of ‘maximizing shareholder value’, summed this 
imperative up when he argued, “The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than 
investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies” (Jensen 1986:23).  
157 In fact, through the mechanisms of share buy backs, Gilead had reduced its share count over the prior 
decade (Seeking Alpha 2015). Yet the high levels of stock-based pay for Gilead’s senior executives tied the 
strategic interests of shareholders and the managers making these capital allocation decisions. I review both 
mechanisms later in this chapter, in section 4.4. 
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Using these two core assumptions, about the future pricing of PSI-7977 as well as the 
discount rate, Gilead assessed the potential value of a Pharmasset acquisition. Gilead capitalized 
PSI-7977 through the net present value calculation (see Muniesa’s earlier definition of 
capitalization): future cash flows were translated to a present value using a discount rate, with the 
cost of the possible acquisition then subtracted (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:824). By Gilead’s modeling, an acquisition of Pharmasset translated to a net present value for 
Gilead of $25.5 billion (after a $10 billion acquisition price), indicating the vast economic potential 
of the opportunity (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:810).158 Furthermore, Gilead 
believed that it could create greater economic value with PSI-7977 than Pharmasset could alone: 
though Gilead’s internal drug development program had not yielded a backbone compound as 
promising as PSI-7977, they anticipated that several of their secondary compounds could be used 
in combination with PSI-7977 to generate a single daily pill regimen that could gain a dominant 
market position (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:861-862). Paired with their 
global manufacturing and distribution infrastructure that had previously specialized in anti-viral 
therapies (with its HIV products), Gilead’s modeling encouraged an aggressive posture towards 
acquiring PSI-7977.  
Yet reviewing Gilead’s posture reveals the dynamics of a third relationship of power 
beyond Gilead and its shareholders and Gilead and the health delivery state: its position of power 
vis a vis Pharmasset and other small companies with pharmaceutical assets. Similar to Gilead, 
Pharmasset had undertaken its own valuation exercise to assess the value of PSI-7977 if it were to 
develop it as a standalone company. They arrived at a net present value of $11 billion, indicating a 
potentially lucrative economic future for the compound if it were to make it through final Phase 
III trials (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:888).159 But Pharmasset forecasted two 
major barriers to this future as a stand-alone company.   
First, unlike Gilead, Pharmasset did not have an existing organizational apparatus for 
engaging regulatory agencies around the world nor the manufacturing and distribution 
capabilities required for hepatitis C (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:498-505, 
																																																						
158 The company’s senior leadership placed a high degree of certainty in the compound’s effectiveness in 
Phase III clinical trials, using 100% and 75% as its ‘possibility of success’ parameters in its sensitivity tests for 
PSI-7977’s value (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:810, 824). 
159 Pharmasset’s valuation of PSI-7977 was lower than Gilead’s because Pharmasset believed they would 
need to pair the compound with a secondary compound from another company, thereby splitting the 
revenue; furthermore, Pharmasset used more conservative assumptions than Gilead based on their lack of 
existing experience in global regulatory, manufacturing, and distribution capabilities.   
Roy	137 
	
507-510). Incumbent firms like Gilead, Merck, and Bristol Myers Squibb already had well-
established infrastructure globally; if any of them beat Pharmasset to the market with a hepatitis 
C treatment (by acquiring another small company with a hepatitis C asset, for example), 
Pharmasset stood to lose major market share for its lone stream of revenue. Second, Pharmasset, 
also unlike Gilead with its HIV earnings stream, had no other potential revenue possibilities 
beyond PSI-7977. Even if it were to build global capabilities in regulatory process, manufacturing, 
and distribution, Pharmasset would have to quickly diversify to other disease areas and products 
in order to generate the kind of growth that shareholders would expect (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:501). As I described in the previous chapter, Pharmasset’s executives 
had examined the landscape and deemed that generating such growth from internal research and 
development would not be possible in the tight frame of 3-5 years, or the time by which growth 
from hepatitis C revenues was set to plateau and even decline (United States Senate, Committee 
on Finance 2015:501).  
Given these factors, Pharmasset positioned itself for a potential acquisition, realizing that 
if an established company like Gilead could value its PSI-7977 compound at the threshold ($11 
billion) that Pharmasset itself did, then being acquired would be a strategically sound move. The 
company’s shareholders would thereby be assured to make an immediate gain at the level of its 
anticipated long-term value while forgoing the downstream risks associated with overcoming the 
barriers to entry I highlighted above. With this determination, Pharmasset’s senior leadership 
aimed to answer the lingering question that they had raised in recent years. Rather than building 
a durable business, they would instead actualize the very meaning contained in their name: serve 
a larger pharmaceutical company like Gilead with a promising asset, thereafter making 
themselves disposable (Berkrot 2011).  
In this section, I have provided an extensive account of Gilead and Pharmasset’s valuation 
of PSI-7977 within the context of each of their own businesses, and unpacked a set of 
relationships of power within which the capitalization process is embedded. First, Gilead 
anticipated a favorable pricing position with regards to a public health delivery state with limited 
downstream countervailing power. Second, Gilead’s managers had to account for the expectation 
of growth that its shareholders expected. Finally, through Pharmasset’s vantage, Gilead was a 
better potential suitor than a potential competitor, given Gilead’s comparative advantage as an 
incumbent firm. Taken together, these factors demonstrate Gilead’s position of power within the 
innovation process to gain control over potential earnings streams via betting on late-stage assets 
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and anticipating pricing power with the state – thereby enabling its shareholders to extract value 
generated through near-term growth.160 We now turn to whether Gilead would be able to execute 
on this speculative bet.   
 
Box 4.2 Cost of capital, the discount rate, and net present value: a primer 
*Adapted from Gallo (2014) in Harvard Business Review 
 
																																																						
160 I elucidate this extraction in section 4.4, particularly through the distribution of hepatitis C revenues to 
shareholders via buybacks.  
Cost of capital: the return expected by those who provide capital for the business  
- Two types of actors may put up capital for a business: investors who purchase equity, and debt holders 
who buy bonds or issue loans to a company 
- Cost of capital and discount rate (see below) are often confused. While related, they are arrived at in 
different ways and for different purposes.  
o A company’s financial team typically calculates cost of capital; investors use it to assess the 
risk of a company’s equity.  
o The management team typically takes the cost of capital calculation and then translates that 
number to a ‘discount rate’ that must be exceeded to justify an investment.  
- The cost of capital is calculated by weighting the cost of a company’s debt and equity.  
o To calculate the cost of debt, take all money the company has borrowed and average the 
interest rates being paid.  
o The cost of equity is a more theoretical number, and measures a stock’s volatility (a beta 
figure) as well as the market rate of expected return on the stock market (typically 10-12%).  
- To arrive at the weighted cost of capital (WACC), take the cost of debt and equity and weight them 
according to their relative proportions/percentages within the company. For example, if a company 
has 25% debt at a 4% rate, and 75% debt at a 8 percent rate, the WACC = .25(4%) + .75(8%) = 7%  
 
Discount rate: the rate that must be exceeded to justify an investment (also ‘hurdle rate’) 
- Used to calculate the value of future cash flows in terms of prevent value, based on the idea that 
money tomorrow is less valuable then money today (time value of money).  
- Typically set by business managers evaluating a potential investment, using the financial team’s cost 
of capital as a reference point 
- Companies will set the discount rate higher than the cost of capital if they are risk-averse and desire a 
higher rate of return in order to make an investment.  
 
Net present value (NPV): the present value of an investment’s expected cash flows minus the costs of 
making/acquiring the investment 
- Business managers use this calculation to assess whether an investment should be pursued or made: if 
the NPV is negative, the project is not a good one, whereas a positive NPV the project might be worth 
pursuing, with the larger the NPV, the greater the benefit.  
- Net present value is calculated using a discount rate (above), which is set based on a business’s cost of 
capital, and management’s risk appetite.    
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Table 4.5: Key figures used in Gilead and Pharmasset capitalization exercises   
 Gilead’s Project Harry model 
(with Barclays Capital)  
Pharmasset’s Project Knight 
model (with Morgan 
Stanley)  
Anticipated price for PSI-7977  $65,000 $36,000161 
Cost of capital  10%  8%  
Years of sales (from approval 
year to patent expiry)  
2012-2030  2014-2030  
NET PRESENT VALUE* $25.5 billion $11 billion  
NPV translated to Pharmasset 
share price  
$250 per share  $136 per share  
   
Market price of Pharmasset as 
of July 2011 
$70 per share, or $4.8 billion 
Mean target price for 
Pharmasset forecasted by 16 
Wall Street analysts  
$100 per share, or ~$8 billion 
Final acquisition value  $137 per share, or $11.2 billion  
Note: Each of these figures were tested with different assumptions to develop sensitivity ranges, but I am 
communicating the most relevant numbers here to keep the focus on the core political-economy dynamics. 
Source: United States Senate, Committee on Finance, 2015 
 
4.3.2 Betting accumulated capital for acquisition and approval  
 
With these valuation exercises guiding the acquisition process and indicating the 
positions of power of the multiple actors, Pharmasset and Gilead entered negotiations over a 
potential acquisition in the late summer of 2011. By early September of 2011, the results of Project 
Harry and internal deliberations had convinced Gilead’s senior management of the value in 
pursuing an acquisition of Pharmasset for its main PSI-7977 compound (Pharmasset Inc 2011). 
Over the next twelve weeks, Gilead would navigate between the forecasts of investment analysts, 
Pharmasset’s self-valuation (discussed in the prior section), and competing suitors to ultimately 
leverage its prior accumulation of capital to gain ownership of the ‘golden snitch’.  
To make their initial bid, Gilead used the mean and median one-year price targets for 
Pharmasset forecasted by 16 investment analysts, who predicted a value of $100 per share (United 
States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:811). The market value of Pharmasset was far lower – 
trading at about $70 a share in September of 2011 – but these analysts expected that Pharmasset’s 
																																																						
161 In their modeling, Pharmasset assumed a price of $36,000, or about half of what they thought a final 
regimen would cost ($72,000). This is because PSI-7977 represented ‘half the equation’; though PSI-7977 
was the backbone compound, Pharmasset anticipated that it would need to be paired with another 
compound to be the kind of simple, once-daily treatment with high cure rates that could gain a dominant 
market position (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:886). 
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Phase II trial data in late 2011 would boost the share price and increase the value of the company’s 
hepatitis C compound (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015). Yet when Gilead bid 
$100 per share in September for a total of $8 billion, Pharmasset’s executives rebuffed the offer 
(Pharmasset, Inc 2011:24-28). Pharmasset’s executives had begun reviewing the incoming data 
from their Phase II trial and privately knew that the positive results would likely surpass the 
expectations of Wall Street; furthermore, this $8 billion bid fell below their self-estimated $11 
billion value.  
Leveraging this private clinical trial data, Pharmasset drew Gilead into an auction process, 
inviting multiple companies to review the new evidence confidentially and make bids (Carroll 
2011). Sensing the competition, Gilead elevated its acquisition bid now to $125 per share 
(Pharmasset, Inc 2011). Yet Pharmasset’s executives did not relent; their internal self-valuations of 
$11 billion translated to a bid of between $136-$146 per share (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015:888). The major medical conference held by the American Association for the Study 
of the Liver (AASLD) would be held in November, and releasing PSI-7977’s Phase II trial data at 
the conference would give Pharmasset a favorable negotiating position (Carroll 2011; Pharmasset, 
Inc 2011). 
Ultimately, the release of this data along with the appearance of competition in the 
bidding contest motivated Gilead to increase its bid a total of three times (Pharmasset, Inc 2011). 
On November 20, 2011, Pharmasset agreed to be bought for $137 per share, for a total value of $11.2 
billion (Pollack and La Merced 2011). This $11.2 billion figure – the largest ever acquisition of a 
small biotechnology company at the time – fell right into the range of net present values of the 
downstream earnings that Pharmasset’s senior leadership had anticipated accruing for PSI-7977 
as a stand-alone company (Ha et al. 2011; Krauskopf and Basu 2011; Winslow and Loftus 2011). 
With this bid from Gilead, Pharmasset could guarantee its shareholders this payout now, and 
forgo the multiple downstream barriers associated with bringing a drug to global markets. 
Pharmasset’s shareholders emerged as big winners from the acquisition, as the $137 per 
share value represented a 89% premium from Pharmasset’s share price on the last trading day 
before the announcement (when it traded at $72 per share). At the time of the acquisition, five 
institutional shareholders, comprised of pension and hedge funds, held more than 5% of 
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Pharmasset’s shares amounting to an aggregate 39% stake (Pharmasset, Inc 2011).162 The winners 
also included the company’s executives, which owned 5.3% of the shares, with the CEO Schaefer 
Price owning 2.4% alone (Thrum 2011). Ray Schinazi, the original founder of Pharmasset, received 
a $400 million payment for owning 4.4% of the company (Berkrot 2011; Thrum 2011).  
Whether Gilead and its shareholders would ‘win’ now depended on if the predictions over 
PSI-7977 would be realized. Within the realm of the financial community, Gilead’s bet was 
perceived as a significant financial risk, with major news stories in the business press each 
quoting analysts concerned with the size of the acquisition (Ha et al. 2011; Krauskopf and Basu 
2011; La Merced 2011; Winslow and Loftus 2011). The Wall Street Journal’s ‘Heard on the Street’ 
column titled ‘Gilead’s Risky Revivial Procedure’ summed up this sentiment (Jannarone 2011):  
 
“With the Pharmasset deal, Gilead has transformed itself into a much riskier 
company. While all the signs suggest Pharmasset’s drug is on a successful path, if 
something goes wrong, the value of the company could disintegrate.” 
 
In other words, Gilead had traded in financial exposure – by betting a third of the company’s 
market value on a single compound – for reduced technical risk associated with completing a final 
stage of clinical trials.  
Yet in the innovation process, Gilead’s shareholders did not risk their capital into the 
innovation process. Instead, payments from taxpayers provided the bulk of the speculative capital 
used for Gilead’s acquisition. Gilead acquired Pharmasset by leveraging its position as an 
‘accumulation center’ in the innovation process from the prior sales of its HIV medicines to 
acquire Pharmasset. At the time of the acquisition, Gilead had $10 billion in cash, accumulated 
primarily from its sales of Atripla and Truvada (Gilead Sciences 2012; S&P Capital IQ 2011b; 
2012).163 These sales were in part driven by price increases, with Atripla, for example, rising from 
$13,800 per year in 2006 to $25,874 per year by 2011 (Fair Pricing Coalition 2015; Rode 2011). 
Payment for these treatment regimens came from public sector programs across high-income 
countries. Even in the US with large private insurance markets, the public sector finances 
																																																						
162 From Pharmasset’s acquisition SEC filing, these five institutional shareholders with more than 5% in 
share ownership were: Fidelity Management (12.6%), Capital World Investors (10%), T. Rowe Price (5.6%), 
Capital Research Global Investors (5.6%) and Baker Brothers Advisors (5.4%).  
163 As a reminder, both Atripla and Truvada are based on two compounds TDF and embtricitabine which 
were both licensed. Embricitabine can be traced to Triangle Pharmaceuticals, which was also started by Ray 
Schinazi and based at Emory University, where Schinazi drew on NIH funding to sustain his early research 
into the drug (Cohen 2015).  
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treatment for over 50% of all individuals diagnosed with HIV through a special government 
program begun with the AIDS epidemic in the mid-1990s, and 80% of all HIV patients in the US 
are on a Gilead treatment regimen (Petersen 2016b; Pund, Lefert, and Bowes 2016). 
To come up with the $11.2 billion required, Gilead spent $5.2 billion of this HIV cash, 
saving the rest to pay down previous debt or finance future acquisitions and share repurchases 
(Gilead Sciences 2012; S&P Capital IQ 2011b; 2012). Gilead also leveraged this accumulated capital 
to raise new debt, which it used to pay for the remaining $5.9 billion of the acquisition (Gilead 
Sciences 2012; S&P Capital IQ 2011b; 2012). Gilead’s betting capital, then, hinged on the prices paid 
for its prior HIV drugs, much of this financed by public sector programs. Gilead’s shareholders, on 
the other hand, had not risked any capital into the innovation process; instead, they continued to 
trade Gilead’s shares on the anticipation of sofobuvir’s Phase III clinical trials.  
With the backbone sofosbuvir compound now in hand, Gilead fashioned a clinical trial 
strategy bearing the imprints of its HIV approach: bringing multiple compounds together to 
create a single daily oral pill (see Table 4.7 for a summary of Gilead’s clinical trial strategy). Gilead, 
like many established companies, had experienced recent success in developing compounds for 
the NS3/4 protease and NS5a polymerase targets; yet each of these compounds was useless on 
their own as they did not attack the pivotal NS5b polymerase (Link et al. 2014; Pawlotsky 2013).164 
With sofosbuvir, Gilead now completed the hardest part of the puzzle by finding the backbone 
compound necessary for a simplified treatment regimen. The company’s scientists and 
management team thus envisioned a “combination strategy”, in which Gilead would bring 
together sofosbuvir with its internal secondary compounds in a series (“waves”) of phase III trials 
(United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015). Each of these trials confirmed Gilead’s 
confidence in the PSI-7977 compound, with the trials indicating near 100% cure rates (Afdhal et 
al. 2014; Jacobson et al. 2013; Lawitz et al. 2013). The FDA designated sofosbuvir a ‘breakthrough 
therapy’, enabling Gilead to pursue an expedited approval process and move their anticipated 
launch date forward by almost a year (Sherman et al. 2013; United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015).  
																																																						
164 Gilead provided the clinical trial costs below for these secondary compounds used in combination with 
sofosbuvir. However, I did not document their discovery as these internally developed compounds did not 
offer a major therapeutic advance on their own and were in the same class as compounds developed by 
many other labs. Their only value came in combination with sofosbuvir, which was the sought-after 
backbone compound.  
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Taken together, Gilead reported spending $880.4 million on clinical trials for sofosbuvir 
and its combination therapies (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:23), allowing us 
to account for the costs of development for sofosbuvir-based medicines across Pharmasset and 
Gilead (see Table 4.6 below).165 Like with Gilead’s $11 billion acquisition, it was the accumulated 
capital from prior sales, not the capital of its shareholders, that enabled Gilead to complete these 
clinical trials. On December 1, 2013, two years after Gilead’s acquisition of sofosbuvir, the FDA 
approved the treatment (Pollack 2013), with the company setting its launch price north of $80,000 
– a decision I dissect in chapter 5.  
As described later in this chapter, Gilead’s shareholders would make major gains as the 
compound went to market in late 2013. Before unpacking the Gilead’s capital allocation decisions 
with their newfound hepatitis C revenues, however, I illustrate that the political-economic 
dynamics that shaped the trajectory of sofosbuvir were not unique or exceptional in the realm of 
hepatitis C drug development. A comparison with other hepatitis C assets and Gilead’s 
competitors reveals a pattern of speculation and shareholder control, in which a struggle for 
growth between businesses escalated the speculative costs of the innovation process in its final 
stages.  
 
Table 4.6 Main sofosbuvir-related clinical trial costs by Pharmasset and Gilead  
Trial sponsor Phase  Reported cost for sofosbuvir 
specifically  
All R&D costs during 
period of sofosbuvir 
development  
Pharmasset  Pre-clinical to Phase II 
trials 
$62.4 million $281 million (2001-2011)  
Gilead  Phase III combinations 
(actual)  
$880.3 million $4.02 billion (2012 – 
2013)  
 TOTALS  Sofosbuvir-based regimens = 
$942.5 million 
 
Estimated costs of sofosbuvir 
alone (based on Pharmasset 
estimate – see below) = $62.4 + 
$90.5 million = $152.9 million 
Total costs of all R&D: 
$4.3 billion 
Source: US Senate Finance Committee (2015:23-24) 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
165 I return to an interpretation of these costs after a review of Gilead’s pricing strategy and revenues from 
hepatitis C. For now, I note that the costs of sofosbuvir’s development was $942.5 million, with the costs of 
all R&D across Pharmasset and Gilead during the time of its development was $4.3 billion.   
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Table 4.7: Gilead’s combinations of sofosbuvir as part of their ‘wave’ strategy 
Wave Compounds / Targets  Brand name Approval/launch date  
Wave 1 
 
Sofosbuvir* + ribavarin (and 
inteferon in certain sub-groups) 
Sovaldi December 2013 
Wave 2:  
 
Sofosbuvir + Ledipasvir (NS5a 
inhibitor) 
Harvoni October 2014  
Wave 3 Sofosbuvir + Veltapasvir (NS5a 
inhibitor) 
Epclusa  June 2016  
Wave 4:  
 
Sofosbuvir + Veltapasvir + 
Voxilaprevir 
(NS3/4a protease inhibitor) 
N/A (not approved 
yet)  
Application submitted by 
Gilead, December 2016  
*Sofosbuvir is NS5b inhibitor 
4.3.3 A speculative gold rush and the struggle for hepatitis C assets  
The dynamics of speculative capital and shareholder control that governed sofosbuvir’s 
journey would also influence the directions of other compounds for hepatitis C. In fact, Gilead’s 
acquisition intensified these dynamics, leading to a ‘hepatitis C gold rush’ (Swann 2013). Soon 
after the $11.2 billion acquisition, investment analysts predicted more such speculative activity. 
“These deals tend to happen in waves,” said Dan Veru, who had managed an investment fund 
with Pharmasset shares (Tirrell and Lachapelle 2011). The reason: Gilead’s competitors still held 
out hope to catch the ‘golden snitch’ (in case sofosbuvir unexpectedly failed in Phase III trials), or 
at the very least gain a share of a market with escalating value.166 Andrew Berens, an analyst with 
Bloomberg, predicted, “We are going to see a land grab to try and get companies that are 
developing them” (Tirrell and Lachapelle 2011). His prediction came to fruition, with large 
companies making a play for a series of late-stage assets in the months and years following 
Gilead’s purchase. These deals reflect two of the key features that shaped the innovation process 
behind sofosbuvir: the speculative features of markets for pharmaceutical assets as well as the 
shareholder-driven strategies of large, established pharmaceutical companies (see Table 4.8).  
First, Gilead’s large valuation of sofosbuvir escalated the price of other hepatitis C assets 
that had entered their later stage clinical trials even with therapeutic outcomes less potent than 
those realized by sofosbuvir. For example, within a month of Gilead’s acquisition, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb announced that it had bought Inhibitex for its INX-89 asset at a price of $2.5 billion, or $26 
dollars per share (La Merced 2012). On the prior day of trading, the company had been valued at 
$9 per share, with its shares hovering even lower at the time of Pharmasset’s acquisition (La 
Merced 2012). Two years later in June 2014, Merck made a similar move, buying Idenix for its IDX-
																																																						
166 Ultimately sofosbuvir would be the best compound and gain almost the entire market ‘share’ for hepatitis 
C (nearly 90%), with other companies and assets gaining only a small slice.  
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21437 asset at a price of $3.85 billion, translating to $24.50 per share (Pollack 2014). On its previous 
day of trading, Idenix had been valued at $7 per share (Pollack 2014). The potentially lucrative 
market in hepatitis C, underscored by Gilead’s bet on sofosbuvir, drove the valuations of these 
smaller companies. 
Second, these large companies operated similarly to Gilead in the hepatitis C innovation 
process: as acquisition specialists aiming to generate new growth through owning a hepatitis C 
asset. BMS, for example, anticipated losing their best-selling Plavix to generic competition in May 
of 2012, leaving the company without an asset that had generated 1/3 of the company’s revenue in 
2011 (Staton 2012; Team 2013). Inhibitex’s INX-89 offered a potential route to compete with Gilead 
and replenish lost revenue. Merck, too, had long viewed hepatitis C as a vehicle to deal with an 
impending patent cliff facing three of its best-selling medicines – Remicade, Cubicin, and Zetia – 
in 2017 (Campbell 2016). This left the company vulnerable to losing $4 billion in revenue to 
generic competition (Campbell 2016). With Gilead racing ahead with sofosbuvir, Merck aimed to 
enter the hepatitis C market via the acquisition and gain a piece of the market share (Pollack 
2014). Each of these companies, dominated by the expectations of shareholders detailed earlier in 
this chapter, aimed at acquisitions in the late-stages of the innovation process to generate growth 
in the face of dry pipelines and patent cliffs.  
These acquisitions echo Veblen’s view of assets in the economy, with an intra-capitalist 
struggle over future earnings streams leading to an escalation of speculative bets in the late-stages 
of the innovation process (Birch 2016; Veblen 1908a). The costs of these acquisitions were not tied 
to the size of investments in the tangible dimensions of drug development, but rather fastened to 
the demand logics of assets in financial markets: the prices for these assets rose in parallel to their 
demand, as companies sought to gain control over potential revenue growth.    
Table 4.8 Major transactions in hepatitis C between 2011 – 2015   
Acquired 
Company  
Acquiring 
Company  
Value and Timing 
of the Deal 
HCV asset of 
interest 
Current status 
Pharmasset  Gilead Sciences  $11.2 billion, 11/2011 PSI-7977  $45 billion in revenue for 
Gilead  
Inhibitex  Bristol Myers 
Squibb 
$2.5 billion, 1/2012 INX-89  Abandoned in Phase III trials 
after patient death  
Idenix Merck  $3.85 billion, 6/2014  IDX-21437  Competing with Gilead for 
10% market share  
Achillion  Johnson and 
Johnson 
(Jansen)  
$1.1 billion, 5/2015* 
 
ACH-3102 In Phase III trials, aiming to 
come to market in 2018 
*value of partnership deal, rather than outright acquisition 
Sources: Pollack (2013), De La Merced (2012), Tirrell (2011), and Loftus (2014). 
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4.4 Buying back or paying forward? Following Gilead’s hepatitis C revenues  
 
Amidst these companies racing for hepatitis C revenues, Gilead gained approval for their 
hepatitis C medicines first, in December 2013, and rapidly accumulated capital from their sales. 
While Gilead’s pricing strategy for these medicines is the subject of the following chapter in 
which I document the deployment phase of the innovation process, in this section I use Gilead’s 
financial reports to detail the company’s position as an accumulation center to perform its other 
function in the innovation process (besides bet on late-stage acquisitions): distribute capital to 
shareholders. Tracing the flow and uses of this capital further illuminates the extractive processes 
driven by Gilead’s shareholders (and the ways in which they exert control over business 
executives and corporate strategy) which I introduced earlier in this chapter.   
Between their launch in December of 2013 until the end of 2016, Gilead accumulated $46.4 
billion in worldwide revenue from sofosbuvir-based regimens. In the space of three years, Gilead’s 
total revenues as a business tripled, from $11.2 billion in 2013 to $32.6 billion in 2015 (Gilead 
Sciences 2017). Hepatitis C sales drove this escalation in revenue, accounting for 60% of all sales 
in 2015 and 50% in 2016, with the remainder coming largely from their steadily growing HIV sales 
(Gilead Sciences 2017). With the relatively low cost of production for its HIV and hepatitis C 
medicines, the company’s gross profits were 87% of their revenues, totaling to $76.3 billion 
between 2014 and 2016 (Gilead Sciences 2017).167  The company’s executives had significant capital 
allocation decisions to make with their newfound hepatitis C sales.  
4.4.1 The cannibalized company and Gilead’s share buybacks     
 
Where did these earnings go? Of this $76.3 billion in gross profits, Gilead’s executives 
stockpiled $32.4 billion in cash and cash equivalents (short-term debt) by the end of 2016 (after 
ending 2013 with $2.6 billion in cash) for potential acquisitions and distributions of capital to 
shareholders (Gilead Sciences 2017). Additionally, the company directed $30.7 towards share 
buybacks and dividends in those years (Gilead Sciences 2017).168 In other words, Gilead’s 
leadership translated 79% of its gross profits over three years into a cash stockpile and 
																																																						
167 Gross profit is total revenues minus the cost of goods sold (the manufacturing and production costs of 
Gilead’s medicines). I cite this figure here as it presents the total sum with which Gilead’s senior leadership 
then made capital allocation decisions.  
168 Of this total, $4.36 billion were dividends and the $26.3 billion were buybacks. Gilead only began to offer 
dividends in the second quarter of 2015.  
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distributions of capital aimed at shareholders.169 By contrast, the company reported spending 
$9.67 billion, or 12.6% of their gross profits in this period, towards research and development 
(Gilead Sciences 2017).170 Figure 4.7 depicts Gilead’s revenues and gross profits, as well as their 
capital allocation strategies.171 Though I return to the dynamics around Gilead’s stockpiled cash in 
chapter 5, here I focus on the level of distribution to shareholders because they demonstrate a 
recurring theme from this chapter: the extractive relationship between Gilead’s shareholders and 
the innovation process.  
 
Figure 4.4 Gilead’s revenues and capital allocation decisions, 2012-2016 (in billions)  
 
 
Source: Gilead’s SEC Filings  
 
Of the $30.7 billion that Gilead’s executives distributed to shareholders, $26.3 billion were 
for share buybacks (or ‘repurchases’), with $4.36 billion in dividends (Gilead Sciences 2017). By 
buying back their own shares, Gilead’s executives aimed to raise the value of the remaining ones 
(Ezekoye, Koller, and Mittal 2016) and promote near-term trading with the aim of boosting the 
																																																						
169 This 79% figure represents $29.8 billion in additional cash with $30.7 billion in buybacks and dividends 
(for a total of $60.5 billion) divided by $76.3 billion in gross profits. For context: the annual budget for the 
entire US National Institutes of Health has hovered at the $30 billion level in recent years (NIH 2017a).  
170 Though Gilead did not provide a break-down of their research and development expenses, they noted in 
their SEC filing that a significant bulk of their expenses was aimed at clinical trials; from the Senate 
investigation as well as other filings, we can surmise a major share of this cost to be their late-stage trials for 
sofosbuvir combinations as well as a new HIV compound aimed at extending their patent protection, which 
I describe further in chapter 5. 
171 General operating expenses as well as taxes account for the remaining use of the gross profits.   
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share price.172 Such buybacks, however, illustrate the ways in which the growth logics fueling 
shareholders (described in section 4.2) ultimately drive extractive processes. In this configuration, 
the generation of growth at the magnitude and within the time horizons expected by 
shareholders meant that Gilead’s senior leadership only reinvested a small fraction of the 
company’s earnings back into research and development, with those reinvestments positioned 
primarily to fund the late stage clinical trials that could lead to the kind of near-term growth 
demanded in financial markets (Gilead Sciences 2017).  
Signaling the perceived absence of other directions for investment, Gilead’s senior 
leadership used buybacks as a way to ‘maximize shareholder value’, with shareholders deemed in 
this configuration to be the sole residual claimants on Gilead’s ‘free cash flow’ – as the only 
economic actors argued to risk capital without a guaranteed market rate of return (such as via 
wages or contracts) and as ‘efficient allocators’ of capital across the economy. Though these 
arguments are the prevailing wisdom in corporate governance, they are in tension with the facts 
of the sofosbuvir innovation process.   
As I have showed with sofosbuvir, Gilead’s shareholders did not risk any capital into the 
innovation process – they traded on the company’s stock price. Lazonick has shown how 
buybacks only aimed to boost this trading, and thereby Gilead’s share price – not drive 
investment, such as further biomedical innovation in areas of unmet medical need (Lazonick et 
al. 2016). Though dividends are thought to encourage share ownership by providing a quarterly 
reward on a per-share basis, buybacks are observed to have the opposite effect by promoting 
trading on the anticipation of changes in share price (Ezekoye et al. 2016; Lazonick et al. 2016). In 
this way, shareholder control both limits reinvestments in long-term research efforts within the 
firm and drives the distribution of earnings towards shareholders to propel speculative stock 
trading. A Reuters investigation into the rise of buybacks across large publicly-traded U.S. 
businesses provided an apt name for this strategy: the ‘cannibalized company’ (Brettell, Gaffen, 
and Rohde 2015).173  
																																																						
172 One way this happens is by artificially boosting the earnings per share (EPS) ratio, a key financial 
indicator used by traders to buy and sell stocks: reducing the share count reduces the denominator 
(earnings/shares), making the stock potentially more attractive to traders in the near-term (Ezekoye et al. 
2016).  
173 This approach reproduced the structural crisis that I described earlier, and which I discuss further in 
chapter 5. 
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Yet share buybacks are not a natural feature of corporate strategy and financial markets. 
Rather, they are a function of particular historical and institutional changes, of which I detail two:  
1) regulatory shifts by the U.S. state that have enabled this distribution of capital to shareholders 
through buybacks and 2) the power relations that shareholders assume over senior executives 
through stock-based compensation. Before the 1980s, companies purchasing their own shares at 
such high levels would have been deemed to be engaging in illegal and manipulative stock 
trading. On November 17, 1982, however, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
promulgated Rule 10-b-18, which gave companies ‘safe harbor’ against charges of manipulation in 
pursuing such transactions (Lazonick 2015). This rule change gave companies another strategy to 
direct earnings to shareholders beyond the use of dividends. In the subsequent decades, share 
buybacks have grown as a corporate practice, with data from the prior decade indicating the scale 
of its effects. For example, the 19 pharmaceutical companies on the S&P 500 Index expended a 
total of $226 billion on buybacks during the years of 2005 to 2014, equivalent to 51% of their 
combined R&D expenditures (Lazonick 2015).  
This SEC rule change came as part of the Reagan administration’s de-regulatory agenda, 
with a former brokerage executive, John Shad, heading the SEC at the time. Shad described his 
agenda in a New York Times piece: “To facilitate the accumulation of capital by corporations by 
removing regulations”  (Gerth 1981).  But as I have illustrated with Gilead, the SEC rule change 
would have a much more paradoxical effect: though corporations could accumulate more capital, 
this capital did not stick around within the corporation (Lazonick 2015). The buyback rule 
facilitated the distribution of this capital to purchases of a company’s own shares. The use of this 
buyback strategy to distribute capital to shareholders relied on a second dynamic beyond the SEC 
rule-change: linking the strategic interests of senior executives with those of shareholders.      
4.4.2 Structuring executives to disinvest and distribute capital 
 
Institutional shareholders during the 1980s and 1990s increasingly looked to tighten the 
tie between the interests of shareholders and senior executives by pushing corporate boards to 
significantly increase the proportion of executive compensation coming from stock options and 
awards (Lazonick 2015). The rise in executive pay over the last three decades – with senior 
executives today earning 949:1 of the average worker – has been attributed to this shift towards 
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offering stock-based compensation (Lazonick and Hopkins 2016).174 In this permissive regulatory 
environment, I focus less on the actual rise in executive compensation, but the capital allocation 
strategies that shifts in compensation have incentivized.  
Gilead’s senior executives fit what is now a common pattern, with their compensation also 
coming largely from stock-based pay (Gilead Sciences 2016b). Between the years 2014-2016, for 
example, Gilead’s top five executives made a total of $1.07 billion in compensation (see Table 4.9). 
Of this sum, 95% came in the form of stock options and awards in the years 2014 and 2015, and 
80% in 2016 (Gilead Sciences 2016b). As Gilead’s shares rose on the strength of hepatitis C sales 
and as their executives directed $26.3 billion towards share buybacks, they also exercised their 
options and grant awards to make sizeable gains on the upside of Gilead’s ascending share price. 
As shareholders themselves, Gilead’s senior executives has been structurally incentivized to 
distribute capital to shareholders and stockpile cash for potential acquisitions, rather than 
reinvest in long-term projects.175  
Table 4.9 Compensation for Gilead’s Top Five Executives, 2014-2016   
(All figures in Millions)  2014 2015 2016* 
John Martin(CEO, now retired)  $192.80 $231.96 $98.15 
John Milligan (COO, now CEO)  $89.50 $103.35 $58.10 
Gregg H. Alton (EVP) $56.20 $22.57 $8.50 
Norbert Bischofberger (Head of R&D)  $50.70 $95.53 $7.00 
Robin L. Washington (CFO)  $26.60 $21.97 $5.53 
Percent from stock-based pay 95%  95% 80% 
TOTAL COMPENSATION $415.80 $475.37 $177.28 $1,068.45 
Source: Gilead’s SEC 14-A Proxy filings, 2014-2016 
*We discuss the reason behind the 2016 decline in executive pay and share-based compensation in the 
following chapter.  
 
 
	
																																																						
174 Legislation from the U.S. Congress aimed at addressing the rise in executive compensation – principally 
through the Dodd-Frank bill after the financial crisis – has to date shown little effect as key provisions have 
yet to be enacted, such as the disclosure of pay ratios between executives and workers. I do not review the 
full array of legislation that has sought to regulate executive compensation patterns over prior decades, but 
focus more narrowly on the link between stock-based compensation and the buyback strategy it 
incentivizes.  
175 By 2016, this buyback strategy began to falter in the aim of rising Gilead’s share prices, however, for 
reasons I discuss in chapter 5 and which are also intimately linked to the speculative and shareholder-
dominated features of the innovation process. 
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4.4.3 An offshore tax haven for sofosbuvir  
 
Thus far, I have illustrated buybacks and cash stockpiles to be the major destinations of 
Gilead’s accumulated capital, rather than research and development within the company. Another 
potential destination – paying taxes to the US state, which had made critical contributions to the 
innovation process – was diminished through Gilead’s maneuvers of their intellectual property 
protections over sofosbuvir.   
In a February 2013 earnings call, Robin Washington, Gilead’s Chief Financial Officer 
counseled investment analysts: “the IP (intellectual property) of 7977 (sofosbuvir) is domiciled in 
Ireland, so as we commercialize that, there is opportunity for our tax rate to decline over time” 
(S&P Capital IQ 2013). In other words, Gilead had transferred the ownership claims over its 
sofosbuvir property to one of its 6 Irish subsidiaries, and created a licensing arrangement through 
which it reported lower US profits (Rice and Clemente 2016). The outcomes of this strategy are 
reflected in several key financial metrics. First, while two-thirds of Gilead’s hepatitis C sales are in 
the US, they report only 37% of their profits domestically and assign the rest to places with lower 
or no taxes, making for a 1% foreign tax rate (Gilead Sciences 2017). Second, Gilead’s accumulated 
offshore profits mirror their surging hepatitis C revenue, rising from $8.6 billion in 2013 to $28.5 
billion in 2015 (Gilead Sciences 2017). Third, Gilead’s US tax rate fell by 40%, from 27.3% in 2013 to 
16.4% in 2015 (Rice and Clemente 2016). Such metrics culminate in a significant magnitude of tax 
avoidance: a report released by the Americans for Tax Fairness found that Gilead had avoided $10 
billion in US taxes by ‘domiciling’ sofosbuvir in Ireland (Rice and Clemente 2016).  
Gilead’s strategy is enabled by ‘legal loopholes’ in the US tax code, by which companies 
routinely avoid paying the 35% corporate tax rate by holding earnings overseas (Rubin 2015). 
Companies have argued that the US tax rate is non-competitive for making domestic investments, 
making these ‘tax planning’ maneuvers to be a matter of survival (Rubin 2015). Yet when Congress 
and the Bush administration temporarily lowered the tax rate on profits to be repatriated from 
35% to 5.25% in 2005, companies did not direct this capital towards investment (Kocieniewski 
2016). Of the $300 billion in repatriated profits from 800 companies, 92% of the money was used 
for the type of share buybacks and executive bonuses described in this section (Kocieniewski 
2016). These loopholes and distributions of capital can be juxtaposed against the ongoing threats 
to the US NIH budget, whose investments were critical to the sofosbuvir innovation process. 
Roy	152 
	
In following the flow of capital from sofosbuvir-based medicines in section 4.4, I have 
illustrated the extractive processes shaping Gilead’s business strategy as manifested in share 
buybacks, sizeable stock-based executive compensation, and tax avoidance.        
4.5 Taking stock of speculative capital and shareholders: a summary  
 
Over the course of four parts, this chapter demonstrated the processes constituting the 
financialization of sofosbuvir. Pharmasset’s control over intangible hepatitis C assets mobilized 
speculative capitals from a chain of financial actors on the anticipation of rising prices (the 
pricing escalator) and market valuations and the opportunity for capital gains on the entry and 
exit of ownership stakes in the company. Without any approved products and sales nor the 
investments to develop the organizational capabilities for a durable business, Pharmasset viewed 
large companies like Gilead better as potential suitors than future competitors – with an 
acquisition offering the chance to gain a major reward for Pharmasset’s shareholders while 
passing off the technical risks for end-stage drug development to the acquiring company.  
In this context, Gilead – and other large, publicly traded pharmaceutical companies – 
faced a structural crisis due to the continual and near-term expectations of growth driving 
Gilead’s shareholders. To overcome this crisis, Gilead pursued an acquisition of Pharmasset, 
betting its accumulated capital from prior HIV sales (and using it to leverage debt) on the 
sofosbuvir (PSI-7977) compound. Gilead’s position in the innovation process as more an 
acquisition specialist than a research and development organization illustrated the extractive 
logics driving the company’s shareholders. Gilead's $11.2 billion bet – part of a speculative gold 
rush in the late stages of hepatitis C drug development - was based on Gilead’s anticipation of 
charging the health systems higher prices in the future than the existing standard of care in 
exchange for therapeutic improvements. Though Gilead’s shareholders had not risked any of their 
own capital into the innovation process, their control over capital allocation decisions (i.e. 
through linking executive compensation to share price) led the company’s senior leadership to 
distribute a bulk of Gilead’s hepatitis C earnings to shareholders. Along this process, the state 
provided the knowledge assets that activated the curative value of sofosbuvir with the McGuigan 
method, but also governed the rules by which capital mobilized in its different forms, from the 
emergence of venture capital to the escalation in share buybacks.   
The financialization of drug development is marked by a distribution of risks and rewards 
across the innovation process which I review more fully in chapter 6. But some preliminary 
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observations are possible. In this chapter, I demonstrated that the owners of speculative capital in 
the earlier stages of drug development were motivated by compressed cycles of risk-reward, in 
which they attempted to gain a reward based on their ability to enter and exit ownership in time 
periods far shorter than the lengthy period of drug development. As for Gilead’s shareholders, 
they did not risk capital into the innovation process, as the company converted its accumulated 
capital from patent protected prices of its HIV medicines into the speculative capital necessary to 
acquire sofosbuvir’s potential earnings stream from Pharmasset. Yet Gilead directed its 
accumulated capital from hepatitis C towards maximizing shareholder value and future 
acquisitions while also using loopholes to avoid taxes to the US state, which had risked its patient 
capital to shape the direction of the innovation process. Finally, the pricing and valuation 
strategies underpinning these speculative and extractive processes would ultimately impact 
patient and public health outcomes.  We now turn to an analysis of the deployment phase of the 
innovation process to better understand these specific impacts and the dynamics that produced 
them.  
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Chapter 5. Waiting on Value: Gilead’s Pricing and the Crises of the 
Triage State and the Patient Cliff  
 
“It is crystal clear to me that the body is an accumulation strategy in the deepest sense”   
- Donna Haraway (1996: 510)  
 
As Gilead launched their sofosbuvir-based regimens 2013 and 2014, the hopes of millions of 
patients with hepatitis C appeared fulfilled: the toxic, interferon-based regimens would now be 
cast aside, opening the way to near 100% cure rates with a shorter treatment that triggered few 
side effects (Hagan and Schinazi 2013; Pollack 2013; Rice and Saeed 2014). Along with its clinical 
marvels, the medicine also appeared poised to be a financial marvel for Gilead, with large patient 
populations and high potential launch pricing leading to significant revenue growth (S&P Capital 
IQ 2013). Yet these hopes were short-lived, and by 2016, both patients and Gilead viewed these 
medicines in a diminishing light, with deferred treatment access and waning financial success 
(Crow 2016a; Hoofnagle and Sherker 2014; Nisen 2017; Ward and Mermin 2015). This chapter 
illustrates these confounding outcomes in the deployment phase176 of the innovation process, 
tracing the relationships between Gilead, public health delivery systems, and financial markets. 
In understanding these outcomes, this chapter traces forward the influence of 
financialization introduced in the prior chapter, with speculative and extractive dynamics shaping 
Gilead’s launch prices for sofosbuvir, the deployment of the medicine, as well as the reproduction 
of financialization for future innovation processes. Gilead’s pricing strategy culminated the 
pricing escalator observed with the mobilization of speculative capitals, in which the company 
priced sofosbuvir using the reference price of the existing standard of care as a floor and estimated 
the upward limits of what health systems would be willing to pay for improved therapeutic 
outcomes. This pricing strategy created a crisis of treatment access, budgetary stewardship, and 
public health planning for the state: the health delivery state turned into a triage state and 
																																																						
176 The dynamics unfolding in this stage are important in two respects. First, the adoption and use of an 
innovation is, by most common definitions, intrinsic to the innovation process itself. See chapter 2 (section 
2.1.2) for more on my definition of the innovation process, and the inclusion the deployment phase. In this 
stage, the extent and types of rewards accrued through an innovation are no longer a matter of anticipation: 
they can be directly observed. For example, we can account for the rewards in a more comprehensive 
manner by following the extent to which sofosbuvir benefited patients and public health as well as 
influenced Gilead’s business strategy. A second reason for studying this stage: the evidence from the 
deployment stage of innovation can give us clues to the reproduction and sustainability of the innovation 
processes for the future.  
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exercised limited countervailing power vis a vis Gilead and the ‘value-based’ logics of drug pricing 
at play. Finally, a curative therapy revealed the dynamics reproducing financialization and their 
stark consequences for future innovation: even with rates of profitability exceeding 40% in 2015 
and 2016, Gilead’s inability to meet financial market expectations of continuous growth with a 
curative therapy reinforced the company’s extractive and speculative strategies in ways that 
promoted distribution of revenues to shareholders, the accumulation of capital for acquisitions, 
and a focus on incremental therapeutic advances for a ‘chronic market’ rather than more radical 
innovation (Chen 2017). I trace the mechanisms that constitute this deployment phase of the 
innovation process in three parts.   
First, I chronicle Gilead’s approach to pricing their regimens in section 5.1 to show the 
rationale they used and situate it in the wider context of the pricing escalator that had mobilized 
the speculative capitals presented in the prior chapter. This account is based on a close analysis of 
the US Senate investigation and the associated appendices of Gilead’s internal corporate 
documents along with interviews and observation at meetings.  
Second, I trace the consequences for Gilead’s pricing on health systems and patients in 
section 5.2 to evaluate the extent of health outcomes experienced by patients and public health 
systems, drawing on public policy reports, media accounts, multiple interviews, and observations 
at meetings. Furthermore, I map the relations of power between the state and drug manufacturers 
vis a vis drug pricing and the logics of value at stake.  
Finally, section 5.3 documents how the mechanisms underpinning financialization 
produced another episode of crisis for Gilead and in turn shifted the company’s business strategy 
towards prioritizing short-term growth. The company pursued a major marketing campaign to 
increase hepatitis C uptake, a financial cycle of acquisitions and buybacks, and increased 
attention on ‘innovation’ for chronic over curative therapies.177 An examination of each of Gilead’s 
earnings call transcripts over a two-year span (2014-2016), transcripts from investor meetings, and 
media accounts shaped the interpretation of this stage of the process.  
What emerges across these three parts is a narrative of ‘waiting on value’, in which the 
financial dynamics of a curative therapy in the hands of Gilead sustains a dual crisis: patients 
waiting for the health value of a cure and shareholders waiting for the value of near-term and 
																																																						
177 By chronic versus curative, I mean therapies that require patients to take a treatment over a life-time 
(“chronic”) versus therapies that can end a disease process to the point where medicines are no longer 
required (“curative”). I explore this in the context of HIV, which currently is a disease for which patients 
must take life-time treatment.   
Roy	156 
	
continuous growth that a curative therapy cannot durably deliver. Upon this final stage of 
accounting, I will take full stock of the innovation process in chapter 6.  
5.1 Setting a price for a cure: Gilead’s $1,000 a day pill   
 
On December 2, 2015, the US Senate investigation offered a rare opportunity: an inside-
look at the black box of pharmaceutical pricing from within a business (Loftus 2015; United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015).178 Lifting this black box is crucial for three reasons. First, it 
enables an understanding of the proximate factors that shaped Gilead’s sofosbuvir’s launch price, 
which I then situate in the wider organizational and political-economic dynamics shaping the 
innovation process – the central inquiry driving my study. Second, unpacking Gilead’s internal 
pricing strategy through this interpretation of primary documents – rather than inference from 
secondary sources – allows a firmer consideration of the competing answers for the prices of new 
drugs reviewed in chapter 1.  Finally, Gilead’s pricing strategy would be a crucial determinant 
behind the effectiveness of sofosbuvir’s deployment in health systems, which in turn shaped the 
distribution of risks and rewards in the innovation process and public health outcomes (which 
provides data to answer my second research question).179  
Data from the US Senate Investigation shows that Gilead converted its position in the 
innovation process – as an acquisition specialist and end-stage owner of a pharmaceutical asset – 
to maximize its accumulation of capital. To seize this opportunity, Gilead (1) used the price of the 
existing standard of care for hepatitis C as a reference that served as a pricing floor, (2) evaluated 
the potential of competitors to erode accumulation, and (3) made a social and political estimation 
(through survey-based market research as well as interviews) of the upward limits of price that 
buyers would be willing to pay for sofosbuvir’s improved therapeutic value. Each of these factors 
ultimately pointed Gilead to a price of $84,000 for its initial sofosbuvir-based regimen and set the 
																																																						
178 I triangulated the data in the US Senate investigation with interviews and observation at meetings where 
drug pricing was discussed. Interviews 8, 16, 25, 31, 37 contributed to this understanding.  
179 Two major factors that can negatively affect the deployment of a medicine were not at play with 
sofosbuvir-based therapies: treatment complexity and health system capacity. Where many treatments can 
be complex, due to multiple doses per day and constant management of dosage level and side effects, 
sofosbuvir-based treatments comprised a once-a-day pill with few side effects (Ward and Mermin 2015). 
Where many health systems might not have the trained doctors and nurses to provide the medicine, most 
US and Europe systems had the requisite workforce (even in the case where there were not enough liver 
specialists, primary care doctors could be trained to provide a treatment that is simpler in many ways than 
treating diabetes or high cholesterol, given the ease of uptake). Price, then, was the driving factor for the 
depoloyment and public health outcomes realized in this case.  
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baseline for its eventual $94,500 price for their sofosbuvir-based combination therapy.180 This 
pricing strategy culminated the pricing escalator highlighted in the prior chapter – with the prices of 
the prior standard of care serving as the floor (‘reference price’) upon which the company estimated 
the amount that health systems would be willing to pay in exchange for improved therapeutic 
outcomes. Gilead considered this pricing strategy over the course of 2013, with a senior leadership 
group called the Global Pricing Committee meeting with IMS, a consulting group. In this section, 
I describe each of these three factors before considering their implications for our understanding 
of the drug pricing and innovation process.   
 
Table 5.1 Key factors in Gilead’s pricing strategy  
Pricing factor  Gilead’s consideration 
Reference price of existing 
standard of care 
- Telaprevir regimens typically came between $80,000-96,000 total 
because of the long course of interferon and ribavirin. Sofosbuvir’s 
pricing would be based on using this as a reference price from which to 
estimate what more health systems might pay in exchange for improved 
outcomes.  
Position of potential 
competitors   
- Gilead believed that charging a lower price would enable future 
competitors to erode potential revenue and also erode their own ability 
to charge higher price for future combination therapies for hepatitis C. 
Anticipation of competition in this case served to cement Gilead’s price 
floor.  
Estimation of buyers’ 
assessments of price and value 
of sofosbuvir therapies  
- Buyers surveyed by Gilead initially indicated that they would not 
restrict access in the $85,000-$95,000 range, but would restrict at prices 
above that range. Multiple stakeholders, such as patient groups, 
indicated that budgetary pressures and the potential for access 
restrictions could however be triggered even at lower price points. This 
evaluation gave Gilead a sense for the upward limits on what health 
systems could bear in exchange for ‘value’.   
 
5.1.1 The baseline: a reference price from the existing standard of care   
 
The guiding framework for Gilead’s pricing approach relied on an assessment of the 
pricing of existing standards of care for hepatitis C at the time. From the outset, Gilead used the 
prices of the existing standards of care as a baseline from which to compare potential options for 
their sofosbuvir-based regimens (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:33). Though 
																																																						
180 As a reminder, Gilead’s initial wave of sofosbuvir would require interferon and ribavirin for 12 weeks but 
its ‘wave 2’ of sofosbuvir-ledipasvir (trade name Harvoni), would eliminate the need for interferon and 
ribavarin. It would ultimately be the first single-daily oral pill approved to cure hepatitis C (Kowdley et al. 
2014).  
Roy	158 
	
this framework appears throughout Gilead’s internal corporate deliberations, I use one example as 
illustrative of their assessment.  
In a March 2013 briefing presentation with senior vice presidents at the beginning of 
deliberation, Gilead reviewed the pricing landscape of the standard of care therapies. In 2011, two 
‘first-generation’ anti-viral therapies had been launched that were used in combination with the 
original interferon based regimens: Vertex’s telaprevir and Merck’s boceprevir (Chaplin and 
Dusheiko 2012).181 With fewer side effects, telaprevir had been the leading medicine of the two 
with more widespread use (Chaplin and Dusheiko 2012). In their model, Gilead deemed 
telaprevir’s price to be $55,000 based on their scan of the prices Vertex was charging at the time 
(early 2013). Telaprevir still required an average of 9 months of ribavirin and the injectable 
treatment interferon (manufactured by Roche) as part of a complete regime. Adding this nine-
month cost of interferon and ribavirin ($28,000) to the price of telaprevir meant an average total 
price of $83,000 for the existing standard of care at the time (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015:33). This pricing floor can be viewed as a cumulative effect of previous increases in 
prices for hepatitis C medicines (i.e. the pricing escalator).182  
As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, Gilead’s executives considered this ~83,000 price point to be a 
‘baseline’ from which to then consider sofosbuvir’s ‘value premium’ that could enable Gilead to 
charge a higher price. They highlighted four key features of sofosbuvir that they believed could be 
used to justify this ‘value premium’ – the higher cure rates (‘SVR’ – sustained virologic response), 
increased tolerability (given few side effects compared to interferon), shorter treatment duration 
(only 3 months of treatment compared to an average of 9 months meant more patients would be 
able to begin and complete the regimen), and finally ‘part of an all-oral regimen’ (removing the 
need for interferon altogether) (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:1349-1351). 
																																																						
181 Both of these compounds attacked the NS3/4 protease in the hepatitis C virus, making them less potent 
inhibitors than sofosbuvir, which attacked the NS5b polymerase. These earlier medicines, which also 
required the toxic interferon regimens, were phased out within 2 years,with the advent of sofosbuvir-based 
therapies. 
182 The price of the telaprevir regimen itself was a product of the political-economic dynamics illustrated in 
this dissertation. Though the US Senate report did not have Vertex’s internal documents, Gilead’s internal 
documents indicated that Vertex had used the prices of the prior interferon and ribavirin-only regimens as 
a floor from which to estimate the ‘value premium’ of their telaprevir treatment. Observation of a 
presentation on drug pricing by a Vertex executive at the HEPDART conference supported this view. 
Vertex’s prices combined with Roche’s annualized price increases between 2003 and 2011 on their interferon 
and ribavirin treatments to produce a total regimen price at $83,000 in 2013, when Gilead began 
deliberating on their sofosbuvir. Later in section 5.3, I illustrate how such price increases function to meet 
shareholder expectations for large established companies like Roche and Gilead.  
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Gilead’s executives then sought to estimate the upward limits of what this value premium could 
be by turning to a consulting company – IMS – to survey payers to understand how much they 
would be willing to pay for improved therapeutic outcomes. I return to this assessment in section 
5.1.3.  
 
Figure 5.1 Gilead’s initial pricing approaches with existing standard of care 
 
Caption: Gilead’s initial pricing approaches “build directly on current HCV prices and regimens” (A) with 
the company considering it as a baseline from which sofosbuvir’s higher quality could accrue (B) a  “value 
premium” at a higher price (ovals and letters added), which they mapped out in subsequent slides.  
Source: United States Senate (2015:1348) 
 
5.1.2 The position of potential competitors  
 
Gilead also took into consideration the position of competitors with hepatitis C 
compounds expected to be approved in the near-term (1-2 years). Though analysts expected 
sofosbuvir to be the compound with the best treatment outcomes, Gilead predicted two ways in 
which competitors could potentially diminish their revenue gains and considered how their 
pricing strategy could prevent this from happening.  
One competitor Gilead examined closely, AbbVie, anticipated getting FDA approval on a 
regimen in the year following Gilead’s launch of sofosbuvir. AbbVie’s regimen would contain 
multiple compounds and be free of the toxic interferon, much like Gilead’s planned second launch 
Roy	160 
	
series (dubbed ‘wave 2’) in which sofosbuvir would remain the backbone but be supplemented by 
another anti-viral (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:46). Thus, AbbVie’s 
treatment regimen presented competition to later waves of Gilead’s sofosbuvir-based regimens. 
Because AbbVie might beat Gilead’s wave 2 regimen to approval, Gilead’s senior leadership and 
IMS consultants believed that Gilead’s wave 1 pricing (of sofosbuvir) – as the first curative 
compound to be approved - needed to set a strong baseline (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015:47). Otherwise, AbbVie could set a lower price point, thereby forcing Gilead to enter 
at AbbVie’s price point and depressing their revenue opportunity in Wave 2.183 Gilead noted that 
pricing at $60,000 would likely mean they would be “very unlikely to face any access issues” but 
the company would not be “realizing a substantial revenue amount and achieving more than an 
$80K Wave 2 price will be unlikely, eroding shareholder value” (US Senate Finance Committee, p. 
47). In other words: a low price would mean a better public health outcome, but it would hurt 
their ability to use it as a “high floor” to set the price of both their competitor’s and their own 
combination regimens. With revenue foregone, shareholder gains would be “eroded”. Gilead 
ultimately followed precisely this approach to set its ”wave 2 pricing” of sofosbuvir-based 
regimens (sofosbuvir + ledipasvir) at $94,500, using its “wave 1 pricing” floor of $84,000 as a useful 
baseline.   
Furthermore, Gilead feared that if they priced their sofosbuvir compound ‘too low’, other 
companies could then ‘pair’ sofosbuvir with their own compound and diminish Gilead’s revenue 
potential. For example, Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) expected to enter the market with a potent 
viral inhibitor, daclatasvir, which would not be a stand-alone therapy but rather would need to be 
paired with sofosbuvir to realize higher cure rates (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:49). Gilead feared that health insurers and public health systems might choose to pair 
sofosbuvir with daclatasvir, thereby limiting Gilead’s pricing potential for their own wave 2 
combination regimen.184 By ‘breaking-up’ Gilead’s combination sofosbuvir-based therapy, BMS 
would instead take a cut of the potential market. 
Rather than forcing prices downward, these competitive dynamics, served to cement 
																																																						
183 IMS laid out this possibility in stark terms: “If AbbVie’s 3-DAA comes to the market before (Gilead’s) 
Wave 2, it will become the standard of care (SoC) and Wave 2 will not be able to command a premium over 
it if equal market access is the goal” (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:1451).  
184 In July 2013, Gilead’s pricing team warned the company’s senior leadership: “further consideration of BMS 
strategy has emphasized the possible risk of daclatasvir being used to break-up the sofosbuvir STR (single-
therapy regimen) if a significant value capture opportunity is presented” (United States Senate, Committee 
on Finance 2015:1256) 
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Gilead’s pricing floor, in order to 1) set a higher reference point for future market entrants and its 
own sofosbuvir combination regimens and also 2) to ward off competing companies from co-
opting their sofosbuvir compound into alternative combination therapies.  
5.1.3 Estimations of buyer’s expectations of price and ‘differential value premium’  
 
A central piece to Gilead’s deliberation comprised of evaluating the views of multiple 
players, focused primarily on the estimations and expectations of players across the fragmented 
and less-regulated US market from which Gilead expected to make a disproportionate share of its 
revenue.185 As part of their work, IMS surveyed 90 payers in a double-blind fashion to identify the 
value they saw in an anonymized drug resembling sofosbuvir‘s clinical attributes. Figure 6.2 below 
shows the breakdown between different US payers in IMS’s survey – commercial health insurance 
plans, Medicare, and Medicaid – and the extent to which each would provide access for the 
medicines at different price points. The research gave IMS confidence about their use of the prior 
standards of care as a baseline, reporting to Gilead that the $85-$95,000 price range would be 
acceptable across a wide variety of health system payers.186 Yet in their final recommendations, 
they also noted that other “softer factors must be considered” beyond their survey (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:1249).  
Discussions between IMS and multiple stakeholders pointed to these ‘softer’ factors, 
namely the potential for public outcry due to the high number of hepatitis C patients. In addition 
to the survey, IMS also prepared what they called a ‘heat map’ of the anticipated social and 
political responses that Gilead might face from multiple key groups– such as patient activists and 
the U.S. Congress – to different escalating price points (see Figure 6.3). This ‘heat map’ helped 
Gilead estimate the upward limits past which public outcry would be likely (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:30). Strikingly, the rubric modeled for responses such as the 
probability of a “Congressional hearing”. Gilead’s own stakeholder meetings confirmed these 
possibilities.187 In 2013, for example, Gilead met with the Fair Pricing Coalition, a patient group 
																																																						
185 The company used their launch US price as a reference point off which to negotiate prices in Europe and 
Japan, where predominantly government-financed health care systems typically have stronger regulating 
power (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:59).  
186 Medicaid later would restrict treatment in this price range, as the numbers of patients requiring 
treatment exceeded their expectation. Furthermore, payers communicated that lower prices would ensure 
better access for sofosbuvir (see Figure 5.3).  
187 These cautions, however, were countervailed by a set of expectations from a powerful set of players: Wall 
Street investment analysts. In late October 2013, as Gilead prepared to launch sofosbuvir, Mark Schoenbaum 
– known as one of the top biotechnology investment analysts in Wall Street for the firm Evercore ISI – sent 
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which engaged senior leadership at pharmaceutical companies to provide input prior to a drug 
being released to the market. In their meeting, the group communicated their hope that Gilead 
would set a price of $60,000, which represented the price of telaprevir without interferon or 
ribavirin (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:101).188  
In closing their consultation with Gilead, IMS, citing $80-85,000 per course of therapy as 
their recommended launch price range, summed up their thesis: “this price will allow Gilead to 
capture value for the product without going to a price where the combination of external factors 
and payer dynamics could hinder patient access to uncomfortable levels” (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:1249). Taken from an array of players, these price estimates provided 
Gilead with an assessment of the upward limits of what health system buyers and the US political 
system could potentially bear. 
5.2 Survey of US payers’ anticipation of access at various price points for sofosbuvir  
 
 
Caption: Both Medicare and Medicaid show a willingness to cover sofosbuvir at prices greater than $85,000, 
increasing Gilead’s confidence on their preferred price range.  (US Senate Finance Committee, p. 1469).  
 
 
																																																						
an email to Robin Washington, Gilead’s Chief Financial Officer (and a member of the company’s pricing 
committee), with the results of his own research. Schoenbaum had surveyed 203 investment analysts to ask 
them “where do you think GILD (Gilead) will price 12 weeks of single-agent sofosbuvir”? The average: 
$85,400 (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:1836).  
188 The Fair Pricing Coalition (FPC) believed that Gilead’s sofosbuvir’s price should reflect the large volume 
increases compared to prior therapies. The FPC director, Lynda Dee, had already communicated this view 
at the FDA review meeting for sofosbuvir: “I mean, if the price of telaprevir and boceprevir I think is already 
exorbitant. I mean, if you could prove it even close to what those drugs are, I think that you would be 
reasonable under the circumstances, and you’d still make a fortune. The volume that you’re going to get for 
this is I think its outstanding” (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:101) 
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Figure 5.3 Gilead’s assessment for potential stakeholder responses to sofosbuvir’s pricing 
 
Caption: Gilead attempted to assess the severity of negative responses at upward limits of the pricing 
range. For example, they anticipated “likelihood of a letter from congress on SOF price” at even $70,000 for 
sofosbuvir, and “likelihood of public outcry if SOF revenue exceeded $2B” at a price point of $105,000.189 
Source: (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:30) 
 
On November 23, 2013, just two weeks before the FDA’s decision date and likely approval 
for sofosbuvir, Gilead’s senior leadership arrived at their price: $84,000 (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:57).190 Ten months later, Gilead would launch its sofosbuvir-based 
combination therapy (which eliminated the need for interferon in all hepatitis C patients) at the 
price point of $94,500 – meaning that Gilead’s estimation of the ‘value premium’ for sofosbuvir-
based treatments compared to the prior standard of care would be ~$11,500 (see ~$83,000 price 
point referred to in section 5.1.1). The three considerations described above guided them towards 
																																																						
189 Gilead’s initial revenue in 2014 from sofosbuvir exceeded $10 billion at a price of $84,000 .   
190 Why the precise price of $84,000 for the launch price of the initial sofosbuvir treatment? John Martin, 
Gilead’s CEO noted that the per-bottle price of $28,000 ($84,000 per three months divided by 3 = 
$28,000/month) would be “easy from the press release, from 28 days and $28,000”(United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015:57). Gilead’s other senior leadership concurred on the email chain, figuring that 
$1,000 a day for the cure would make for an easy marketing push. 
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this price point, as it (1) was comparable to the existing standard of care given the ‘added value 
premium’, (2) provided a high baseline price from which to prevent competitors from eroding 
returns, and (3) came within the upward limits of the range the company forecasted would be 
acceptable to health systems in exchange for improved therapeutic outcomes.  
Telescoping out from the close account of these three rationales, we can juxtapose Gilead’s 
pricing strategy with competing economic claims on drug prices, as well as situate it in the wider 
context of the innovation process. Notably, Gilead never considered their investments in research 
and development in the pricing process, and the ‘value’ of their therapies was never objectively 
defined or algorithmically calculated.  The three factors I outlined converged on Gilead’s singular 
rationale for pricing: to maximize their opportunity to grow through sofosbuvir-based regimens. 
Their use of monopoly power in searching for this maximum price point, however, was situated in 
the broader political-economic dynamics of the innovation process driven by financialization. The 
use of the reference price (from the existing standard of care) and their estimation of the 
differential value that health systems would be willing to pay reinforced the pricing escalator that 
had previously mobilized speculative capitals behind Pharmasset. Furthermore, this pricing 
strategy underscored Gilead’s role in this chain of speculative actors – as an acquisition specialist 
betting on intangible assets, based on their anticipation of charging prices that continue this 
value-based pricing logic.191 Gilead’s launch price strategy served as a culmination of this escalator, 
another ‘step’ in a long upward trend.  
The pricing immediately spurred a crisis of treatment access and a contentious public 
debate over the value of new breakthroughs which landed on the front pages of multiple news 
media (Knox 2013; Pollack 2013). We turn to the dynamics of this crisis next.  
5.2 The State of Public Health or the Triage State?  
 
Gilead’s pricing shaped the extent to which sofosbuvir-based regimens would create an 
optimal public health impact for hepatitis C. In this section, I first describe how instead of 
universal access at a price deemed affordable, the ‘public health delivery state’ became a “triage 
state” as they 1) allocated significant budgets for a small number of patients, 2) rationed treatment 
																																																						
191 Gilead had used this value-based logic for the prices they assumed for sofosbuvir in their capitalization 
exercise in 2011 at the time they made their $11.2 billion acquisition on Pharmasset. As I describe later in this 
chapter, Gilead’s accumulation of revenue from their pricing strategy would enable them to reproduce and 
fortify their position in the innovation process – using this accumulated capital to search for intangible 
assets on which to bet (and distribute earnings to shareholders in the form of buybacks).  
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to only the sickest patients with hepatitis C, and 3) deferred public health planning to eliminate 
the disease. I then illustrate these public health outcomes in the context of both the limits of 
countervailing powers of the state in drug pricing as well as limits of health economic algorithms 
used to justify ‘value-based pricing’. This account is based on health policy articles, media 
accounts, interviews192, drug spending database, and observations at meetings.   
5.2.1 Turning to Triage 
 
Health systems around the world responded to the price by allocating significant public 
funding to treat only a small number of patients while limiting access to only the sickest patients 
in the late stages of disease (Iyengar et al. 2016).193 I focus this section on treatment access and 
spending on sofosbuvir-based regimens in the U.S., where a fragmented network of public payers 
are responsible for the care of a significant proportion of hepatitis C patients, particularly those 
experiencing social disadvantage (Chahal et al. 2015; Ward and Mermin 2015; H. F. Yee Jr 2015). 
Official estimates indicate that the US has over 3.2-4.7 million infected with hepatitis C, with 
public systems responsible for approximately 50% of this population, including veterans, 
incarcerated populations, low-income, Native American, and elderly patients (Edlin et al. 2015).194 
Taken together, the health systems responsible for these patients constitute a “health delivery 
state” (Khullar and Chokshi 2016), in which taxpayers finance the health of multiple populations, 
from patients over the age of 65 (Medicare), low-income patients and disabled (Medicaid), 
veterans (Veterans Affairs), Native Americans (Indian Health Service), and those incarcerated 
(state prison systems). 
Three dynamics shaped patient and public health outcomes in the US from the 
development and pricing of sofosbuvir–based regimens. First, US health systems had to grapple 
with the significant budgetary expenses of treating even a small fraction of hepatitis C patients, 
																																																						
192 Interviews 2, 8, 16, 18, 22, 29, and 31 provided insight into the dynamics of treatment access.  
193 Across Europe, even publicly financed health systems with centralized negotiating power over drug 
prices placed restrictions on treatment due to the large numbers of potential patients seeking treatment 
(Chabrol, David, and Krikorian 2017; Gornall et al. 2016). In the UK, for example, the National Health 
Service restricted treatment for nearly two years after their launch to under 3,000 thousand patients, and 
then only expanded treatment to ~10,000 per year (Gornall et al. 2016). Though Gilead offered a license to 
generic companies to produce the medicine at approximately $1,000 in low-income countries where the 
company did not expect to garner high sales in any case, the company restricted this license so that many 
middle-income countries with high hepatitis C burdens met difficult budgetary choices with limitations in 
treatment availability (Love 2014c; Momenghalibaf 2014) 
194 This wide estimate is due to the uncertainty created from the large number of undiagnosed patients who 
may be in their early stages of disease.  
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and the opportunity costs for spending in other areas of health and social concern. Second, in 
considering the budgetary consequences of these medicines, health systems responded with 
treatment access restrictions, forcing patients to wait for the medicines. Third, and finally, public 
health officials and policy-makers deferred the planning for an elimination-focused strategy for 
hepatitis C which in turn has supported the conditions for the long-term durability of the 
epidemic.  
The first two dynamics are captured in Table 5.1, which summarizes the responses of 
various U.S. public health delivery systems in the two years after the launch of sofosbuvir-based 
treatments. Amidst financial and treatment access challenges, approximately 230,000 patients 
were treated with sofosbuvir-based treatments in 2014-2015 across these systems over the first two 
years of their launch, far less than the 1.6 to 2.4 million hepatitis C patients with publicly funded 
insurance.195 I now map each of these two dynamics – budgetary pressures and treatment access - 
in detail and then turn to the deferment of public health planning.  
																																																						
195 This comprised a significant share of the 400,000 patients Gilead has estimated for the entire US 
population, with the rest accessing the treatment through private insurance.   
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Table 5.2: US public health delivery response to sofosbuvir-based treatments, 2014-2015  
Public health 
delivery system  
Treatment 
restrictions?  
Estimated 
hepatitis C 
population196 
Treated 
hepatitis C  
population 
Hepatitis C spending 
Medicare  No, Medicare cannot 
legally restrict access 
nor can they negotiate 
with drug companies 
on pricing 
350,000 
(Hoadley et al. 
2016; United 
States Senate, 
Committee on 
Finance 2015) 
135,238 patients 
(CMS 2016) 
$12.15 billion 
($3.8 billion in 2014 and 
$8.15 billion in 2015, at 
average price of $90,000) 
 
(CMS 2016) 
Medicaid Yes, state programs 
restricted access to 
patients based on their 
stage of disease as well 
as substance use 
(alcohol, injecting 
drugs), with only the 
sickest eligible to 
receive the medicines.  
(Barua et al. 2015; 
Canary, Klevens, and 
Holmberg 2015) 
700,000 
 
United States 
Senate (2015) 
surveyed all US 
state Medicaid 
directors 
 
51,512197 
 
Using United State 
Senate (2015) for 
2014 data, and 
Center for 
Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS 
2016) drug 
spending 
dashboard 
$4 billion  
 
Using United State Senate 
(2015) for 2014 data, and 
Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid (CMS 2016) drug 
spending dashboard; $1.2 
billion in 2014 and $2.8 
billion in 2015 
 
 
Veterans 
Affairs  
Yes. In 2014-2015, 
patients waited for 
treatment in earlier 
stages of disease. In 
second-half of 2015, VA 
ran out of budget for 
hepatitis C, forcing 
patients to wait until 
2016  
 
(Graham 2016) 
174,000 
 
(Veterans 
Affairs 2014)  
42,000 (Jan 2014 – 
March, 2016) 
 
(Veterans Affairs 
2016) 
 
5,400 veterans 
treated in 2014; 
(Kime 2015) 
$1.066 billion 
- 2014: $370 million 
- 2015: $696 million,  
17% of their entire 
pharmaceutical budget 
*Congress appropriated $3 
billion for hepatitis C 
treatment in 2016 and 2017. 
 
(Graham 2016; Veterans 
Affairs 2016) 
Departments 
of Correction 
(state prison 
systems)  
 
 
Yes, rationed access 
based on length of stay 
in prison as well as 
cirrhosis staging  
 
 
~106,000  
(data from 
41/50 states, 
estimated to be 
10% of the 
entire prison 
population)  
949 patients (.89% 
of the estimated 
total population of 
infected)  
Atleast $39.8 million in 
2014, with no figure for 
2015  
 
All data in this row from 
Beckman  (2016), which 
surveyed all 50 state DoCs 
Indian Health 
Service (HIS)  
Yes, because IHS has 
not directly funded 
hepatitis C treatment, 
patients seek care 
typically via Medicaid 
programs, which have 
restrictions (Leston 
and Finkbonner 2016) 
National data 
is limited, one 
study 
estimated 
120,000 
positive (Edlin 
et al. 2015)  
No direct 
treatment 
available (Leston 
and Finkbonner 
2016) 
No supplemental HCV 
budget; entire annual 
budget of HIS is $4.6 
billion (Leston and 
Finkbonner 2016)  
																																																						
196 These estimates include diagnosed and estimated undiagnosed patients.  
197 2015 data was reported in terms of prescriptions versus beneficiaries, with an estimated 105,695 
prescriptions. If we assume an average of three prescriptions per patient (each prescription lasts one month 
for a three month regimen), this would indicate about 35,231 patients treated (CMS 2016).  
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First, covering all hepatitis C patients was estimated to take up a large share of the entire 
pharmaceutical budget for U.S. health systems, forcing a consideration of opportunity costs for 
other areas of health and social spending. One prominent study estimated that treating all 
hepatitis C patients in the US over 5 years would require $136 billion to cover drug costs, of which 
$61 billion would need to be paid by the government (Chahal et al. 2015). Even treating a small 
fraction of patients ultimately required significant allocations of new spending which represented 
large proportions of health system budgets. For example, the Veterans Affairs administration in 
2015 ran out of funding for hepatitis C drugs in the second half of the year after spending nearly 
17% of their entire pharmaceutical budget on sofosbuvir-based treatments (Flynn 2015; Graham 
2016; 2016b). Public pressure in early 2016, stemming in part from two national news broadcasts 
devoted to the VA challenge, led the US Congress to allocate $3 billion for hepatitis C treatment; 
advocates are still concerned that many may have to wait (Graham 2016).198 US veterans suffered 
from high rates of hepatitis C primarily from blood transfusions and injecting drug use during the 
Vietnam War  (Flynn 2015). The US Medicaid system, run by individual US states, spend $4.0 
billion during 2014-2015 to treat 7% of all hepatitis C patients (CMS 2016; United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015). The state of New York, for example, spent 10% of their entire 
pharmaceutical budget in 2015 on hepatitis C (Goldberg 2016).  
Second, in weighing these budgetary pressures, health systems restricted access to 
treatment, turning to a system of triage to contain costs. In the U.S. Medicaid program where 
individual states make determinations over spending allocations, a majority of states placed 
significant restrictions (see Figure 6.4) on sofosbuvir-based regimens (Barua et al. 2015; Canary et 
al. 2015; J. Walker 2015). Patients on Medicaid have been triaged for treatment largely based on 
two criteria: stage of disease and substance use (see Table 6.1). Most states restricted patients by 
the staging of their liver disease, allowing only patients with advanced fibrosis (medically 
categorized as those with F3 and F4 staging) to receive access (Barua et al. 2015; Canary et al. 
2015). 199 Additionally, many states required that patients be alcohol and drug free in the one 
month to upwards of 6 months leading up to treatment. Most observers concluded that these 
																																																						
198 Tricia Lupole, executive director of HCVEts, a website run for veterans with the disease, shared in an 
interview with Journal of Medical Association (JAMA), “The fact is they don’t have the money to treat 
everyone despite what they’re promising.” (Graham 2016).  
199 33/50 states instituted restrictions, including the largest states. F3 and F4 stage refers to late stage liver 
fibrosis (scarring of liver tissue), as compared to patients in earlier F0, F1, or F2 stages.  
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guidelines, which had no clinical basis, were set up as mechanisms by which to delay access and 
contain costs (Barua et al. 2015; Canary et al. 2015; Ward and Mermin 2015). In a study by 
researchers at University of Pennsylvania researchers found that nearly 50% of Medicaid patients 
were denied access because the medicines were deemed to not be a “medical necessity” or 
because “the patients tested positive for alcohol/drugs” (Re et al. 2016). These denials 
disproportionately fell on those populations most at-risk for worsening hepatitis C as well as 
transmission of the infection: low-income patients with histories of injecting drug use.  
 
Figure 5.4 Medicaid requirements for treatment access by liver disease stage as of June, 2015 
 
 
 
 
Note: The darker blue shades indicate the majority of states restricting access to late stages of liver disease 
(F3 and F4), 18 months after sofosbuvir-based treatments had been approved by the FDA. Source: (Barua 
et al. 2015) 
 
Beyond the US Medicaid system, these restrictions have impacted another crucial 
vulnerable population: incarcerated patients. The US prison system, which holds an estimated 
15% to 25% of the entire hepatitis C population in the US, has provided treatment to less than 1% 
of its patients (Beckman et al. 2016; He et al. 2016). State prison systems are not mandated to 
receive a discount from Gilead, making their access challenges even steeper than other public 
systems (Ayer et al. 2016; Loftus and Fields 2016; United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
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2015). Restricting access in this population presents a major squandered opportunity for tackling 
the epidemic to this point, as prisons are often the only stable source of health care for these 
patients; after release, they are also at higher risk for transmitting the virus in the community 
(Barry-Jester 2015; He et al. 2016). This uneven use has presented challenges for providers and 
patients at the frontlines of care delivery. Caregivers described the predicament for doctors and 
patients in the journal Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA): “Earlier treatment can 
prevent advanced liver disease, but late-stage disease is needed to qualify for treatment: for a 
clinician, explaining this circular logic to a patient can be frustrating for both parties” (Leston and 
Finkbonner 2016:817). 
These restrictions and budgetary pressures have converged on a third dynamic shaping 
the public health outcomes of sofosbuvir-based medicines: the deferment of public health planning 
for hepatitis C elimination. In a major national commission on viral hepatitis organized by the 
Institute of Medicine in 2016, experts concluded that eliminating the public health problem of 
hepatitis C was clinically possible but “would require near universal access to treatment, 
something that appears unfeasible given the current pricing and policy environment” (National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine 2016). The unfolding public health consequences of 
this deferred implementation are significant over the long-term. A modeling study performed by 
myself with colleagues compared the effect in the US of expanding treatment access and versus 
the ‘restricted’ strategy currently being deployed (Roy, Chokshi, Kissler, and Singh 2016a). Figure 
6.5 demonstrates the differences in population-level outcomes over the next decade. Under an 
expanded access strategy, hepatitis C could be transformed from an epidemic to a rare disease, 
with less than 150,000 infected patients by 2025. But under a restricted scenario, more than a 
million people would still be infected. The virus would persist for decades longer.  
Gilead’s pricing, therefore, created a set of stark challenges for the health delivery state. In 
the face of the prices for sofosbuvir-based medicines, a ‘Triage State’ allocated significant portions 
of their budget to treat a small fraction of patients, restricted treatment to contain costs, and 
deferred the implementation of a public-health centered plan to eliminate the virus in the 
population. This crisis of the Triage State in the case of sofosbuvir-based medicines was not an 
inevitable outcome; rather, it illustrated relations of power between drug manufacturers and the 
U.S. state that were one element in sustaining the mechanisms of financialization described thus 
far.  
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Figure 5.5  US hepatitis C epidemic under ‘rare disease by 2025’ versus ‘restricted 
treatment’ scenarios  
 
 
Caption: A Markov model showing that treating all patients in the US with advanced liver disease in the 
next two years followed by progressively more patients in early stages of disease, especially among those 
who inject drugs, can make hepatitis C a rare disease by 2025, with under 200,000 infected persons as 
compared to restricting treatment to only those with advanced disease. Source: Roy (2016a) 
5.2.2 Public-private powers and the limits of value-based pricing   
 
As described in section 5.1, Gilead priced their therapies based on an estimation of the 
upward limits of what health systems could pay, using the pricing of the existing standard of care, 
telaprevir, as their key reference for the ‘value’ Gilead believed their therapies would command 
given sofosbuvir’s superior clinical attributes. This pricing strategy, designed to maximize Gilead’s 
revenue accumulation, was shaped by two dynamics contained within the innovation process. 
The first dynamic is the growing but contested use of ‘value-based pricing’ as a standardized 
algorithm deemed to objectively evaluate a therapy’s price for the ‘value’ it provides health 
systems. This logic of ‘value-based pricing’ is tightly affixed to a second dynamic, however: the 
limited countervailing power of the state vis a vis oligopolistic pharmaceutical businesses like 
Gilead. I describe each dynamic in turn to show how drug pricing is politically constituted within 
the innovation process.  
The arguments over value-based pricing emerged and intensified in the months after the 
late 2013 launch of sofosbuvir. As Gilead’s pricing drew increasing scrutiny in 2014, the company’s 
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senior leadership countered with a repeated message, summed up in a Bloomberg Business 
interview with Executive Vice President Gregg Alton. “Price is the wrong discussion”, he asserted, 
“value should be the subject” (Barrett and Langreth 2015). Gilead’s executives and industry 
leaders, buttressed with evidence from health economic studies, communicated value in two 
ways.200 First, sofosbuvir provided a much higher cure rate at a price comparable to the prior 
standard of care for hepatitis C – this meant health systems were essentially paying similar or 
slightly higher prices (depending on the given health system and the price) as before for a much 
better health outcome. Second, not only could more patients be cured immediately, but by 
treating patients in their early stages, health systems could also save the downstream costs of 
progressive liver disease (Chahal et al. 2016; Tice et al. 2015). The annual medical expense for a 
patient in the F4 stage of liver cirrhosis, for example, was estimated to be $20,000 due to 
complications and hospitalizations, and liver transplant costs exceeded $150,000 (Van Nuys et al. 
2015). These justifications of value had figured into Gilead’s pricing strategy, when the company 
and IMS gathered subjective assessments through interviews from a variety of stakeholders to 
estimate the highest price at which the drugs would present value for health systems in 
comparison to the existing standards of care at the time.  
As health systems began to decide their responses to paying for and providing access to 
the therapies in 2014-2016, Gilead’s executives – and the wider health policy community – turned 
to a series of health economics studies regarded in academic and policy circles as an objective 
assessment of sofosbuvir’s value. In a series of eight major health economics papers201 published in 
the two years after sofosbuvir’s launch (see Appendix D for the studies and a short technical 
summary), each affirmed the pricing of sofosbuvir-based treatments as ‘value-based’ using 
comparative cost-effectiveness methodologies.202 These studies, with one prominent study funded 
																																																						
200 These value arguments from the pharmaceutical industry also adopt and co-opt the arguments made by 
the US government, in which the Affordable Care Act (‘Obamacare’) has attempted to shift health care 
systems from ‘fee for service’ (i.e. incentivizing number of tests and doctor visits) to ‘value-based payments’ 
(i.e. incentivizing improvements in health outcomes) (Obama 2016).  
201 These eight studies used slightly different assumptions and methods, but arrived at similar conclusions 
on sofosbuvir-based treatments (Chahal et al. 2015; Chhatwal et al. 2015; Leidner et al. 2015; Najafzadeh et al. 
2015; Rein et al. 2015; Tice et al. 2015; Van Nuys et al. 2015; Younossi et al. 2016).  
202 I provide brief background in this footnote regarding the method, but see Chapters 2 and the Appendix 
D for a more expansive technical summary. Put simply, these studies calculated the difference in costs 
between the regimens divided by the difference in health outcomes (measured in QALYs, quality adjusted 
life years), to produce a cost-effectiveness ratio of dollars spent per QALY unit of health gain; if the dollars 
are below a certain threshold, the medicine is deemed to be cost-effective. These thresholds vary based on 
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by Gilead itself, were widely used in policy meetings and in the media as a rationale for Gilead’s 
pricing. One economic modeling study summed up the commonly held finding: “treating HCV 
infection at early stages of fibrosis appeared to improve outcomes and to be cost-effective” 
(Chahal et al. 2016:65). The study also contained a caution, however, that would expose the rift 
between health systems and Gilead: though the treatments were cost-effective compared to prior 
therapies and could save billions in downstream medical expenses, this savings would be incurred 
at “substantial aggregate costs” that “may have implications for health care coverage policies and 
clinical decision making” (Chahal et al. 2015:65). This basic tension – between supposed savings 
and cost-effectiveness of the treatments in the long-run and the significant, near-term budgetary 
costs – exposed the limitations of conventional health economics studies in three ways.203  
 First, cost-effectiveness studies for sofosbuvir could not account for a major shifting 
political-economic variable: the rise in drug prices over time, or what I have illustrated to be the 
pricing escalator in the prior chapter. This trend, clearly demonstrated in hepatitis C (see Figure 
5.7), ‘up-shifted’ the prices at which comparative value assessments were being made. While the 
price of interferon regimens was $19,000 in 1998, they had jumped to $32,000 for a modified 
version by 2002 (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015). With the advent of telaprevir 
in 2011, the price leaped again, with regimens now crossing $80,000 per patient (Vernaz et al. 
2016). Each price point was justified by companies on the basis of the progressive improvements 
in health outcomes. The doctor and policy analyst Peter Bach (2015), has pointed out the 
challenge this raises for analyzing prices using existing value frameworks: “expensive drugs can 
still seem deceptively cost-effective, because of the long upward spiral we have seen.” This upward 
spiral reflects the cumulative effects of the financialized mode of drug development, as these 
increasing prices and market valuations for hepatitis C helped mobilize speculative capitals in the 
prior chapter.  
 Along with the pricing escalator, the limits of cost-effectiveness analysis are also related to 
a second factor: an increased number of patients eligible for treatment. As was the case with 
sofosbuvir-based treatments, better clinical outcomes with a new therapy expands the number of 
																																																						
the preferences of a given health system and country. For example, the NHS in the UK is typically ‘willing to 
pay’ $20,000-$30,000 for an additional QALY.   
203 I provide a broader analysis and critique of the value argument in chapter 6, pointing to the inability of 
such arguments to account for the difference between value creation and value extraction, and even value 
destruction. Here I share the basic arithmetic problems with using such health economics studies in a 
context of rising drug prices.  
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patients who can benefit – in other words, the ‘volume’ of patients grows (Reinhardt 2015). With 
many more patients seeking treatment at per-unit prices that are higher than before, prices that 
are deemed ‘cost-effective’ buckle the budgets of health systems. Gilead anticipated this explosion 
of cost for health systems (See Figure 5.7), forecasting dramatic increases in hepatitis C spending 
in 2014 and onwards with the launch of their medicines. This second factor in turn created the 
problem of social opportunity costs for governments highlighted in section 5.2.1, with decision-
makers weighing whether hepatitis C spending would displace investment in other health or 
social purposes (Reinhardt 2015). Though studies analyzing sofosbuvir’s value provided a 
justification for Gilead’s pricing using widely adopted cost-effectiveness methodologies, they 
could not resolve the challenges posed by higher prices and social opportunity costs. 
 Finally, the ‘savings’ argued to accrue to health systems through early treatment was based 
on a set of illusory assumptions. The savings were measured in these studies over 30 to 50 year 
time horizons – but governments make budgets in much smaller time horizons, making it 
difficult to allocate significant new spending to single therapeutic areas for the purpose of 
realizing savings decades later. More importantly, the costs of treatment far exceeded the 
anticipated savings accrued from sofosbuvir.204 The study by Chahal, for example, found that 
treating all patients in the US even at a 46% discount from Gilead’s launch price would require 
$29 billion and result in savings of $3.3 billion versus treating only patients in their late stages of 
disease.205 The treatment regimen did represent a value for patients as a curative therapy, but 
these health economic studies attempted to justify its price as a reflection of value in isolation of 
the political realities of budgets and public health.  
 
 
																																																						
204 Joseph Dumit, in his work on pharmaceutical consumption, has noted that the ‘downstream savings’ 
argument for early treatment with high priced medicines ignores the reality that patients who receive 
treatments live longer, sustaining their possibility as a target for further pharmaceutical intervention and 
spending (Dumit 2012a; 2012b). He makes this provocative point to illustrate that the humanitarian 
argument for treating patients early of disease is perhaps the most reasonable justification, rather than the 
economic savings argument.  
205 Chahal et al (2016) notes, “For budgetary considerations, if only 50% of eligible patients with HCV 
genotype 1 were to be treated with sofosbuvir-ledipasvir during the next 5 years, the cost of drugs in the 
United States would be $53 billion at current prices. Many payers negotiate prices, as has been seen with 
exclusivity deals with drug manufacturers.  If a mean 46% reduction in drug prices occurred, the cost of 
treating 50% of patients with HCV genotype 1 during the next 5 years could be as high as $29 billion, partly 
offset by $3 billion in savings in the management of chronic HCV and advanced liver disease.”  
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Figure 5.6  Historical price escalation from 1986 interferon to 2011 telaprevir regimen 
 
 
Caption: The upward ladder of price increases on prior hepatitis C medicines shifted the entire valuation of 
Gilead’s sofosbuvir-based regimens. Source: US Senate Finance Committee (2015:1320) 
 
Figure 5.7  Sales of HCV drugs expected to dramatically increase with new patient 
population 
 
 
Source: US Senate Finance Committee  2015:1620)  
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 These debates over ‘value-based pricing’ were ultimately tied to a second dynamic: the 
limits of public health systems to negotiate and regulate drug pricing in the face of publicly-granted 
monopoly power. Gilead was not operating in a free and competitive market of textbook fame; 
rather, as Gilead entered the hepatitis C market in late 2013 and onwards, the patents for 
sofosbuvir-based regimens granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USTPO) assured 
protection until 2028 (Reinhardt 2015).206 This protection enabled Gilead to price free from 
competitive pressures at the time of its launch. The entry of two companies with curative 
hepatitis C regimens (AbbVie in 2014 and Merck in 2016) did eventually lead to modest price 
competition, with Gilead dropping its prices to certain public systems like the VA and some 
Medicaid states to below $50,000 (Crow 2016b; Dabney 2016).  
Yet a major national commission in the US of hepatitis C experts concluded in March of 
2017 that even a price of $40,000 per patient would prevent a public health oriented elimination 
strategy from being employed (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 2017). Under such a 
scenario, the commission found that 240,000 patients on Medicaid would be treated over 12 years 
at a cost of ~$10 billion, far short of the nearly 700,000 patients infected with hepatitis C on the 
program currently. The commission predicted, “It is unlikely that market forces alone will lower 
the prices of these drugs sharply or quickly enough to meet the targets set. The goals described 
depend on prompt, large-scale treatment of hepatitis C, and the price of these drugs is a major 
obstacle to unrestricted treatment, especially for institutions of limited means such as the prison 
system and state Medicaid program” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 2017:7). In 
their report, the commission concluded that alternative methods of negotiation between the US 
government and manufacturers would be needed to overcome the pricing obstacle. 207   
																																																						
206 Pharmasset originally patented the sofosbuvir compound in 2008, with patents from USTPO lasting 20 
years from the time, including clinical testing time (World Health Organization 2016). This followed from 
their 2004 patent on the pre-cursor to sofosbuvir, PSI-6130.  
207 The commission proposed that the government engage Gilead in a negotiation in which a winning 
company would receive compensation in exchange for a license; this license would then be used by a third-
party manufacturer to produce generic versions of hepatitis C treatments. At the roughly $200 per patient 
for a three-month regimen it would take for a generic supplier to produce the medicine and retain a 
sustainable profit margin (Hill, Khoo, and Fortunak 2014), such a strategy would provide for universal 
treatment to the Medicaid population at a cost of $140 million in addition to compensation provided the 
prior patent holder. The commission determined that this generic licensing and production approach was 
the only way for public health targets to be realized over the next decade. The report considered several 
ways to compensate the patent holder, estimating a potential compensation deal in the arena of $2-3 billion, 
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This prediction was founded on a long-run observation: the limits of public health delivery 
systems in the US in exercising counter-vailing power in the face of state-granted monopolies. For 
example, the Medicaid program for low-income populations is a joint state-federal program, with 
individual states charged with allocating spending for pharmaceuticals and the federal 
government splitting the costs; the fragmentation of the Medicaid market into 50 separate states 
diminishes their negotiating leverage (Obama 2016; Paradise 2017).  
The US Medicare program has faced a different challenge: it was explicitly barred from 
negotiating pricing with companies upon legislative passage of its prescription drug plan in 2003 
(Oliver, P. R. Lee, and Lipton 2004). The rationale at the time, heavily influenced by the PhRMA 
lobby group, was that ‘the market’ would lower prices with private prescription insurance plans 
competing to attract beneficiaries and translating this into market power with which to negotiate 
with manufacturers – with taxpayers financing the scheme (Oliver et al. 2004). Yet studies have 
shown that Medicare has not been able to gain discounts from the launch prices set by companies 
(Bach 2009; Bach and McClellan 2005; Gellad et al. 2008), and the case of hepatitis C appears to 
demonstrate this point: Medicare spent $90,000 per patient for sofosbuvir-based regimens at a 
total cost of $12.15 billion in 2014-2015 (CMS 2016).  
Furthermore, though the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services under President 
Obama raised the possibility of using the ‘March-in rights’ rule contained in the Bayh-Dole Act, in 
which the government grants a license to a third-party manufacturer in cases where publicly 
funded technologies are necessary to address a public health concern, the provision has never 
been exercised in the 37-year history of the law (Kesselheim 2011; Rai and Eisenberg 2002). This 
record of avoidance has continued with the case of hepatitis C (Silverman 2016d). 
The limited countervailing power of the state has been shaped in part by the conversion of 
Gilead’s accumulated capital into lobbying government officials responsible for policies on drug 
pricing and intellectual property. For example, while Gilead’s lobbying expenses grew steadily 
with their HIV revenues during the 2000s, their expenses more than doubled (see Figure 5,9) with 
the advent of sofosbuvir from $1.59 million in 2012 to $3.48 million in 2016 (OpenSecrets 2017). 
Publicly available records show that Gilead used lobbying groups with prominent officials from 
both major political parties.208 According to federal disclosure reports, Gilead gave their lobbyists 
																																																						
since companies like Gilead are not gaining unrestricted access to neglected markets like Medicaid at 
current prices (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 2017). 
208 These officials included Arshi Siddiqui, a former senior policy advisor to House Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi; Josh Lamel, former legal counsel to Senate Finance Chairman Ron Wyden; Ryan Long, former chief 
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the job of influencing “hepatitis C policies” and providing “education on hepatitis C issues” 
(Demko 2014). In the fall of 2014, as scrutiny increased on Gilead’s pricing, the company hosted a 
forum, “Curing hepatitis C – the patient’s perspective”, for legislative staffers at the Rayburn 
House Office building in Washington DC (Demko 2014). A hepatitis C doctor, who earned 
$20,000 in payments from Gilead, joined a Gilead vice president and a hepatitis C patient to argue 
for the ‘value’ of hepatitis C medicines (Demko 2014).209 Such lobbying by Gilead is part of the 
much larger efforts by the pharmaceutical industry, which spent more than any industry - $2.3 
billion – to influence key decision-makers in Washington DC between 2006 and 2016 – with two 
lobbyists per member of Congress (Chon 2016).  
 
 
Figure 5.8 Gilead’s lobbying expenses on US federal decision-makers, 2001-2016 (in 
millions)  
 
Source: Open Secrets database (2017)  
 
In sum, section 5.2 illustrates the patient and public health consequences of this 
relationship of power between state-financed health systems and Gilead Sciences towards drug 
																																																						
health counsel for the House Energy and Commerce Committee under Republican leadership (Demko 
2014). 
209 The ranking Republican senator on the Senate VA committee, Richard Burr, later stood up for Gilead 
and its pricing, arguing, “innovation is expensive…I think the one thing we agree on is we don’t want to give 
up on innovation.” He continued that instead of attacking prices, the VA should look at how much could be 
saved in the long-term, “I believe the price of this particular drug should be look at on the macro level.” In 
this exchange with a media outlet covering veterans issues, Burr echoed the two lines – ‘risk’ and ‘value’ – 
used by Gilead and the industry to justify its prices. Burr made these arguments in multiple Senate 
testimonies and public interviews; in 2014, Gilead also donated $5,000 to Burr’s political committee, the 
maximum allowable donation (Kravitz 2016; Tritten 2014).  
Roy	179 
	
pricing. In the face of Gilead’s prices, health systems allocated significant spending to treat a small 
fraction of patients, relying on treatment restriction criteria to limit the budgetary pressures 
posed by the cost of treating large populations of hepatitis C patients. Additionally, public health 
planning for hepatitis C elimination has been deferred, with government health systems failing to 
exercise countervailing power to negotiate lower prices with Gilead. These prices have been 
justified by Gilead based on their ‘value’, derived from health economic studies that fail to 
account for the long-run increase in the prices of prior hepatitis C medicines. As we observed in 
chapter 4, this pricing escalator was linked to the mobilization of speculative capital behind 
Pharmasset and fueled Gilead’s valuation of sofosbuvir in their acquisition of Pharmasset.  
For advocates of the value-based pricing argument, however, these increasing prices were 
the primary incentive for the development of a curative therapy: paying more, in this view, would 
mean more curative therapies like sofosbuvir would be developed by the pharmaceutical industry 
(Kliff 2014).210 The extent of this claim, however, would be conditioned by the very speculative and 
shareholder-driven processes driving the pricing escalator documented thus far. I now turn to 
tracing these processes into Gilead’s business strategy as they accumulated capital from hepatitis 
C sales.  
5.3 Gilead’s Conondrum: The Limits of a Cure for Shareholder-Driven 
Growth  
 
Rather than experiencing durable success in the eyes of financial markets with its hepatitis 
C sales, Gilead in turn faced another episode of crisis shaped by the shareholder-driven growth 
treadmill: whereas shareholders value assets that provide continuous and near-term growth, 
sofosbuvir-based medicines represent a cure which promises to reduce patient numbers over 
time. The extractive strategies driven by Gilead’s shareholders were exacerbated by the company’s 
ownership over a ‘curative asset’ - even with $19 billion in sales for hepatitis C just in 2015 and 
nearly $45 billion in revenue by mid-2016, the dim prospect for continued revenue growth from a 
																																																						
210 In summing up her interviews with a group of health economists, the journalist Sarah Kliff (2014) wrote, 
“Sovaldi, many of them argued to me, is exactly the type of drug we should reward with high prices. 
Economists argue that there's a tension in setting the price for a breakthrough drug like Sovaldi. We want 
to encourage more pharmaceutical companies to pursue similarly big developments — a cure for 
Alzheimer's, for example, or diabetes — but also want patients to have access to those treatments. When 
push comes to shove though, many prefer that we err on the side of higher prices as a way to encourage 
other big, blockbuster drugs in the future.” As a reminder, Sovaldi is the brand name for sofosbuvir.  
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curative therapy sank Gilead’s share price by almost 50% from its peak in mid-2015 to its current 
trough in April of 2017 (Chen 2017; Crow 2016a; Nisen 2017).  
To boost their share price in the context of a curative therapy, Gilead turned to a three-
fold strategy: a large-scale marketing campaign for hepatitis C, the accumulation of capital for 
potential acquisitions as well as distributions of capital to shareholders through buybacks, and a 
shift in attention to their ‘chronic franchise’ (HIV medicines) which can be used in a growing 
number of patients for a long-time horizon. Under the conditions of shareholder-driven financial 
growth, a curative therapy for a chronic disease pushed Gilead towards incremental advances for 
life-long HIV treatments rather than reinvestments towards breakthrough innovations (i.e. a cure 
for HIV).  
In this section, I draw on Gilead’s financial statements, historical share prices, media 
accounts, and transcripts of earnings call between investment analysts and senior leadership to 
trace the response of financial markets to Gilead and the company’s strategy in the three years 
since the launch of sofosbuvir. I begin by describing how shareholders initially valued Gilead with 
the surge of hepatitis C revenues in the two years after the launch of sofosbuvir-based medicines 
followed by their subsequent concern with diminishing prospects for growth. I then turn to the 
three-fold strategy Gilead attempted to employ in the face of those concerns. 
5.3.1 An initial honeymoon for Gilead 
 
Gilead experienced success by every financial metric in the months after their launch of 
sofosbuvir-based medicines. As highlighted in chapter 4 (and captured in Figure 5.8 below), 
Gilead’s revenues tripled in two years, going from an $11 billion a year company in sales in 2013 to 
over $30 billion in 2015, mostly on the strength of their hepatitis C medicines (Gilead Sciences 
2017). In 2015, these medicines alone made up $19 billion of their total sales, with HIV medicines 
accounting for most of the rest (Gilead Sciences 2017). Investment analysts viewed Gilead’s 
hepatitis C launch in historic terms. In their 2014 first quarter call, one of biotech’s leading 
investors, Mark Schoenebaum, congratulated Gilead’s senior leadership on the “best launch of any 
drug of all time, that I’m aware of at least,” with a fellow analyst, Brian Skorney adding, “let me 
congratulate you and maybe even one-up Schoenebaum by saying I think this was actually the 
biggest single quarter for a pharmaceutical product in U.S. history” (S&P Capital IQ 2014). Wall 
Street valorization translated into major gains for Gilead’s shareholders, as they anticipated near-
term revenue growth in each subsequent quarter.  
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When Gilead bought Pharmasset in late November, 2011, their share price stood at 
$19/share. By June of 2015, Gilead’s price had leapt to $122 per share. Figure 5.7 captures the rise 
during this period, with the price increasing during 2012 and 2013 largely on the strength of the 
anticipated approval of sofosbuvir in late 2013, with actual sales and revenue growth driving the 
rise in 2014 and 2015. As highlighted in the prior chapter, Gilead’s senior executives, as significant 
shareholders themselves, were major winners from this share price escalation. This honeymoon, 
however, would be short-lived.   
Figure 5.9 Gilead’s share price, November 2011 to June 2015 
 
November 2011: $19/share  
June 2015: $122/share 
Source: Google Finance (GILD) 
 
Figure 5.10 Gilead’s hepatitis C (HCV) sales drive quarterly revenue growth  
 
Source: Gilead’s SEC filings  
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5.3.2 A patient cliff for hepatitis C  
 
Sofosbuvir-based treatments laid bare a clash between public health and the conditions of 
shareholder-driven growth: while providing universal treatment via a cure to reduce an infectious 
disease and end an epidemic would be the best public health outcome, a cure also meant that a 
finite number of patients would become smaller and smaller over time. In other words, sofosbuvir 
would lead not to a ‘patent cliff’, but a patient cliff: the elimination not only of a disease over time, 
but Gilead’s ‘market’ of patients for continued growth.  
This concern was demonstrated in Gilead’s conversations with Wall Street analysts from the 
time of their Pharmasset acquisition in 2011 and onwards from their launch in late 2013. On a call 
to announce Gilead’s acquisition of Pharmasset, Thomas Wei of Jeffries investment house 
inquired about the epidemiological modeling that allowed Gilead to arrive at an $11 billion price 
for Pharmasset, with John Milligan, Gilead’s COO, offering a reassurance (S&P Capital IQ 2011a:14-
15):  
 
Thomas Wei (Jeffries): “When you modeled the market to get this valuation, how 
did you deal with the shape of the sales curve here? Did you take the approach that 
there would be a bonus initially with big sales and then falling to steady-state like 
what you’ve said about prevalence and incidence? Or did you assume that sales 
could grow continuously over time?”  
 
John Milligan (COO, Gilead): “So many markets, certainly chronic markets, 
continue to grow over time. And this (hepatitis C) does have a different-shaped 
curve, but we see the curve being not as sharp as many have predicted, more flat 
and proceeding at a very high level of sales well into the late 2020s.” 
 
In this exchange, Milligan surmised that because of its limited growth potential, a curative 
therapy possessed limitations as opposed to one for a ‘chronic market’; yet he also reassured Wall 
Street that high sales would continue for the life of their patent protections over sofosbuvir-based 
treatments.  
When publicly financed health systems like the U.S. Medicaid program restricted access to 
the treatment later in 2014, investors openly wondered about the promise of triage for Gilead’s 
long-term growth potential. Michael Yee (2014:1), a leading investment analyst for the Canadian 
investment bank RBC Capital Markets, summed up this possibility in a note to his clients in May 
2014:  
 
“If payers prioritize or ration patients and limit use to only F3-4—would this be bad 
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because F3-4 is only 30% of the market? Our conversations with investors over the 
last week is peak revenues might be less near-term but long-term tail is much 
longer...so this is much more attractive...so if anyone including Medicaid starts to limit 
to only sicker patients, this wouldn't dramatically worry us and could be better long-
term.”   
 
Though treating patients in earlier stages over liver scarring (F0-F2 levels of fibrosis in the most 
common staging system) can reduce risks of disease progression and transmission, Medicaid 
restrictions could in turn lead to the disease spreading to a higher number of patients than a 
scenario of universal treatment (Canary et al. 2015). In the view of Yee and his fellow investment 
analysts, the “long-term tail” of revenues could prove much longer, and higher.  
As Gilead looked forward, the company estimated ~4 million people infected with 
hepatitis C in the US, with less than a 1/3rd of those diagnosed or treated (S&P Capital IQ 2014). 
This meant that growth would be driven by a steady flow of undiagnosed patients getting tested 
and diagnosed, and then diagnosed patients then getting treated. More than a year into Gilead’s 
launch, however, investment analysts wondered about the company’s projections on a February 
2015 earnings call (S&P Capital IQ 2015). Cory Kasimov of JP Morgan asked Gilead’s senior 
leadership, “Try to give us a little bit more comfort on how we can be thinking about this longer-
term evolution in the U.S.?” John Milligan, Gilead’s COO at the time, comforted, “our most recent 
data still suggests there's about 1.5 million patients diagnosed in America, which means that – and 
that was about 1.6 million when we launched (sofosbuvir). So that implies that there has been a 
refilling of that bucket, a replenishment, if you will.” By identifying the large number of patients 
still working through ‘buckets’ of undiagnosed to treated, Milligan aimed to demonstrate the 
available growth potential for Gilead’s hepatitis C medicines.  
Yet analysts on Wall Street had run their own epidemiological models of hepatitis C under 
different pricing, treatment, and competition scenarios. Figure 6.9 shows Bloomberg financial 
analysts’ prediction of three hepatitis C ‘market scenarios’ for Gilead (Nisen 2016). The scenarios 
shared one trend in common: a downward revenue trajectory. Gilead’s predicament came in part 
from the population level dynamics of hepatitis C that had been triggered by the launch of 
sofosbuvir-based medicines. Before 2013, a sizeable proportion of patients had delayed treatment 
for many years due to the toxicity and lower response rates of prior interferon-based therapies 
(Alberti et al. 2014).211 With Gilead’s treatment approved in late 2013, these patients-in-waiting 
																																																						
211 This phenomenon in which physicians recommended delayed treatment for their patients with hepatitis 
C in order to use better therapies that are anticipated to be approved in the near future is known as 
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turned up at higher numbers than the company originally estimated (United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015). The large numbers of sick patients eligible for treatment - even 
under restricted access guidelines - combined with the company’s launch pricing fueled a surge of 
revenue growth in 2014 and 2015. Yet the velocity of this growth appeared to be impossible to 
sustain with a curative therapy, and the Bloomberg sales curves – which also included consensus 
predictions from across Wall Street – captured this likelihood.  
By 2016, Gilead’s own sales reports and forward guidance from the company’s senior 
leadership to investment analysts began to confirm this forecast. With Gilead’s hepatitis C sales 
starting to plateau, analysts focused on the limitations of the company’s growth potential with 
these curative medicines (Crow 2015; Nisen 2017; Silverman 2016a). When Gilead ‘disappointed’ 
Wall Street analysts with second quarter sales in 2016 of $7.7 billion – viewed by financial markets 
as a 19% decline in sales compared to the same quarter in 2015 – the company’s share price fell by 
nearly 10% (Stynes 2016). Deutsche Bank analyst Gregg Gilbert noted, “while management pointed 
to increasing screening volumes and confirmed its prior estimate of about 1.5 million people in 
the US who are yet to be diagnosed, it also anticipates a gradual decline in new patient-starts 
going forward, especially in mature markets such as the US, Germany, and France.” These gloomy 
predictions, now shared by both Wall Street analysts and Gilead’s senior leadership, led to a 
progressive decline in Gilead’s share price (see Figure 5.10): from its peak of 122 per share in June 
of 2015, the price fell below ~70 per share by late January of 2017.  A trader Bret Jansen (2016) 
summed up Wall Street’s view of Gilead in late 2016:  
“Being a shareholder in biotech juggernaut Gilead Sciences over the past two 
years has been akin to being stuck in the classic ‘Waiting for Godot’ as one feels 
like he is waiting for some thing that will never happen. Despite seeing a ~600% 
increase in earnings from FY2013 through FY2015 driven by the blockbuster 
success of hepatitis C cures Sovaldi and Harvoni, the stock has gone nowhere as 
investors have worried that hepatitis C sales will continue to decline in the 
United States as the sickest patients have been treated and new competition will 
continue to emerge in this lucrative space.”  
 
Gilead’s rate of profitability – 55% in 2015 and 45% in 2016 – became insignificant under this 
calculus of shareholder-driven growth (Gilead Sciences 2017). Even with over $45 billion in 
revenue from hepatitis C sales, the diminishing prospects for near-term growth created a 
predicament for Gilead and its senior leadership. This predicament and Gilead’s response to it 
																																																						
‘warehousing’ (Alberti et al. 2014). Once the warehouses were unlocked with the approval of sofosbuvir, 
Gilead experienced unprecedented growth which it could not sustain.  
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demonstrate the mechanisms underpinning the reproduction of financialisation and their 
consequences for innovation.  
 
Figure 5.11 Bloomberg analyst forecast of Gilead’s hepatitis C revenue, 2015-2025  
 
 
Caption: Each forecast by Bloomberg showed a steady decline in sales. Of note, the figure under the lowest 
forecast (scenario 3), still shows a sales figure of $9.7 billion. But the direction of the sales trend, in this case 
showing the loss of revenue, pushed Gilead’s share price downward.  See Figure 5.14  
Source: Nisen (2016) 
 
Figure 5.12 Gilead’s hepatitis C sales plateau and decline, 2015Q3 – 2016Q4  
 
Source: Gilead’s 10-Q filings 
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Figure 5.13 Gilead’s share price, June 2015 to May 2017  
 
 
June 25, 2015: $122 per share 
May 9, 2017: $67 per share  
Source: Google Finances (GILD)   
 
5.3.3 Generating growth for shareholders: advertising campaigns, cycles of acquisitions 
and buybacks, and chronic therapies   
 
The shareholder-driven pressures for short-term growth created glaring questions for 
Gilead. In a January 2016 Financial Times piece titled, “Gilead risks becoming victim of its own 
success,” the company’s executive vice president Paul Carter worried, “There’s this sort of pressure 
now we are a $30 billion a year revenue company. People are asking where the next 8 or 10 percent 
of year on year growth is going to come from” (Crow 2016a). In other words, the greater the 
magnitude of growth for the company in the recent past, the larger the growth would need to be 
in the near future.212  
Gilead’s response demonstrates the ways in which the innovation process is configured by 
the relations of power between shareholders and business. I traced Gilead’s response to this 
pressure by drawing on media accounts, transcripts containing the statements of Gilead’s senior 
leadership such as earnings call meetings, and Gilead’s financial statements.  
																																																						
212 Carter’s concern reflects their basic arithmetic challenge: generating 8-10% growth on $30 billion revenue 
would push up the absolute amount ($2.4 billion to $3.0 billion) by which Gilead had to grow to meet 
expectations versus when it was a $10 billion dollar revenue company ($800 million to $1 billion in growth 
would suffice).  
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The evidence from these sources of data indicate that Gilead attempted to deploy three 
strategies (see Table 6.3): (1) maximizing its hepatitis C sales via a major marketing campaign, (2) 
a financial cycle of acquisitions, buybacks, and price increases213, and (3) a shifting focus towards 
developing its chronic therapy business (HIV/AIDS). These strategies all aimed at generating 
growth within a time frame that would increase their share price in the near-term. 
 
Table 5.3 Three strategies to generate growth in revenues and share price  
Strategy  Execution of strategy   Examples from Gilead  
Boost sales of 
existing 
products 
- Increase marketing and geographic 
reach 
- Increase prices of current medicines  
- >$100 million advertising campaign 
for hepatitis C to boost number of 
patients who are getting tested and 
treated early in the disease process 
- Price increases on HIV drugs 
Financial 
market 
maneuvers for 
acquisitions and 
buybacks   
- Stock pile cash and debt to 
capitalize on late-stage drug assets 
via the financial market  
- Use share buybacks and price 
increases to generate boost for share 
price, which can be used as leverage 
to raise debt for acquisitions or pay 
for further buybacks   
- Over $20 billion in cash stockpiled 
from sales 
- Price increases on HIV drugs 
- $15 billion of debt issued on open 
market 
- Gilead viewed in financial markets 
as likely ‘buyer’ in near future  
Chronic therapy 
clinical trials  
- Focus on late stage clinical trials for 
medicines that will require long-term 
patient use and extend patent 
protection for long time horizon 
- Late-stage clinical trials on already-
developed compound for HIV that 
will create new patent rights for 
Gilead into late 2030s in a ‘market’ 
that can continue to grow (unlike 
hepatitis C) 
 
 Marketing campaign to maximize hepatitis C sales  
 
One of Gilead’s strategies to boost growth involved getting more people in the US infected 
with hepatitis C to visit their doctors, get tested, and eventually use the sofosbuvir-based 
treatment. 214  Because hepatitis C is a chronic disease that unfolds over a long period of time, 
many people are either unaware of their infection or the fact that new curative medicines are now 
available without the toxicities that might have discouraged them from seeking treatment in the 
past (Harris 2009; Rhodes et al. 2013; Rosen 2011a). From Gilead’s view, this meant lost revenue 
and a chance to boost sales growth in the near-term by driving more patients to visit their 
doctors. Though a marketing campaign held the potential for providing a public health service by 
																																																						
213 I return to buybacks here in order to situate them as part of Gilead’s overall capital allocation and 
business strategies as well as their ineffectiveness (and value destroying consequences) in counteracting the 
financial market reaction to a curative therapy.  
214 US government policy allows for direct to consumer marketing of medicines.   
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raising awareness on the disease, Gilead’s strategy – drawn from a STAT Health investigation as 
well as the US Senate Finance committee report – exacerbated the uneven deployment of the 
medicine.  
Gilead developed their marketing approach to target those populations most likely to 
either have private health insurance through employment or Medicare (the health insurance 
system in the US for people over the age of 65), which as I highlighted in section 5.2, cannot 
negotiate drug pricing or restrict access (Robins 2016; United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015). Their aim was to remind people, typically at the earlier stages of disease, about the 
potential seriousness of hepatitis C (see Figure 5.15). To deploy this message, Gilead spent more 
than $100 million on a multi-pronged marketing campaign for hepatitis C between the spring of 
2015 and 2016, and which continues to run in 2017  (Robins 2016).  According to a STAT Health 
investigation that analyzed Gilead’s marketing campaign, the company ran more than 11,000 ads 
for their sofosbuvir-based regimens aired on multiple TV channels, from FOX to the Game Show 
Network. According to media research firms iSpot.tv and Kantar Media, Gilead’s spots during that 
time cost an estimated $60 to $80 million (Robins 2016). Alongside the TV ads, Gilead bought 
more than $30 million in magazine ads from People to Popular Mechanics, as well as $5 million in 
online ads (Robins 2016).  
Their leading advertisement as part of the campaign, titled “Hepatitis C and Baby 
Boomers” shows greying men and women in the foreground with statistics of a ‘forgotten virus’ in 
the backdrop. The ad aims to get all Baby Boomers215 tested for hepatitis C (by sharing that ‘1 in 30 
Baby Boomers have hepatitis C’) and that those are diagnosed be cured using their treatments. 
The money and strategy delivered on Gilead’s intended marketing outcome (see Figure 5.15) – 
“ask their doctor about new treatment for HCV” (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 
2015:1299). As part of an interview to STAT Health, a leading hepatologist, Dr. Douglas Dieterich 
of Mt Sinai, explained, “patients have Harvoni on the mind because of these TV commercials,” 
adding, “we’re battling their successful direct-to-consumer advertising” (Robins 2016). In order to 
sustain and expand their position in the innovation process – as an acquisition specialist capable 
of continuous growth – Gilead translated their accumulation of capital into marketing influence. 
Notably, this marketing influence was aimed at the most lucrative market – older patients with 
																																																						
215 Baby Boomers refers to the demographic group born in the US during the post-World War II era between 
the years 1946 and 1964. The term is culturally typically linked to the wealth and privilege of the generation,  
growing up in the post-War boom.  
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private insurance or Medicare. Gilead’s marketing approach to Baby Boomer populations, 
however, contrasted sharply with the rationing approach employed in Medicaid and the US 
prison system – the populations precisely most at-risk for untreated disease progression and 
transmission (Beckman et al. 2016; Loftus and Fields 2016).216  
Though Gilead’s marketing enabled the company to continue to generate higher sales for 
hepatitis C than otherwise would have been possible, their efforts in hepatitis C alone would not 
provide the magnitude of growth necessary to meet the expectations of shareholders. Addressing 
this challenge would require an entirely new source of revenue. 
 
Figure 5.14 Gilead marketing aimed at Baby Boomer patients  
 
Caption: Internal Gilead document depicting their marketing strategy and aims for sofosbuvir-based 
treatments. Their focus was to remind Baby Boomer populations “about the seriousness of their condition, 
even though they have no symptoms”.  
Source: United States Senate, Committee on Finance (United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015)  
 
A focus on acquisitions and buybacks   
 
Though the marketing campaign aimed to boost Gilead’s hepatitis C sales, the overall 
trajectory of growth – the 8-10% expectation noted earlier by Paul Carter, Gilead’s Executive Vice 
President – would require a new product and its associated stream of revenues. Phil Nadeau, an 
investment analyst at Cowen, summed up Gilead’s dilemma:  
																																																						
216 Gilead noted in a 2013 market strategy that the Departments of Corrections “may not be a Gilead target” 
(United States Senate, Committee on Finance 2015:1265), and subsequently did not pursue any contracts 
with prison systems; care in US correctional system is largely on an ad-hoc basis (Loftus and Fields 2016). 
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“We suspect that for Gilead’s stock to become a top performer, management must 
change the conversation among investors from ‘how quickly will hepatitis C 
decline, and how soon?” to ‘How much can product X grow Gilead’s revenue?’ 
Such a turnaround of sentiment is difficult for any biopharmaceutical company, 
and even more so for one with $30 billion in product sales” (Silverman 2016a).  
Not only would Gilead need a new product, but one that could deliver significant growth 
on top of Gilead’s recent escalation. One obvious possibility for finding a ‘product X’ could have 
been in plain slight: Gilead’s own innovation pipeline.  
Yet Gilead’s internal pipeline lacked value in the eyes of Wall Street217, with Brian Skorney 
of RW Baird seeing “few opportunities for such growth in the company’s existing pipeline as is” in 
a note after Gilead’s earnings call in early February 2016 (Silverman 2016a). Piper Jaffray’s Joshua 
Schimmer went further, expressing his frustration that Gilead “has not impressed us with its 
development capabilities beyond HIV and hepatitis C”. He went on, “we have little enthusiasm for 
most of what we consider to be a highly speculative pipeline and nowhere close to the level we 
would expect from such an important and sizeable company…There is not a single program which 
we even find worth highlighting (Silverman 2016a).”218 As described in chapter 5, Gilead’s 
investments in research and development had paled in comparison to its revenues, and their 
internal pipeline reflected this under-investment. Growth, in other words, appeared less likely to 
come from Gilead’s own research and development. Gilead would instead turn towards a familiar 
financial cycle translating its position as an accumulation center in the innovation process to 
pursue potential acquisitions while also directing capital to shareholders via buybacks and 
dividends.219  
Acquisitions remained Gilead’s as well as Wall Street’s favored vehicle for achieving new 
revenue growth to sustain this financial cycle. When the Financial Times caught up for an 
interview with Norbert Bischofberger the company’s head research and development official in 
																																																						
217 I drew these investor notes from a report in STAT Health, see Silverman (2016a), which corroborated my 
reading of earnings call transcripts, reports from other investment analysts, and other media accounts.  
218 This evaluation may be a product of investment analysts’ difficulty in valuing any early-stage compounds, 
thereby pushing companies to focus on late-stage compounds and acquisitions (and thereby creating a self-
fulfilling process, with dry pipelines). In Birch’s (2016) interviews with biotechnology executives, one 
executive shares this possibility: “The focus has shifted more towards how close are we to profitability? So 
it’s sustainable profits is like a key focus rather than delivering value from the pipeline because investors 
don’t value sort of R&D projects that are pre-phase three essentially. And so it’s all about kind of keeping 
costs under control, maximizing the revenue we can generate from our lead assets, acquiring companies 
that have got royalty streams that bring in royalties on drugs that have already been launched.”   
219 I detailed Gilead’s focus on acquisitions and buybacks in a letter to the BMJ written with Dr. Lawrence 
King. See Roy and King (2016).  
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December of 2015, he did not focus on the company’s internal research and development 
prospects, but rather the company’s strategy towards acquisitions (Crow 2015).In a piece titled, 
“Cash rich Gilead hits the acquisition trail”, Bischofberger recounts their approach to Pharmasset 
as an ideal model moving forward: “Philosophically, we prefer to wait for more certainty and pay 
more money, which is what we did with Pharmasset, rather than getting something cheap with 
uncertainty” (Crow 2015). This acquisition strategy required capital, which Gilead would draw 
from two sources: cash and debt.  
When asked what the company was going to “do with all its money”, Bischofberger 
continued, “Well, we have our eye on the external world—we have incredible cash flows and we 
are looking for opportunities” (Crow 2015). Indeed, Gilead had accumulated over $20 billion in 
cash by early 2016 (it had $32.4 billion by the end of 2016), much of it on the winds of hepatitis C 
sales (Crow 2015; Nisen 2017).220 In order to finance an acquisition, however, Gilead also raised 
debt – not from banks, but through selling ‘corporate notes’ (essentially IOUs) on the open 
market (Glabau 2016a; Roy, Hawksbee, and King 2016b).221 This debt would enable the company 
flexibility to direct capital towards a potential large-scale acquisition or further share buybacks. 
Gilead had used this strategy previously with its acquisition of Pharmasset in 2011, which relied on 
leveraging its significant cash from HIV sales – which had in turn depended on annualized price 
increases.222 Annualized price increases in the US market, a common practice by pharmaceutical 
companies, thus are a lever not only for generating growth, but also with using the accumulated 
cash (and potentially increasing share price) as leverage in raising debt capital for buybacks and 
																																																						
220 As of their Q3 2016 financial statement, Gilead had $25.2 billion of their cash in accounts outside the 
United States in order to avoid paying US corporate tax (Nisen 2017).  
221 Though Gilead did not have to use any of its assets as collateral in order to borrow through the issuance 
of what are called ‘unsecured senior notes’, it’s ‘A’ credit rating by rating agency Moody’s – due to its past 
performance, debt payments, and stockpiles of cash – allowed them to issue these notes at favorable 
interest rates (~3%). Raising debt by going directly to lenders through corporate note issuances, rather than 
through banks for loans, is an example of the kind of financial dis-intermediation (removing banks as 
mediators between lending and borrowing) that is explored in other works, such as Krippner’s work on 
financialization (Krippner 2005; 2011). I point to this dynamic here to show the ways in which Gilead’s 
capital allocation strategy aimed less at tangible investments in research but rather financial maneuvers 
aimed at buttressing their position for potential acquisitions and buybacks.  
222 Between 2006 and 2011, Gilead had increased the prices of its HIV medicines from $13,800 per year to 
$25,874 per year (Fair Pricing Coalition 2015). Gilead continued this practice over this period and into 2016, 
when it raised the price of its hypertension drug Letairis and its HIV regimens Complera and Stribld by 7 
percent each in July 2016, coming off 5 and 7 percent increases on those two drugs in January of 2016 
(Silverman 2016c). The prices of Gilead’s HIV regimens now exceed $30,000 per year. Combined with free 
cash flows from hepatitis C revenue, this revenue was used to pay for buybacks and stockpiled for a 
potential acquisition.  
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acquisitions (Glabau 2016a; Roy, Hawksbee, and King 2016b). Between 2015 and 2016, Gilead 
followed the strategy they had used prior to Pharmasset, leveraging their accumulated cash to 
raise $15 billion in debt on the open markets (Palmer 2016; Terry 2015). 
These moves positioned Gilead for a major acquisition. Leading biotechnology analyst 
Mark Schoenbaum probed Gilead’s senior leadership in an earnings call (Seeking Alpha 2016a): 
“The biggest question on everyone's mind for Gilead is, "Who are you going to buy? Who are you 
going to buy? Who are you going to buy? Who are you going to buy?" Every day this is what we 
talk about in investment circles.” Since Gilead’s acquisition of Pharmasset, the company has not 
made a ‘transformative deal’ on that scale. A series of smaller acquisitions had yet to yield a 
product with major growth potential, with Figure 5.16 from a Bloomberg piece representing the 
financial sector’s dim view of Gilead (Chen 2016). Though the company’s senior leadership 
continued to scan the market of pharmaceutical assets into 2017 to find their next Pharmasset, 
they would not have an answer for Schoenbaum.223  
Figure 5.15  Bloomberg analyst perception of Gilead’s need for acquisitions  
 
Caption: The title of the slide sums up traders’ preferred strategy for Gilead to generate growth via its 
pipeline: re-stock it by looking outside the company. Source: Chen (2016) 
 
While speculation about Gilead’s acquisition possibilities continues at the time of my 
submission, Gilead’s senior leadership pointed investors towards the other component of their 
financial strategy: directing capital towards shareholders. Bischofberger shared the company’s 
thinking on an earnings call in 2016:  
 
																																																						
223 Some industry and investment analysts wondered whether the company needed a change in 
management, or even could get bought out by a larger competitor due to its falling market capitalization 
(Budwell 2016; Williams 2016).  
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“If you look back at the last six years, it has been remarkable. We have done many, 
many deals – CGI, Arresto, Calistoga, Pharmasset, Galapagos224 – and yet, we were 
able to return 70% out of free cash flow to shareholders. So I think that is a good 
way to think about the future, to in-license through collaborative efforts while at 
the same time returning money to shareholders” (Seeking Alpha 2016a).   
 
Indeed, as I documented in the prior chapter, Gilead announced a series of major share buybacks 
with their new hepatitis C revenue. In just the first six months of 2016, for example, Gilead bought 
back $9 billion in its own shares, about three times their entire research and development budget 
for the year (Gilead Sciences 2017).  Robin Washington, Gilead’s Chief Financial Officer, 
communicated the company’s rationale:  
 
“We have purposely focused on share repurchases because in the absence of M&A it 
allows us to be flexible and more opportunistic. But when the right M&A 
opportunities present themselves, it allows us to reduce our share repurchases in 
order to make those necessary acquisitions and leverage our cash and debt and 
borrowing if we need to” (Seeking Alpha 2016b). 
 
Washington here focuses on buybacks as a form of flexibility in Gilead’s strategy towards 
shareholders; where dividends create expectations among shareholders for a return at regular 
intervals, buybacks aimed to boost Gilead’s share price in the near term while also keeping capital 
– cash and debt – available for a future acquisition.  
But as I have chronicled in this chapter, Gilead’s share price has fallen despite this 
significant share buyback program; the failure to generate near-term growth with a curative 
therapy led the company to lose $41 billion in market capitalization between mid-2015 and end of 
2016 – which buybacks, with their transient, short-term effects could do little to affect (Budwell 
2016). As Table 5.4 below shows, Gilead used $23 billion in capital – a mix of its cash and debt – to 
purchase its own shares. Yet as the average share prices indicate, the buybacks had little effect in 
redressing their decline. Seen with this context, the share buyback program destroyed value – both 
by limiting reinvestments back into research and development and also failing even to boost the 
																																																						
224 CGI, Arresto, Calistoga, and Galapagos all were smaller acquisitions by Gilead (Rangan and Lee 2009).  
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company’s share price for its shareholders (Nisen 2017).225 
Table 5.4 Gilead’s share buybacks and average share price after sofosbuvir launch 
Share buyback program  
(by month of announcement) 
Total dollar amount of shares 
purchased 
Average purchase 
price  
May 2014 program $5 billion $102.36 
January 2015 program $10 billion $100.85 
January Q1/Q2 accelerated program $5 billion $92.09 
January 2016 program $3 billion $84.11 
TOTAL AMOUNT $23 billion  
Caption: Companies typically announce a share buyback program with a given amount and then report the 
average purchase price of the actual shares later purchased through that program. Here, Gilead’s share price 
fell even as they bought back billions in their own stock.  
Source: Gilead’s 2016Q4 earnings slides 
 
In sum, these strategies formed a kind of ‘financial toolkit’ (see Figure 5.17), via which the 
company aimed to leverage cash and debt towards an acquisition while also directing the majority 
of its capital towards buybacks and dividends in the attempt to ‘increase shareholder value’ (see 
Figure 5.17 for a visual flowchart of this strategy). John Milligan, now the CEO, synthesized the 
toolkit on an earnings call, “For us it's fairly simple. We have the flexibility to do both things; that 
is, return shareholder value through stock repurchases and dividends and of course continue to 
be opportunistic in M&A” (Seeking Alpha 2016c). In attempting to generate growth for 
shareholders, reinvestments within the business thus remained at the margins of their capital 
allocation strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
225 A Bloomberg reporter Max Nisen (2017) described this buyback strategy as a “more efficient way to 
destroy value than an acquisition, with none of the upside”, in a piece entitled, “Gilead Mismanaged its 
Gold Mine”.  
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Figure 5.16 Gilead’s capital allocation strategy: a focus on buybacks and acquisitions  
 
Caption: This diagram follows Gilead’s capital allocation strategy, which focuses on using revenue 
from health systems (A) combined with leveraged debt (F) for buybacks and dividends (B) and 
acquisitions (C), with a fraction going towards clinical trials (E - often on acquired late stage 
assets, like Pharmasset’s PSI-7977) and payments (D) to workers, contractors, and government.  
 
A shifting focus from curative to chronic ‘innovation’  
 
As Gilead directed returns to shareholders and waited for potential acquisitions, they also 
turned to a focus on ways to generate growth within the company that could begin in the near-
term and also sustain into the long-term. Investment analysts too wondered how Gilead could 
deliver this growth. An exchange at Morgan Stanley’s annual health care conference in September 
of 2016 between an analyst and Gilead’s CEO, John Milligan, reveals Gilead’s approach (Seeking 
Alpha 2016c):  
Matthew Harrison (Morgan Stanley): “It feels like the default investor view point 
is that Gilead has to be a growth company. So do you think that’s reasonable, do 
you think that’s accurate?”  
 
John Milligan (CEO, Gilead): “We (Gilead) had an unprecedented rate of growth 
through 2015, essentially tripling revenue in three years. That’s a very challenging 
thing to grow off of. […] So that (hepatitis C) doesn’t lead to the continuous 
growth that you would want. Still great economically, still great in cash flow and 
will be a very important product category for us for the next decade or beyond. 
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But I separated (hepatitis C and HIV) at the beginning for a reason. If you look at 
where we can focus and what we can do, it’s really off that base HIV business. I 
think what’d like to see is that business continue to grow and really ultimately 
eclipse the HCV business through new products and growth out of our pipeline, 
which we certainly have the potential to do in the coming decade.”  
 
In this response, Milligan outlined Gilead’s predicament of near-term shareholder-driven growth, 
and the resulting direction for the company with regards to future innovation. As Milligan 
reminded us, the growth predicament is two-fold. First, growing off growth is itself a challenge. 
Second, a curative therapy “doesn’t lead to the continuous growth that you would want”. Both the 
magnitude and velocity of growth expected by shareholders posed a threat to Gilead. To address 
this threat, Milligan shifted the attention of the audience to where Gilead had placed its near-
term hopes: “if you look at where we can focus and what we can do, it’s really off that base HIV 
business”. Why is this the case? As I documented in the prior chapter, Gilead’s HIV medicines are 
not a curative therapy; rather, patients with HIV must take them as a lifelong treatment. This 
allows these assets to not only endure through out the entire course of Gilead’s intellectual 
property rights, but also can be used in a growing number of patients, as the main ‘loss’ is not due 
to cure but due to an eventual death.226 This financial imperative shaped Gilead’s approach to 
innovation with the company – rather than use the money for hepatitis C internally to pursue a 
curative treatment for HIV, Gilead maneuvered to make incremental improvements in HIV 
medicines by extending patent protection over a potential ‘growth market asset’.  
Gilead’s intellectual property protection for one of their two backbone HIV compounds, 
tenofovir disoproxil fumurate (TDF), was set to expire in 2017 (Gilead Sciences 2012). This would 
expose their two main HIV/AIDS regimens, Complera and Stribild, to generic competition, since 
both contained TDF. This patent expiry threatened approximately $11 billion in revenue (Gilead 
Sciences 2012). To counter this expiration, Gilead pursued approval of a “new” HIV compound 
with incremental but clinically significant improvements, tenofovir alafenemide fumerate (TAF) 
(Petersen 2016a). While the original TDF therapies were accompanied by significant side effects 
such as kidney dysfunction and bone loss in some patient populations, the new TAF therapies 
																																																						
226 This focus on HIV returns Gilead in some ways to its pre-2011, pre-Pharmasset acquisition period, in 
which growth from HIV had stagnated and had produced an earlier period of crisis. The difference now is 
that the company hopes that with new combinations, HIV regimens can produce steady growth (Silverman 
2016a). Gilead’s share price has continued to fall even with this strategy as shareholders and financial 
markets anticipate that this growth will fall short of the expected 8-10% clip, without a major acquisition or 
new product line.  
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showed reduced side effects with a smaller dosage based on a minor change in chemistry (Wang 
et al. 2016). This clinical improvement was used to justify approval in 2015 from the FDA (FDA 
2015). Critically for Gilead’s future growth, the intellectual property rights for their new HIV 
regimens (Odefsey and Genvoya, both containing TAF) will last well into the late 2020s and early 
2030s (Petersen 2016a). For example, the compounds in Genvoya are protected by multiple 
patents, the last of which is set to expire in 2032. Odefsey is priced at $2,346 and Genovya is priced 
at $2,578 per month in the US, amounting to approximately $30,000 in annual costs for a 
medicine that is required over the remainder of a patient’s life (Silverman 2016c). If a patient lives 
fifteen years (the length of the patent) on these medicines, Gilead will accrue $450,000 per 
patient, and more if the company follows prior practices (described earlier in this section) and 
raises prices over time.  
The story behind this “innovation” has drawn public scrutiny, serving as the center of a 
lawsuit in which patient groups have alleged that Gilead actually had the data on their new 
compound – TAF – over a decade ago, but deliberately delayed further clinical trials on TAF for 
several years in order to extend intellectual property protection for as long as possible (Petersen 
2016b; Silverman 2016b). Legal filings show that Gilead scientists had, as early as 2001, published 
findings for a less toxic formulation of tenofovir than the TDF version, and even performed a small 
trial with 30 patients demonstrating this result in 2002 (Petersen 2016b). Yet the results for the 
small trial were not published until 2014, and Gilead’s leadership halted further study on the 
compound until 2010 (Petersen 2016b). As trials were initiated with TAF after 2010 and accelerated 
in 2014-2016 (in part through their new hepatitis C revenues), Milligan reported to analysts that 
the new alternative could add “a great deal of longevity” to their HIV business, and replace the 
lost sales from patent expirations (Petersen 2016b). Figure 6.9 demonstrates the longevity and 
growth gained through the advent of their TAF-based therapies.  
Thus, as Gilead accrued significant hepatitis C sales in 2014 and 2015, their internal 
organization was not directed at further innovation. Rather, Gilead’s strategy with HIV 
demonstrates the dynamics of shareholder-dominated growth: rather than directing funding 
towards a curative therapy for a disease such as HIV/AIDS that affects millions of patients 
globally, Gilead instead focused on extending their hold over a ‘chronic market’, while continuing 
to distribute significant revenue to shareholders and stockpiling cash for a potential acquisition.  
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Table 5.5 Comparing TDF (old) vs. TAF (new), Gilead’s backbone HIV compounds 
Backbone 
compound 
Key feature  Main 
Combinations  
Patent 
expirations 
Revenue 
implication 
TDF 
(tenofovir 
diproxil 
fumurate)  
 
Gilead’s old 
backbone 
-Approved in 2001 by 
FDA 
- Significant 
improvements in HIV 
outcomes when used in 
combination, but leads 
to side effects (kidney 
dysfunction and bone 
loss).   
 
Contained in 
Atripla and 
Truvada; also sold 
alone as Viread  
- 2017 in EU for 
Atripla,  Truvada, 
and Viread; 2021 
in U.S. for Atripla 
and Truvada, 2018 
for Viread 
TOTAL sales 
in 2015 for 
TDF 
regimens:  
 
$11 billion, 
accounting for 
32% of all 
revenue 
TAF 
(tenofovir 
alafenimide 
fumurate)  
 
Gilead’s new 
backbone 
-Approved in 2016 
-Less dosage required 
leading to fewer side 
effects 
-Disputed clinical 
development; lawsuit 
alleges that Gilead held 
onto the compound 
since 2001 in order to 
use the TDF and TAF 
compounds 
sequentially to extend 
HIV market dominance 
Contained in new 
Genvoya 
combination 
(main 
combination 
used) 
 
Also in Odefsey 
and Descovy  
-2032 in US for 
Genvoya 
- 2028 in EU for 
Genvoya 
Just approved 
in 2016; 
expected to 
generate 
significant 
long-term 
revenue; see 
graph below  
Source: Gilead’s 10K filings  
 
 
Figure 5.17 Gilead’s expected growth from new HIV backbone 
 
Source: Petersen’s (2016b) report in the LA Times  
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In this section, I chronicled the conundrum of a cure for realizing the growth that Gilead’s 
shareholders expect. Sliding downward to a patient cliff, Gilead’s share price declined in parallel 
between its peak of 122 per share in June of 2015 to less than 70 by May 2017. As Gilead’s revenues 
from hepatitis C plateaued and began to decline compared to the year before, the company turned 
to a three-fold set of strategies to attempt to generate growth. First, I described Gilead’s 
marketing campaign aimed at patients with private insurance or Medicare, the public program 
barred from negotiating prices or restricting access. Second, with no late-stage internal 
compounds promising new revenue, Gilead accumulated capital in the pursuit of an acquisition 
(along with leveraging debt) and distributed capital to shareholders through buybacks and 
dividends. Finally, I show how Gilead focused their attention on building their “base business” – 
therapies for HIV patients that would be required for a lifetime. Rather than directing revenue 
towards early-stage research for a HIV cure, the company performed late-stage clinical trials to 
extend their dominance over a “chronic market” which could deliver continuous growth.  
5.4: Waiting on Value: a summary  
 
In this final deployment phase of the innovation process, with an approved medicine 
ready to be priced and delivered across health systems, I illustrated the ways in which the 
mechanisms underpinning financialization shaped Gilead’s pricing, the capability of state health 
systems to deliver optimal patient and public health outcomes, and finally Gilead’s business 
strategy in the face of recurring crises of growth.  
In the first part, I described Gilead’s approach to pricing sofosbuvir-based treatments as a 
culmination of the pricing escalator which had in part fueled the mobilization of speculative 
capital behind Pharmasset, including Gilead’s prior $11.2 billion bet. The price of the existing 
standard of care at the time served as a reference ‘base-line’, with the company using surveys and 
interviews to estimate the upward limits of what health systems would be willing to pay for 
improved therapeutic outcomes. These considerations, along with evaluating the position of 
potential competitors, guided Gilead to a price of $84,000 for their first wave of sofosbuvir-based 
regimens, and $94,500 for their second wave.  
This pricing dynamic created a crisis for the state, however, which I traced in the second 
part of the chapter. I showed that public health systems responded to the price by allocating 
significant budgets to treat only a small fraction of patients with hepatitis C, instituted access 
restrictions to contain costs, and deferred public health planning to eliminate the virus at a 
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population-level. The health delivery state, in this case, turned into a triage state, treating only 
the sickest patients to avoid the opportunity costs of health and social spending in other areas. 
Though Gilead’s prices represented a ‘value-based price’ via conventional health economics 
measures of cost-effectiveness and averted downstream medical expense, I illustrated the pitfalls 
of these ‘value’ studies as well as the limited negotiating power of the state vis a vis Gilead with 
regards to drug pricing.  
Finally, I observed how financial markets and Gilead’s shareholders reacted to a curative 
market and thereby reinforced the extractive strategies employed in the innovation process. The 
dynamics of a cure market underlined the influence of financialization – even with annual rates of 
profitability exceeding 45% in the three years after the launch of sofosbuvir-based medicines, 
Gilead’s market capitalization – as measured by its share price – fell in half by the beginning of 
2017 from its peak in 2015. A curative therapy eliminated the very possibility of growth on which 
its value as an asset in financial markets depended. To transcend this shareholder-driven 
expectation of growth, the company directed its capital towards marketing campaigns, potential 
acquisitions and buybacks, and a focus on incremental advances for a chronic market.  
With this account of the innovation process now complete, from the early stages of 
research beginning in the 1960s (chapter 3), onwards into the clinical development phase in the 
2000s (chapter 4), into the deployment era of sofosbuvir-based medicines (2013-present), I now 
turn to synthesizing the key descriptive and evaluative claims in the dissertation that answer the 
two research questions I posed.
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Chapter 6. Diagnosing Financialization in Sofosbuvir  
Etiology, Outcomes, Justifications, Futures 
 
To change the world, one has to change the ways of world-making, that is, the vision of the 
world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced. 
- Pierre Bourdieu (1989: 23) in Social Space and Symbolic Capital  
 
Over the past three chapters, I followed the organizational and political-economic 
dynamics in the innovation process behind sofosbuvir. This representation of the innovation 
process now provides the opportunity I take up in this chapter: to build an analytical synthesis 
that answers both research questions and can be used to understand the limits of the competing 
economic answers considered in chapter 1.227 In answering my first question, I argue that the 
prices of sofosbuvir did not represent the tangible costs of innovation or embodied health 
improvements for patients, but rather were a product of financialization: a pattern of 
accumulation in which growth was pursued through the capitalization and control over intangible 
assets in financial markets. In section 6.1, I dissect the etiology228 of financialization in the case of 
sofosbuvir by tracing the specific organizational relations of power and political-economic 
dynamics that can explain its price.  
In answering my second evaluative question in section 6.2, I argue that while 
entrepreneurial investment from the state shaped the direction of the innovation process towards a 
cure, the processes of financialization disconnected the distribution of risks and rewards, 
undermined the sustainability of the innovation process, and diminished patient and public health 
outcomes. In answering both questions, I illustrated that the innovation process and its outcomes 
were a product of dynamic power relations at stake between multiple state, business, and 
financial actors in a politically and historically contingent context.  
In section 6.3, I revisit the competing economic rationales of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ presented in 
chapter 1 and demonstrate their limitations in explaining sofosbuvir’s prices in light of the 
																																																						
227 As a reminder, I posed two research questions in chapter 1. My first research question aimed at a 
descriptive understanding: how do the organizational and political-economy dynamics in an unfolding 
innovation process explain the pricing of sofosbuvir-based medicines for hepatitis C? The second research 
question sought to evaluate the process and its distributive outcomes: how were the risks and rewards of 
sofosbuvir’s development distributed across its innovation process, and what were the outcomes for the 
direction and sustainability of the innovation as well as for patients and public health? 
228 Oxford English Dictionary (2017) defines etiology as the cause, set of causes, or manner of causation of a 
disease or condition which is a subject of investigation.  
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evidence I have laid forth. I also illuminate the ways in which these claims are used in the 
innovation process as justifications of pricing that in turn aim to naturalize a given distribution of 
capital. A fourth section highlights the key contributions this dissertation makes and also 
identifies the limitations of the study, while translating each limitation into potential directions 
for future inquiry. I conclude with a brief post-script, reflecting on the broader questions and 
hopes that my investigation provoked. 
6.1 The etiology of financialization in biomedical innovation and drug 
pricing 
What follows is a synthesis of the answer to my first research question, which aims at a 
descriptive understanding of the organizational and political-economic dynamics of the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir and its pricing. In tracing the innovation process as it 
unfolded, I argue that the prices of sofosbuvir were a product of financialization, a pattern of 
accumulation in which growth was pursued from the capitalization and control of intangible assets 
in financial markets. This description helps us understand sofosbuvir’s price in the context of 
three empirical puzzles that emerged from my recounting of the innovation process.  
• The first puzzle: how did Pharmasset, a company with no approved products or sales and 
an accumulated deficit of $330 million over its 12-year existence, raise approximately $100 
million through venture capital and an IPO?  
• The second puzzle: why did Gilead, with over $8 billion in sales in 2011, bet $11 billion for 
Pharmasset’s sofosbuvir compound – and then direct the large majority of its eventual 
revenues from sofosbuvir to shareholders and a stockpile of cash? 
• A third puzzle: why did Gilead’s market capitalization (total share value) halve from its 
peak after nearly doubling its rate of profitability and accumulating $30 billion in cash on 
the strength of their sofosbuvir earnings?  
In each of these puzzles, different financial actors capitalized the anticipated earnings from 
hepatitis C assets (on the promise that downstream financial actors and health systems would 
‘value’ sofosbuvir and its precursor, PSI-6130 at increasing prices) and gained control over them 
(either through share ownership, trading, or acquisition) in order to accumulate capital and 
generate near-term growth.229 This analysis of financialization, which I develop further below, 
																																																						
229 I used Veblen’s work to define and conceptualize ‘intangible assets’ as well as capitalization in section 
1.3.3. I traced these concepts in greater depth in chapter 4. 
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resolves each of the three puzzles – and situates sofosbuvir’s prices as a product of this pattern of 
accumulation. This pattern was in turn constituted by three dynamics, summarized in Table 6.1: 
(1) the mobilization of speculative capitals with the anticipation of rising prices and valuations for 
intangible hepatitis C assets in trading markets, (2) extraction driven by Gilead’s shareholder 
control over growth expectations and distributions of capital, and (3) and governance of 
intangible assets and financial capital by a multi-valent state. My diagnosis of financialization 
stands in contrast to the dominant explanations of sofosbuvir’s prices: the prices of sofosbuvir did 
not represent the tangible costs of innovation, nor did they represent the embodied 
improvements in health experienced by patients and populations. I first describe my diagnosis 
through the dynamics that underpin it before returning later to the existing answers on drug 
prices.230  
Table 6.1 The three dynamics constituting financialization of sofosbuvir   
Dynamic  Key features  
Mobilization of 
speculative 
capitals on 
anticipation of 
rising 
valuations in 
trading 
markets 
1. Speculative capitals set in motion by existence of downstream financial markets  
2. Anticipation of rising prices and valuations for hepatitis C assets in these markets 
(capitalization) provided investors and traders to make capital gains.  
3. Capitals entered for periods far shorter than the multiple stages and years required for 
drug development (compressed ‘risk-reward loop’).  
4. Almost completely reliant on external financial markets, Pharmasset positioned as a 
bundle of assets (a single asset, in this case) ready to be sold, rather than a durable 
business.  
Extraction 
driven by 
shareholder 
control  
1. Shareholder control exposed Gilead to a structural crisis, driven by expectations of growth 
and disinvestment in innovation (i.e. distributions of capital to shareholders).  
2. To respond to this structural crisis, Gilead mobilized accumulated capital to specialize in 
acquisitions – in this case of a late-stage asset, sofosbuvir - on the basis of charging patent-
protected ‘value-based’ prices in the future. 
3. This reinforced Gilead’s position as an accumulation center – using its sofosbuvir-based 
revenues to stockpile cash for potential acquisition and distributed earnings to 
shareholders.  
4. A ‘cure market’ eliminated the very growth prospects on which sofosbuvir’s value as an 
asset depended, intensifying Gilead’s turn towards incremental improvements in a ‘chronic 
market’ to generate growth.    
Governance of 
intangible 
assets and 
financial 
capital by 
multi-valent 
state  
1. Legislation permitted conversion of public knowledge into private, intangible assets (Bayh-
Dole Act) that enabled sofosbuvir to be an object of speculation in financial markets. 
2. Enabled emergence of speculative capitals through rule changes, beginning most 
prominently venture capital financing with Department of Labor ‘prudent man’ rule 
change in 1979  
3. Sanctioned the distribution of capital from firms to shareholders through the 
promulgation of SEC rule 10-b-18 in 1982  
4. Limited exercise of countervailing power on drug pricing by state has indirectly supported 
the reproduction of speculative and extraction strategies described in the first two 
dynamics highlighted above.  
																																																						
230 Appendix E contains a series of diagrams that depict parts of this innovation process, with the final 
diagram (the last page in the dissertation) attempting to illustrate the overall flows of capital, funding, and 
knowledge across the innovation process.  
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6.1.1. Mobilization of speculative capitals  
Speculative capitals, coming in various forms from venture capital to institutional 
shareholders, mobilized behind Pharmasset on the promise of rising prices for better treatments 
(pricing escalator). In this process, patents (securing knowledge into intangible assets) drew in a 
chain of speculative financial actors pursuing the possibility of a significant reward by exiting long 
before the approval of any medicine, thereby passing off further risk to later investors and traders. 
Four key features of these speculative capitals are relevant to understanding sofosbuvir’s price: (1) 
their position in the innovation process, (2) the pricing and valuation logics driving them, (3) the 
expectation and time horizon of rewards, and (4) their consequences for the destination of 
Pharmasset.   
First, these speculative capitals were ‘doubly’ set in motion by an entrepreneurial state and 
by the existence of downstream financial markets (both acquisition markets and stock markets) 
that could value intangible assets. On the one hand, venture capital mobilized based on the 
technological opportunity created by an entrepreneurial state, with the development of the 
replicon and the advance of nucleoside science.231 Yet on the other hand, this speculative capital 
for Pharmasset - which came in multiple forms, from venture capital, corporate capital (Roche’s 
partnership), and public equity (i.e. initial public offering) – was lured not on the revenues from a 
new product, but more on the potential for financial markets to value intangible assets through 
future capitalization, share trading, and acquisitions.232 For venture capitalists, the presence of 
incumbent firms who might acquire Pharmasset as well as a stock market via which Pharmasset 
could become capitalized as a publicly traded company presented an opportunity to make a gain 
far before the uncertain fate of any particular pharmaceutical assets (Evnin 2014; Robbins-Roth 
2001).233 Finally, institutional shareholders in the IPO and later equity traders bet on Pharmasset 
based largely on the potential for gains on near-term changes in share price on the NASDAQ 
stock market (Birch 2016).234  
																																																						
231 I elaborate on the role of entrepreneurial state in 6.1.3 as well as in 6.2.  
232 In interrogating the ‘Pisano puzzle’ – referring to Gary Pisano’s observation of a biotechnology sector 
that continued to attract capital in the absence of approved products and sales – Lazonick and Tulum 
mirror my analysis, positioning companies Pharmasset between an entrepreneurial state and financial 
markets (Lazonick and Tulum n.d.; Pisano 2006). 
233 Even in Roche’s partnership with Pharmasset, which did have the aim of taking PSI-6130 towards later 
stage clinical trials and regulatory approval, Roche exercised an ownership stake in Pharmasset as a way of 
mitigating their risk. 
234 The emergence of these speculative capitals, such as venture financing, is linked to regulatory and 
political-legal shifts in the US State. For example, the Bayh-Dole Act and rule changes for pension funds 
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The second feature of these speculative capitals are the pricing and valuation logics driving 
them. The valuations in this speculative chain of capital were based on an anticipation of future 
earnings potential of an intangible asset with rising prices. This future earnings potential, on 
which different capitalists bet, rested on a promise of what I called the pricing escalator, in which 
investors and traders projected that buyers in the future would pay higher prices in exchange for 
medicines with improved clinical outcomes (Gregson et al. 2005; Vernaz et al. 2016). This echoes 
Veblen’s analysis of intangible assets in the economy, with value coming not from existing 
approvals and sales, but from ownership and control over future earnings streams that contain 
the promise of differential accumulation – gaining more than competing avenues for 
accumulation (Gagnon 2016; Veblen 1908a). This pricing escalator underpinned the growing 
market valuations for hepatitis C assets during the 2000s, as larger patient populations were 
forecasted to be eligible for treatment with progressively improved regimens (Ha et al. 2011; 
Pharmasset 2009).  
In 2004, for example, when Pharmasset raised its biggest venture capital round (series D), 
the company had already run $15 million in deficits, and was not expected to have an approved 
product in the near future (Pharmasset 2006). But they had recently patented a hepatitis C 
compound, PSI-6130. At the time, Roche had their interferon-based treatment on the market for 
approximately $36,000 per patient for a toxic, year-long regimen. Pharmasset and their investors 
anticipated that developing a directly acting anti-viral, rather than interferon-based regimen 
(which operated indirectly by boosting the body’s immune system), would lead to more patients 
desiring and being eligible for the treatment (fewer side effects, shorter treatment) (Pharmasset 
2006; 2009).235 This offered investors and companies a chance at winning the intra-capitalist 
competition not only for profits, but for growth – to make more money than the owners of the 
existing standards of care at the time, Roche and Schering Plough.236 Such forecasts required an 
																																																						
and capital gains taxation in the late 1970s and early 1908s expanded financial flows to venture capital. I 
turn to this in section 6.1.3.  
235 While these longer-term expectations held up sustained valuations in financial markets, equity traders 
attempted to make gains by betting on Pharmasset’s nearer-term milestones and news announcements. The 
launch of a new clinical trial or new results for a compound drove short-term swings in Pharmasset’s share 
price from which traders attempted to make capital gains. For example, when Pharmasset announced part 
of the Phase II trial results for PSI-7977 in March of 2011, the company’s share value rose by 24% in a single 
day – this climb ultimately shaped Gilead’s acquisition price-tag later in the year (Feuerstein 2011) 
236 The revenue opportunity (‘the market’) was defined by price x eligible patient population. Even with a 
higher potential patient population, investors do not assume lower price (offset by the higher potential 
volume). Instead, they make investments on the idea that 1) growing revenue will enable a given asset 
vehicle or company to generate a differentially greater accumulation than the existing asset (Roche’s 
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anticipation of the relationship between manufacturers and buyers (publicly funded health 
delivery systems) with regards to drug pricing, to which we return in the following section (6.1.2).  
Third, investment and trading in Pharmasset was defined by a compressed ‘risk-reward loop’, 
in which capital entered into the innovation process for periods far shorter than the multiple stages 
and years required for drug development. Investors and traders risked their capital for the sake of 
uncertain rewards, yet these risks and rewards were variable, depending on the expectations and 
interests of a given investor or trader. What these variable investors and traders shared – from 
venture capitalists to institutional shareholders at the time of an IPO, for example – were ‘exit 
possibilities’ at a ‘terminal point’ long before the approval of any new medicine. Drug 
development can last well over a decade – the case of sofosbuvir took 10 years, between 
Pharmasset and Gilead.237 But these different forms of speculative capital were only advanced into 
the innovation process for fractions of this time: the risk-reward return-loop was compressed into 
a period that lasted a few years in the case of venture capitalists to hours or days, in the case of 
stock traders betting on Pharmasset’s share price. The liquidity offered in such a model, in which 
investors can enter and exit at variable points and with compressed time horizons, is sustained by 
the pricing possibilities and valuation promises described in the previous point (Andersson et al. 
2010; Birch 2016). Andersson (2010) and Birch (2016) have described this process of investment to 
be akin to a ‘relay-race’, in which different financial actors take the baton of drug development. 
Yet where all the actors in a relay race win a medal for their collective labors, this financialized 
model diminished the relationship between the actors taking risks and those actors accruing 
rewards. We return to this risk-reward nexus in section 6.2.  
Finally, the dynamics of speculative capital-oriented development with complete reliance 
on external sources of financing and little retained capital for reinvestment meant that 
Pharmasset was not positioned to become a durable organization with multiple integrated 
capabilities (research, manufacturing, regulatory affairs, distribution) (Andersson et al. 2010; 
Hopkins et al. 2013). Rather, Pharmasset was more a bundle of assets ready to be sold. By the time 
Pharmasset had developed PSI-7977 into Phase II trials, the company had yet to turn a profit – 
and had accumulated a deficit of more than $300 million over its life-span (Pharmasset 2011). Yet 
its value in the summer of 2011 had reached ~$8 billion based on the promise of the compound 
																																																						
interferon regimen, for example), and 2) health systems, including the state, will pay based on a ‘value-
pricing’ rationale, which I describe elsewhere in detail.  
237 The ten-year figure comes from the period beginning in 2003, when Pharmasset began working on PSI-
6130, the precursor to sofosbuvir, to 2013, when Gilead received FDA approval for sofosbuvir.  
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and resulting revenue opportunity. Pharmasset’s life cycle and valuation illustrates Mirkowski’s 
description of such small, product-less biotechnology companies as ‘financial artefacts’ (Mirowski 
2012:296). As Pharmasset scanned the horizon for its future, incumbent firms like Gilead Sciences 
appeared less ideal as competitors and better as potential suitors. In this respect, Pharmasset was 
positioned to be what Blackburn (2006:42) has called a ‘disposable’ business, with the 
organization dissolving on the sale of its assets.  
These four features together reveal a mobilization of speculative capital oriented around 
financial gains from betting on an intangible pharmaceutical asset for periods far shorter than 
required for the development and use of sofosbuvir as a hepatitis C therapy. The anticipation of 
patent protected pricing propelled growing financial market valuations for hepatitis C assets, in 
which investors and traders forecasted buyers in the future paying higher prices in exchange for 
better clinical outcomes. This mobilization of speculative capitals, however, would be interrelated 
with the capital allocation strategies of large, incumbent pharmaceutical companies, to which we 
turn next.  
6.1.2 Extraction driven by Gilead’s shareholders   
To overcome episodes of recurring crisis driven by shareholders’ expectations of growth 
and distributions of capital, Gilead used its pricing and revenue to position itself as an 
‘accumulation center’ in the innovation process, with stockpiled revenues used for speculative 
bets on late-stage assets through acquisitions as well as extraction by shareholders through 
buybacks and dividends. This orientation to extraction is illustrated by four elements structuring 
Gilead’s position and function in the innovation process: (1) a recurring configuration of crisis 
driven by shareholder control and expectations of growth, (2) the generation of growth as an 
acquisition specialist, with a pricing strategy culminating the pricing escalator that had mobilized 
the chain of speculative capital behind sofosbuvir, (3) the reproduction of a financial cycle using 
accumulated revenues from sofosbuvir on speculation and extraction, and (4) an intensification of 
these dynamics with ownership of a curative ‘asset’ which eliminated the very market for growth 
(by curing patients) on which its value as an asset rests.    
First, shareholders and financial markets exposed Gilead, even as a company with high rates 
of profitability, to a structural crisis. This structural crisis was a product of the ‘shareholder 
growth treadmill’, in which shareholders expect differential growth (greater than the cost of 
capital and competing companies) on a near-continual annual basis (Montalban and Sakinc 2013; 
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Rajan 2012).238 In other words, what will make the most money in the fastest time? In this way, 
publicly traded companies like Gilead are less valued by their profitability and approved products, 
and more on their potential to deliver this growth (Birch 2016; Birch and Tyfield 2013; Rajan 2012). 
For example, even with rates of profitability annually between 20-30% in the 2009-2011 period, 
Gilead’s share price plateaued on the perception that their HIV-centered business would not 
generate further growth. Convergent with patent cliffs on their existing HIV assets as well as a dry 
pipeline lacking investment, this expectation of shareholder-driven growth produced recurring 
episodes of crisis for Gilead. This shareholder control over business strategies has been in part the 
product of several regulatory shifts promulgated by the US state since the 1970s, which has 
enabled the distribution of capital towards shareholders and tied the short-term interests of 
shareholders to corporate executives (Lazonick 2015; Stout 2013).239 The expectations of 
shareholders motivated Gilead’s senior leadership to look for growth from pharmaceutical assets 
in financial markets described in the previous section (6.1.1).  
This brings us to the second element: to respond to crisis, Gilead mobilized its accumulated 
capital less as a research and development company and more as an acquisition specialist with 
significant power vis a vis the health delivery state in terms of drug pricing. With Pharmasset’s PSI-
7977 demonstrating positive outcomes in Phase II trials, Gilead aimed at gaining the ownership 
and control over the sizeable flow of future earnings the compound promised (United States 
Senate, Committee on Finance 2015; Veblen 1908b). The company used a portion of its $10 billion 
in accumulated capital from HIV sales to make an $11.2 billion bet on Pharmasset for its PSI-7977 
compound, getting the rest of its capital for the transaction by leveraging its accumulated capital 
to raise debt (Gilead Sciences 2012; S&P Capital IQ 2012). In its capitalization exercise to value PSI-
7977, Gilead projected charging over $65,000, continuing the pricing escalator that mobilized the 
chain of speculative capital earlier in the innovation process (United States Senate, Committee on 
Finance 2015). As Veblen initially illuminated, Gilead’s capitalization exercise showed the 
relations of power at stake in the innovation process with regards to drug pricing: to make bets, 
capitalists anticipated a state that would continue to pay higher prices in exchange for therapeutic 
																																																						
238 This structural crisis can be viewed through the hybrid combination of Veblen’s insight into capitalists 
pursuing differential accumulation vis a vis other potential vehicles for accumulation (magnitude of 
growth) with the insights of shareholder-oriented financialization, in which shareholders expect this 
growth in quarterly and annual periods (velocity of growth) (Cochrane 2011; Davis 2009; Lazonick et al. 
2016; Nitzan and Bichler 2009). 
239 I provide a fuller summary of these shifts in sections 4.2.2 as well as 1.3.2.  
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outcomes (Gagnon 2016; Veblen 1908b). Lobbying clout, both by Gilead as an individual business 
but also by the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, sought to maintain this relation of power with 
the US state (Demko 2014; OpenSecrets 2017). Gilead’s launch pricing, ultimately set at $84,000 
and $94,500 for its sofosbuvir-based regimens, culminated the pricing escalator and enabled the 
company to accrue $45 billion in revenue in its first three years since approval – the most 
profitable drug launch in history.  
This revenue from sofosbuvir-based medicines reinforced the third element:  Gilead’s 
position as an ‘accumulation center’ to speculate and extract value for shareholders. Gilead accrued 
gross profits of $76 billion between 2014 and 2016, growing from annual revenues of $11 billion in 
2013 to $32 billion by 2015. These financial outcomes demonstrate Zeller’s (2007) conception of 
multi-national pharmaceutical companies existing as ‘accumulation centers’, with growing 
stockpiles of cash drawn from monopoly rents on their ownership of assets. Where did this 
accumulated capital go? Gilead’s strategy reflects Lazonick’s analysis of the influence of 
shareholder value on companies shift from strategies of ‘retain and reinvest’ earlier in the 20th 
century to ‘downsize and distribute’ in recent decades (Lazonick 2015; Lazonick et al. 2016). At the 
end of 2016, Gilead held $32.4 billion in cash (after ending 2013 with $2.6 billion in cash), largely 
on the growth from its hepatitis C revenues (Gilead Sciences 2017). Shareholder and investment 
analysts in financial markets expect Gilead to use this accumulated capital to acquire a 
pharmaceutical asset that can generate further growth (Crow 2015; Nisen 2017).240 In the 
meantime, Gilead also distributed $30.7 billion to shareholders in the form of buybacks and 
dividends (with $26.3 billion of this in buybacks). These distributions were reinforced by the fact 
that Gilead’s senior leadership were major stockholders themselves, with the top five senior 
executives accruing over $1 billion in compensation in the three years following the launch of 
sofosbuvir (Gilead Sciences 2016b). Only $9.6 billion was directed towards research and 
development within the company, primarily on late-stage trials for re-combinations of its existing 
HIV and hepatitis C medicines (Gilead Sciences 2017).241  
																																																						
240 Though the company has yet to make a major acquisition at the time of this dissertation submission, 
pressure from financial markets on Gilead’s leadership to pursue such a transaction has grown, for reasons I 
illustrate in the fourth point below. 
241 As I documented in chapter 5, this dual strategy of speculation and value extraction rather than internal 
investments in research was summed up by Gilead’s CEO declaration of its strategy in a 2016 earnings call: 
“For us its fairly simple. We have the flexibility to do both things; that is, return shareholder value through 
stock repurchases and dividends and of course continue to be opportunistic in M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions)” (Seeking Alpha 2016c).  
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Finally, far from inoculating itself against crisis, Gilead’s accumulation with sofosbuvir 
revealed a fourth point: a cure eliminates the very market for growth on which its value as an asset 
depends, thereby intensifying the company’s extractive and speculative strategies. Despite Gilead’s 
high rates of profitability in 2015 and 2016 – at 55% and 45% respectively – the company’s share 
price fell from its peak of $122 in 2015 per share to almost $60 by early 2017 (Crow 2016a; Nisen 
2017). This juxtaposition of high profitability with declining share price is captured by Veblen’s 
analysis of assets, in which valuation is based on the potential generation of differential growth in 
the future (Birch 2016; Veblen 1908a). The anticipation of sliding towards a ‘patient cliff’ created 
another episode of crisis for Gilead. In responding to their declining prospects for growth, Gilead 
has directed capital to marketing for hepatitis C as well as clinical trials aimed at incremental 
improvements in HIV order to extend intellectual property protection over this ‘chronic market’ 
(see chapter 5).242  
In sum, as a publicly traded incumbent pharmaceutical company, Gilead was valued by 
shareholders based on potential growth from pharmaceutical assets rather than profitability from 
products, which generated a process of extraction, accumulation, speculation in attempts to 
transcend recurrent episodes of crisis. 
6.1.3 Governance of intangible assets and financial capital by a multi-valent state  
Finally, these two mechanisms of financialization – the mobilization of speculative capital 
and extraction driven by shareholders - were underpinned by a third: the governance of 
intangible assets and capital by a multi-valent state.243  Investments by an entrepreneurial US 
state produced the intangible assets that mobilized the private capital documented earlier; state 
governance also influenced the trajectory and uses of these intangible assets (such as 
Pharmasset’s nucleoside science) as well as private capitals (such as venture capital). I do not 
argue whether the relationship between the state and the financialization of biomedical 
innovation was a result of regulatory bias and capture by industrial interests, voluntary and 
intentional policy shifts pursued by the state, or inadvertent attempts to solve problems in other 
																																																						
242 See Joseph Dumit’s (2012a) book Drugs for Life for a wider discussion on how current models of public 
health epidemiology and financial market oriented drug development converge to promote ‘chronic 
therapies’.  
243 By a multi-valent state, I refer to the multiple state organs that influence the innovation process, from 
innovative, investment organizations such as the NIH to regulatory bodies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. By governance, I mean both legislation passed through the US Congress as well as 
rules promulgated and changed by agencies with regulatory power, such as the Department of Labor.  
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domains of policy – or potentially (and likely) some combination of all of the above.244 However, I 
observed that these ‘rules for capital’ governed by the state underpinned each of the first two 
mechanisms  I elaborated in this chapter. Taken together, the case highlighted four domains of 
state governance (summarized in Table 6.2) which contributed to the financialization of the 
innovation process behind sofosbuvir.  
 
Table 6.2 A multi-valent state and the financialization of sofosbuvir   
State influence over 
rules of control  
Government legislation and rule-making 
(1) Conversion of public 
science into private 
assets   
- 1980 Bayh-Dole Act provided the political-legal contract for conversion of 
publicly funded knowledge into private intangible assets that entered 
into financial markets and became objects of speculation and 
shareholder control.245 (Kesselheim 2011; Rai and Eisenberg 2002) 
(2) Emergence and 
expansion of venture 
capital and financial 
markets for speculative 
capitals  
- Department of Labor ‘prudent man’ rule amendment (1979) – enabled 
pension funds to use larger shares of its capital (up to 5% at the time) in 
venture funds, considered to be higher-risk; led to rapidly expanding 
flows of capital from pension funds (a type of institutional shareholder) 
to venture capitalists.  (Gompers 1994) 
- Reduction in capital gains tax (initial major reduction in 1978, later 
reductions in 1980s – 2000s) (Gompers 1994) 
- NASDAQ (founded in 1971) permits IPOs and trading on startups with no 
products or profits and low capitalization, with SEC as the regulatory 
agency mediating and monitoring main rules246 (Lazonick and 
Mazzucato 2013) 
(3) Increased 
distribution of capital 
from business 
organizations to 
shareholders   
- SEC Rule 10-b-18 (1982), permitting companies to use capital to 
repurchase (buy back) their own shares on the open market with out 
being charged with share price manipulation; share buybacks escalated 
in the 1990s and 2000s as a ‘flexible’ way to distribute capital to 
shareholders (Lazonick 2015) 
(4) Payment for 
increasing prices by 
health delivery state 
with limited use of 
countervailing 
negotiating power or 
regulation  
- Medicare Part D (2004) bars government from using negotiating power 
with manufacturers (Bach 2009)  
- Medicaid program designed as a state-based program, fragmenting 
negotiating power (Barua et al. 2015) 
- No uses to date of ‘march-in rights’ contained in Bayh-Dole Act (Rai and 
Eisenberg 2002; 2016b) 
- Turn towards value-based payment (in which increase in prices are tied 
to therapeutic improvements) (Bach and Pearson 2015) 
 
																																																						
244 I discuss this as a potential direction for further research in section 6.4.  
245 The knowledge patented through the Bayh-Dole Act provisions is also governed by other features of the 
US state’s approach to intellectual property: (1) through the US Patent and Trademark Office, patents are 
granted for 20 years from the point of issuance, as well as (2) FDA measures to protect the data generated in 
clinical trials (‘data exclusivity’ through 1984 Hatch-Waxman Law) in order to delay generic competition.  
246 See SEC site for history of its rule-making for the NASDAQ stock market: 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq.htm 
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The first domain of state governance was the rules of control over intangible assets. In the 
case of sofosbuvir and hepatitis C, investments by the US state produced the replicon research 
tool and the nucleoside science that were used by Pharmasset for their development of sofosbuvir 
(see chapter 3, and Talbe 3.1). The governance of intangible assets by the US state, through the 
1980 Bayh-Dole Act passed by Congress, enabled Ray Schinazi – the founder of Pharmasset – to 
convert this publicly funded science into privately owned intangible assets (Kesselheim 2011; Rai 
and Eisenberg 2002). With this political-legal arrangement, Pharmasset emerged from the VA and 
Emory-based labs at which Schinazi had been based, and attracted private capital to finance the 
further development of their intangible nucleoside assets.  
Second, the state governed the rules for the emergence and function of speculative capitals 
that mobilized behind Pharmasset. Schinazi did not take his inventions to a larger, established 
company; rather, the conversion of public science into private assets as permitted by the Bayh-
Dole Act coincided with rule changes that had expanded the role of venture capital to be a main 
early-stage source of financing for these private assets (beyond the state). With regards to the 
expansion for venture capital, for example, the Department of Labor in 1979 changed the ‘prudent 
man’ rule which allowed pension funds to direct a greater percentage of their capital to venture 
funds (Gompers 1994). Furthermore, US Congress passed a major reduction in capital gains tax 
the same year, which may have also expanded venture capital (Gompers 1994). By the time 
Pharmasset began in the late 1990s, the maintenance of these rules positioned venture capital to 
become a key source of financing for small biotechnology companies (Pisano 2006; Robbins-Roth 
2001). The later transformation of Pharmasset from a privately held, venture-backed company 
into a publicly traded company, even with no profits or approved products, was also facilitated by 
a state-mediated financial actor: the NASDAQ stock exchange. A product of SEC-guided moves to 
promote stock trading in the 1970s, NASDAQ allows companies with low capitalization and little 
to no profitability to join the exchange (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). NASDAQ has provided a 
market for raising financing from institutional shareholders and trading on intangible 
pharmaceutical assets. The creation of these financial markets was also paralleled by a stark 
absence of the state in terms of the public financing of clinical trials (Baker 2008). Lacking access 
to further mission-oriented public funding from the state, Pharmasset instead relied on 
speculative capitals external to the firm.247 
																																																						
247 Though the NIH supported an important Phase II trial for sofosbuvir (Osinusi et al. 2013a), the US state 
had not developed a larger funding mechanism for hepatitis C clinical trials, leaving a small cash-hungry 
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 Third, the late 20th century rise of shareholder control over the capital allocation decisions of 
established companies was mediated by several factors, and I focused on one in particular – SEC’s 
Rule 10-b – given Gilead’s use of share buybacks as central to their business strategy. Rule 10-b 
permitted companies to buy a significant amount of their own shares, which Gilead’s senior 
executives, as major shareholders themselves, pursued as a ‘flexible’ strategy to distribute capital 
to its shareholders while maintaining the rest of their accumulated capital for potential 
acquisitions (Lazonick 2014). The buyback rule facilitated ‘maximizing shareholder value’, in 
which shareholders not only expected near-term and differential growth but also the distribution 
of ‘residual’ capital that could not be used to yield this type of growth (Lazonick 2015).    
 Fourth, the US health delivery state exercised limited power in drug price negotiations as a 
main buyer of sofosbuvir-based medicines. Though the state’s governance of drug pricing 
regulations did not directly influence the control over capital, it did so in an indirect manner: the 
anticipation of the state’s payments of higher prices fueled the speculative bets made by financial 
actors – from venture capitalists to institutional shareholders – along the chain of innovation. 
Notably, Gilead’s accumulated capital from the payments made by the state was ultimately 
directed towards the acquisitions and buybacks illustrated earlier. The limited exercise of the 
state’s countervailing power came in multiple forms, from the fragmented state-based Medicaid 
system lacking market power as well as federal systems like Medicare legally barred from 
negotiating directly with manufacturers (due to the 2004 passage of the Medicare Part D program 
by a Republican-controlled Congress) (Bach 2009). Even in the case of a major public health 
concern, the US state has also never invoked the ‘march-in’ provision contained in Bayh-Dole Act, 
whereby the government can license knowledge property to a third-party manufacturer in order 
to meet a given social concern (Silverman 2016d). This limited exercise of countervailing power 
has remained true in the case of sofosbuvir and hepatitis C. 
In sum, the state’s governance of the rules by which intangible assets and different capitals 
function in the economy – from venture capital to the accumulated capital of businesses – played 
a critical role in the financialization of the innovation process and prices behind sofosbuvir. 
																																																						
company like Pharmasset pursuing venture capital, public equity markets, and potential acquirers. Even if 
the company had received additional public funding, however, the state would be constrained by a second 
factor beyond narrow financing: the absence of rules for public ownership stakes in companies granted 
entrepreneurial investments from the state. Though Pharmasset already counted the Veterans 
Administration as well as the NIH as two crucial sources of support in its early stages, neither possessed an 
ownership stake in the company, leaving the state unable to share in the financial upside of the innovation 
process as venture capitalists, for example, did. 
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Rather than pursuing further public financing for drug development, Pharmasset relied on capital 
from outside the firm in the form of short-term oriented financing. Furthermore, the rules of 
shareholder control and distributions of capital focused Gilead less on research and development 
company and more towards acquisitions and buybacks. Finally, the health delivery state’s limited 
countervailing power vis a vis end-stage manufacturers, in this case Gilead, sustained this 
mobilization and distribution of capital in the innovation process.  
This innovation process thus illustrated a multi-valent state operating in different 
domains of the economy, from innovative, public sector organizations producing intangible assets 
to an array of bodies with regulatory power (i.e. SEC, Department of Labor, Medicare) governing 
the rules for the distributions and uses of these intangible assets as well as different kinds of 
capital.   
6.1.4 Summary of the three dynamics and revisiting existing answers on drug prices   
The financialization of biomedical innovation in the case of sofosbuvir – as a pattern of 
accumulation in which growth was pursued from the capitalization and control of intangible 
assets in financial markets – was underpinned by three dynamics: the mobilization of speculative 
capitals from investing and trading on the anticipation of higher prices and valuations (the 
pricing escalator), extraction driven by shareholders pursuing growth and distributions of capital, 
as well the governance of intangible assets and financial capital by a multi-valent state. With 
these processes, the prices of sofosbuvir became fastened to the logics, institutions, and relations 
of power propelled by financial markets, rather than the tangible costs of production and 
innovation or the value of the embodied health experiences of patients infected with hepatitis C.  
This diagnosis departed from existing answers on drug prices by analyzing the innovation 
process behind sofosbuvir and the organizational as well as political-economic dynamics that 
made up this process. Rather than focus on ‘risk’ and ‘value’ at the point of exchange between 
Gilead and health systems, for example, I elucidated the dynamic nature of these concepts across 
the innovation process – such as strategies of risk-mitigation undertaken by different actors and 
the creation and extraction of value. Rather than study the monopoly-state relationship in 
isolation of other factors, I situated this relationship in the wider context of shareholder control 
over Gilead’s business strategy as well as the ownership of intangible assets in financial markets. 
In reducing our understanding of drug prices to a single relationship and point of exchange, these 
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existing answers had obscured the influences and consequences of crucial organizational and 
political-economic dynamics.  
By contrast, my organizational and political-economic orientation to understanding an 
innovation process also afforded me the opportunity to more fully evaluate its outcomes - 
through assessing the distribution of risks and rewards across the process, the direction and 
sustainability of innovation, and impacts on patients and public health. This evaluation further 
illuminates the limits of existing answers on drug prices by indicating the distributive 
consequences of financialization. Before revisiting existing answers on drug prices to show the 
analytical ground gained through my account of the innovation process (which I do in section 
6.3), I next turn to this opportunity of evaluating its outcomes.  
6.2 Evaluating the outcomes of the process  
Having described the processual mechanisms and relations of power underpinning the 
prices of sofosbuvir based medicines, I now take on a second task: an evaluative assessment of the 
innovation process. To answer my second research question, I posited several key measures by 
which to make this assessment. First, I aimed to take stock of the distribution of risks and rewards 
across the process, using Lazonick and Mazzucato’s (2013) risk-reward nexus as a framework for 
analysis. Second, I accounted for the implication of such a distribution on the direction and 
sustainability of the innovation process, as well as its impacts on patient and public health 
outcomes. I argue that while entrepreneurial investment from the state shaped the direction of 
the innovation process towards a cure, the processes constituting financialization disconnected 
the link between risk-taking and the accrual of rewards, undermined the sustainability of the 
innovation process, and diminished the patient and public health outcomes for a communicable 
disease. I take each assessment in turn.  
6.2.1 The distribution of risks and rewards   
The case of sofosbuvir illustrates a disconnect between the distribution of risks and 
rewards across the innovation process. Multiple actors took on risks for the sake of uncertain 
rewards along this innovation process, but the risk-reward ratio varied for different actors.  
For example, the case of sofosbuvir and hepatitis C reflects Mazzucato’s conception of the 
role of an entrepreneurial state in innovation processes (Mazzucato 2013b; 2016). Public sector 
organizations, primarily the US National Institutes of Health, provided patient capital and risk-
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taking investment for sofosbuvir and hepatitis C which included (see Table 3.1): (1) long-term 
tracking studies of the disease to reveal its significant clinical and public health consequences as 
well as its identity as a pathogenic virus, (2) the development of the replicon tool, which pushed 
the technological frontier for all hepatitis C drug development and shaped a ‘market’ for private 
investment, (3) the funding of nucleoside science through Schinazi’s VA and Emory-based 
laboratories during the 1990s and early 2000s. Beyond these critical early-stage inputs, the state 
also (4) funded the early-stages of therapeutic development that would lead to the pre-cursors of 
sofosbuvir through the NIH’s SBIR grants to Pharmasset.248 Yet the health delivery state also paid 
Gilead’s monopoly prices for a downstream outcome of those public investments, while receiving 
no direct return on their initial investments and only diminished indirect returns via taxation due 
to Gilead’s offshoring of intellectual property for sofosbuvir to Ireland (see chapter 5).  
On the other end of the spectrum, Gilead accrued a major reward: $45 billion in revenue 
from sofosbuvir between 2014 and 2016. But Gilead then directed much of this capital towards its 
shareholders, who had collectively not risked any capital into the innovation process for 
sofosbuvir.249 Among these shareholders were Gilead’s senior leadership: the top five executives in 
total earned over $1 billion in compensation in the three years since sofosbuvir’s launch, with over 
90% of their compensation coming in the form of stock awards and options (see chapter 4).   
Venture capitalists and Pharmasset’s initial public shareholders for the IPO as well as 
shareholders in their follow-on financings each risked capital behind Pharmasset, with a share of 
this capital going to the development of sofosbuvir. The existence of financial markets, however, 
enabled each of these investors to enter and exit their investment and ‘cash out’ long before the 
approval of any product, thereby mitigating their risks by passing along ownership claims while 
attempting to maximize their potential rewards by wagering bets at the right time (Andersson et 
al. 2010; Birch 2016; Gleadle et al. 2014). The innovation process behind sofosbuvir recalls Birch’s 
(Birch 2016:465) observation that the financing of biotechnology and drug development is akin to 
																																																						
248 Publicly funded science in Europe, available in the public domain, also provided the critical knowledge 
(the ‘MgGuigan method’) that activated sofosbuvir’s previously indolent precursor, PSI-6130, into a curative 
backbone. The NIH and the Affordable Care Act – through the Internal Revenue Service – also funded 
Phase II trials for sofosbuvir. 
249 The $11.2 billion acquisition of Pharmasset as well as the late-stage trials completed by Gilead were 
funded by retained earnings from prior revenues on HIV medicines (as well as debt that was leveraged 
using this cash) paid by public health systems. Furthermore, Gilead had last raised investment capital from 
shareholders in 1996, and given that the company began to offer a dividend only in 2015, those shareholders 
have likely left their ownership claim long ago. 
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a ‘reverse Ponzi scheme’, in that the final financier can accrue the largest return, while the first 
financiers (the government, friends and family in the seed rounds) accrue the least. As I described 
earlier, this disconnect between risks and rewards can be traced to relations of power between 
state, businesses, and financial actors.  
This accounting of the sofosbuvir process provides positive evidence for Lazonick and 
Mazzucato’s (2013:1095) claim that, “although risk-taking has become more collective […] the 
reward system has become dominated by individuals, who inserting themselves strategically 
between the business organization and the product market or a financial market, and especially 
the stock market, lay claim to a disproportionate share of the rewards of the innovation process”. 
This outcome was starkest with Gilead’s shareholders, who accrued a large share of rewards by 
being positioned at the end-stages of the innovation process. However, what kind of outcomes 
did this distribution of risks and reward in the case of sofosbuvir produce for the direction and 
sustainability of biomedical innovation as well as for impacts on patient and public health?  
6.2.2 Implications for the direction and sustainability of biomedical innovation 
In evaluating the innovation process, I first map the implications of the risk-reward nexus 
described above onto both the direction and sustainability of the innovation process. These 
measures are intertwined. On the one hand, as argued by Stirling (2009) and Mazzucato (2016) 
innovation has not just a rate but a direction: in the realm of biomedicine, an example is the 
creation of better quality therapies that can improve clinical outcomes and address public health 
challenges. The extent of this directional outcome - such as whether an innovation process only 
incrementally improved outcomes or produced breakthroughs – can be assessed. On the other 
hand, innovation is also a process that is continually dependent on capital and labor across 
multiple stages of discovery, development and deployment as well as for numerous health 
challenges, and thus can be evaluated for whether its directional outcomes (in this case, a curative 
therapy) can be reproduced in a sustainable manner for other areas of unmet medical need.  
With regards to the directional outcome, I begin my analysis by acknowledging a fact of 
the sofosbuvir case that is rare in biomedical innovation: a curative therapy was developed for 
patients which can be taken largely free of side effects and eliminates the need for long-term, 
chronic treatment. This represents an optimal directional outcome for the hepatitis C innovation 
process: rather than producing an incremental advance, these medicines created a paradigm shift 
for patients. Yet the valorization of Gilead for this outcome, can, however, obscure the key factors 
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behind it and lead to mis-recognizing how the direction of the innovation process was shaped and 
might be sustainably reproduced. A health economist at USC, Dana Goldman, reflected this mis-
recognition when he shared in an interview with an online news site, “We’d love for 
pharmaceutical companies to come up with a treatment that cures diabetes rather than just treats 
it. I want to pay them enough so it’s possible they’ll start working on cures rather than 
treatments” (Kliff 2014). Goldman’s stated hope of creating more curative medicines by focusing 
only on payments to Gilead falls short on two counts, each of which demonstrate the ways in 
which state, business, and financial actors influenced the direction and sustainability of the 
innovation process in the case of hepatitis C and wider areas of unmet medical need.  
First, an entrepreneurial state, primarily in the US, provided four critical inputs that set 
the direction of the innovation process towards a cure: (1) unveiling the virus and its biology as a 
pathogen of public health concern but also amenable to elimination through its long-term 
tracking studies, (2) development of the replicon, with which companies tested antivirals that 
directly attacked and eliminate hepatitis C unlike prior interferon therapies250, (3) long-term 
investments in nucleoside science that gave Pharmasset the scientific base with which to 
eventually develop sofosbuvir, and (4) the European supported ‘Protide method’, which enabled 
sofosbuvir to reach the liver and was the differentiator from other previous attempts at creating 
compounds with high cure rates.  
Yet the public-sector actors that enabled the directional outcome of a curative therapy 
realized diminished rewards from the process, which can threaten future investments in the 
uncertain research on which such directional outcomes rest. In other words, the sustainability of 
the innovation process is at stake: failing to reward the value creating organizations that shaped 
this directional outcome in a given process may challenge future value creation in the form of 
breakthrough therapies. As I documented earlier, neither the VA nor the NIH gained an 
ownership stake in Pharmasset to share in the upsides of the company’s gains that could have 
financed future innovation efforts, even though both public sector organizations provided long-
term support to the science on which Pharmasset was founded (see Appendix B and chapter 3). 
Furthermore, Gilead avoided $10 billion in taxes in the first two years after its sofosbuvir launch, 
																																																						
250 Of these four inputs, the replicon was most pivotal towards setting the direction towards a curative 
therapy, as drug developers could thereafter test antiviral compounds that directly eliminated the virus, 
rather than therapies that worked indirectly to boost the immune system. The direct targeting of the virus 
was necessary for the high cure rates observed with sofosbuvir (Bartenschlager 2002). 
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challenging the tax base used to finance the public-sector organizations that supported 
innovation efforts (Kocieniewski 2016). Gilead’s tax avoidance over two years (2014-2015) was 
equivalent to 1/3 of NIH’s annual budget, which has hovered in the ~$30 billion range in recent 
years (NIH 2017a). Proposed cuts to the NIH budget in the US along with reductions in corporate 
taxation currently being debated within the US political arena are an exacerbation of this dynamic 
(Varmus 2017). 
Second, rewarding the end-stage manufacturer (Gilead) with more capital, as Goldman 
suggests, reinforced late-stage speculative and extractive strategies that were more captured by 
logics and directions of continual revenue growth rather than directional outcomes such as 
breakthrough therapies. This has implications for the sustainability of capital allocation across 
multiple areas of unmet medical need. In the context of this cure market, we observed that 
Gilead, beyond distributing much of its revenues from hepatitis C to shareholders in the forms of 
buybacks and dividends, also re-directed their hepatitis C capital towards clinical trials for 
incremental improvements to HIV/AIDS medicines, which are chronic, life-long treatments with 
‘sustainable’ growth projections. Paying more to Gilead for a cure, therefore, has not ensured – 
per Goldman’s hope – that more money is going towards cures rather than chronic therapies. In 
fact, through its HIV strategy, I illustrated that Gilead is dis-incentivized to invest more money 
towards cures under the conditions of financialization. This dynamic supports Dosi’s (1982) claim 
that markets are “blind” to directional outcomes that may relate to societal challenges. 
The pricing and valuation strategies underpinning the distribution of risks and rewards in 
this innovation process also produced another outcome: an affordability crisis for health systems, 
which threatened the directional possibility at the heart of better quality therapies: realizations of 
improved patient and public health outcomes, and in the case of hepatitis C, the elimination of an 
infectious disease. We turn to assessing this set of outcomes next.  
6.2.3 Patient and public health outcomes  
The existence of a curative therapy with few side effects offered a stark break from prior 
treatment regimens. For patients, sofosbuvir represented a breakthrough and cause for hope. For 
policy-makers and public health officials, these medicines also offer the possibility of halting 
transmission of the virus and reducing the prevalence of the disease at a population level (Ward 
and Mermin 2015). Yet these hopes have ebbed in light of the prices of sofosbuvir-based 
medicines. As I documented in chapter 6, health systems around the world have restricted access 
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to the medicines due to their price and resulting budgetary pressures. In the US during 2014-2015, 
about 230,000 patients could get access to the medicines through public health systems, but this 
represented a fraction of the nearly 1.3 to 2.4 million patients on publicly funded insurance 
believed to be infected (Chahal et al. 2016; Edlin 2016; Edlin et al. 2015; United States Senate, 
Committee on Finance 2015).251 The much touted ‘value’ of these medicines – particularly if used 
to treat patients most likely to transmit the disease as well as those in early stages of disease most 
likely to progress to later stages – was diminished by the pricing strategy employed by Gilead and 
the inability of government health systems to negotiate better deals. In chapter 5, I illustrated 
three impacts on patient and public health consequent to the innovation process and pricing of 
sofosbuvir-based medicines.   
First, restrictions in access to sofosbuvir-based medicines have meant that many patients 
infected with hepatitis C are waiting for the treatment. These restrictions, based on liver staging 
and substance abuse, have disproportionately affected those populations most vulnerable from 
infection, transmission, and progression of the disease (Beckman et al. 2016; Rosenthal and 
Graham 2016; Ward and Mermin 2015). The systems of state and federal prisons, for example, in 
the US, has yet to offer widespread access to treatment. Only 949 patients out of a total of 
approximately 106,000 patients in the US prison system were believed to have received treatment 
in the years 2014 and 2015 (Beckman et al. 2016). Yet the incarcerated population is 
disproportionately at risk of not only being infected with hepatitis C, but also transmitting the 
disease in the community upon release  (Barry-Jester 2015). The deployment of the medicines has 
thus exacerbated the social gradients along which the disease runs, with higher income patients 
with private insurance more likely to get the medicine (Re et al. 2016). These restrictions have 
meant that many patients are unable to break free both from the pathophysiology of the disease 
and the stigma that the infectious disease carries (Harris et al. 2015; Rhodes et al. 2013), In some 
cases, patients decided not to wait and instead turned to older, more toxic therapies, exposing 
them to the risk for deleterious side effects and a reduced chance of realizing a cure (Harris et al. 
2015; Rhodes et al. 2013). 
Second, at the level of health systems, public health plans for hepatitis C elimination have 
been delayed and deferred, as officials scramble to figure out how to fund treatment as part of 
such a plan. The US Institute of Medicine commission dedicated to developing such a plan 
																																																						
251 See Chapter 5, section 5.2 for more on these outcomes.  
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declared in 2017 that without the government licensing the intellectual property from Gilead 
Sciences to a generic manufacturer, the country was unlikely to realize a goal of eliminating the 
disease by 2030 (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 2017). Modelling studies have 
confirmed this forecast (Roy et al 2016a). By contrast, Gilead’s deal with the Egyptian government, 
in which they have licensed the medicine for less than a $1,000 per three-month regimen, has 
allowed the country to launch an ambitious hepatitis C elimination campaign (McNeil 2015). This 
contrast shows the missed opportunities that health systems and countries are facing because of 
high prices.  
Third, even for those patients who have received treatment, the significant budgetary 
expenditures on a single therapy by health systems have raised questions over how to balance the 
opportunity costs with spending in other areas of social and health concern (Reinhardt 2015).252 
For example, in the year 2015, the Veterans Affairs system, even after receiving discounts, spent 
17% of their entire pharmaceutical budget on sofosbuvir-based medicines (Graham 2016). In the 
same year, the state of New York’s Medicaid program spent 10% of their drug budget to these 
medicines as well (Goldberg 2016). Such allocations require drastically raising overall health 
spending on pharmaceuticals or making challenging fiscal choices in other vital areas of public 
spending.  
In sum, though this innovation process has produced a veritable clinical advance with the 
potential for major gains in public health, much of this potential has dimmed as the prices of the 
medicines have led to an uneven deployment and challenging fiscal pressures.  
6.3 The limits and uses of dominant economic accounts as justifications  
Considering this sociological and political economy analysis, how might we understand 
the claims made in the dominant economic accounts of risk and value? This section pursues this 
question by taking the claims made in each account with regards to the hepatitis C and sofosbuvir 
case, and then juxtaposing them against the evidence yielded by the representation of the 
innovation process I built over the three empirical chapters (and summarized in sections 6.1 and 
6.2). Through this juxtaposition, I illustrate the limits of both economic answers in explaining the 
																																																						
252 In discussing the sofosbuvir’s costs to public health systems, Reinhardt (2015b) describes the stark 
tension: “The government has to be mindful of the social opportunity costs of high health care spending, 
which means beneficial activities such as education and infrastructure are displaced by high spending on 
health care.”  
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prices of sofosbuvir. Yet even in their limitations, I demonstrate their uses in the innovation 
process: to conserve a distribution of capital between shareholders, speculative actors, and the 
state as a given, naturalized order. To conclude this section, I show how my diagnosis of 
financialization has provided analytical gains not possible with the monopoly-state critique of 
drug prices.   
6.3.1 Risk and risk-mitigation 
Under the risk argument, patent protected pricing power is argued to be necessary due to 
the failure-ridden, long-term nature of drug development. As I described in chapter 1, this link 
can be formally represented with this simple equation:  
P = C + I 
where C = cost of research and development and I = profits 
We see the limits of this purported relationship between price and cost with a brief review of the 
relevant numbers in the sofosbuvir innovation process. Pharmasset’s reported expenses for 
developing sofosbuvir into Phase II clinical trials were $62.4 million, and their total expenses for 
all research and development, including failed compounds and dead-end research, amounted to 
$281 million between 2001-2011. Yet Gilead’s $11 billion acquisition cost for Pharmasset represented 
a sizable difference with Pharmasset’s research and development costs (39 - 171x). Gilead later 
reported spending $880 million on running late-stage clinical trials on sofosbuvir and sofosbuvir-
based combinations with their internally developed compounds. During the years of these clinical 
trials (2012-2013), Gilead spent a total of $4.02 billion in research and development across all areas 
(see Table 6.1) (Gilead Sciences 2017). But the revenues generated by Gilead’s end-stage pricing 
($45 billion over three years) will only increase in multiple over its costs of research and 
development as they continue to accrue revenue in future years. In comparing these costs on one 
side and rewards on the other hand, we see how little the P = C + I relationship explains in the 
sofosbuvir case other than to point out that the rewards were many multiples above costs of 
development for both Pharmasset and Gilead.  
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Table 6.3  R&D costs versus financial returns for Pharmasset and Gilead  
 Sofosbuvir-specific costs / Total 
costs including failures during 
period of sofosbuvir development 
Financial reward Multiple range 
(Financial reward 
/ R&D costs)253 
Pharmasset $62.4 million / $281 million (2001-
2011) 
$11 billion 
(acquisition payment 
by Gilead)  
39x - 171x 
 
(11/.281; 11/.0624)   
Gilead  $942.4 million / $4.02 billion (2012 -
2013)  
$45 billion  
(revenues to Gilead 
from sofsobuvir-based 
medicines, 2014-2016) 
11x - 47x  
 
(45/4.02; 45/.942) 
 
Others have noted this disconnect between prices, revenues, and research and 
development costs (Kesselheim et al. 2016). The industrial economist Scherer (2004) provided an 
important though limited clarification in a major policy brief in the New England Journal of 
Medicine over a decade earlier: in his view, patent protected pricing was not about recuperating 
costs of risky research and development, but rather served as a lure for capital. Just as we observed 
with Gilead’s pricing of sofosbuvir, research and development spending figured nowhere into the 
final calculation and were viewed as sunk costs. What Scherer did not observe however, was that 
the capital lured into the innovation process through patents was not the ‘internal capital of 
organizations’, as is commonly imagined in analyzes of drug pricing and development, but rather 
the external capital along a chain of speculation within financial markets of intangible assets.  
The ‘risk’ argument is thus plagued by two central limitations: 1) risk is reduced to that of 
a single actor – the manufacturer – rather than accounting for it across a collective innovation 
process, and 2) the relationship between patents (which this risk argument attempts to 
legitimate) and the valuation and pricing logics of financial markets and patents is made invisible. 
First, as we observed, financial markets offered a way for investors and traders to enter and exit 
ownership of Pharmasset within short time-horizons and pass risk along to another ownership 
with the potential for a reward long before the approval of a compound. In other words, multiple 
financial actors operating across the innovation process, enabled by financial markets, engaged in 
a process of risk-mitigation.  
																																																						
253 I calculated a multiple range to show how the rewards compared not only to the costs of sofosbuvir’s 
development, but the costs of all research and development undertaken (which includes sofosbuvir) to give 
a high and a low range. Even the ‘low’ range, which uses the costs of all research and development as a 
denominator illustrates the disconnect between the costs of research and development and accrued 
rewards.   
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Second, far from creating and protecting monopolies which finance research and 
development, patents are instead affixed to the valuation logics and expectations of a chain of 
financial actors. As we witnessed along the development process for sofosbuvir, the mobilization 
of speculative capital was sustained by an expanding market valuation underpinned by the pricing 
escalator with investors anticipating buyers paying higher prices for better clinical outcomes. By 
the time we arrived at Gilead’s pricing for sofosbuvir, the buyers – public health systems - were 
many financial exchanges removed from the original and multiple inventors involved in 
producing the compound.  
In this way, claims to patents, legitimated by the ‘risk’ argument, are severed from their 
original meaning of a fair exchange between inventors (looking to invest in research and 
development) and the public (Biagioli 2006; Peterson 2014). Instead, patents – and the intangible 
assets they secure through legal contracts – buttress the speculative and extractive pursuits of 
financial actors. As this earlier risk-price relationship is increasingly overwhelmed by these 
speculative and shareholder-driven dynamics, a second logic has been used to justify prices: the 
value they deliver to society and health systems.  
6.3.2 Value and value-shifting 
The second logic used in the dominant economic account is that health systems should 
pay more for the ‘value’ of better health outcomes. This value-based pricing is conceived by 
comparing the medicine to be priced with the existing standard of care and estimating the 
difference in value that the public (via health systems) will be willing to pay (Gregson et al. 2005). 
This pricing logic is represented as such:  
Price = Value = R ± D 
Where R = reference price, D = differential value estimation 
As I described in chapter 5, Gilead’s pricing strategy did indeed hold to this composition, 
as they used the pricing of the existing standard of care at the time (telaprevir and interferon) to 
set their reference price for comparison, and estimated that health systems would be willing to 
pay around the same or a few thousand above the telaprevir price because sofosbuvir-based 
regimens yielded improved outcomes. This shaped their decision to charge a $84,000 launch price 
for sofosbuvir in December, 2013 and $94,500 for their sofosbuvir-based combination that 
launched less than a year later in October, 2014. A study which tracked hepatitis C drug pricing 
from the late 1990 interferon regimens onwards to sofosbuvir-based treatment found this ‘value-
Roy	225 
	
based pricing’ strategy to hold across the period, with prices over 15 years of new product launch 
prices going up $1,063.68 per each additional percentage increase in cure rate (Vernaz et al. 2016). 
An array of health economics studies of cost-effectiveness and prevention modelling – which 
show improved health compared to prior standard of medicine per dollar spent as well as averted 
downstream medical expenses - has attempted to justify these price increases as ‘value-based’ (see 
Appendix D).  
Similar to the ‘risk’ answer, this value logic suffers from the two central limitations: the 
differentiated and dynamic nature of value is reduced to a single (cost-benefit) metric, and the 
relationship between value and financial markets is obscured. First, value here is defined narrowly 
at the point of an exchange between a business and a health system buyer, not tracked in terms of 
overall flow between multiple sources (value creation) and potential destinations (towards 
activities that range from sustainable value creation to value extraction). For example, the 
contribution of an entrepreneurial state in the development of sofosbuvir was absented, with the 
state gaining no direct stake in the assets that public funding helped create (i.e. lack of VA 
licensing or stake in Pharmasset) and only diminished benefit back from the revenue on those 
assets (i.e. Gilead’s offshoring of sofosbuvir’s intellectual property for tax avoidance purposes and 
prices creating fiscal and treatment access pressures for public systems). Furthermore, much of 
the value exchanged in transactions between Gilead and public health systems was ultimately 
stockpiled for future acquisitions and directed to Gilead’s shareholders through buybacks and 
dividends. The health policy scholar Uwe Reinhardt has called this phenomenon in 
pharmaceuticals value-shifting, in that Gilead’s shareholders have gained a disproportionate share 
of the value that has materialized from the development of sofosbuvir (Reinhardt 2016). I take this 
further, arguing that value-shifting occurred in varying degrees across the innovation process – 
from venture capitalists risking capital for a significant gain, to Gilead’s shareholders engaging in 
value extraction – taking advantage of their position of control to, as Veblen would put it, ‘gain 
something for nothing’.   
Second, the links between this value logic and financial markets are, like with the ‘risk’ 
argument, obscured. Each R + D combination formed a pricing escalator that I described earlier, 
with health economic studies translating this formulation into ‘value’. These studies suffered from 
a methodological fault: as prices rose, along with the number of patients eligible to benefit from 
improved treatments, value-based pricing failed to consider the impacts of higher aggregate costs 
on public budgets – which ultimately led to access restrictions and diminished the very health 
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value being touted for the treatment.254 Furthermore, these studies required abstracting health 
away from patient’s lived experience of being infected with hepatitis C – and instead calculated 
value by imputing quantitative values (i.e. QALYs) that could be aggregated over a patient’s life 
time and across a population.255 My analysis of financialization showed, however, that the R+D 
underpinning value-based pricing and used in these health economics studies had less to do with 
valuing health and the experience of patients infected with hepatitis C, but rather more so to do 
with the mobilization of speculative capitals in financial markets - with investors, traders, and 
Gilead anticipating rising market valuations for intangible assets (the pricing escalator). In this 
way, ‘value-based pricing’ methodologies are fundamentally intertwined with the logics of 
speculative capitals and can be understood to be an artefact of the financial markets in which 
these capitals circulate.256  
6.3.3 The uses of justifications   
By revisiting dominant economic accounts on ‘risk’ and ‘value’, I demonstrated each of 
their limitations in explaining the prices of sofosbuvir-based medicines. ‘Risk’ and ‘value’ were 1) 
reduced to static metrics rather than considered as dynamic forms across an innovation process 
as well as 2) abstracted away from the financial market contexts in which biomedical innovation 
occurred in the case of hepatitis C. But my accounting of the innovation process in chapters 3 
through 5 also shows that these economic arguments cannot be merely dismissed. Rather, we can 
understand both accounts as central forms of justifications for drug pricing advanced by powerful 
actors to conserve a given distribution of capital.257   
																																																						
254 I described this dynamic in chapter 5 (section 5.2) as well as chapter 1 (section 1.1.2).  
255 For an extended and rich discussion on how health economics and clinical epidemiology studies today 
abstract health away from patient’s experiences and buttress the business models of pharmaceutical 
companies, see sociologists Sunder-Rajan’s (2017) new book Pharmocracy, as well as Joseph Dumit’s (2012) 
book Drugs for Life.  
256 Peterson’s work (2014:138) on speculation in pharmaceutical assets, though in a very different geographic 
context (Nigeria), is relevant here. She writes, “These politics (of pharmaceutical valuation) are a far cry 
from Joseph Schumpeter’s description of the monopoly as producing a low-risk environment for business 
innovation […] The ultimate result is that a politics of valuation is dissociated from the actual health needs 
of a population and, instead, connected to the speculative dynamics of pharmaceutical markets and 
industry practices.” 
257 Here, I draw on Veblen’s conception of control in capitalism in relation to societal values, developed 
later by Nitzan and Bischler (2009) as well as Cochrane (2011). In a piece tracing Veblen’s conception, 
Cochrane (2011:120) argues that “control actually constitutes the axia of every non-egalitarian society, with 
other values serving as an a posteriori justification for a distribution that favors the powerful”. In this case, I 
adapt Cochrane’s observation to situate ‘risk’ and ‘value’ as two forms of justifications – one ex-ante and one 
ex-post – that play out in the social spaces in which struggles for the control and distribution of capital in 
biomedical innovation are at stake.  
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Both accounts operate as types of justification for drug pricing. ‘Risk’ is used as an ex-ante 
justification by the pharmaceutical industry for patent-protected pricing power: no drug company 
will do research on a promising lead without intellectual property in place beforehand (Jasanoff 
2011). ‘Value’ is used as an ex-post justification, with end-stage manufacturers using health 
economic studies to demonstrate the relative value of their therapies to health systems at the 
launch prices they have set after a lengthy drug development process (Reinhardt 2015). As I 
highlighted in chapter 5 as well as my opening literature review, an array of academic, public 
relations, and lobbying clout – taken up by Gilead Sciences and the industry at large but also used 
by physicians and policy-makers – has attempted to advance the use of these justifications to 
legitimate the prices of drugs. At stake with these justifications are two critical features of the 
innovation process: the ownership and control over intangible pharmaceutical assets, closely 
linked with laissez-faire pricing regulations by government health systems. By attempting to use 
the ‘risk’ and ‘value’ arguments to legitimate these features of ownership and control, these 
accounts have become ‘internal’ to the innovation process itself: the unwillingness of the US state 
to exercise its Bayh-Dole ‘march-in’ rights and the limited use of countervailing power by the 
state with regards to sofosbuvir drug pricing were two examples of how the innovation process I 
described is sustained and reproduced.  
Beyond attempting to legitimate drug pricing, these accounts thus also serve another 
purpose: to conserve a given distribution of capital in the innovation process. This given 
distribution privileges, as I have illustrated in my findings, several actors and dynamics, such as 
the “maximizing of shareholder value”, the rewarding of venture capital and traders in financial 
markets to finance biotechnology, and a ‘market-fixing’ state enabling conversion of public 
science into private intangible assets but otherwise getting out of the way.258 Though the ‘risk’ and 
‘value’ accounts do not explicitly refer to this distribution of capital, they help sustain the modes 
of capital circulation and accumulation critical to the reproduction of these actors and dynamics 
in the innovation process.   
																																																						
258 An array of scholarship has pointed to the mythologies contained within each of these privileged 
dynamics, which I have alluded to in varying degrees throughout this dissertation. As a starting point for 
further insight into the mystifications involved in such economic arguments, see Lynn Stout’s (2013) work 
on the Myth of Shareholder Value; Nightingale, Martin, and Hopkins’ writings as well as Pisano’s work on 
the myth of the biotech revolution (Hopkins et al. 2007; Nightingale and Coad 2014; Nightingale and P. 
Martin 2004) and Pisano’s work on the limits of venture capital (Pisano 2006); Mazzucato’s elaboration of 
the discourses that obscure our understanding of public-private sector relations (Mazzucato 2013b).  
Roy	228 
	
Yet none of these dynamics were a ‘given’ in the unfolding of the innovation process 
behind sofosbuvir - as I have described through my empirical investigation, this distribution of 
capital has been a historical and politically contingent configuration in which the relations of 
powers between multiple state, business, and financial actors have been continually at stake. 
Share buybacks, for example, have not always been a dominant capital allocation strategy for 
pharmaceutical businesses. Making public science into financial assets has not been a trans-
historical phenomenon: the Bayh-Dole Act passed by the US Congress in 1980 created the 
political-legal contract by which this could occur. This contingent nature, highlighted by these 
two among many other examples, should offer promise to those positing reforms and imagining 
alternatives: there is no singular, ‘given’ way to configure biomedical innovation. But the uses of 
justifications, such as the ‘risk’ and ‘value’ arguments, highlights the vital importance for 
reformers to attend to and dissect the symbolic power of discursive claims in conserving a taken-
for-granted distribution of capital. This appeal harkens to Bourdieu’s call at the opening of this 
chapter: changing the future of biomedical innovation will require entering into social spaces of 
struggle and re-imagining the very vision and categories by which a distribution of capital is 
produced and reproduced.  
In conclusion, this section has thus sought not only to describe the limits of both 
economic accounts but also to illustrate the mechanisms by which these accounts have operated 
within the innovation process as strategies to legitimate drug prices and naturalize a given 
distribution of capital.   
6.3.4 A note on the monopoly-state relationship 
The monopoly-state analysis, lacking a consideration of the dynamics constituting 
financialization that I have described in this dissertation, not only fails to fully explain sofosbuvir’s 
prices, but also cannot mount an effective interrogation into the limits and uses of the dominant 
economic answers of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ I have thus far outlined in section 6.3.  
As I illustrated in chapter 5, Gilead’s monopoly power – with patent protection over 
sofosbuvir – combined with its lobbying clout to set prices at the upward limits of what they 
estimated public health systems could pay. But this monopoly-state relationship does not alone 
explain sofosbuvir’s prices, as it takes a narrow view of the structure and operation of the 
‘monopoly’ in the innovation process. First, the patent protection over sofosbuvir was controlled 
by multiple financial actors before Gilead Sciences, with hepatitis C assets deriving their value 
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from the anticipation of rising prices and expanding market size. Second, Gilead’s monopoly 
control over sofosbuvir was shaped by its relationship with financial markets and shareholders – 
with the expectation of continued growth structuring Gilead’s position as an ‘accumulation 
center’ in the innovation process, using capital derived from high priced medicines to acquire 
late-stage assets and distribute capital to shareholders. Third and finally, Gilead’s position with 
the state was governed not only by the health delivery state, but rather by a multi-valent state 
operating in different domains of the economy, from entrepreneurial public sector organizations 
making risk-taking investments to different bodies governing the rules of control over capital.    
With out this processual view of innovation, the monopoly-state critique also falls short in 
contending with the limits and uses of prevailing economic answers. The reduction in research 
and development investments alongside high prices - or a turn to value-based pricing – are both 
presented in the monopoly-state critique as the outcome of profit-maximizing businesses and its 
political power. Yet as I demonstrated above, such a critique remains incomplete with out a 
consideration of the financial contexts in which profits are not the only concern – but where the 
anticipation of growth structures the ways in which ‘risk’ and ‘value’ are dynamically configured 
and shaped (see my discussion on ‘risk-mitigation’ and ‘value-shifting’ above.) With these 
limitations, such an analysis of the monopoly-state relationship thus also offers narrow 
prescriptions by locating solutions at the point of exchange between a company and a 
government health system, such as increasing the negotiating power of the state in drug prices.259 
Yet my analysis shows the multiple mechanisms and relations of power that may be levers for 
attention in addressing the challenges of high drug prices, from alternative sources of funding for 
clinical trials to limiting (or prohibiting) share buybacks.  
 I next turn to specifying and extending the contributions that this dissertation offers 
before reflecting on the limitations I confronted through my research.    
6.4 Contributions, Limitations, and Questions for the Future  
In describing the three mechanisms underpinning the prices of sofosbuvir as a case of a 
financialized mode of accumulation, taking stock of its outcomes and consequences for both 
innovation and public health, as well as re-considering the existing answers on the prices of new 
medicines, I have pursued a set of contributions to the scholarly and policy debate that I highlight 
																																																						
259 A potentially important solution, but only one tool in a broader toolkit.  
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in this section. Yet the study was also bounded by several limitations; in identifying each of these, 
I forecast potential directions for further inquiry to complement a rich and growing research 
agenda into the links between financialization and and biomedical innovation.  
6.4.1. Contributions  
My dissertation makes three central contributions: a set of novel empirical findings on a 
crucial case, a synthetic analytical orientation towards studying drug pricing and biomedical 
innovation, and a methodological strategy bolstered by access to rare sources of data. These 
contributions in turn point towards a growing platform for scholarship and potential policy 
interventions.    
First, I made a set of novel empirical findings on a crucial case of drug pricing and 
biomedical innovation by linking the mechanisms of financialization to the prices of sofosbuvir-
based medicines. While prior analyzes of financialization had alluded to its influence in rising 
drug prices at a sector-wide level, I used a single case to more precisely illustrate the ways in 
which market valuations shaped the mobilization of speculative capital and how the control and 
expectations of shareholders structured Gilead as an accumulation center in the innovation 
process, distributing capital to shareholders and acquiring late-stage assets to generate further 
accumulation. I also ‘retrieved’ the role of an entrepreneurial state largely absented in public 
debate over sofosbuvir, while also tracing the role of the US state’s rule-making functions in 
governing the relative powers of different kinds of capital at play in the innovation process. In 
describing these mechanisms, I illuminated the dynamics particular to a curative therapy under 
conditions of financialization – with the downward slide to a patient cliff reinforcing Gilead’s 
speculative and extractive strategies in an effort to generate near-term growth for shareholders. 
With these insights, I was able to counter and situate the dominant economic accounts of risk 
and value in ways that can provide alternative policy critiques of rationales for high drug prices 
than those currently at the center of debates. The potential usefulness of these findings has been 
demonstrated during my dissertation, with three publications offering a slice of these findings – 
to which Gilead’s senior leadership responded directly in one case – and a meeting with the U.S. 
Senate Finance committee staff to share my research.260   
																																																						
260 See online for my July 2016 publication in the BMJ, Roy and King (2016) and the response by Gregg Alton, 
Gilead’s Executive Vice President. This publication primarily focused on findings from chapter 5, and my 
work has evolved since then as I have put together my dissertation.  
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Second, these empirical findings were linked to my analytical orientation, which drew 
together disparate literatures in a synthetic manner. This orientation can be used to investigate 
other cases of biomedical innovation and issues related to pricing and regulation. Rather than 
taking the existing economic account on hepatitis C and sofosbuvir as essential givens, I expanded 
the frame of analysis by looking at the nexus of relationships between state, business, and 
financial actors in a historical, processual manner. Though most sociological approaches of 
pharmaceuticals have privileged the state-business dyad, this triad of relationships may be used 
for analytical gains in multiple arenas of investigation in biomedicine and pharmaceuticals. My 
analytical orientation also highlighted the potential for applying Veblen to studying biomedical 
innovation and the pharmaceutical sector. His conceptualization of capital as 1) ownership and 
control over a community’s socially produced assets, 2) a quantified and future-oriented form of 
control aimed at differential growth and accumulation and 3) a relational form of power indicated 
through the capitalization process – can be a useful way to think about and interrogate the 
political-economic dynamics of the contemporary drug development process and broader life 
sciences sector given its place as a knowledge and capital-intensive domain of the economy (Birch 
2016, Gagnon 2016).261  
Third, this analytical orientation animated my pursuit and interpretation of data sources 
that are typically not mined, such as the interactions between investment analysts and senior 
executives at large companies on earnings calls. Reviewing earning call transcripts, for example, 
illuminated the stark dynamics of ‘cure markets’, the expectations and influences of financial 
markets, and the configuration of and response to recurrent episodes of crisis that Gilead faced. 
The release of the U.S. Senate Investigation also offered a surprise at the mid-point of my 
dissertation. Where most observers did not go beyond the initial 150-page Senate report, my 
analytical orientation allowed me to go further and interpret the nearly 1,500 pages in appendices 
on Pharmasset and Gilead’s internal operations and strategy. A review of internal corporate 
documents and board meeting minutes revealed, for example, the orientation of Pharmasset and 
Gilead to one another prior to the acquisition, and the relations of power at stake in the 
capitalization and betting process. This data proved critical to building my account of the 
innovation process. As researchers aim to re-embed analysis of biomedical innovation in the 
																																																						
261 This conceptualization allowed me to unpack, for example, the specific valuation logics underpinning 
Gilead’s $11 billion acquisition of Pharmasset, the structural crisis for larger drug companies created by 
demands for continual differential growth, as well as the financial market reaction to a curative therapy (an 
asset with a declining future earnings stream).  
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social and political-economic contexts in which it occurs (or fails to occur), an array of 
Congressional reviews and reports into pharmaceutical companies in recent years as well as 
earnings call transcripts offer two potential sources of data.262 
Taken together, my contributions and findings on financialization point also point to a 
larger platform of emerging sites of intervention and reinvention to address drug pricing. First, 
my findings help better situate existing proposals made in the drug pricing debate, which focus 
on the manufacturer-health system relationship. Second, and perhaps more importantly, my 
analysis of financialization indicates that the search for solutions must not be limited to a single 
relationship between manufacturers and buyers, but rather should focus on multiple levers of 
power across an innovation process that may influence drug prices. These proposals are 
motivated by a notion that debates over drug prices and access to medicines have a normative, 
moral dimension, in which health is viewed not as just any asset or public good, but rather a 
domain for which we may need to imagine a political economy for health as a human right 
(Orsenigo et al, 2009). 
In the first category of potential solutions are the calls for governments and health 
systems to be able to better negotiate and regulate the prices that manufacturers can set. Across 
Europe and even now with growing momentum in the U.S., ‘value-based pricing’ is held to be one 
method for restraining drug prices (Bach and Pearson 2015). But as I described in chapter 5, while 
‘value-based pricing’ may provide a ceiling to the charges that company’s may charge, the overall 
trend towards ever higher prices will be challenging to restrain as each price sets the floor for the 
next price in a therapeutic area (Bach and Pearson 2015; Sarpatwari et al 2016).263 Another strategy 
being considered are laws that mandate ‘transparency’ whereby companies are required to report 
research and development costs associated with price setting (Sarpatwari et al 2016).264 The main 
																																																						
262 For example, recent Congressional investigations into Turing Pharmaceuticals, Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 
and inquiry into Mylan Pharmaceuticals all offer opportunities to examine how different companies 
approached drug pricing from within the corporation (Rockoff et al. 2016). 
263 Value based pricing may give governments a limited tool to regulate the upward increases in price by 
setting ceilings on the rate of increase, like the NHS has done, above which they are likely to not pay for a 
new drug (Bach and Pearson 2015). Yet this will not lead to a major shift in the overall dynamics around 
value creation and value extraction that are at play with financialized innovation, and prices will likely 
continue to rise well beyond rate of inflation (Reinhardt 2015). 
264 Multiple US states are considering legislation requiring companies to report research and development 
costs when prices of new medicines are set (Sarpatwari 2016). Reporting research and development 
expenses on a per drug basis, as Pharmasset and Gilead did in the US Senate investigation, can be a political 
tool via offering transparency, but as I highlighted in chapter 1, still will leave open multiple kinds of 
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benefit of such a proposal would be political in nature, as it would likely provide greater evidence 
for the uncoupling of research and development expenses and drug prices. Such evidence may 
embolden efforts at legislative changes for drug pricing regulation, and in the long-run could 
provide more data for advocates pushing for alternative models of health innovation. Finally, 
another direction might be to consider new public-private contracts that allow for fair pricing 
deliberations in cases where innovation processes receive significant public investment (often 
well beyond early stage science). This could also include public ownership stakes in companies 
where the state makes a direct investment, whereby taxpayers receive a return that can be 
reinvested into nurturing further public investment for innovation (Mazzucato 2016).  
The second category I identified above involves looking more at the multiple sites and 
levers by which financialization operates across innovation processes. One direction is the search 
for more patient forms of financing (i.e. more patient venture capital, public financing) across the 
currently fragmented and linear chain of speculative financial actors. The boldest alternative in 
this direction would be the development of a ‘prize system’, in which philanthropic and public 
grants could ‘push’ research forward, and publicly financed ‘prizes’ could pull developed products 
to market (Baker 2008; Love and Hubbard 2009). In this strategy, prizes would replace patents as 
the reward mechanism, as prices would be coupled to the costs of production, thereby 
significantly lowering drug prices: entrepreneurial teams would receive prizes as compensation, 
and generic manufacturers would receive the license to produce the new technology for a 
marginal profit. Such a strategy may work in an area of major public health concern, such as 
antibiotic resistance, infectious diseases such as HIV, and cancer. Another direction in this second 
category aimed at financialization are changes in the rules of corporate governance that privilege 
shareholders, such as untangling the nexus of ties between executive compensation, shareholder 
power, and capital distributions via buybacks (Lazonick 2014; Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013). For 
example, limiting stock-based awards as well as share buybacks could lead to firms relying less on 
price increases on existing products as well as expensive late-stage acquisitions for generating 
short-term growth and instead invest more in long-term research and development. This may 
lead to a ‘re-coupling’ of drug prices more closely with the costs of innovation, with the additional 
benefit of providing greater capital for the long-term risks required in biomedical research.  
																																																						
interpretations – such as how to account for the speculative costs of acquisitions or even what implication 
such data has for pricing, given the financialization of drug development. 
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Table 6.4 below summarizes this survey of potential directions for drug prices, in which 
prices are ‘coupled’ less to the structure, expectations, and power relations of financial markets 
and more to alternative metrics, such as public budgets and public investments, as well as the 
costs of production and innovation. Further research and policy experimentation will yield 
evidence on the effectiveness of these possible directions. A central lesson offered by this 
dissertation is that no single lever will address the challenge of drug prices; the survey of levers I 
offer here is by no means an exhaustive elaboration of policy directions, but points to the wide 
landscape upon which reformers might imagine solutions given the impacts of financialization.  
 
Table 6.4 Scenarios for coupling prices to production, innovation, and/or public health   
Drug prices 
coupled to:  
Main political-economic 
mechanisms 
Consequences for drug prices  
Public budgets 
and public 
health need   
Increasing government negotiating 
power; value-based pricing 
assessments  
Increases in drug prices may be 
restrained over time, with 
governments better able to assure 
universal coverage for new health 
technologies    
Public 
investment   
State takes ownership stakes in 
financed companies; public-private 
contracts developed in which prices 
negotiated upfront in areas of 
significant public investment  
State gets a direct return on 
investment through stake while also 
contracting with private 
manufacturers to assure access for 
technologies developed with public 
investment; drug prices would be 
related to public investment and also 
budgets of health system buyers  
Cost of 
production  
Prize system where patents are 
licensed to generic manufacturers in 
exchange for entrepreneurial 
teams/companies receiving major 
financial reward  
Prices significantly drop in areas of 
health research where public prizes 
are created and new therapeutic 
development occurs.  
Cost of 
innovation  
Reforming/limiting share buybacks 
and executive compensation; 
instituting reforms towards more 
‘stakeholder’ oriented corporate 
governance 
Companies may invest more in long-
term research and couple their prices 
(and profits) to their re-investments, 
resulting in a slower rate of growth in 
prices.   
Financialization 
and what 
‘society can 
bear’  
Status quo of stock-market and 
shareholder-driven model, in which 
prices and corporate strategy are 
linked to meeting expectations of 
near-term growth  
Escalating drug prices that are linked 
to the upward limits of what ‘society 
can bear’, as in Gilead’s case with 
sofosbuvir 
Note: Gray boxed indicate alternative directions for drug prices.  
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6.4.2 Limitations and questions for the future  
My study was bounded by three limitations. While none of these limitations hampered by 
ability to answer the two questions set forth, each translates into potential directions to extend 
research into the mechanisms and outcomes of financialization in relation to biomedical 
innovation.  
First, my analysis looked at a single case, which limits the potential generalizability of the 
findings (i.e. the extent to which financialization, as defined in this dissertation, plays a role in 
other therapeutic areas). However, my aim from the beginning was to use the deeper 
interrogation offered by analysis of a single case to trace the central mechanisms and relations of 
power at stake, which could inform a larger comparative analysis across compounds and 
therapeutic areas. For example, comparing the sofosbuvir case with the innovation processes 
behind a particular oncology technology (such as CAR-T) in the present and a process from the 
past such as anti-retroviral therapies for HIV/AIDS in the 1980s and 1990s may yield comparative 
historical insight into shifting political-economic and organizational dynamics explaining drug 
development and pricing. A study could also compare across multiple therapeutic areas 
contemporaneously to examine the extent to which state-business-finance dynamics differ or are 
similar by therapeutic type (biologics versus small molecules) or health challenge (i.e. cancer 
versus HIV/AIDS).   
Second, within the category of financial actors, I did not distinguish between different 
kinds of shareholders when discussing Gilead’s owners, besides identifying Gilead’s executives as 
major shareholders themselves in addition to institutional shareholders. While I did follow the 
differences between speculative capital, venture capital, and corporate capital (Roche), I largely 
held Gilead’s shareholders to be acting as a monolithic group. Part of the reason for this limitation 
is that I could not reach investors with the top institutional shareholders with links to the 
hepatitis C case for interviews. My analysis of Gilead’s shareholders relied heavily on investor 
notes and earnings call transcripts, which provided one lens into understanding how financial 
markets were potentially shaping the company’s strategies. Additional research could focus on 
interviews as well as deeper documentary searches aimed at unveiling the role of other 
institutional investors such as hedge funds and pension funds. Elucidating the specific function 
and strategies of these actors can provide further insight into how financial markets fuel 
valuations and structure the business models of small and large companies. 
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Third, my account of the state’s role in the innovation process, and with regards to 
financialization specifically, did not fully trace the strategic interests and relations of power that 
influenced public organizations and state-rule making processes. 265  Instead, I focused my 
attention on the trajectory of intangible assets and the flow of capital allocation, accumulation, 
and distribution within the sofosbuvir innovation process – and then drew on others’ historical 
studies of state policy and regulation to understand their links to the sofosbuvir case (i.e. Bayh-
Dole Act, Rule 10-b-18, Medicare Part D drug pricing negotiation). This allowed me to answer my 
research questions into the organizational and political-economic dynamics of sofosbuvir’s 
innovation process and pricing. But unlike the ‘thick’ account I provided of the entrepreneurial 
state’s role in the sofosbuvir innovation process, my treatment of the state’s governance pointed 
to the state’s role in permitting and sanctioning certain rules in different domains of the economy 
with out fully tracing the ways in which these rules may have been influenced and changed over 
time. A fuller account of the state’s role in the financialization of biomedical innovation could 
bring together historical analysis of each of the key policy shifts raised in this dissertation, a 
political sociology of the relationships within the state between different US public sector 
organizations (such as the NIH, FDA, VA, SEC), as well as a tracing of the relations between the 
state and business and financial actors. One potential direction may be to investigate the 
relationship between publicly funded science and contracts over future drug pricing.266 A 
direction of research analyzing the state may take a cue from Gretta Krippner’s work in 
Capitalizing on Crisis, in which she traces financialization from the perspective of state policy-
makers, and how their attempts to address different crises beginning in the 1970s ultimately led to 
the rise of finance (Krippner 2011). 
These three limitations in my investigation – a focus on a single case, Gilead’s 
shareholders as largely a monolithic group, and a limited tracing of the state’s governance with 
																																																						
265 A thorny area for investigation in relation to the state are the uses of publicly funded science across 
borders as a global public good – as happened in the case of the replicon and the McGuigan method – in 
which multiple states financed the development of critical inputs to sofosbuvir. Such an effort fell outside 
the scope of the dissertation, but see work by Suerie Moon and colleagues on the potential for a global R&D 
treaty to address research for vulnerable populations (Moon et al. 2012). 
266 The NIH has enabled technology transfer since the 1980s with private companies, but in the mid-1990s 
struck a ‘reasonable price’ clause from their agreements (Richtel and Pollack 2016). Though the Bayh-Dole 
Act stipulates a march-in clause in cases of public health concern such that the US government can license 
intellectual property, the clause has never been exercised in 37 years (Silverman 2016). Similarly, though the 
Veterans Affairs finances research and development, they did not take any stake in Schinazi’s intellectual 
property nor the development of Pharmasset. Further research within the state may elaborate potential 
explanations for these outcomes. 
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relation to the financialization of biomedical innovation – all can be complemented by existing or 
emerging threads of scholarship. Such research can further our understanding of political-
economic dynamics that have re-configured the way new medicines are developed, valued, and 
priced.  
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Conclusion: Back to Extraction and Onwards to Care  
 
In following the trajectory of sofosbuvir in this dissertation, my research indicates a kind 
of return to an earlier time in drug development. The modern pharmaceutical industry’s genesis 
in the 19th century began with isolating therapeutic elements from plants that would ultimately 
lead to medicines such as aspirin (for its analgesic and anti-fever properties) and chloral hydrate 
(for sedation). As Hopkins et al (2007) elaborate, a particular ‘heuristic’ molded the early 
developers of medicinal compounds: extraction from the natural world. As the next century 
unfolded and industrial and technological advances were used in pharmaceutical development, 
new heuristics came to dominate, such as a focus on synthetic organic chemistry through much of 
the mid-20th century and a turn to biotechnology in the latter two decades.  
The case of sofosbuvir, however, reveals a reappearance of an earlier, extraction-oriented 
heuristic. When applied to sofosbuvir, however, the heuristic refers to a social phenomenon 
whereby rather than extraction drawing directly from nature, we observed a political-economic 
form of extraction, characterized by financialization, in part driven by the shareholders of an 
established, publicly traded pharmaceutical company. Economic justifications of ‘risk’ and ‘value’ 
have attempted to naturalize this political-economic form. I have shown, however, that these 
economic justifications of drug pricing aim to conserve a distribution of capital that is far from 
given: rather, the financialization of the innovation process and pricing behind sofosbuvir-based 
medicines has been a historically and politically contingent unfolding shaped by shifting relations 
of power between state, business, and financial actors. Though I have illustrated this dynamic in a 
single case of sofosbuvir, the increasing use of concepts like ‘financial toxicity’, elaborated by 
oncologists to describe the medical side effects their patients experience from the anxiety of high 
drug prices, is an indication of the broader implications at play in this form of extraction: patients 
feel it in their bodies (Zafar 2015; Zafar and Abernethy 2013). 
This dissertation’s introductory chapter concluded with a notion that drug prices which 
place medicine out of reach for patients and populations strikes against our common-sense ideal 
of care in biomedicine. As a physician-to-be committed to caring for vulnerable communities, this 
sense hits me palpably. In the case of hepatitis C, hundreds of thousands of patients continue to 
wait for sofosbuvir in the US, and millions more across the world (Edlin 2016; Iyengar et al. 2016). 
Yet as I also suggested in the introduction, the moral appeal that this ideal provokes in the face of 
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such outcomes is not enough on its own to provide an analysis of how these outcomes came to be, 
or what might be done about them. This dissertation was one modest attempt to provide such an 
analysis. As my findings demonstrate, crossing the breach between the reality of biomedical 
innovation under conditions of financialization and the ideal of care will involve more than a 
single step or a straight path. Our attention must turn towards multiple relations of power and 
flows of capital and knowledge. 
In forging this future, sources for aspiration abound: the economist Carlota Perez, for 
example, has shown that though financialization has emerged in every technological epoch since 
the dawn of industrial capitalism, the process has also ultimately provoked a societal response in 
each of these epochs, whereby the technological possibilities of the time are re-balanced towards 
the concerns of the public, rather than those of financial capital (Perez 2002). If the debate 
spurred by sofosbuvir and the multiple re-imaginings already underway within global agencies, 
national capitols, and civil society267 are any indication of the early stages of this response, the 
kind of future where new medicines are put more fully in the service of care is not beyond our 
sight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
267 See UN High-Level panel on access to medicines from 2015-2016 (http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/new-
page/) and report by Universities Allied for Essential Medicines for examples of alternatives currently being 
explored (Greenberg and Kiddell-Monroe 2016).  
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Glossary of Key Terms 
 
Scientific and medical terms 
 
Fibrosis – progressive scarring of liver tissue which can lead to cirrhosis, or impairment of liver 
function; caused by the body’s immune response to the hepatitis C virus, among other potential 
causes; patients with hepatitis C can be ‘staged’ for the severity of their liver damage using 
‘fibrosis scores’, with ‘F0’ indicating earliest stages, and F4 indicating more advanced liver disease.  
 
Interferon – the medicine used in treatments for hepatitis C prior to sofosbuvir; highly toxic side 
effects, long treatment regimen (upwards of 1 year), and cure rates below 50% meant that only 
sickest patients with hepatitis C typically tried the medicine.   
 
Nucleosides – refers to the class of medicinal compounds which insert themselves into the 
genetic material of a replicating pathogen, thereby terminating replication. Sofosbuvir is one such 
nucleoside compound, targeting the NS5b polymerase of the hepatitis C virus and thereby 
inserting itself into hepatitis C genetic material.   
 
Replicon – a pivotal research tool which enabled replication of the hepatitis C genomic material 
while producing the key viral proteins used as targets in drug development; developed in the late 
1990s and early 2000s by US and German scientists and used by drug developers to test 
compounds directly against the hepatitis C virus to measure anti-viral effect.  
 
Sustained virologic response (SVR) (or cure rate) – the failure to detect virus for 12 weeks after 
the completion of treatment; used as a surrogate end point in hepatitis C clinical trials and is 
clinically defined as cure. Long-term studies have shown less than 1% of patients to remit after 
realizing SVR on treatment.    
 
Sofosbuvir (also PSI-7977) – the curative medicine for hepatitis C that is the subject of my 
dissertation, leading to cure rates of greater than 90-95% in most patient cohorts; used as the 
backbone compound in combination with other secondary compounds as a single, daily oral pill 
which eliminates the need for interferon; combination therapies referred to as sofosbuvir-based 
treatments; compound known as PSI-7977 when developed and controlled by Pharmasset. The 
brand name for sofosbuvir alone is Sovaldi, and in combination is known as Harvoni.  
 
Business and finance terms  
 
Assets (intangible and tangible) - a resource that is controlled by the entity because of past 
creation or purchase and from which future economic benefits are expected; tangible assets are 
physical, such as land, vehicles, inventory, equipment, or cash whereas intangible assets are non-
monetary assets that are without physical substance, such as knowledge, patents, copyrights.   
Capitalization – a valuation method that transforms a potential future earnings stream into a 
present value based on a discount rate.  
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Cost of capital – the return expected by those who provide capital for the business such as debt 
holders or equity investors; investors use it to assess the risk of a company’s equity and is 
calculated by weighting the cost of a company’s debt and equity.  
 
Differential rate of growth – expectation of investors for capital in a given investment to create 
a higher rate of return than a competing vehicle of investment, leading to differential 
accumulation; indicated by Veblen as a core concern driving capitalists in their ownership and 
control of assets.  
 
Discount rate – the rate of earnings that must be exceeded to justify an investment; used to 
calculate the value of future cash flows in terms of present value, based on the idea that money 
tomorrow is less valuable then money today (time value of money).  
 
Launch prices – the prices set by a pharmaceutical company at the time of drug approval; these 
prices can be discounted (discount prices) via offering health systems rebates.  
 
Net Present Value – the present value of an investment’s expected cash flow minus the costs of 
making the investment; used by business managers to make investment decisions; a positive NPV 
for an investment project recommends investment by business managers, whereas a negative NPV 
points towards the rejection of the given investment.  
 
Rate of profitability – also profit margin: calculated by taking the net income (total revenues 
minus operational, cost of goods sold, taxes, interest) over the total revenue for a business.  
 
Share buybacks – when a company’s senior leadership purchases a company’s own shares on 
public equity markets using the company’s capital (cash and/or debt), intending to raise the value 
of a company’s share by boosting earnings per share; allowed after a SEC rule change in 1982.  
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Appendix A: Data Sources   
In this Appendix, I elaborate on the four key sources of data used in this research project: 
   
• Documentary sources 
• Semi-structured interviews 
• Databases 
• Observation at meetings  
 
For semi-structured interviews, databases, and observation at meetings, I name each of the 
sources. Because documentary sources involved hundreds of pieces of content which are 
contained in the bibliography and in-text citations, I provide a brief description of how I retrieved 
them and offer a few examples of the kinds of documents I interpreted. Refer to chapter 2 for 
complimentary description about my data collection strategy.  
 
Documentary sources 
 
Scientific and 
medical 
journals  
• First, to identify the key scientific advances in the history of hepatitis C 
science and drug development, I used Web of Science and PubMed 
databases using the search terms “hepatitis C life cycle” and “hepatitis C 
drug development”.268 I looked at the most cited ‘original research’ 
articles in conjunction with ‘review articles’ to identify key advances as 
well as the scientists and organizations involved in these advances.  
• Second, I searched specific journals I knew to be important in the field 
from my background as a medical student. For scientific developments, I 
specifically looked at Science and Hepatology to ensure that my prior 
broad search did not leave out potentially important papers.269 This 
specific search yielded multiple biographical, opinion, and journalistic 
pieces that the Web of Science and PubMed queries missed.  
• Third, I also searched Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA), 
New England Journal of Medicine, Health Affairs, Lancet, and the Annals 
of Internal Medicine, as these are the five key journals that cover health 
policy issues. I used the terms “sofosbuvir drug pricing” and “hepatitis C 
treatment access” to identify articles that allowed me to gain a base-line 
understanding of the deployment dynamics of the sofosbuvir innovation 
process.  
• Fourth, an initial set of articles then led into snowballing, with further 
articles gathered over the course of the research.  
 
Here are examples of key articles that were yielded from this collection.  
 
Key examples of articles on scientific and technological 
developments:  
																																																						
268 I chose ‘life cycle’ to focus on the early science that elaborated the fundamentals of how the hepatitis C 
virus reproduces itself, where as ‘drug development’ articles built off this previous work to pursue 
therapeutics designed to interrupt this reproduction.  
269 For example, a writer for Science, Jon Cohen, wrote three journalistic pieces on hepatitis C drug 
development that were not captured by the initial search for scientific articles, but which contained 
important historical data on the drug development process as well as biographical data on a key publicly 
funded scientist, Ray Schinazi.  
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o Alter, H. J. 2013. “The Road Not Taken or How I Learned to Love the 
Liver: a Personal Perspective on Hepatitis History.” Hepatology 
59(1):4–12. Describes the early NIH stages of hepatitis C research from 
perspective of Harvey Alter, a leading viral hepatitis scientist for forty 
years.   
o Cohen, J. 2015. “King of the Pills.” Science 348(6235):622–25. Describes 
the founder of Pharmasset and his early research into drug 
development.  
o Bartenschlager, R., Rice, and M. J. Sofia. 2016. “Hepatitis C Virus—
From Discovery to Cure: the 2016 Lasker-DeBakey Clinical Medical 
Research Award.” JAMA. Scientists describes their development of the 
replicon as well as the discovery and development of sofosbuvir.  
o Sofia, M. J. et al. 2010. “Discovery of a Β-D-2ʹ-Deoxy-2ʹ-Α-Fluoro-2ʹ-Β-
C-Methyluridine Nucleotide Prodrug (PSI-7977) for the Treatment of 
Hepatitis C Virus.” Journal of Medicinal Chemistry 53(19):7202–
18.Michael Sofia – ‘inventor’ of sofosbuvir – describes the development 
process for sofosbuvir.  
 
Example of key policy and treatment access articles:  
o Brennan, T. and W. Shrank. 2014. “New Expensive Treatments for 
Hepatitis C Infection.” JAMA 312(6):593–94. Interprets Gilead’s pricing 
and implications for insurance and coverage.   
o Van Nuys, K. et al. 2015. “Broad Hepatitis C Treatment Scenarios 
Return Substantial Health Gains, but Capacity Is a Concern.” Health 
Affairs 34(10):1666–74. Describes downstream health savings from 
sofosbuvir using epidemiological modeling.  
o Chahal, H. S. et al. 2016. “Cost-Effectiveness of Early Treatment of 
Hepatitis C Virus Genotype 1 by Stage of Liver Fibrosis in a US 
Treatment-Naive Population.” JAMA Internal Medicine 176(1):65–73. 
Describes cost-effectiveness evaluation for sofosbuvir from health 
economics vantage.  
o Canary, L. A., R. M. Klevens, and S. D. Holmberg. 2015. “Limited 
Access to New Hepatitis C Virus Treatment Under State Medicaid 
Programs.” Annals of Internal Medicine 163(3):226–28.Describing the 
extent of treatment access restrictions across the US from 2014-2015. 
Media accounts  o I used Lexis Nexis to search in New York Times, Bloomberg News, 
Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times between January 1, 2000 to 
October 1, 2014. I did a more recent search from October 2, 2014 – 
December 1, 2016 to include major updates.  
o I also followed STAT Health and FiercePharma/FierceBiotech, two 
websites focused on industry-related news, to stay up to date on 
further development, which often pointed me to one of the news 
outlets in the prior bullet.  
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Organizational 
and institutional 
reports and  
filings  
o US Senate Finance Committee Investigation into Sovaldi’s impacts 
on US health care system, Dec 2015; 2,000 pages, including internal 
corporate documents from Gilead and Pharmasset 
o NIH – U.S. government documents (8): 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 – NIH 
Action Plan for Liver Disease Research launched in 2003, with 3 annual 
follow-up updates (2004-2006); 1999, 2002 – NIH Consensus 
Statements on Hepatitis C; December 14, 2004 – testimony to U.S. 
House Committee on Government Reform by Dr. Jay Hoofnagle, 
Director of Liver Disease Research Branch of National Institutes of 
Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) of NIH 
o Annual SEC filings of Pharmasset and Gilead (16); Pharmasset’s 10-
K annual filings, 2007-2011; Gilead’s 10-K annual filings, 2007-2016; 
Schedule 14D-9; filing of acquisition of Pharmasset by Gilead  
o Investment analyst call transcripts (18): Gilead – Pharmasset M&A 
Call, November 21, 2011; Gilead’s quarterly earnings calls between 
February, 2012 (first call post-acquisition) and September, 2016 
o Investor notes and reports (11): RBC Capital (1), Evercore ISI (7), JP 
Morgan (3) from Thomson Reuters database at Judge Business School 
o FDA-review (4): FDA antiviral drugs advisory committee meeting; 
background package, GS-7977 (sofosbuvir), October 25, 2013; Gilead 
Sciences, Antiviral Drugs Advisory Committee (AVDAC) Meeting, 
briefing document, October 25, 2013; FDA introductory remarks, 
October 25, 2013, Dr. Debra Birnkrant (slides); FDA, Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, summary minutes of AVDAC meeting, 
October 25, 2013.  
Historical  
research  
I used my literature review, presented in chapter 1 (section 1.3) as an initial 
starting point from which to identify key papers (and book chapters) that 
provided historical context on the key rules, policies and political-
economic dynamics shaping the sofosbuvir innovation process. From this 
starting point, I used bibliographies to develop a snow-ball samples of key 
papers, typically finding atleast 2-3 papers on each domain or area, from 
Bayh-Dole to the rise of finance. Here is a sampling of the historical 
research from which I drew insights:   
• Gompers, Paul A. 1994. “The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital.” 
Business and Economic History 23(2). 
• Keller, M R. and F Block. 2013. “Explaining the Transformation in the 
US Innovation System: the Impact of a Small Government Program.” 
Socio-Economic Review 11(4):629–56. 
• Lazonick, W. 2015. Stock Buybacks: From Retain-and Reinvest to 
Downsize-and-Distribute. Brookings Institution.  
• Davis, Gerald. 2009. Managed by Markets: How Finance Reshaped 
America. Oxford University Press. 
• Kesselheim, Aaron S. 2011. “An Empirical Review of Major Legislation 
Affecting Drug Development: Past Experiences, Effects, and 
Unintended Consequences.” The Milbank Quarterly 89(3):450–502. 
• Boettiger, Sara and Alan B. Bennett. 2006. “Bayh-Dole: if We Knew 
Then What We Know Now.” Nature Biotechnology 24(3):320–23. 
• Rai, Arti and Rebecca Eisenberg. 2003. “Bayh-Dole Reform and the 
Progress of Biomedicine.” American Scientist 91(1):52. 
•  Lazonick, W and M Mazzucato. 2013. “The Risk-Reward Nexus in the 
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Structures and the Making of U.S. Biotechnology.” in State of 
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 Semi-structured interviews  
 
 
# 
Actor type  Position title  Date Length 
(total) 
Method 
1 pharma 
business 
executive 
Director, Regulatory Affairs 9/8/2014 60 In-person 
2 drug pricing 
activist 
Executive Director of 
lobbying group  
8/24/2014 60 In person 
3 pharma 
business 
executive 
Medical Director 3/4/2015 40 Phone 
4 journalist biotechnology reporter 3/24/2015 40 Phone 
5,3
8 
pharma 
business 
executive 
Senior Vice President of 
Clinical Research 
3/27/2015, 
7/15/2015 
80 phone, In-person 
6 hepatitis C 
clinician 
consultant hepatologist 12/3/2014 20 In-person 
7 academic 
scientist 
researcher at university lab  2/5/2015 45 Phone 
8 public official CEO of publicly funded 
insurance group 
3/19/2015 40 Phone 
9 academic 
scientist 
doctoral researcher  3/19/2015 40 In-person 
10 patient 
advocate/act
ivist 
director of legal program 4/13/2015 35 phone 
11 pharma 
business 
executive 
pricing consultant 4/21/2015 20 In-person 
12 investment 
analyst 
analyst at major biotech 
investment group 
5/20/2015 60 Phone 
13 pharma 
business 
executive 
CEO of small biotech 
company  
4/9/2015 40 Phone 
14 academic 
scientist 
researcher at university lab  5/9/2015 40 phone, email 
15 investment 
analyst 
analyst at major biotech 
investment group 
5/23/2015 60 Phone 
16 public official Executive Director of 
publicly funded insurance 
group 
5/25/2015 60 In-person 
17 academic 
scientist 
senior researcher at research 
institute 
5/25/2015 90 In-person 
18, 
39 
hepatitis C 
clinician 
doctor and program director 6/3/2015, 
7/22/2015 
90 phone, In-person 
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19 drug pricing 
activist 
access to medicines program 
director at consumer group 
6/5/2015 60 In-person 
20 academic 
scientist 
senior researcher at research 
institute 
6/10/2015 40 In-person 
21, 
40 
patient 
advocate 
access to medicines program 
director at major 
foundation 
6/12/2015, 
12/15/2015 
60 In-person 
22 patient 
advocate 
Executive Director of major 
patient group for hepatitis 
C 
7/8/2015 60 In-person 
23 academic 
scientist 
senior researcher at research 
institute 
7/7/2015 40 Phone 
24 pharma 
business 
executive 
Director, Public Policy  7/20/2015 50 In-person 
25 public official Health Policy director of US 
Senate legislator  
7/27/2015 40 In-person 
26 pharma 
business 
executive / 
scientist 
Project Manager, lead at 
major pharmaceutical 
company 
7/30/2015 40 Phone 
27 patient 
advocate 
hepatitis C director at 
patient advocacy group 
8/5/2015 40 Phone 
28 academic 
scientist, 
pharma 
business 
executive 
organic chemist, CEO of 
small biotech company 
8/15/2015 35 Phone 
29 public official Health Policy director of US 
Senate legislator  
10/22/2015 30 Phone 
30 public official public health expert 12/9/2015 30 In-person 
31 pharma 
business 
executive 
medical director at 
biotechnology company  
12/8/2015 60 In-person 
32 academic 
scientist 
senior researcher at research 
institute 
12/8/2015 30 In-person 
33 academic 
scientist 
researcher at university lab  12/9/2015 60 In-person 
34 medicinal 
chemist 
scientist and executive at 
small biotechnology 
company 
12/8/2015 40 In-person 
35 pharma 
business 
executive / 
scientist 
scientist at small 
biotechnology company 
12/10/2015 45 In-person 
36 patient 
advocate/act
ivist 
lawyer for access to 
medicines group  
12/15/2015 60 In-person 
37 pharma 
business 
executive 
market analyst for 
consulting group to large 
pharmaceutical companies 
12/15/2015 20 In-person 
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41 Venture 
capitalist 
Lead partner at venture fund 
that invests in 
biotechnology companies 
2/17/2017 60 In-person 
 
Databases 
 
o S&P Capital database  
o Gilead Sciences corporate profile and timeline of all events with all major press 
releases on product announcements, investor reports along with complete 
reported financial data  
o Pharmasset corporate profile and timeline of all events with all major press 
releases on product announcements, investor reports along with complete 
reported financial data 
o Access provided via University of Cambridge Judge Business School  
o National Institutes of Health database 
o Reporter database to track public funding for APATH LLC, Pharmasset, Dr. Ray 
Schinazi, Dr. Charlie Rice  
o Wayback Machine database  
o Examining archived websites for Pharmasset and APATH LLC  
o Centers for Medicare and Medicaid drug spending database 
o Collection of data regarding public spending in the US, which includes hepatitis C 
and sofosbuvir-based medicines.  
o OpenSecrets 
o Political lobbying spending database, which I used to track Gilead’s lobbying 
spending to understand their strategy to influence the US state with regards to 
their hepatitis C drug prices  
 
Observation of public meetings 
 
Direct observation (6)  
Event; Date; Location  Key attendees  
FDA/CMS Summit; 
December 12, 2014; 
Washington D.C. 
 
A gathering of regulatory officials from the FDA, payers such as the 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare, and pharmaceutical 
companies; notable, John McHutchison, EVP of Clinical Research 
for Gilead and leading hepatologist and clinical researcher.  
 
British Association for 
Study of the Liver 
(BASL) clinicians 
meeting; March 3, 2015; 
London 
A gathering of leading hepatologists in the UK to discuss Hepatitis 
C guidelines to be shared with the NHS for upcoming policy 
development; leading British hepatologist Dr. Graham Foster, 
chaired the meeting; also notable: Charles Gore, head of the World 
Hepatitis Alliance, a patient advocacy group, also participated.  
Meeting of British Viral 
Hepatitis Group; March 
6, 2016; London 
A conference of the BVHG to discuss Hepatitis C strategy with a 
broader group of hepatologists from across the UK; noteable 
speaker: Dr. Ustianowski, member of NHS Clinical Reference group 
charged with Hepatitis C policy development as well as 
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representatives from each of the major pharma companies with 
Hepatitis C treatments 
 
National Viral Hepatitis 
Roundtable World 
Hepatitis Day meeting; 
July 29, 2015; 
Washington, D.C.  
A gathering of 25+ key stakeholders involved in Hepatitis C policy; 
notable: Dr. John Ward, head of Viral Hepatitis department at 
CDC, industry officials from all major hep C manufacturers 
 
LSE-ICL Forum on 
Medical Innovation; 
October 14, 2015; 
London 
A forum between scholars of the pharmaceutical industry 
sponsored by Gilead Sciences; notable speaker: John Milligan, 
President and COO, Gilead.  
 
HEPDART; December 
6-10, 2015; Hawaii 
 
A forum organized by Dr. Ray Schinazi, leading anti-viral 
researcher and founder of Pharmasset which ultimately produced 
sofosbuvir; scientists, pharmaceutical companies, and investors all 
present at this exclusive meeting forecasting the future of Hepatitis 
C science and research 
 
Observed online video and/or transcript of event (3) 
Event; date; location  Key attendees  
If You Cure It, Will They Pay? 
Placing a Value on Lives?; April 
30, 2014; Milken Institute; Santa 
Monica, CA; (Available at: 
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/e
vents/conferences/global-
conference/2014/panel-
detail/4876) 
 
A panel discussion featuring: Gregg Alton, Executive Vice 
President, Corporate and Medical Affairs, Gilead Sciences, 
Inc.; Shamiram Feinglass, Founder and CEO, The Feinglass 
Group; Former Vice President, Global Medical and 
Regulatory Affairs, Zimmer; Dean Rosen, President and 
CEO, Breakaway Policy Strategies; Partner, Mehlman Vogel 
Castagnetti; Reed Tuckson, Managing Director, Tuckson 
Health Connections; Sean Tunis, President and CEO, Center 
for Medical Technology Policy 
 
American Enterprise Institute 
panel discussion, “How will we 
pay for cures?”; July 11th, 2014; 
Washington D.C. (complete 
transcript)  
 
Featuring: Gregg Alton, EVP of Corporate and Medical 
Affairs, Gilead Sciences; Mark B. McClellan, Brookings 
Institution; Dan Mendelson, Avalre Health; Dirk Calcoen; 
Boston Consulting Group; Scott Gottlieb AEI; Rep Michael 
C. Burgess (R-TX)  
 
Brookings Institute panel 
discussion “The Cost and Value of 
Biomedical Innovation – 
Implications for Health Policy”; 
October 1, 2014; Washington D.C. 
(available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/events
/2014/10/01-cost-and-value-
biomedical-innnovation-hep-c) 
 
Featuring: John Milligan, President and COO, Gilead; Ryan 
Clary, Executive Director, National Viral Hepatitis 
Roundtable; Sam Nussbaum, EVP, Clinical Health Policy 
and Chief Medical Officer, WellPoint; Darius Lakdawalla, 
Quintiles Chair in Pharmaceutical Development and 
Regulatory Innovation, USC Schaeffer Center for Health 
Policy and Economics 
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Appendix B: NIH Funding for Replicon and Sofosbuvir 
Development 
 
1. Development of the replicon by Rice Lab  
2. Commercialization of the replicon by Apath (led by Rice team)  
3. Development of nucleoside science by Schinazi lab  
4. Commercialization of nucleosides by Pharmasset (founded by Schinazi) 
5. Clinical trials for sofosbuvir  
 
 
Major development  Hepatitis C-specific funding  Overall total grants 
Development of the 
replicon by Rice Lab  
$3.40 million  $10.76 million  
(1993-2005)  
Commercialization of the 
replicon by Apath 
$1.81 million  $9.39 million  
(2002-2008)  
Development of nucleoside 
science by Schinazi lab 
$2.72 million $8.84 million  
(1992 – 2011)  
Commercialization of 
nucleosides by Pharmasset 
$1.01 million  $2.46 million 
(1999 – 2004)  
Clinical trials for sofosbuvir  
 
$.244 million (known grant)  
~14.2 million for Phase II trial 
$.244 million (known grant)  
~14.2 million for Phase II trial 
TOTALS  $9.18 million in grants 
 
Adding estimated cost of Phase 
II trial = $23.4 million  
$31.70 million in grants 
 
Adding estimated cost of Phase 
II trial = $45.90 million 
 
 
All the grants are listed below by ‘major development’  
Replicon development grants  
 
     
Project Title 
Contact PI / 
Project Leader Organization Name FY FY Total Cost  
HCV INFECTION SYSTEMS AND ROLE OF 
NEUTRALIZING ANTIBODIES IN HEPATITIS 
C RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2005 $251,675 
ADMINISTRATIVE CORE RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2005 $61,004 
HEPATITIS C: STUDIES OF IMMUNITY AND 
PATHOGENESIS RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2005 $848,905 
HEPATITIS C:  STUDIES OF IMMUNITY AND 
PATHOGENESIS RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2004 $777,103 
HEPATITIS C:  STUDIES OF IMMUNITY AND 
PATHOGENESIS RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2003 $759,817 
HEPATITIS C:  STUDIES OF IMMUNITY AND 
PATHOGENESIS RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2002 $701,031 
HEPATITIS C:  STUDIES OF IMMUNITY AND 
PATHOGENESIS RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2000 $680,907 
CONSTRUCTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
FUNCTIONAL HEPATITIS C VIRUS CDNA 
CLONES RICE, CHARLES M. 
STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY 1999 $236,243 
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CONSTRUCTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
FUNCTIONAL HEPATITIS C VIRUS CDNA 
CLONES RICE, CHARLES M. 
STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY 1998 $236,243 
CONSTRUCTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
FUNCTIONAL HEPATITIS C VIRUS CDNA 
CLONES RICE, CHARLES M. 
STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY 1997 $283,752 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS-DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2005 $396,857 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS-DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2004 $395,975 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS-DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2003 $385,488 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2000 $63,500 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 2000 $262,940 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1999 $314,595 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1998 $303,203 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1997 $323,448 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS --DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINES RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1996 $270,224 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS--DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINE RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1995 $297,719 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS--DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINE RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1994 $278,900 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS--DEVELOPING 
ANTIVIRALS AND VACCINE RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1993 $273,694 
IMMUNOTHERAPY PROTECTION & 
VACCINES FOR HEPATITIS C RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2003 $405,730 
IMMUNOTHERAPY PROTECTION & 
VACCINES FOR HEPATITIS C RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2002 $394,651 
IMMUNOTHERAPY PROTECTION & 
VACCINES FOR HEPATITIS C RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2001 $383,896 
IMMUNOTHERAPY PROTECTION & 
VACCINES FOR HEPATITIS C RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2000 $219,764 
IMMUNOTHERAPY PROTECTION AND 
VACCINES FOR HEPATITIS C RICE, CHARLES M. 
WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 1999 $453,879 
SMALL MOLECULES AS RESEARCH TOOLS 
FOR HCV BIOLOGY RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2004 $252,750 
SMALL MOLECULES AS RESEARCH TOOLS 
FOR HCV BIOLOGY RICE, CHARLES M. 
ROCKEFELLER 
UNIVERSITY 2003 $252,188 
     
   TOTAL $10,766,081 
   REPLICON $3,404,521 
 
Replicon commercialization with APATH: NIH SBIR grants 
 
Project Title 
Contact PI / Project 
Leader 
Organization 
Name FY FY Total Cost  
DEVELOPING SMALL MOLECULE THERAPEUTICS FOR 
WEST NILE VIRUS BEATTIE, JODI  APATH, LLC 2008 $712,161 
DEVELOPING SMALL MOLECULE THERAPEUTICS FOR 
WEST NILE VIRUS BEATTIE, JODI  APATH, LLC 2007 $725,606 
THE IN VITRO HEPATITIS C VIRUS INFECTION SYSTEM 
AS A DRUG DISCOVERY TOOL 
NOUEIRY, AMINE 
OSMAN APATH, LLC 2007 $100,713 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS RNA QUANTITATION USING THE 
3'NTR OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2002 $371,356 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS RNA QUANTITATION USING THE 
3'NTR OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2001 $378,638 
HEPATITIS C VIRUS RNA QUANTITATION USING THE 3' 
NTR OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 1999 $109,410 
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SCREENING FOR ANTI-RSV COMPOUNDS WITH 
INDICATOR CELLS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2004 $359,466 
SCREENING FOR ANTI-RSV COMPOUNDS WITH 
INDICATOR CELLS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2003 $411,213 
CELLS FOR DETECTING NEGATIVE-STRAND RNA 
VIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2000 $99,240 
ANTIVIRAL SCREENING ASSAYS BASED ON HCV 
REPLICONS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2003 $320,675 
ANTIVIRAL SCREENING ASSAYS BASED ON HCV 
REPLICONS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2002 $429,325 
ANTIVIRAL SCREENING ASSAYS BASED ON HCV 
REPLICONS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2001 $99,395 
ANTIVIRAL SCREENING AGAINST MULTIPLE VIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2002 $100,000 
INDICATOR CELLS FOR ANTIVIRAL SCREENING FOR 
FILOVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2005 $368,309 
INDICATOR CELLS FOR ANTIVIRAL SCREENING FOR 
FILOVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2004 $357,582 
INDICATOR CELLS FOR ANTIVIRAL SCREENING FOR 
FILOVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2002 $100,000 
SCREENING FOR ANTIVIRALS AGAINST FLAVIVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2003 $209,250 
SCREENING FOR ANTIVIRALS AGAINST FLAVIVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2002 $187,500 
CONSTRUCTION OF A RESPIRATORY SYNCYTIAL VIRUS 
REPLICON OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2003 $100,000 
MULTIPLEXED GENE ASSAYS BY MICROTITER PLATE 
MICROARRAYS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2003 $111,600 
MOLECULAR TOOLS FOR BUNYAVIRUS ANTIVIRAL 
SCREENING OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2005 $413,699 
MOLECULAR TOOLS FOR BUNYAVIRUS ANTIVIRAL 
SCREENING OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2004 $327,339 
TRANSGENIC INDICATOR CELLS FOR INFLUENZA 
VIRUS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2006 $272,949 
TRANSGENIC INDICATOR CELLS FOR INFLUENZA 
VIRUS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2005 $308,949 
TRANSGENIC INDICATOR CELLS FOR INFLUENZA 
VIRUS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2004 $106,026 
REPLICON-BASED SCREENING FOR INHIBITORS OF 
ALPHAVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2005 $475,049 
REPLICON-BASED SCREENING FOR INHIBITORS OF 
ALPHAVIRUSES OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2004 $483,532 
THERAPEUTICS FOR EBOLA VIRUS OLIVO, PAUL DAVID APATH, LLC 2005 $1,350,000 
     
   TOTAL $9,388,982 
   Replicon $1,809,512 
 
NIH grants for Schinazi-led nucleoside research 
 
 
Project Title Project Leader Organization Name FISCAL YEAR  Total Cost   
CORE--BIOLOGICAL CORE SCHINAZI, RAYMOND  
GEORGIA STATE 
UNIVERSITY 1992  
BORON-CONTAINING 
NUCLEOSIDES FOR NEUTRON 
CAPTURE THERAPY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1992 $133,846  
BORON-CONTAINING 
NUCLEOSIDES FOR NEUTRON 
CAPTURE THERAPY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1993 $135,579  
CORE--BIOLOGICAL CORE SCHINAZI, RAYMOND  
GEORGIA STATE 
UNIVERSITY 1993  
IN VITRO TEST SYSTEMS FOR 
COMBINED CHEMOTHERAPIES SCHINAZI, RAYOND F EMORY UNIVERSITY 1994 $265,601  
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BORON-CONTAINING 
NUCLEOSIDES FOR NEUTRON 
CAPTURE THERAPY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1994 $138,180  
IN VITRO TEST SYSTEMS FOR 
COMBINED CHEMOTHERAPIES SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1994  
IN VITRO TEST SYSTEMS FOR 
COMBINED CHEMOTHERAPIES SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1995  
BORON-CONTAINING 
NUCLEOSIDES FOR NEUTRON 
CAPTURE THERAPY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1995 $146,641  
IN VITRO TEST SYSTEMS FOR 
COMBINED CHEMOTHERAPIES SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1996  
ANIMAL MODELS OF 
HEPATITIS C SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1996 $50,000  
SYNTHESIS & 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI HIV PRODRUGS: 
PHARMACOKINETICS SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1997 $75,504  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTIHIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1997 $154,642  
CORE--VIROLOGY FACILITY SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1998 $153,440  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTIHIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1998 $205,182  
CORE--VIROLOGY FACILITY SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1999 $153,440  
CORE--VIROLOGY FACILITY SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 1999 $153,440  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTIHIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 1999 $164,061  
CORE--VIROLOGY FACILITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2000 $153,440  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2000 $192,000  
DETERM URACIL IN RHESUS 
PLASMA; URINE & 
CEREBROSPINAL FLUID SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 2000 $39,712  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2001 $192,000  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2002 $194,177  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2002 $24,884  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2003 $195,507  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS SCHINAZI, RAYMOND F. EMORY UNIVERSITY 2003 $85,297  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2004 $93,006  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2004 $192,000  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2004 $72,723  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2005 $94,301  
HIV DART:FRONTIERS IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ARV 
THERAPIES 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX 
INFORMED HORIZONS, 
LLC 2005 $16,500  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2005 $225,925  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2006 $107,378  
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NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2006 $220,615  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2007 $214,217  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2007 $78,544  
HIV DART:FRONTIERS IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ARV 
THERAPIES 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX 
INFORMED HORIZONS, 
LLC 2007 $16,500  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2008 $42,758  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2008 $210,146  
VIROLOGY AND DRUG 
DISCOVERY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2008 $291,198  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2009 $68,028  
HIV DART:FRONTIERS IN DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ARV 
THERAPIES 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX 
INFORMED HORIZONS, 
LLC 2009 $14,850  
VIROLOGY AND DRUG 
DISCOVERY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2009 $336,022  
NUCLEOSIDES WITH DUAL 
ANTI-HIV AND HBV ACTIVITY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2009 $210,146  
PRIMATE MODEL TOWARDS 
HIV ERADICATION STRATEGIES NORTH, THOMAS W* 
UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS 2009 $747,943  
SYNTHESIS AND 
BIOTRANSFORMATION OF 
ANTI-VIRAL PRODRUGS 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2010 $65,793  
PRIMATE MODEL TOWARDS 
HIV ERADICATION STRATEGIES NORTH, THOMAS W* 
UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS 2010 $713,009  
VIROLOGY AND DRUG 
DISCOVERY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2010 $325,502  
PRIMATE MODEL TOWARDS 
HIV ERADICATION STRATEGIES NORTH, THOMAS W* EMORY UNIVERSITY 2011 $705,879  
HIV DART: FRONTIERS IN 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT FOR 
ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPIES 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX 
INFORMED HORIZONS, 
LLC 2011 $20,000  
VIROLOGY AND DRUG 
DISCOVERY 
SCHINAZI, RAYMOND 
FELIX EMORY UNIVERSITY 2011 $295,726  
* Schinazi was co-project leader 
on these grants.    TOTALS  $8,385,282  
   
Viral 
hepatitis  $2,718,225  
 
 
 
Pharmasset grants from NIH (including SBIR)  
 
PROJECT TITLE PROJECT LEADER ORGANIZATION NAME YEAR  TOTAL  
RACIVIR FOR TREATMENT 
OF HEPATITIS B AND HIV 
INFECTIONS OTTO, MICHAEL J PHARMASSET, INC. 2000 $142,000  
NOVEL COFACTOR 
ANALOGUES AS 
IMMUNOSUPPRESSANTS 
PANKIEWICZ, 
KRZYSZTOF W PHARMASSET, INC. 2000 $100,001  
NOVEL DIFFERENTIATION 
AGENTS AGAINST HUMAN 
LEUKEMIAS 
PANKIEWICZ, 
KRZYSZTOF W PHARMASSET, INC. 2000 $100,010  
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L-NUCLEOSIDES AS ANTI-
HBV AGENTS 
WATANABE, 
KYOICHI A PHARMASSET, INC. 2000 $100,000  
DESIGN OF EBVTK 
SUBSTRATES TO ERADICATE 
EBV+ TUMORS 
FINGEROTH, JOYCE 
DIANE PHARMASSET, INC. 2001 $100,000  
ANTIVIRALS AGAINST HBV OTTO, MICHAEL J PHARMASSET, INC. 2001 $147,584  
NOVEL BENZAMIDE 
RIBOSIDE ANALOGUES AS 
ANTICANCER AGENTS 
PANKIEWICZ, 
KRZYSZTOF W PHARMASSET, INC. 2001 $249,998  
AZIDE TECHNOLOGY FOR 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
WATANABE, 
KYOICHI A PHARMASSET, INC. 2001 $132,879  
MODIFIED NUCLEOSIDES 
FOR HEPATITIS C VIRUS STUYVER, LIEVEN J PHARMASSET, INC. 2002 $162,200  
ANTI-POXVIRUS 
NUCLEOSIDES:SYNTHESIS 
AND EVALUATION 
WATANABE, 
KYOICHI A PHARMASSET, INC. 2002 $214,155  
ENHANCEMENT OF 5-
FLUOROURACIL 
CHEMOTHERAPEUTIC 
EFFICACY 
EL KOUNI, 
MAHMOUD H PHARMASSET, INC. 2002 $176,852  
DIOXOLANE NUCLEOSIDES 
AS ANTIVIRAL AGENTS DU, JINFA  PHARMASSET, INC. 2003 $175,260  
NOVEL CLASS OF 
COMPOUNDS FOR 
TREATMENT OF HCV 
INFECTIONS 
PANKIEWICZ, 
KRZYSZTOF W PHARMASSET, INC. 2003 $175,000  
NOVEL AGENTS AGAINST 
WEST NILE VIRUS 
INFECTIONS 
PANKIEWICZ, 
KRZYSZTOF W PHARMASSET, INC. 2003 $100,000  
2'-AND/OR 4'-C-MODIFIED 
NUCLEOSIDES AS ANTI-HCV 
AGENTS DU, JINFA  PHARMASSET, INC. 2004 $189,277  
2'-AND/OR 4'-C-MODIFIED 
NUCLEOSIDES AS ANTI-HCV 
AGENTS DU, JINFA  PHARMASSET, INC. 2005 $194,954  
     
   TOTAL 
$2,460,17
0  
   
Hepatitis 
related $1,011,015  
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Appendix C: Organization-level Finances of Pharmasset and 
Gilead Sciences  
This appendix covers the financial metrics of Pharmasset and Gilead Sciences. For Pharmasset, I 
cover the major sources of financing, since it was a start-up biotechnology with no approved 
products or sources of sales revenue. For Gilead Sciences, I provide its main financial metrics in 
the five years (2007-2011) before its acquisition of Pharmasset at the end of 2011 as well as the five 
years after its acquisition of Pharxmasset (2012-2016) which includes the launch of its hepatitis C 
medicines.  
 
Pharmasset  
Financing sources (all figures in millions)  
Period Financing source Amount 
2000-2005 SBIR $2.46 
1999-2004 Venture Capital $53.81 
2004-2010 Roche partnership $44.50 
2007 Initial public offering $45.00 
2008-2011 Follow-on equity financing $345.87 
   
 TOTAL FINANCING, 2011-
2011 
$491.66 
 TOTAL OPERATING LOSS, 
2001-2011 
-$313.9 
Sources: Pharmasset SEC filings, S&P Capital database 
Revenues, R&D Costs, Total Expenses, and Operating Loss: 2001-2011 (all figures in 
thousands)  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Revenues $3,683 $3,692 $1,047 $2,753 $3,719 $5,425 $22,010 
        
R&D  $4,264 $5,751 $4,809 $5,317 $10,468 $10,498 $20,319 
Total 
Expenses  
$5,470 $7,072 $6,570 $8,215 $18,564 $18,410 $29,530 
        
Operating 
Loss 
-$1,787 -$3,380 -$5,523 -$5,462 -$14,845 -$12,985 -$7,520 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011* TOTALS  
Revenues $1,857 $13,293 $1,020 $897 $59,396 
       
R&D  $42,996 $52,552 $48,261 $75,850 $281,085 
Total Expenses  $56,285 $65,917 $64,719 $92,501 $373,253 
       
Operating Loss -$54,428 -$52,624 -$63,699 -$91,604 -$313,857 
*Pharmasset acquired by Gilead Sciences, November 2011  
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Gilead Sciences (all figures in millions)  
 
2007 -2011 (before sofosbuvir)  
     
Pharmasset 
acquisition 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Revenue $4,230 $5,336 $7,011 $7,949 $8,385 
      
Research and 
development 
$591 $722 $914 $1,073 $1,229 
Taxes  $635 $702 $876 $1,024 $862 
Buybacks and dividends $487 $1,970 $998 $4,002 $2,380 
      
Cash and cash 
equivalents   $2,722 
$3,239 $3,905 $5,318 $9,900 
 
2012-2016 (accounting for sofosbuvir launch)  
  
sofosbuvir 
launch in 
December 
2013    
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Revenue $9,702 $11,202 $24,890 $32,151 $29,953 
      
Research and 
development 
$1,652 $2,120 $2,854 $3,014 
$5,098 
Taxes  $1,038 $1,151 $2,797 $3,553 $3,609 
Buybacks and dividends $313 $6,010 $5,349 $11,876 $13,456 
      
Cash and cash 
equivalents 
$2,582 $2,571 $11,726 
       $26,208 $32,280 
 
Sources: Gilead 2016, 2012, 2009 SEC filings.  
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Appendix D: Health economics analyzes of sofosbuvir’s value  
Health economic studies analyzed the value of sofosbuvir-based medicines from two perspectives: 
(1) ‘cost-effectiveness’ value, in which the costs and benefits of new sofosbuvir-based medicines 
are compared versus the existing standard of care, as well as (2) ‘public health prevention value’, 
in which the averted costs of downstream medical care are calculated. In this appendix, I provide 
a technical summary of the methodologies used in these health economics studies of ‘value’ (D1 – 
D3), and list the main studies in D4. Each of these studies affirmed that sofosbuvir-based 
medicines were priced on a ‘value’ basis within the conventions of health economics modeling.  
 
D1. ‘Cost-effectiveness value’ (See Clement (2009) and Groose (2014) for more.)  
Cost-effectiveness is central to the health technology assessment (HTA) process undertaken by 
most European governments, and is increasingly being assessed by different public and private 
payers in the US.  
1) Two different courses of action are defined for comparison: one of which may be called 
reference R (for example, a prior standard of care such as interferon, as was the case in 
hepatitis C) and the other proposed as alternative A (ex. sofosbuvir-based regimens). 
2) The next step is quantitatively identifying and measuring the costs and benefits of each of the 
two courses of actions. The costs are monetized (based on the price of the therapy) whereas 
the benefits are measured using quality adjusted life years (QALYs) that collapse multi-
dimensional health outcome changes into a single metric of health. See D3 below for a brief 
explainer on the QALY.   
3) A cost-effectiveness ratio is calculated, by taking the differences in the costs (numerator) over 
the differences in the benefits (denominator). This calculation leads to a ‘cost per QALY’ ratio, 
indicating the amount of money required to realize an additional quality adjusted life year.  
4) In the case of evaluating new medicines, this ratio is then compared against a “value 
threshold”, or the amount of money that a given health system is willing to pay in exchange for 
a QALY gain. This value threshold is variable from health system to health system: in the NHS, 
this figure is between 30-40K USD per QALY gain, whereas US health economists use a figure 
of $100,000-$150,000 USD per QALY gain. If the cost-effectiveness ratio of a new drug falls 
under the value threshold, the price is deemed to be a ‘value-based price’. The use and 
acceptance of these thresholds enables investors to anticipate that health systems will pay 
higher prices in the future for an improvement in health outcomes.  
 
D2. ‘Public health prevention value’ (See Van Nuys (2015) and Castenada (2017) for more.) 
A second valuation strategy is to calculate the total value gained from early treatment in terms of 
savings from averted medical expenses (and in some studies, value of additional QALYs accrued 
to society). This is done in several steps:  
1) Define the R reference (standard of care) and A (alternative new potential standard of care).  
2) Build a model of a population under the two scenarios.  
3) Model the population’s health status (morbidity and mortality) across a given time frame (ex. 
10 years, 30 years, 50 years) under treatments R and A.  
4) Calculate all medical costs for this sample population (could be all of the US, for example) 
under B and A.  
5) Calculate the difference in medical costs under treatments B and A to see if and how much 
treatment A yields averted medical costs, thereby saving money for the health system.  
6) In some studies: aggregate the total QALYs gained in a population in a given time frame based 
on using treatment A versus treatment R, and impute a value for these QALY gains based on 
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the economic value a health system attributes to each additional quality adjusted life year 
(similar to the value threshold described in section D1 earlier).  
 
D3.  A short QALY explainer 
1. The quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is used most frequently with health technology 
assessment for medications. Under the QALY approach, life years lived in less than perfect 
health are converted into what the representative individual would consider the equivalent 
number of years in perfect health.  
2. The noted health economist Uwe Reinhart explains how it works: “For example, if a person 
said he or she would be indifferent between living 20 more years in a particular lower health 
status described to him or her and only 16 more years in perfect health, then each of the 20 
years in less than perfect health would be considered by that person the equivalent of 16/20 = 
4/5 = .8 of a health year, or .8 QALYs.”  
3. These assessments are gathered via a number of games and interviews performed with 
patients, such as visual analogue scales, standard gamble, and time trade-off adjustors. For 
more on these methods, please refer to Reinhart 1998.  
See Weinstein (2009) for more.   
 
D4. Listing of health economics studies analyzing value of sofosbuvir-based medicines 
1. Chhatwal J, Kanwal F, Roberts MS, Dunn MA. Cost-Effectiveness and Budget Impact of 
Hepatitis C Virus Treatment With Sofosbuvir and Ledipasvir in the United States. Annals 
of Internal Medicine. 2015 Mar 17;162(6):397.  
2. Tice JA, Chahal HS, Ollendorf DA. Comparative Clinical Effectiveness and Value of Novel 
Interferon-Free Combination Therapy for Hepatitis C Genotype 1. JAMA Intern Med. 
2015;175(9):1559 
3. Najafzadeh, M., Andersson, K., Shrank, W. H., Krumme, A. A., Matlin, O. S., Brennan, T., 
et al. (2015). Cost-Effectiveness of Novel Regimens for the Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus. 
Annals of Internal Medicine, 162(6), 407. http://doi.org/10.7326/M14-1152 
4. Rein DB, Wittenborn JS, Smith BD, Liffmann DK, Ward JW. The Cost-effectiveness, 
Health Benefits, and Financial Costs of New Antiviral Treatments for Hepatitis C Virus. 
Clin Infect Dis. 2015 Jun 25;61(2):157–68. 
5. Leidner AJ, Chesson HW, Xu F, Ward JW, Spradling PR, Holmberg SD. Cost-effectiveness 
of hepatitis C treatment for patients in early stages of liver disease. Hepatology. 2015 
Jun;61(6):1860–9.  
6. Van Nuys, K., Brookmeyer, R., Chou, J. W., Dreyfus, D., Dieterich, D., & Goldman, D. P. 
(2015). Broad Hepatitis C Treatment Scenarios Return Substantial Health Gains, But 
Capacity Is A Concern. Health Affairs, 34(10), 1666–1674. 
http://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.1193 Gilead’s executive vice president, Gregg Alton, serves 
on the board of the institute that led this study.  
7. Chahal HS, Marseille EA, Tice JA, Pearson SD, Ollendorf DA, Fox RK, et al. Cost-
effectiveness of Early Treatment of Hepatitis C Virus Genotype 1 by Stage of Liver Fibrosis 
in a US Treatment-Naive Population. JAMA Intern Med. American Medical Association; 
2016 Jan;176(1):65–73.    
8. Younossi, Z. M., Park, H., Dieterich, D., Saab, S., Ahmed, A., & Gordon, S. C. (2016). The 
value of cure associated with treating treatment-naïve chronic hepatitis C genotype 1: Are 
the new all-oral regimens good value to society? Liver International. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/liv.13298 
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Appendix E: Key Diagrams Depicting Innovation Process  
 
Pricing escalator (from chapter 4, section 4.1)  
 
Gilead’s capital allocation strategy (from chapter 5, section 5.3)  
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